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Abstract 
Chia-Hsun Chang 
Container Shipping Risk Management: A Case Study of Taiwan Container 
Shipping Industry 
Whilst container shipping has become increasingly important over the past few 
decades due to its obvious advantages, container shipping companies have 
faced various risks from different sources in their operations. Systematic 
academic studies on this topic are few; and in light of this, this study aims to 
systematically explore and analyse the risks in container shipping operations 
and to examine the applicable risk mitigation strategies in a logistics perspective, 
including information flow, physical flow, and payment flow.  
This thesis uses Taiwan container shipping industry as a case study, and 
borrows four steps of risk management as the main method, which includes risk 
identification, risk analysis, risk mitigation strategies identification, and strategies 
evaluation. In order to ensure the analysis is inclusive and systematic, risk 
factors and risk mitigation strategies are identified through a related literature 
review and are validated through a set of interviews. Risk analysis is conducted 
through using questionnaires, and then through risk ranking, risk matrix, risk 
mapping, and P-I graph. Risk mitigation strategies are evaluated through classic 
AHP and fuzzy AHP analysis. 
A number of significant findings have been obtained. Firstly, 35 risk factors are 
identified and classified into three categories: risks associated with information 
flow, risks associated with physical flow, and risks associated with payment 
flow. After collecting and analysing the risk-factor survey, the results indicate 
that the risk associated with physical flow has the more significant impact on 
shipping companies’ operation. However, one risk factor associated with 
information flow, “shippers hiding cargo information”, has the most significant 
impact among the 35 risk factors. Secondly, 20 risk mitigation strategies are 
identified and classified into three categories: intra-organisational strategies, 
intra-channel strategies, and inter-channel strategies. After collecting the AHP 
survey and analysing through classic AHP and fuzzy AHP, the result indicates 
that “slot exchange, slot charter, joint fleet, ship charter with other container 
shipping companies” is the most important strategy. 
The main contributions of this thesis include: (1) based on the literature review, 
there have been no research on risk management in the context of container 
shipping operation from a broad logistics perspective, and this thesis is the first 
attempt to fill this research gap; (2) this thesis uses Taiwan shipping industry as 
a case study to apply the framework, which generates useful managerial 
insights; (3) the conceptual model of risk management developed in this thesis 
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can be applied to container shipping operations in other countries and regions; 
(4) compared with several studies using secondary data, this thesis uses 
empirical data to conduct the risk analysis, and make the results more close to 
the reality situation in container shipping; (5) in terms of risk analysis, this thesis 
ranks the total 35 risk factors rather than only identify the most important one, 
this can be used to be generalised to the whole container shipping companies 
in Taiwan, or even to the whole world; (6) in terms of risk management, the 
previous studies usually analyse only the importance of strategies. However, 
this thesis analyses the results of AHP from three different angles: reducing 
financial loss, reducing reputation loss, and reducing safety and security 
incident related loss. This can provide different angles for the managers who 
are considering different aspects. 
 
  
v 
 
List of Contents 
Copyright Statement ............................................................................................................... i 
Abstract…. ............................................................................................................................ iii 
List of Contents ...................................................................................................................... v 
List of Tables ........................................................................................................................ ix 
List of Figures ...................................................................................................................... xii 
Acknowledgements ............................................................................................................. xiii 
Author’s Declaration ........................................................................................................... xiv 
List of Abbreviations .......................................................................................................... xvii 
Chapter 1 Introduction .......................................................................................................... 1 
1.1 Background ............................................................................................................. 1 
1.2 Research aims and objectives ................................................................................. 8 
1.3 Research methods ................................................................................................... 9 
1.4 Structure of the thesis ............................................................................................ 11 
Chapter 2 Risks in container shipping operations ............................................................... 15 
2.1 Operational risks in container shipping .................................................................. 15 
2.1.1 What is risk? ................................................................................................ 15 
2.1.2 Operational risks in container shipping ........................................................ 18 
2.2 Risk mitigation strategies in container shipping ...................................................... 22 
2.2.1 Risk management ........................................................................................ 22 
2.2.2 Risk mitigation strategies in container shipping ............................................ 24 
2.3 Research Gaps ...................................................................................................... 31 
Chapter 3 Conceptual model .............................................................................................. 33 
3. 1 The three flows in container shipping logistics operations ..................................... 33 
3.1.1 Information flow ........................................................................................... 34 
3.1.2 Physical flow ................................................................................................ 38 
3.1.3 Payment flow ............................................................................................... 40 
vi 
 
3.2 Development of risk management model in the context of container shipping 
operations .................................................................................................................... 42 
3.3 Risk management steps ........................................................................................ 49 
3.3.1 Risk identification ......................................................................................... 51 
3.3.2 Risk measurement and analysis .................................................................. 52 
3.3.3 Development and evaluation of risk mitigation strategies ............................. 55 
3.4. Chapter summary ................................................................................................. 55 
Chapter 4 Research methodology ...................................................................................... 57 
4.1 Case study: Taiwan’s container shipping industry .................................................. 57 
4.2 Data collection methods ......................................................................................... 60 
4.2.1 Data collection methods in risk identification, validation and 
measurement........................................................................................................ 61 
4.2.2 Data collection methods in risk mitigation strategies identification and 
analysis ................................................................................................................ 67 
4.3 Data analysis methods ........................................................................................... 73 
4.3.1 Risk analysis method ................................................................................... 73 
4.3.2 Risk mitigation strategies evaluation methods ............................................. 85 
4.4 Chapter summary ................................................................................................ 110 
Chapter 5 Identification of risks in container shipping operations ...................................... 113 
5.1 Risk identification through review of the relevant literature ................................... 113 
5.1.1Risks associated with information flow ........................................................ 113 
5.1.2 Risks associated with physical flow ............................................................ 117 
5.1.3 Risks associated with payment flow ........................................................... 121 
5.2 Validation and further exploration of risk factors though Interviews ...................... 122 
5.2.1 Results from face-to-face interview ............................................................ 123 
4.2.2 Result from email interview ........................................................................ 128 
5.3 Chapter summary ................................................................................................ 133 
Chapter 6 Measurement and analysis of risks in container shipping operations ................ 135 
6.1 Respondents' profile in the risk-factor survey ....................................................... 135 
6.2 Validity and reliability test for risk-factor survey .................................................... 138 
vii 
 
6.3 Risk measurement ............................................................................................... 141 
6.3.1 Results in relation to risk likelihood ............................................................ 141 
6.3.2 Results in relation to financial loss consequence ....................................... 146 
6.3.3 Results in relation to reputation loss consequence .................................... 151 
6.3.4 Results in relation to safety and security incident related loss 
consequence ...................................................................................................... 155 
6.4 Risk analysis ........................................................................................................ 160 
6.4.1 Risk scale .................................................................................................. 160 
6.4.2 Risk matrix ................................................................................................. 166 
6.4.3 Risk map .................................................................................................... 169 
6.4.4 P-I graph (Risk map with risk responses) ................................................... 174 
6.5 Chapter summary ................................................................................................ 180 
Chapter 7 Identification and evaluation of risk mitigation strategies .................................. 184 
7.1 Identification of risk mitigation strategies from existing literature .......................... 184 
7.1.1 Intra-organisational strategies .................................................................... 185 
7.1.2 Intra-channel strategies ............................................................................. 187 
7.1.3 Inter-channel strategies ............................................................................. 190 
7.2 Validation and further exploration of risk mitigation strategies through interviews
 .................................................................................................................................. 193 
7.2.1 Result from face-to-face interviews ............................................................ 193 
7.2.2 Result from email interviews ...................................................................... 198 
7.3 Evaluation of risk mitigation strategies ................................................................. 199 
7.3.1 Validity and reliability test for mitigation-strategies survey .......................... 199 
7.3.2 Ranking of risk mitigation strategies ........................................................... 200 
7.3.3 Classic AHP analysis ................................................................................. 204 
7.3.4 Fuzzy AHP analysis ................................................................................... 209 
7.4 Chapter summary ................................................................................................ 219 
Chapter 8 Discussion ........................................................................................................ 224 
8.1 Findings from risk analysis ................................................................................... 224 
viii 
 
8.1.1 Risk identification and validation ................................................................ 224 
8.1.2 Risk analysis .............................................................................................. 227 
8.2 Findings from risk mitigation strategy evaluation .................................................. 232 
8.2.1 Risk mitigation strategies identification and validation ................................ 232 
8.2.2 Risk mitigation strategies ranking .............................................................. 233 
8.2.3 Risk mitigation strategies evaluation .......................................................... 235 
8.3 Generalisation of the research methods............................................................... 237 
Chapter 9 Summary and Conclusion ................................................................................ 241 
9.1 Summary of research background ....................................................................... 241 
9.2 Summary of literature review ............................................................................... 242 
9.3 Summary of research methodology ..................................................................... 244 
9.4 Summaries of main findings ................................................................................. 245 
9.6 Research limitation .............................................................................................. 251 
9.7 Further research .................................................................................................. 252 
Appendix 1 Face-to-Face Interview Questions .................................................................. 254 
Appendix 2 Face-to-Face Interview Transcriptions ........................................................... 259 
Appendix 3 Email Interview Questions .............................................................................. 275 
Appendix 4 Risk Factor and Mitigation Strategy Questionnaire Survey ............................. 280 
Appendix 5 AHP Questionnaire Survey ............................................................................ 284 
Appendix 6 Fuzzy AHP results .......................................................................................... 289 
Reference ......................................................................................................................... 337 
 
 
ix 
 
List of Tables 
Table 2.1 The selected definitions of risk ............................................................................ 16 
Table 2.2 The risk factors in container shipping operations ................................................. 22 
Table 2.3 The selected definitions of risk management ...................................................... 23 
Table 2.4 The risk mitigation strategies in container shipping operations ............................ 31 
Table 4.1 Selected container shipping agents ..................................................................... 60 
Table 4.2 Definition of risk likelihood ................................................................................... 66 
Table 4.3 Definition of risk consequence ............................................................................ 67 
Table 4.4 Definition of the effectiveness category of risk mitigation strategies .................... 69 
Table 4.5 Risk matrix .......................................................................................................... 79 
Table 4.6 Nine-point pairwise comparison scale (Saaty, 1988) ........................................... 93 
Table 4.7 Example of AHP questionnaire survey ................................................................ 94 
Table 4.8 Random index table ............................................................................................ 97 
Table 4.9 TFN of Fuzzy AHP ............................................................................................ 106 
Table 4.10 Summaries of the research methods ............................................................... 112 
Table 5.1 The risk elements and factors associated with information flow ........................ 117 
Table 5.2 The risk elements and factors associated with physical flow ............................. 120 
Table 5.3 The risk element and factors associated with payment flow .............................. 122 
Table 5.4 Risks within container shipping operations (refined after face-to-face interview)
 ......................................................................................................................... 127 
Table 5.5 Respondent’s profile in the email interviews ...................................................... 129 
Table 5.6 Summary of data on resources acquired ........................................................... 131 
Table 5.7 Classification of risks within container shipping operations ................................ 132 
Table 6.1 Questionnaires reply detail ................................................................................ 136 
Table 6.2 respondents’ profile ........................................................................................... 137 
Table 6.3 Reliability test for the whole survey ................................................................... 139 
Table 6.4 Reliability test for risk likelihood ........................................................................ 139 
Table 6.5 Reliability test for risk consequence on financial loss ........................................ 140 
x 
 
Table 6.6 Reliability test for risk consequence on reputation loss ..................................... 140 
Table 6.7 Reliability test for risk consequence on safety and security incident related 
loss ................................................................................................................... 141 
Table 6.8 Risk likelihood ................................................................................................... 145 
Table 6.9 Risk consequence - financial loss ..................................................................... 150 
Table 6.10 Risk consequence - reputation loss ................................................................. 154 
Table 6.11 Risk consequence - safety and security incident related loss .......................... 159 
Table 6.12 Risk scale ....................................................................................................... 165 
Table 6.13 Financial loss risk matrix ................................................................................. 167 
Table 6.14 Reputation loss risk matrix .............................................................................. 168 
Table 6.15 Safety and security incident related loss risk matrix ........................................ 169 
Table 7.1 Risk mitigation strategies based on literature review ......................................... 192 
Table 7.2 Risk mitigation strategies based on literature review and face-to-face 
interviews .......................................................................................................... 197 
Table 7.3 Reliability test for risk mitigation strategies ........................................................ 200 
Table 7.4 Risk mitigation strategies .................................................................................. 203 
Table 7.5 The reply rate of AHP survey ............................................................................ 205 
Table 7.6 The standardised weights, the global weights, and the rank .............................. 206 
Table 7.7 The fuzzy positive reciprocal matrix of three criteria .......................................... 210 
Table 7.8 The fuzzy positive reciprocal matrix of seven strategies under reduce financial 
loss ................................................................................................................... 211 
Table 7.9 The fuzzy positive reciprocal matrix of seven strategies under reduce 
reputation loss .................................................................................................. 211 
Table 7.10 The fuzzy positive reciprocal matrix of seven alternatives under reduce 
safety and security incident related loss ............................................................ 212 
Table 7.11 The geometric mean of TFN and the fuzzy weights of three criteria ................ 213 
Table 7.12 The geometric mean of TFN and the fuzzy weights of seven strategies under 
reduce financial loss ......................................................................................... 213 
Table 7.13 The geometric mean of TFN and the fuzzy weights of seven strategies under 
reduce reputation loss ....................................................................................... 213 
Table 7.14 The geometric mean of TFN and the fuzzy weights of seven strategies under 
reduce safety and security incident related loss ................................................ 213 
xi 
 
Table 7.15 The defuzzified and standardized weights of three criteria .............................. 214 
Table 7.16 The defuzzified and standardized weights of seven strategies under reduce 
financial loss ..................................................................................................... 214 
Table 7.17 The defuzzified and standardized weights of seven strategies under reduce 
reputation loss .................................................................................................. 214 
Table 7.18 The defuzzified and standardized weights of seven strategies under reduce 
safety and security incident related loss ............................................................ 215 
Table 7.19 The standardised weights, the global weights, and the rank ............................ 217 
Table 7.20 The comparison of classic AHP and three different fuzzy AHP ....................... 219 
  
xii 
 
List of Figures 
Figure 3.1 Flow of goods and information: the traditional structure ..................................... 36 
Figure 3.2 Physical flow and information flow in the air cargo supply chain......................... 36 
Figure 3.3 Information flows in container shipping services ................................................ 38 
Figure 3.4 Physical flows in container shipping services ..................................................... 40 
Figure 3.5 Payment flows in container shipping services .................................................... 42 
Figure 3.6 Uncertainty model in the product delivery process ............................................. 43 
Figure 3.7 Uncertainty logistics triad model......................................................................... 44 
Figure 3.8 Sources of risk in the supply chain ..................................................................... 45 
Figure 3.9 Supply chain risk management model................................................................ 46 
Figure 3.10 A model for managing supply chain network risk.............................................. 47 
Figure 3.11 Conceptual model ............................................................................................ 48 
Figure 3.12 The three flows in container shipping operations in the conceptual model ....... 49 
Figure 3.13 Supply risk assessment processes .................................................................. 50 
Figure 4.1 Hierarchical Model 1 of mitigation strategies ...................................................... 71 
Figure 4.2 Hierarchical Model 2 of mitigation strategies ...................................................... 72 
Figure 4.3 An illustrative risk map with multiple risk factors ................................................. 82 
Figure 4.4 P-I graph ............................................................................................................ 85 
Figure 4.5 An illustrative example of AHP hierarchy ........................................................... 92 
Figure 4.6 The fuzzy controller .......................................................................................... 102 
Figure 4.7 Membership function of TFN ............................................................................ 103 
Figure 4.8 Membership function of TFN used in Fuzzy AHP ............................................. 106 
Figure 6.1 Financial loss risk map ..................................................................................... 171 
Figure 6.2 Reputation loss risk map .................................................................................. 172 
Figure 6.3 Safety and security incident related loss risk map ............................................ 174 
Figure 6.4 Financial loss risk map with four responses ..................................................... 176 
Figure 6.5 Reputation loss risk map with four responses .................................................. 178 
Figure 6.6 Safety and security incident related loss risk map with four responses ............ 180 
xiii 
 
Acknowledgements 
First and foremost I would like to thank Prof Dong-Ping Song and Prof Jingjing 
Xu. Thank you both for giving me guidance, continuous feedback and other 
technical suggestions with your consistent and patient supervision. I could not 
have done this without you and your extraordinary insights. It is my pleasure to 
be the student under your supervision for four years.  
Secondly, special thanks to the seven managers for face-to-face interview, six 
managers for email interview, and a number of questionnaire respondents for 
their time, helpful experience and understandings in my research. 
Thirdly, I would like to thank my friends who I met in Plymouth, such as Venkat 
B., Catalina Duarte Zajacova, Anas Sattar, Jose M.M. Gomez, Fu-Yun Ho, I-Ting 
Tsai, Yu-Shuo Kuo, Shu Huang, Young-Joon Seo, etc. You enriched my life in 
Plymouth and my PhD studying life. Also, I would like to thank the friends in 
Taiwan for supporting me, such as Tsu-Jui Cheng, Ying-Hsiang Huang, 
Chia-Hung Weng, Da-Wei Shen, Li-Jen Chiang, Ya-Cheng Chen, Chi-Chang Lin, 
Chiu-Ju Tu, Chia-Hsin Cheng, etc. I can keep connecting with Taiwan through 
chatting with you guys. 
Most importantly, I would like to thank my parents who offer me the funding to 
study the PhD in Plymouth University. With your encouragement, I could 
overcome the depression and carry on focusing on my research. This piece of 
research is a return of their love and faith on me. 
 
 
 
Chia-Hsun  
Plymouth, March 2013 
xiv 
 
Author’s Declaration 
At no time during the registration for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy has the 
author been registered for any other University award without prior agreement of 
the Graduate Committee. 
Papers have been published and presented by the author including: 
Publications- Journal papers 
1. Chia-Hsun Chang, Jingjing Xu, Dong-Ping Song, “Risks Analysis in 
Container Shipping – logistics perspective”, International Journal of Logistics 
Management (Accept subject to minor revision) 
2. Chia-Hsun Chang, Dong-Ping Song, and Jingjing Xu, “Evaluating risk 
mitigation strategies in container shipping supply chain”, Transport Reviews 
(under review). 
3. Chia-Hsun Chang, Jingjing Xu, and Dong-Ping Song, “An analysis of safety 
and security risks in container shipping supply chain: a case study in Taiwan”, 
Safety Science (under review). 
Publications- Conference papers 
1. Chia-Hsun Chang, Jingjing Xu, and Dong-Ping Song, “Impact of different 
factors on risk perceptions of employees in container shipping companies”, to 
be submitted at IAME 2013. 
2. Chia-Hsun Chang, Dong-Ping Song, and Jingjing Xu (2012), “Payment risk 
within container shipping supply chain”, Postgraduate Research Symposium, 
May 2012, University of Plymouth. 
xv 
 
3. Chia-Hsun Chang, Dong-Ping Song, and Jingjing Xu (2012), “Evaluating risk 
mitigation strategies in container shipping supply chain”, IAME 2012, Taipei, 
Taiwan. 
4. Chia-Hsun Chang, Jingjing Xu, and Dong-Ping Song, “An analysis of safety 
and security risks in container shipping supply chain: a case study in Taiwan”, 
was accepted but not presented at IAME 2012. 
5. Chia-Hsun Chang, Dong-Ping Song, and Jingjing Xu (2011), “Information 
and physical risk management in container shipping supply chain”, 2011 LRN 
Conference, Southampton. 
6. Chia-Hsun Chang, Jingjing Xu, and Dong-Ping Song (2011), “Information risk 
management in container shipping supply chain”, the First International 
Conference on Marine and Maritime Affairs, Plymouth.  
7. Jingjing Xu, John Dinwoodie, and Chia-Hsun Chang, (2011), “Seeing is 
believing: developing research and enterprise skills in international maritime 
students”, the First International Conference on Marine and Maritime Affairs, 
Plymouth. 
8. Chia-Hsun Chang, Dong-Ping Song, and Jingjing Xu (2010), “Supply chain 
risk management and organisational performance in container shipping”, 
Postgraduate Research Symposium, May 2010, University of Plymouth. 
 
Presentations and Conferences Attended: 
1. Postgraduate Research Symposium 2010, Plymouth, England 
2. 4th Maritime Risk Management 2010. Hilton Metropole, London, England. 
xvi 
 
3. First International Conference on Marine and Maritime Affairs 2011, 
Plymouth, England 
4. 2011 LRN Conference, Southampton, England 
5. Postgraduate Research Symposium 2012, Plymouth, England 
6. IAME 2012, Taipei, Taiwan. 
 
Word count of main body of thesis: 61,540 
 
 
Signed:  
Date: 23 July 2013 
  
xvii 
 
List of Abbreviations 
AHP - Analytic Hierarchy Process 
ARS - Average Risk Scale 
BAF - Bunker Adjustment Factor 
B/L - Bill of Lading 
CAF - Currency Adjustment Factor 
C.I. - Consistency Index 
CIF - Cost, Insurance and Freight 
CIO - Chief Information Officer 
CKYH - COSCO, "K" LINE, Yang Ming, HANJIN 
COA - Centre of Area 
COG - Centre of Gravity 
C.R. - Consistency Ratio 
CSCL - China Shipping Container Lines 
CSI - Container Security Initiative 
CY - Container Yard 
DEA - Data Envelopment Analysis 
DG - Dangerous Goods 
D/O - Delivery Order 
EDI - Electronic Data Interchange 
EXW - EX-works 
FMEA - Failure Mode and Effect Analysis 
FOB - Free On Board 
FTA - Fault Tree Analysis 
HAZOP - Hazard Operability 
ICT - Information Communication Technology 
xviii 
 
IMDG code - the International Maritime Dangerous Goods code 
IMO - International Maritime Organisation 
INCOTERMS - International Commercial terms 
InfoD - Information Delay 
InfoI - Information Inaccuracy 
InfoIT - IT Problem 
InterCS - inter-channel strategy 
IntraCS - intra-channel strategies 
IOS - intra-organisational strategies 
ISM Code - The International Safety Management Code 
ISMS - information security management system 
ISPS Code - The International Ship and Port Facility Security Code 
ISO27001 - International Organization for Standardization27001 
IT - Information Technology 
L/C - Letter of Credit 
MSC - Mediterranean Shipping Company S.A 
NASA - The National Aeronautics and Space Administration 
NII - Non-Intrusive Inspection 
NPSA - National Patient Safety Agency 
OOCL - Orient Overseas Container Line 
PayCE - Currency Exchange 
PayNP - Non-Payment 
PayPD - Payment Delay 
P-I graph - Probability-Impact graph 
PhCD - Cargo/asset loss or Damage 
PhTD - Transportation Delay 
RFID - Radio-Frequency Identification 
xix 
 
R.I. - Random Index 
ROC - Republic of China 
RSALC - Risk Scale Average Likelihood and Consequence 
S.D. - Standard Deviation 
SEM - Structural Equation Modelling 
S/O - Shipping Order 
SOLAS - International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea 
TEU - Twenty-foot Equivalent Unit 
TFN - Triangular Fuzzy Number 
THX - Taiwan/Hong Kong/Ho Chi Minh Express Service 
 
 
1 
 
Chapter 1 Introduction 
This chapter provides a general background of container shipping industry, and 
risks and risk management in container shipping, followed by the research aims 
and specific objectives, the research methods, and the outline of the thesis. 
1.1 Background   
Container shipping 
In today’s dynamic and time-based competitive business environment, the 
shipping market has faced many challenges (Chow and Chang, 2011). Shipping 
is an international business; it has a strong relationship with the prosperity and 
adversity of global economies. It is reported that about 90% of international trade 
is transported by ships (Shipping Facts, no date). Container shipping has 
become increasingly important over the past few decades due to its significant 
advantage in loading and unloading operations and the ability to achieve 
intermodalism. Containership carrying capacity and world traffic have both 
increased in significant growth rates (Chow and Chang, 2011). At present, there 
are approximately 5,000 full-cellular container ships in the world fleet carrying 
52% of the world seaborne trade in terms of value of the cargo (World Shipping 
Council, 2011a; 2011b).  
According to Stopford (1997, p.512), a container shipping service is “a fleet of 
ships, with a common ownership or management, which provides a fixed service, 
at regular intervals, between named ports, and offers transport to any goods in 
the catchment area served by those ports and ready for transit by their sailing 
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dates. A fixed itinerary, inclusion in a regular service, and the obligation to 
accept cargo from all comers and to sail, whether filled or not, on the date fixed 
by a published schedule are what distinguish the liner from the tramp.” (This 
definition is an updated version of the definition given in A Short History of the 
World’s Shipping Industry Fayle, 1933, p. 253.) 
Because of the fixed service routes and published timetable, consignor can trust 
that their goods will be delivered to the certain port on the certain time (ICS, 
2010). Several characteristics in container shipping are identified as follows (Lin 
and Chang 2006)-  
1. Container shipping needs huge capital investment 
2. Container shipping is easily impacted from the global economy 
3. Container shipping earns unstable income which is impacted by world 
fuel price and exchange rate 
4. Container shipping is limited by inflexible supply of container ships 
5. Container shipping is impacted by the degree of government support 
6. Container shipping has fixed freight, which is because of the upward 
trend in sizes of container ships 
7. Container shipping has to bear the cost of empty container transportation 
8. Container shipping has to follow International regulations 
The above characteristics indicate that container shipping is associated with a 
wide range of risk sources in a complex international environment. In addition, 
as container shipping is often a part of the supply chain, it needs to interact with 
other parties, e.g. consignees, consignors, ports, terminal operators, agencies, 
inland transportation, hauliers, and forwarders. The complex operations within 
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and between these entities and the long distance of physical process may give 
rise to various types of risks, which could negatively impact on the performance 
of container shipping companies. It is therefore important for shipping 
companies to know what are the associated risks? Which ones are more 
important and how to mitigate the impacts of these risks on shipping operations? 
Risk and risk management 
Risks in container shipping business have attracted considerable attention in 
academia over the past decade. Various types of risk in relation to container 
shipping have been addressed in previous studies, e.g., technical risk, market 
risk, business risk, and operational risk (Ewert, 2008). Technical risk generally 
refers to the loss arising from activities such as ship or equipment design and 
engineering, manufacturing, technological processes and test procedures. 
Market risk in shipping industry includes revenue and investment risk 
(Kavussanos et al., 2003), and it refers to unforeseen changes in demand and 
supply (Rodrigue et al., 2011). Business risk relates to the nature of the business 
and it “deals with such matters as future prices, sales or the cost of inputs” (Yip 
and Lun, 2009, p.153). The main business risk in container shipping operation is 
the action of increasing capacity due to the fact that container shipping 
companies try to take advantage of economies of scale (Yip and Lun, 2009). 
Operational risk is “the possibility of an event associated with the focal firm that 
may affect the firm’s internal ability to produce goods and services, quality and 
timeliness of production, and/or the profitability of the company” (Manuj and 
Mentzer, 2008a, p.139), and it is essentially arising from the logistics processes. 
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Within this complex picture of risks in container shipping, this thesis attempts to 
address one group of these risks - the operational risk. To tackle this issue, it is 
important for the shipping companies to know what these risks are and how they 
affect the shipping operations. Unless there is unlimited resource that could be 
employed to mitigate such risks, shipping companies will always have to 
prioritise their resources to mitigate those risks that are most imminent and 
significant. This makes it important to analyse the extent to which each risk 
affects the performance of a shipping company and to identify the relative 
importance of each risk factor. 
Risk management often includes risk identification, risk analysis and risk 
mitigation. In the aspect of risk identification and analysis, a number of studies 
have provided some very valuable insight into the risks faced by container 
shipping companies in their operations. For example, Talley (1996) states that 
unlicensed operators (versus licensed operators), and smaller ship size (versus 
large ship size) may contribute to the increase of risks and severity of cargo 
damage in container shipping. He also suggests that the risks and severity of 
damage are greater in incidents of collision and fire/explosion than grounding. 
Noda (2004) states that terrorist attacks have been a threat to container 
shipping companies for many years. Fu et al. (2010) report that piracy is a 
significant threat and it has forced several major container liners to alter their 
service routes. Drewry (2009) has identified several physical risk factors in 
container shipping, including strikes and transport congestion, theft, piracy, and 
terrorist attack (the detailed information will be presented in Chapter 2).  
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There are a number of studies that have addressed risk from a logistics 
perspective by looking at the single organisation’s inbound and/or outbound 
vulnerabilities, which mainly focused on the physical material flow (Zsidisin and 
Ellram, 1999; Zsidisin et al., 2000; Svensson, 2000, 2002; Johnson, 2001). The 
concept of logistics has broadened in the last decade, logistics flows involve not 
only physical material flow, but also information flow, and financial/ payment flow 
among multiple parties (Spekman and Davis, 2004; Diniz and Fabbe-Costes, 
2007; Ellegaard, 2008; Tummala and Schoenherr, 2011). Each flow “represents 
a different dimension of risk and each is essential for the supply chain to perform 
its objectives in an efficient and effective manner” (Spekman and Davis, 2004, 
p.419). As three logistics flows are closely linked in container shipping 
operations through terms of sales, terms of payment, and bill of lading, it is 
necessary to investigate risk management in container shipping from a broad 
logistics perspective.  
However, to the best of our knowledge no research has been published on the 
identification of risks in relation to all three major logistics flows in container 
shipping. In other words, no studies so far have approached this issue from a 
perspective that inclusively examines all the possible risks faced by a container 
shipping company and comprehensively evaluates the relative importance of 
each of them. Such a study is indeed important as it could assist the shipping 
company managers to make efficient yet economical strategic decisions given 
that the attainable resources are normally limited.  
In light of this, the first aim of this thesis is to conduct a comprehensive empirical 
study on the risks that a container shipping company may face in providing 
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services in shipping supply chains. The purpose is to answer the questions as to 
what are the risk factors in container shipping operations, and which risk factors 
are relatively more significant to a shipping company’s performance. In this 
thesis, risks will be identified and analysed in relation to three flows in container 
shipping operations, i.e., risks associated with information flow, risks associated 
with physical flow and risks associated with payment flow. Three types of risk 
consequence are discussed within container shipping operation sector, including 
financial loss, reputation loss, and safety and security incident related loss. 
In the aspect of risk mitigation, some research has focused on risk response 
attitude which defines the general approach to risk management such as 
whether or not risks are taken, tolerated, retained, shared, reduced, or avoided, 
and whether or not risk treatments are implemented or postponed. For example, 
Miller (1992) proposes that strategic risk management can be divided into five 
generic responses, which are avoidance, control, cooperation, imitation, and 
flexibility. Hillson (1999) and Vose (2008) suggest that the risk responses can be 
divided into four quadrants, namely, avoid, control, transfer, and accept.  
Many other studies focused on specific mitigation strategies to manage risks in 
general supply chains. For example, Giunipero and Eltantawy (2004) present 
several methods of risk management, e.g. consolidate partnerships, just in time 
deliveries, small flexible supply base, frequent commitment, and highly-trained 
supply management professionals. Quite a few studies state that information 
sharing, aligning incentives, risk sharing with co-operators, and corporate social 
responsibility can reduce the impact of risk on business (Chopra and Sodhi, 
2004; Spckman and Davis, 2004). Chopra and Sodhi (2004) suggest several risk 
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mitigating strategies, e.g. acquire redundant suppliers, pool or aggregate 
demand, and increase capacity, flexibility, capability and inventory.  
The discussions of risk mitigation strategies in container shipping are rather 
fragmented. The majority of studies did not use the term “risk mitigation”. Instead, 
the attempts to reduce, control or avoid the risks or uncertainties are often 
implied, e.g., the liner service schedule design considering uncertainties in 
shipping and port operations (Notteboom, 2006; Notteboon and Vernimmen, 
2009; Qi and Song, 2012; Wang et al., 2013), joint ventures between shipping 
companies and the supply chain partners to share financial responsibilities, to 
avoid conflicts, and to overcome the instability in container shipping (Heaver et 
al., 2000; Heaver et al., 2001; Notteboom, 2004), operational measures to 
respond to uncertain events and delays in shipping (Notteboom, 2006; Imai et al., 
2007), handling the piracy problem (Chalk, 2008; Fu et al., 2010), improving port 
operation security (Bichou , 2004; Frittelli, 2005). Moreover, the rapid rising fuel 
prices and containership overcapacity are the new issues that have emerged in 
recent years mainly due to the global economic crisis, which have urged 
container shipping companies to lay up ships or operate more idle ships in the 
existing routes for slow steaming and cost-saving (Bonney, 2010).   
In light of the discussion above, the second aim of this thesis is to conduct an 
empirical study on risk management in container shipping operations. The 
purpose is to help container shipping companies better understand the different 
forms of risk mitigation strategies and their relative importance to different 
performance criteria. In this thesis, the risk mitigation strategies are proposed 
and classified into three categories: intra-organisational strategies, intra-channel 
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strategies, and inter-channel strategies. The relative importance of these 
strategies is then evaluated as part of risk management.  
It is worth pointing out at the outset that the focus of this thesis is about the risks 
faced by container shipping companies in their operations and providing 
services in maritime supply chains, which is different from supply chain risks in 
container shipping. A “supply chain risk” is defined as “an event that adversely 
affects supply chain operations and hence its desired performance measures, 
such as chain-wide service levels and responsiveness, as well as cost” 
(Tummala and Schoenherr, 2011, p. 474). In other words, supply chain risks are 
those that affect the entire supply chain. Studies on maritime supply chain risks 
normally focus on the risks that impact on the performance of the entire supply 
chain including all the players and not just one or two players such as shipping 
company. This thesis only addresses the risks faced by a container shipping 
company, as a player in a supply chain. 
1.2 Research aims and objectives  
The aim of the thesis is to conduct a comprehensive empirical study on risk 
management in container shipping industry through the development of a 
tailored framework that can be used for identifying risks from the logistics 
perspective, measuring the risk likelihood and risk consequence, analysing risk 
scale, and evaluating the importance of risk mitigation strategies and their 
relationships in container shipping operations. The specific research objectives 
include: 
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1. Elaborate the logistics flows (information, physical, payment flows) in 
container shipping operations 
2. Develop a conceptual framework for risk management in the context of 
container shipping operations, and apply the framework to a case study 
3. Identify key risk factors within the three flows in container shipping 
4. Identify typical risk mitigation strategies for container shipping companies 
5. Perform risk analysis to assess the impact of risk factors and their 
relationships 
6. Evaluate the importance of risk mitigating strategies and their 
relationships 
 1.3 Research methods  
“A research method is a strategy of inquiry which moves from the underlying 
philosophical assumptions to research design and data collection” (Myers, 1997). 
General speaking, a research method should include the source of data 
collection and the method to analyse the data. These methods can be classified 
into two categories, namely, qualitative method and quantitative method. In this 
thesis, both qualitative and quantitative research methods were used.  
First of all, this thesis is based on the Taiwan container shipping industry as a 
case study. Owing to its island geography, Taiwan largely relies on international 
trade. Most of the materials for manufacturing are imported by ships, and 
therefore the shipping industry plays an important role in Taiwan’s economy. 
According to official statistics (Ministry of Transportation and Communications, 
2011), around 99% of international trade in Taiwan is transported by sea. It is 
expected, therefore, that a case study of Taiwan will be able to provide some 
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insight into the risk analysis issues in the wider maritime context. Findings 
obtained therein should be generally applicable to those countries where 
container shipping also plays an important role in their economies.   
The data collection methods include a literature review, a series of interviews, 
and three questionnaire surveys. Relevant literature review is used as a base to 
identify risks and risk mitigation strategies. The review of literature includes two 
major parts: a review of risks and risk mitigation strategies in container shipping 
operations, and a literature review in general supply chains context to expand 
the coverage of risks and risk mitigation strategies. A series of interviews with 
managers in container shipping companies was conducted to validate the risk 
factors and risk mitigation strategies that are extracted from the existing 
literature and to explore new risk factors and mitigation strategies that have not 
been mentioned in the literature. In order to analyse the risk scale, it is 
necessary to measure the risk likelihood and the risk consequence. A risk-factor 
questionnaire survey is conducted to collect the primary data on risk likelihood 
and risk consequence. The level of each risk factor is then analysed through risk 
scaling and risk mapping. This thesis presents a new formulation - Average Risk 
Scale (ARS) – to perform the risk map for three risk consequences, namely, 
finance loss, reputation loss, and safety and security incident related loss. The 
second questionnaire survey (termed mitigation-strategy survey) is conducted to 
rank the risk mitigation strategies according to their overall performance to 
shipping companies. An important set of mitigation strategies is then obtained.  
In order to better understand the relationships between the identified important 
risk mitigation strategies with regard to different criteria such as reducing 
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financial loss, reducing reputation loss, and reducing safety and security incident 
related loss, the third questionnaire survey with paired comparison was used to 
collect the relevant primary data. The classic Analytic Hierarchy Process (AHP) 
and fuzzy AHP methods are then used to analyse the data and quantify the 
relative importance of those mitigation strategies with respect to different 
performance criteria. The differences between classic AHP results and fuzzy 
AHP results are discussed.  
1.4 Structure of the thesis 
This thesis includes eight chapters. The rest of this thesis is organised as 
follows. 
Chapter 2 presents the risk management in container shipping operations. The 
risk factors in container shipping operations were firstly identified through the 
review of relevant literature. The second section introduces risk mitigation 
strategies in container shipping operations. The last section discusses the 
research gap.   
Chapter 3 presents the conceptual model and the methodology of this thesis. An 
introduction of Taiwan’s container shipping industry was firstly presented. The 
second section developed the research conceptual model, in which three major 
logistics flows (information flow, physical flow, and payment flow) in container 
shipping operations were firstly presented. Several risk models were then 
introduced from previous studies. The research conceptual model was proposed 
through organising and refining the previous models. Following that, the risk 
management steps were introduced in detail, which includes risk identification, 
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risk analysis, risk mitigation strategy making and risk mitigation strategy 
evaluation. The third section discussed data collection methods, including the 
methods for risk identification and measurement, and risk mitigation strategy 
identification and evaluation. Within the risk measurement, risk consequences in 
container shipping were discussed from three performance perspectives, 
namely, financial loss, reputation loss, and safety and security incident related 
loss. The fourth section discussed the data analysis methods, including risk 
analysis methods and risk mitigation strategies evaluation methods. Within the 
risk analysis method, a new formulation was developed to perform the risk map, 
and then three methods were introduced to present the risk scale. In terms of 
risk mitigation strategy analysis method, the classic Analytic Hierarchy Process 
(AHP) and the fuzzy AHP were described in detail, respectively.  
Chapter 4 is the identification of risks in container shipping operations. Risk 
identification is regarded as the very first step among risk management. In order 
to expand the coverage of the risk identification, this chapter firstly reviewed 
relevant literature on risks in general supply chain from the logistics perspective, 
and categorised them into risks associated with information flow, risks 
associated with physical flow, and risks associated with payment flow. After 
identifying the risk factors from previous literature review, seven interviews have 
been conducted to validate the risk factors and explore more risk factors that are 
not mentioned in previous studies.  
Chapter 5 measures and analyses these risk factors in container shipping 
operations. The data were collected through a questionnaire survey, which used 
a five-point Likert scale. The result of this questionnaire survey provided the 
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respondents’ details of the questionnaire, and the risk measurement and 
analysis, including the level of risk likelihood, risk consequence and risk scale. 
Through risk scale calculation, the impact of each risk factor was presented by 
categorising them into four levels (extreme risk, high risk, moderate risk and low 
risk). After this, three risk maps (financial loss, reputation loss, and safety and 
security incident related loss) were presented to show the relationships (risk 
likelihood, risk consequence and risk scale) among risk factors. Several 
important risk factors were then presented and discussed in the end of this 
chapter. 
Chapter 6 presents the identification and evaluation of risk mitigation strategies 
in container shipping operations. Similar to risk identification, the risk mitigation 
strategies were firstly identified through a relevant literature review, and then 
validated and explored through interviews. The risk mitigation strategies in 
container shipping were classified into three categories, including 
intra-organisational strategies, intra-channel strategies, and inter-channel 
strategies. The second section presents the evaluation of risk mitigation 
strategies in container shipping operations. The result of the five-point Likert 
scale survey yielded the ranking of the risk mitigation strategies according to 
their overall importance. The top seven mitigation strategies were selected to be 
further investigated through conducting the AHP questionnaire survey in order to 
evaluate their relative impact on three different performance criteria: reducing 
financial loss, reducing reputation loss, and reducing safety and security incident 
related loss. The classic AHP and the fuzzy AHP were used to analyse the data. 
The results of classic AHP and fuzzy AHP were then discussed and compared. 
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Chapter 7 is the research discussion and implications. Firstly, the findings of 
risks and their implications were discussed and linked to existing studies to 
support or refine their results.  Secondly, the findings from the risk mitigation 
strategy evaluation using classic AHP and fuzzy AHP were discussed and also 
linked to previous studies. Thirdly, the generalisation of the research methods 
and the research findings from the Taiwan’s case study are discussed.  
Chapter 8 is the conclusion of this research. This chapter highlights the main 
findings, points out the limitation, and suggests the further research directions. 
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Chapter 2 Risks in container shipping operations 
Chapter 2 presents the relevant literatures about risk management in container 
shipping operations, including the identification of operational risks in Section 2.1 
and risk mitigation strategies in container shipping in Section 2.2.  The research 
gap is then identified in Section 2.3.  
2.1 Operational risks in container shipping 
This thesis firstly clarifies what risk is. Then the relevant studies on operational 
risks in container shipping will be reviewed and the risk factors will be 
summarised.  
2.1.1 What is risk? 
The word “risk” originates from the Italian word risicare, which means to dare. 
(Bernstein, 1996; Khan and Burnes, 2007; Rao and Goldsby, 2009). However, 
its meaning has changed and expanded over time and appears through 
different people and different situations (Frosdick, 1997). The study of risk was 
used to apply mathematics to gamble when it was proposed by Pascal and 
Fermat (Frosdick, 1997; Khan and Burnes, 2007; Rao and Goldsby, 2009). 
Their work developed probability theory, which becomes the core concept of 
risk (Bernstein, 1996). Nowadays, more studies have attempted to understand 
risk and its responses from human behaviour and psychology-based 
approaches (Kahenman and Tversky, 1979; Thaler, 1985; Khan and Burnes, 
2007). 
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There are various definitions of risk. We conduct a comprehensive literature 
review and organise different definitions of risk by chronicle into Table 2.1. The 
definitions can be categorised into several groups such as “risk is a negative 
consequence/ outcome” (Rowe, 1980; March and Shapira, 1987; Miller, 1991; 
Sitkin and Pablo, 1992; Hutchins, 2003; Norrman and Jansson, 2004; Spekman 
and Davis, 2004), “risk is a measure of the probability of loss” (Lowrance, 1980; 
The Royal Society, 1992; Yates and Stone, 1992; Chiles and McMackin, 1996; 
Mitchell, 1999; Hutchins, 2003; Norrman and Jansson, 2004; Spekman and 
Davis, 2004), and “risk is the outcome of uncertainty” (Sitkin and Pablo, 1992; 
Deloach, 2000; Rao and Goldsby, 2009). 
Table 2.1 The selected definitions of risk 
Authors Definition 
Knight (1921) Risk is defined as the probability of incurring a loss 
Markowitz 
(1952, p.89) 
The concepts “yield” and “risk” appear frequently in financial 
writings. Usually if the term “risk” were replaced by “variance 
of return,” little change in apparent meaning would result 
Blume (1971) Risk, in reality, is a somewhat imbalanced definition given that 
most risky decisions in business are taken on the basis of 
generating a potential gain 
Rowe (1980) Risk is the potential for unwanted negative consequences to 
arise from an event or activity 
March and 
Shapira (1987) 
Risk refers to the negative variation in business outcome 
variables such as revenues, costs, profits, etc. 
Lowrance 
(1980) 
Risk is a measure of the probability and severity of adverse 
effects 
Miller (1992) Risk refers to the variance in outcomes or performance that 
cannot be forecasted ex-ante 
The Royal 
Society (1992) 
Risk is “the chance, in quantitative terms, of a defined hazard 
occurring. It therefore combines a probabilistic measure of the 
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occurrence of the primary event(s) with a measure of the 
consequences of that/those event(s)” 
Sitkin and 
Pablo (1992) 
Risks  refers to “the extent to which there is uncertainty about 
whether potentially significant and/or disappointing outcomes 
of decisions will be realized” 
Yates and 
Stone (1992) 
Risk is an inherently subjective construct that deals with the 
possibility of loss 
Chiles and 
Mackin (1996) 
Risk refers to the possibility of loss 
Mitchell (1999) Risk is defined as a subjectively determined expectation of 
loss; the greater the probability of this loss, the greater is the 
risk 
Deloach (2000) Business risk is the level of exposure to uncertainties that the 
enterprise must understand and effectively manage as it 
executes its strategies to achieve its business objectives and 
create value. 
Hutchins 
(2003) 
Risk is the probability that an event or action may have 
negative impact on the organisation 
Norrman and 
Jansson (2004) 
Risk is “a quality that reflects both the range of possible 
outcomes and the distribution of respective probabilities for 
each of the outcomes” 
Spekman and 
Davis (2004) 
Risk is defined as the probability of variance in an expected 
outcome 
Rao and 
Goldsby (2009) 
Risk is exposure to a premise, the outcome of which is 
uncertain 
In this thesis, “risk” is deemed as a negative outcome from uncertainty and it 
can be measured from the likelihood and the consequence of uncertainty. As 
this study focuses on operational risks in container shipping, it is necessary to 
review all the studies related to risks and uncertainties in container shipping 
operations.  
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2.1.2 Operational risks in container shipping 
This section reviews the operational risks in container shipping. The literature is 
roughly organised according to the nature of the associated risk including asset 
risks, schedule unreliability, inappropriate empty container repositioning, fuel 
price uncertainty, cargo damage, and terrorist attack.   
Drewry (2009) identified a list of business process risks and asset risks in 
container transport and logistics including documentation, booking and invoicing 
errors, errors in customs regulatory compliance and in security compliance, 
strikes and transport congestion, theft and cargo loss or damage, piracy, and 
terrorist attack. Podsada (2001) also reported that each year more than 10,000 
containers are lost at sea. In 2007 in Antwerp, just in one incident, about 100 
containers with cars fell overboard during the loading operation where the ship 
was capsized (IMC, 2007). It is easy to understand that asset/cargo losses at 
sea are quite significant in container shipping operations. 
Unreliability of service schedule is also a risk factor in container shipping as it 
would lead to transportation delay and affect shipping companies’ reputation. 
Notteboom (2006) investigated the sources of schedule unreliability of the East 
Asia-Europe route and identified several sources that had led to unreliability of 
service schedule, including waiting time and delays caused by port strikes, 
unstable weather and sea conditions, port/terminal/transport congestion, and 
port/terminal productivity being below expectations. He found that port 
congestion is the most important source that leads to schedule unreliability. A 
large survey from Drewry (2006a) showed that more than 40% of the vessels 
deployed on worldwide container shipping services arrived one or more days 
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behind schedule, based on the monitoring of more than 5,410 vessels between 
April and September 2006. The result also revealed that only 52% of the 
vessels were on-time, with 21% of the vessels arriving 1 day late, and more 
than 22% of the vessels arriving 2 or more days late. Vernimmen et al. (2007) 
stated that several common factors impacted on vessel delay include bad 
weather at sea, congestion or labour strikes at the different ports of call, and 
knock-on effects of delays suffered at previous ports. They found that the 
impact of decreasing liner schedule reliability on shipping companies include 
“the delays in ports add to the duration of the total round-trip time, affecting 
bottom-line profits through additional fixed delay ship costs and/ or increased 
operational costs by the need to sail at full service speed to make up for lost 
time” (Vernimmen et al., 2007, p. 210). Qi and Song (2012) pointed out that lack 
of appropriately designed flexible liner service schedules would lead to service 
unreliability.  
Inappropriate empty container repositioning could incur significant costs to 
shipping lines (Dong and Song, 2009; Song and Dong, 2011; Dang et al., 
2013). It is thus considered as a risk in container shipping. Song et al. (2005) 
stated that empty container transportation incurred approximately 15 billion 
USD for the world containership fleet in 2002. Drewry (2006a, 2006b) reported 
that empty containers have accounted for at least 20 per cent of global port 
handling activity ever since 1998.  
Notteboom and Vernimmen (2009) used a cost model to simulate the impact of 
bunker cost changes on the operational costs of liner services and the results 
showed that oil price rise may force shipping lines to face increasing operational 
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costs and operational risks. Notteboom (2006) reported that at the historic price 
of 135 USD per ton bunker fuel costs were about half the operating cost of 
larger containerships; whilst Ronen (2011, p.211) argued that “a large ship may 
be burning up to 100,000 USD of bunker fuel per day, which may constitute 
more than 75% of its operating costs”. Rubin and Tal (2008) also reported that 
shipping a standard 40-foot container from Shanghai to the U.S. eastern 
seaboard cost 8000 USD in 2008. In 2000, when oil prices were 20 USD per 
barrel, it cost only 3000 USD to ship the same container.  
Talley (1996) based on micro-data of individual vessel accidents that occurred 
in the U.S. for the time period 1981-89 found that unlicensed operators (versus 
licensed operators) and smaller ship size (versus large ship size) may 
contribute to the increase of risk and severity of cargo damage in container 
shipping. He also suggested that the risks and severity of damage are greater in 
collision and fire/explosion incidents than in grounding. Vernimmen et al. (2007) 
reported several more serious factors that lead to transportation disruption, 
such as cargo loss, fire incidents (cf. Hyundai Fortune fire incident in the Gulf of 
Aden in March 2006), ship collision or ship groundings (cf. the incident with the 
MSC Napoli off the UK East Coast in early 2007).  
Tseng et al. (2012) analysed the risks of cargo damage for aquatic products of 
refrigerated containers based on a questionnaire survey in various maritime 
communities in Taiwan, including container carriers, ocean freight forwarders, 
and container terminal operators. They identified a number of risk factors in 
transporting refrigerated containers and found that “container data setting 
errors” is the top factor of perceived risk as well as of risk severity. 
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Noda (2004) stated that terrorist attacks have been a threat to container 
shipping companies for many years. According to the report of International 
Maritime Organisation (IMO), by the beginning of February 2011, about 30 
ships and 714 hostages have been held by the pirates (IMO, 2011). Fu et al. 
(2010) reported that piracy has been a significant threat and it has forced 
several major container liners to alter their service routes. They focused on the 
Far East-Europe container liner shipping service and proposed a 
simulation-related economic model using history data to explain the impact of 
piracy. 
Yang (2010; 2011) investigated the impact of the container security initiative 
(CSI) on Taiwan’s shipping industry. The CSI is a programme imposed by US 
after 9/11, which requires that an inbound container or cargo from foreign 
commercial ports be pre-inspected in order to strengthen the US nation 
security. They identified several CSI-related risk factors including “cargo cannot 
make a shipment on time and shut out by customs authority”, “cargo handling 
time delay”, “longer lead time of data entering”, and “various transmission 
system”. It was reported that “cargo cannot be shipped on time and is shut out 
by the customs authority” is the top CSI-related factor in terms of risk severity. 
Table 2.2 summaries the risk factors in container shipping operations from 
previous studies. 
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Table 2.2 The risk factors in container shipping operations 
Risk factors Authors  
Port strike Notteboom (2006); Drewry (2009) 
Port congestion (unexpected waiting 
times before berthing or before 
starting loading/discharging) 
Notteboom (2006);  
Drewry (2009) 
Port/terminal productivity below 
expectations (loading/discharging) 
Notteboom (2006) 
Unstable weather Notteboom (2006) 
Inappropriate empty container 
transportation 
Song et al. (2005); Notteboom (2006); 
Dong and Song, 2009;Song and Dong 
(2011); Dang et al., 2013 
oil price rising Notteboom and Vernimmen (2009) 
Cargo stolen from unsealed 
containers  
Drewry (2009) 
Damage to ship or quay due to 
improper berth operations  
Talley (1996);  
Vernimmen et al. (2007) 
Damage to frozen cargo Tseng et al. (2012) 
Attack from pirates or terrorists Noda (2004); Drewry (2009);  
Fu et al. (2010) 
 
2.2 Risk mitigation strategies in container shipping  
Similar to the organisation of Section 2.1, we first discuss the definition of risk 
management in general, and then review the relevant literature about risk 
mitigation strategies in container shipping. 
2.2.1 Risk management 
In the competitive business environment, risk is everywhere. The management 
to mitigate the impact of risks is an important issue to companies. There are 
also many studies that address risk management in various areas, such as 
banking (e.g. Sinkey, 1983; Bessis, 2010), finance (e.g. Smith et al., 1989; 
Vaughan, 1997), economics (e.g. Kahneman and Tversky, 1979; Tversky and 
Kahneman, 1992), gold mining (e.g. Tufano, 1996), medical/health (e.g. Neale, 
1998; Aufseeser-Weiss and Ondeck, 2001; NPSA, 2008; Hollman, 2010), 
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technology (e.g. DeLone and McLean, 1992; Elky, 2006), transportation (e.g. 
Alizadeh and Nomikos, 2009), logistics (e.g. Notteboom, 2006; Husdal and 
Bråthen, 2010) and supply chain (e.g. Harland et al., 2003; Christopher and 
Peck, 2004; Zsidisin et al., 2004; Waters, 2007; Manuj and Mentzer, 2008a, 
2008b; Knemeyer et al., 2009; Yang, 2010, 2011), etc. The definitions of risk 
management can therefore be found across the authors and industries. This 
thesis presents several definitions of risk management from selected studies 
that related to business management and these are presented in Table 2.3. 
Table 2.3 The selected definitions of risk management 
Authors Definition 
Dickson (1989) The identification, analysis and control of those risks which 
can threaten the assets or earn capacity of an enterprise 
The Royal 
Society (1992, 
p.3) 
Risk management is the making of decisions regarding risks 
and their subsequent implementations, and flows from risk 
estimation and risk evaluation 
Fone and 
Young (2000) 
Risk management is a general management function that 
seeks to assess and address risks in the context of the overall 
aims of the organisation 
Norrman and 
Jansson (2004) 
Risk management is the process whereby decisions are made 
to accept a known or assessed risk and/or the implementation 
of actions to reduce the consequences or probability of 
occurrence 
Waters (2007, 
p.75) 
Risk management is the process for systematically identifying, 
analysing and responding to risks throughout an organisation 
Syriopoulos 
(2011) 
Risk management  for shipping is the process by which 
various risk exposures are identified, measured and controlled 
Yang (2011) Risk management is a decision-making process which is in 
view of the outcome of risk assessment 
There are four common risk management steps, i.e. risk identification, risk 
analysis, risk mitigation strategies identification, and risk mitigation strategies 
evaluation. This reflects some of the above definitions such as Dickson (1989), 
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Norrman and Jansson (2004), and Waters (2007). This thesis will generally 
follow the four step risk management perspective. 
The identification of risk factors in container shipping has been mentioned in 
Section 2.1. The following section presents the risk mitigation strategies in 
container shipping industry from the relevant studies.  
2.2.2 Risk mitigation strategies in container shipping 
A number of risk mitigation strategies in container shipping have been 
mentioned in the previous studies. The literature is roughly organised according 
to the nature of the associated risk mitigation strategies including adding buffer 
time, omit port-of-call, slow steaming, advanced information technology, 
training, long-term contracts with shipper, collaboration, alliance, cooperation 
with competitors, merge and acquisition.   
In order to reduce the impact from unreliable schedule, Notteboom (2006) 
suggested that designing service schedules with buffer time to make it more 
flexible. If a shipping schedule has included a buffer time, it offers opportunities 
to reduce the impact of uncertainties and delays at ports and at sea. Notteboom 
and Vernimmen (2009), based on the data from Drewry (2006c), stated that the 
biggest container shipping company (Maersk Line) has 70% on time service 
vessels in the world. Whilst the second biggest container shipping company 
(MSC) has the poorest performance with 41% on time service vessels because 
of the relatively low time buffers and random skipping of one or more ports of 
call during a round voyage. They suggested that buffer time in the service 
schedule should be sufficiently large to cope with unexpected transportation 
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delays. It has been reported that adding certain buffer time in each route can 
lead to a more robust shipping network (Wang and Meng, 2012a, 2012b). 
Moreover, appropriately designing the ship schedule with a given fixed 
round-trip time can also minimize the impact of port time uncertainty on 
operational costs (Qi and Song, 2012). 
Sometimes ships may not be able to arrive at destination ports on time due to 
various reasons such as temperamental weather, engineering break down or 
port congestion. Notteboom (2006) suggested five strategies to deal with delay 
in container shipping operations, include: (1) reshuffling the order of ports of call: 
more import cargos will be discharged in the first port-of-call, and they will be 
transported through inland transport to the destinations near ports that will be 
called at much later than initially planned; (2) cancel one or more port-of-calls to 
reduce total port time and get the vessel back on schedule; (3) deploy other 
vessels to take over in combination with delivery to hub; (4) speed up turnaround 
time at next port(s) of call in the loop to catch up and resume the schedule; and 
(5) make up time by increasing vessel speed on the intercontinental trunk route. 
Using a flexible transportation network allows a company to reduce the overall 
cost in responding to unstable risks. When the transportation delays happen 
such as port strike or bad weather condition, shipping companies may reduce 
the berthing time in the port or cut ports-of-call (Kerr, 2011b). Cutting 
ports-of-call is a common method to catch up the original shipping schedule 
when the ship has a very serious delay or port strike. Usually, the ship may berth 
at the next port-of-call to loading and unloading the cargos which should be done 
at this coming port-of-call. Brouer et al. (2013) studied the problem of real-time 
recovering a disrupted container shipping schedule using several operational 
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measures such as speeding up vessel, cutting ports-of-call, and swapping 
ports-of-call.   
Rising fuel prices and overcapacity are new issues that have emerged in recent 
years. The fuel consumption of a ship is regarded as a cubic function of the 
sailing speed (Ronen, 1982; Fagerholt et al., 2010; Qi and Song, 2012). Many 
studies have stated that slowing the sailing speed is an effective risk mitigation 
strategy to reduce the operational cost caused by the rising fuel price. 
Notteboom (2006) used the data provided by Sea Span to show that when a 
vessel sails at the maximum service speed (25.4 knots), the daily fuel 
consumption will be twice more than a slower sailing speed (18 knots). He also 
stated that a number of shipping companies slowed down vessel speed on the 
Trans-Pacific route to 19 knots instead of the normal 22-23 knots because of 
the port congestion at the US West Coast. Notteboom and Vernimmen (2009) 
further confirmed that operating vessels at an economic speed would benefit 
shipping companies to reduce the fuel consumption and an overall operating 
cost. Ronen (2011) used the published data and calculated the operational 
costs and fuel costs through a cost model, the result shows that when a vessel 
is operated at the minimal-cost speed, the shipping company can gain great 
cost-savings. Cariou (2011) found that under slow steaming, shipping 
companies can save more than 16% of average fuel oil consumption per ship 
when the vessel size is more than 5000 Twenty-foot Equivalent Unit (TEU). Qi 
and Song (2012) stated that the fuel consumption and emissions can be 
minimised by appropriately designing the containership schedule in situations 
with port uncertainty, which essentially balance the ship sailing speed over the 
entire journey. Maloni et al. (2013) aimed to quantify the costs and benefits of 
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slow steaming related to container shipping companies and shippers, and the 
results showed that the most beneficial vessel speed is “extra slow steaming”, 
which means a 20% reduction in total costs and a 43% reduction in carbon 
dioxide emissions.   
E-commerce has been used in container shipping operations for many years, 
Marle (2009) states that shippers could save a huge amount of money in bills of 
lading (B/L) overcharges through new transport management software. Kerr 
(2011a) emphasizes that the use of an e-invoice system could significantly 
reduce errors and costs when processing documents. However, only 59% of 
logistics and freight businesses use e-commerce as standard practice because 
of the huge investment (Brett, 2011). 
Employee training can reduce a lot of risks in a shipping company. Almost every 
shipping company pays much attention to it. Lloyd’s List even holds an award 
called ‘Lloyd's List Maritime Excellence Award for Commitment to Training and 
Education’. Several research studies state that regular training is an important 
mechanism to reduce the probability of risk in container shipping (Young, 2010, 
Ganesan, 2010). Training also can reduce the probabilities of information delay 
and error. Therefore, we choose employees’ skill and risk awareness training as 
one type of risk mitigating strategies in container shipping. 
Container shipping companies have to invest heavily in capital to operate 
regular, reliable and frequent services. Once the cost consumption networks are 
set up, the shipping companies need to fill the networks with freight (Notteboom, 
2004). To gain a reasonable profit, shipping companies have to ensure high 
vessel utilisation. However, it is difficult to match capacity supply with trade 
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demand. Establishing a close relationship with major shippers is an important 
strategy to reduce the risk of vessel underutilisation. Notteboom (2004) stated 
that container shipping companies need to negotiate long-term contracts with 
shippers to secure the cargo volume.  
In order to provide comprehensive services (such as door-to-door services), 
some container shipping companies attempt to use trustworthy independent 
inland operators’ services on a contract base (Baird and Lindsay, 1996, Graham, 
1998; Carious, 2001; Heaver, 2002; Notteboom, 2004). Apart from inland 
transportation, Notteboom (2006) also suggested that container shipping 
companies can use joint ventures with port/terminal operators to reduce the 
impact of port congestion, which is the main source of schedule unreliability. For 
example, a shipping line may collaborate with inland distributors through 
expanding/ subcontracting inland container logistics, and collaborate with 
terminal operators through a joint venture or dedicated terminal. Such 
relationships often go beyond information sharing because partners in the 
supply chain are more closely linked and involve joint long-term planning. For 
example, Yang Ming Marine Transport Corporation has many supply chain 
partners including Yes Logistics Corporation (distribution centre), Jing Ming 
Transport Corporation (inland transportation company), and Kao Ming Container 
Terminal Corporation (www.yml.com.tw).  
There are also some practical strategies across shipping companies including 
strategic alliances (Ryoo and Thanopoulou, 1999; Midoro and Pitto, 2000; 
Heaver et al., 2000; Slack et al., 2002; Song and Panayides, 2002; Notteboom, 
2004; Lu et al., 2010), exchanging slots (Song and Panayides, 2002; 
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Notteboom, 2004; Lu et al., 2010), merging with (Heaver et al., 2000; Song and 
Panayides, 2002 Notteboom, 2004) or acquiring (Song and Panayides, 2002; 
Notteboom, 2004) other companies. Strategic alliances are defined as the 
partnership of two or more organisations to pursue a set of private and common 
interests through cooperation and sharing of resources (Ariño et al., 2001). 
Midoro and Pitto (2000) stated that container shipping companies can gain 
several benefits from strategic alliances, including “wider geographical scope”, 
“possibility to perform vessel planning and co-ordination on a global scale”, “risk 
and investment sharing”, “economies of scale”, “entry in new markets”, “increase 
in frequency of services”, and “cost down through combining purchasing power 
and volumes”. There are currently several container shipping alliances, such as 
CKYH (COSCO, "K" LINE, Yang Ming, HANJIN) Alliance, G6 Alliance 
(APL/NOL, Mitsui OSK lines, Hyundai, Hapag-Lloyd, NYK line, and OOCL), and 
P3 Alliance (Maersk Line, Mediterranean Shipping Company, and CMA CGM). 
Each shipping company in an alliance group often contributes several ships to 
co-operate on the same routes, and this could reduce the capital investment and 
risk for these shipping companies. Heaver et al. (2001) indicated that the 
dedicated terminal is an important form of joint venture between shipping liners 
and container ports/terminals, which has been implemented by many container 
shipping lines, e.g. Maersk/Sea-Land, P&O Nedlloyd and the other members of 
the Grand Alliance, and World Alliance. 
Several studies stated that the collaboration strategies in container shipping 
include joint fleet, slot charter, slot purchase, and slot exchange (Cullinane and 
Khanna, 1999; Song and Panayides, 2002; Shry et al., 2003; Notteboom, 2004; 
Lu et al., 2010; Chow and Chang, 2011). Cullinane and Khanna (1999) found 
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that through joint services, the benefit of economies of scale is significant when 
ship sizes are above 8,000 TEU for both the Europe-Far East and trans-Pacific 
trade, and for ship sizes between 5,000 and 6,000 TEU on the shorter 
trans-Atlantic trade. Lu et al. (2010) stated that slot exchange allows the 
companies to use the recognised capacities of the group of container shipping 
companies not operated by them; and if the exchanged slots are insufficient, 
more slots can be purchased from its partners in the group. 
Merging or acquisition is a common method to make a company rapidly increase 
market share. In the container shipping industry, there are many cases that a 
shipping company merges with or acquires other liner companies. Notteboom 
(2004, p. 90) stated “the economic rationality for mergers and acquisitions is 
rooted in the objective to size, growth, economies of scale, market share and 
market power. Other motives for mergers and acquisitions in liner shipping 
related to gaining instant access to markets and distribution networks, obtaining 
access to new technologies or diversifying”. For example, two of Germany’s 
shipping companies plan to merge recently to reduce pressure from tumbling 
charter rates (Barnard, 2011); the first large merging occurred between P&O 
Containers and Royal Nedlloyd in 1997, although this merger produced some 
problems, the benefits of merger still outweighed initial difficulties (Bonney, 
2011). In 2005, Maersk Sealand acquired P&O Nedlloyd to become Maersk 
Line. 
Table 2.4 summaries the risk mitigation strategies in container shipping 
operations from previous studies. 
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Table 2.4 The risk mitigation strategies in container shipping operations 
Risk mitigation strategies Authors  
Add buffer time when designing 
routes  
Notteboom (2006);  
Notteboom and Vernimmen (2009) 
Omit pot-of-call when transportation 
delay happen 
Notteboom (2006);  
Kerr (2011b) 
Implement slow steaming to reduce 
the oil price rise 
Notteboom (2006); Notteboom and 
Vernimmen (2009); Ronen (2011); 
Cariou (2011); Qi and Song (2012); 
Maloni et al. (2013) 
Use more advanced information 
technology 
Marle (2009);  
Kerr (2011a) 
Train employee regularly  Young (2010); Ganesan (2010) 
Enter into long-term contracts with 
shipper 
Notteboom (2004) 
Make collaboration with partners Baird and Lindsay (1996); Graham 
(1998); Carious (2001); Heaver (2002); 
Notteboom (2004), (2006) 
Make alliance with other container 
shipping companies 
Ryoo and Thanopoulou (1999); Heaver 
et al. (2000); Slack et al. (2002); Song 
and Panayides (2002); Notteboom 
(2004); Lu et al. (2010) 
Joint fleet, slot charter, slot 
purchase, and slot exchange with 
other container shipping companies 
Cullinane and Khanna (1999); Song and 
Panayides (2002); Shry et al. (2003); 
Notteboom (2004); Lu et al. (2010); 
Chow and Chang (2011) 
Merge or acquisition other container 
shipping companies 
Notteboom (2004);  
Barnard (2011) 
2.3 Research Gaps 
As mentioned in the Introduction, the role of container shipping is becoming 
more and more important in global economics. Meanwhile container shipping 
business is to facing various types of risks, it is therefore necessary to know 
what the risks are and how to mitigate these risks.  
Although the studies reviewed in this Chapter have provided some very valuable 
insight on risks and risk management in container shipping operations, the 
research in this area is still rather fragmental. For example, the majority of the 
existing studies focused on dealing with the risks caused from cargo delivery. 
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There is a lack of research that explicitly considers the risk management in 
container shipping from a comprehensive logistics perspective including physical 
flow, information flow and payment flow.  
To the best of our knowledge, no studies so far have approached the risk 
management issue from a perspective that inclusively examines all the possible 
operational risks and risk mitigation strategies faced by a container shipping 
company and comprehensively evaluates the relative importance of each of 
them. Note that the resource of each container shipping company is limited, 
every company has to firstly mitigate the most imminent and significant risk 
factors. This makes it important to analyse the extent to which each risk affects 
the performance of shipping company and to identify the relative importance of 
each risk factor. Equally important, although many risk mitigation strategies 
could be used to reduce the impact of risks, their effectiveness may vary 
significantly. It is therefore necessary to evaluate the relative importance of 
different mitigation strategies under a given performance criterion.  
  
33 
 
Chapter 3 Conceptual model 
In this chapter, three main logistics flows in container shipping operations will 
firstly be presented to build up the research structure in Section 3.1. Section 3.2 
discusses the development of risk management model in the context of 
container shipping operations will be discussed. Section 3.3 presents the risk 
management steps as the main guideline to structure the research process in 
this thesis. Section 3.4 is the summary of this chapter. 
3. 1 The three flows in container shipping logistics operations 
The majority of the literature in Chapter 2 address the risk factors and risk 
mitigation strategies in physical part. In addition, these previous studies focus on 
one or two or several risk factors and risk mitigation strategies and this is 
fragmental and insufficient. In fact, there have been discussed various aspects 
in container shipping operations from a logistics perspective (See Section 2.3). 
In order to develop a conceptual model on risk management in container 
shipping operations, this thesis firstly introduces the three main flows in general 
supply chains and then discuss how they work in container shipping operations. 
There are various classifications of supply chain flows. For example, Mentzer et 
al. (2001) stated that supply chains require coordinated goods flows, services 
flow, information flow and money flow with and across national boundaries. 
Ayers (2006) stated that there should be four major flows in a supply chain, 
including physical flow, information flow, financial flow, and knowledge flow 
whose purpose is to satisfy end-user requirements with physical products and 
services from multiple, liked suppliers. He also supported the supply chain 
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definition from American Production and Inventory Control Society, and stat that 
“physical, information, and financial flows are frequently cited dimensions of the 
supply chain, the viewpoint, a very common one, of supply chains as only 
physical distribution is too limited. Information and financial components are as 
important as physical flow in many supply chains” (Ayers, 2006, p.5). Fawcett et 
al. (2007) stated that information flow, physical flow and financial flow are three 
major flows in process management. Mangan et al. (2008) stated that supply 
chains includes three key flows, namely, physical flows of materials, flows of 
information that inform that supply chain, and resources flow which help that 
supply chain to operate effectively. They, furthermore, think that not all 
resources are tangible in the supply chain, such as good partner-relationships in 
supply chains. The most common classification of supply chain flows includes 
information flow, physical/ cargo flow, and payment/ financial flow (e.g. 
Premkumar, 2000; Chopra and Meindl, 2007).  
3.1.1 Information flow 
Information flow in logistics normally refers to the information/knowledge 
collection and transfers between manufacturers, transportations, retailers and 
customers. The information includes the data or documents that need to be 
transferred for cargo processes. Information flow is an important factor in supply 
chains. Chopra and Meindl (2010, p.60) stated that “information consists of data 
and analysis concerning facilities, inventory, transportation, costs, prices, and 
customers throughout the supply chain. Information is potentially the biggest 
driver of performance in the supply chain because it directly affects each of the 
other drivers. Information presents management with the opportunity to make 
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supply chains more responsive and more efficient.” Coyle et al. (2003) argued 
that the directions of information flow not only involve the flows from 
downstream to upstream (in traditional viewpoint), but also include the opposite 
directions and the flows between supply chain members for replenishing orders. 
From a customer-oriental perspective (e.g. retailer), Fawcett et al. (2007, p.376) 
stated that the process of supply chain relies heavily on information flows about 
the product or service life cycle. Information flows can therefore enhance the 
value-added activities and make the operation more efficiently within a set of 
supply chain networks. Handfield and Nichols (1999) stated that “little doubt 
remains about the importance of information and information technology to the 
ultimate success, and perhaps even the survival, of any supply chain 
management initiative.” 
Several studies have mentioned the processes of information flow within a 
supply chain, which usually involves cargo flows. For example, Wilson (2007) 
presented a traditional structure of goods flow and information flow in supply 
chains in Figure 3.1, in which includes six basic entities, namely, raw material 
supplier, supplier (Tier 2) for incoming raw material converted into 
subassemblies, supplier (Tier 1) subassemblies converted into final goods, 
warehouse, retailer, and customer.  
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Figure 3.1 Flow of goods and information: the traditional structure 
Source: Wilson (2007) 
Moreover, Christiaanse et al. (1996) proposed a flow chart (Figure 3.2) within the 
traditional intercontinental air cargo supply chain, which was adapted from Zijp 
(1995) and involved physical flow of goods and 16 steps of information flow (with 
the numbers in Figure 3.2). In the flow chart, the information flows connect 
between almost every entity in this supply chain.  
Shippier
Road-
transporter
Forwarder Agent
Airline
company
Agent Forwarder
Road-
transporter
Consignee
Customs Customs
1
2
4
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3
8
5
11 13
7 7 7 7
16 16
10 12
14 15
9
Physical flow of goods Information flow
 
Figure 3.2 Physical flow and information flow in the air cargo supply chain 
Source: Christiaanse et al. (1996) adapted from Zijp (1995) “Telematics in Air 
Cargo” 
A typical information flow in the container shipping services is developed by the 
author which is presented in Figure 3.3 based on the flow chart of Christiaanse 
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et al. (1996), Lu and Wang (2008) and WanHai Line (no date). Firstly, the 
Consignee will enquire and negotiate the price of the cargo several times and 
make a contract with the Consignor. Following that, the Consignee needs to 
apply for a Letter of Credit (L/C) from the Paying Bank (Bank2) by the Consignee 
itself or through the Broker2 (who arranges transactions between the consignor 
and the consignee), and Bank2 will transfer the L/C to the Consignor through the 
Advising/Notifying Bank (Bank1). At the same time, the Consignee/Broker2 has 
to apply for import documents from the Government2, and waits for the import 
documents returning back from the Government2; the Consignor/Broker1 also 
has to apply for export documents from the Government1, and waits for the 
export documents returning back from the Government1. The 
Consignor/Broker1 can directly or indirectly via the forwarder to ask freight price 
and book container space from the shipping company. After transferring goods 
information (Shipping Order, S/O) to the Shipping company (or through the 
Forwarder), the Consignor will receive the documents of Bill of Lading (B/L) from 
the Shipping company or through the Forwarder. Next step, the 
Consignor/Broker1 needs to declare export to the Customs1, and the Customs1 
will check and discharge the cargos in the Container Yard (CY1). Following that, 
the Shipping company contacts the CY1 to load the cargo to the container ship. 
The Consignor/Broker1 will transfer the B/L and shipping documents to the 
Consignee/Broker2 through the Bank1 and Bank2. After the goods arriving at 
the port of destination and unloading the goods to the CY2, the shipping 
company will inform the Consignee/Broker2 that cargos have arrived and ask 
the Consignee/Broker2 to use the B/L to exchange a Delivery Order (D/O). At 
the same time, the Consignee/Broker2 needs to declare import to the import 
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customs or entrust the customs agency. Finally, the Consignee can take the D/O 
to exchange the goods from the CY2.  
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Figure 3.3 Information flows in container shipping services 
Source: author 
3.1.2 Physical flow 
Physical flow generally refers to that goods such as raw materials, finished 
goods, and return/recycle products are transferred from business sectors to 
customer sectors in a supply chain. Chopra and Meindl (2010, p.60) stated that 
“transportation entails moving inventory from point to point in the supply chain”. 
Transportation can take the form of many combinations of modes and routes, 
each with its own performance characteristics. Coyle et al. (2003) stated that 
products and related services flow has traditionally focused on the logistics 
section and is still an important element in supply chain management. In a 
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transportation industry, it is essential that cargos can be delivered in a timely, 
reliable, and damage-free manner are essential. As a type of transportation 
industry, physical flow is the most important concern in container shipping 
domain. The flow of cargos is delivered from consigners to consignees through 
various transportation types such as trailers, trains, airplanes and ships. Cargo 
delivery on time and safety are the main elements that have to be considered in 
container shipping operations.  
The physical flows in container shipping services refer to the movement of 
container cargos. Figure 3.4, designed by the author, illustrates the physical 
flows in a container shipping services, the Consignor transports goods to the 
inland deport or the Container Yard (CY1) through an Inland Transportation firm 
1. Following that, the goods are transferred to the port of loading to wait for 
loading. In the next step, the goods are loaded on ship and transported to the 
Port of destination or several transhipment ports by the shipping company. 
Finally, the goods are unloaded and transported to the consignee by another 
Inland Transportation firm 2. Cavinato (2004) also stated that physical flow 
involves transportation, warehousing, checking goods by customs, handling, and 
other forms of activities.  
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Figure 3.4 Physical flows in container shipping services 
Source: author 
3.1.3 Payment flow 
Payment flow refers to monetary payment from the customer sector to the 
business sector that provides goods or services. Coyle et al. (2003) stated that, 
payment flow traditionally has been deemed as one-directional in a supply chain 
or, in other words, payment for goods and services. Fawcett et al. (2007) stated 
that cash flow can be divided into cash entries and cash out. Cash enters a 
business from three sources, including creditors make loans, investors provide 
new capital, and operations generate cash; whilst the purpose of cash out is to 
pay for the goods and services used in operations. 
This thesis adapts the payment flow chart from several reports, e.g., Lu and 
Wang (2008), KLS Logistics (no date), and organises the whole payment flows 
in a container shipping services showing in Figure 3.5. At first, the consignor and 
the consignee have to agree the terms of sale (contracts) according to the 
International Commercial terms (INCOTERMS), which was issued by the 
International Chamber of Commerce. Each INCOTERM refers to a type of 
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agreement between the consignor and the consignee for the purchase and 
shipping of goods. There were 13 different terms in 2000 and these were 
reduced to 11 rules in 2010, each of which helps users deal with different 
situations involving the physical movement of goods and the payments. For 
example, EXW (EX-works) is one of the simplest and most basic shipment 
arrangements in which the consignor has the minimum responsibility. Under 
EXW terms, goods are made available for collection at the consignor's factory or 
warehouse and the consignee or its forwarder is responsible for making 
arrangements for insurance, export clearance, handling of all other paperwork, 
and the movements of the goods. FOB (Free On Board) is a commonly used 
terms, in which the consignor or its forwarder takes the responsibility to move the 
goods to the port or designated point of origin. The consignee or its forwarder 
will take the responsibility for insurance and transportation after that point. The 
terms of sale is closely linked to the payment. In most cases, the payment is 
triggered at the point when the ownership of the goods (or the responsibility of 
goods movement) is transferred from the consignor to the consignee.  
The payment flow between the Consignee and the Consignor involves not only 
international banks in both countries, but also the Shipping companies’ supply 
chain partners. In Figure 3.5, designed by the author, the payment flow could 
start at the Bank1 to the Consignor. After the contract made by the Consignor 
and the Consignee, the Bank2 will check the credit of the consignee, and then 
the Bank1 will pay the money of goods to the consignor. The consignor will pay 
the money of freight and commission to the Shipping company in order to book 
the cargo space through the forwarder. The Consignor can also book the cargo 
space from the Shipping company without the forwarder if the Consignor has a 
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huge transportation demand. This payment might also be paid be the Consignee 
if the contract is EXW. Simultaneously, the Consignor needs to pay the money of 
freight to the Inland Transportation 1 in order to transport the cargo from the 
factory or warehouse to the port of load. After the cargo arriving port of 
destination, the consignee needs to pay the money of freight to the Inland 
Transportation 2 for collecting and transporting the cargos to the consignee. 
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Figure 3.5 Payment flows in container shipping services 
Source: author 
3.2 Development of risk management model in the context of container 
shipping operations  
Several studies have addressed the risk models in different industrial sectors. 
Some of them focused on uncertainty identification and mitigation. The following 
sections will discuss the details from “uncertainty model” to “risk model”. 
Money of freight 
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Davis (1993) proposed that there are three distinct sources of uncertainty that 
impact on supply chains: suppliers, manufacturing, and customers. He also 
stated that it is essential to measure all of them to reduce the uncertainty. 
Mason-Jones and Towill (1998) proposed a model of the causes of uncertainty 
in the product delivery process (Figure 3.6). Within the product delivery process, 
four main uncertainty sources are included: the supply side, the manufacturing 
process, the demand side, and the control systems. In order to reduce 
uncertainties in supply chains, it is important to understand and tackle the root 
causes in these four sources, and how they interact with each other. They 
suggested that lean-thinking principles can be used to deal with the uncertainty 
in the supply side and or in the manufacturing process; whilst understanding 
dynamics of the whole system can help to manage the uncertainty happening in 
control systems and/ or in demand side. 
Control
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Manufacturing
Process
Demand Side
Physical Flow Information Flow
 
Figure 3.6 Uncertainty model in the product delivery process 
Source: Mason-Jones and Towill (1998) 
Based on Mason-Jones and Towill’s (1998) research, Rodrigues et al. (2008) 
proposed a logistics triad model with five uncertainty sources (including shipper, 
carrier, customer, control systems and external) and three flows (physical flow, 
information flow, and relationships) (Figure 3.7). Various strategies are also 
proposed to tackle the five uncertainty sources. Rodrigues et al.’s (2008) model 
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is based on the general transportation uncertainty model, whilst this thesis 
focuses on the risk of container shipping operations. It is considered as a base 
model that can be extended to the conceptual model of this thesis. 
 
Figure 3.7 Uncertainty logistics triad model 
Source: Rodrigues et al. (2008) 
Regarding uncertainty as risk, Christopher and Peck (2004) presented a model 
to categorise supply chain risks (Figure 3.8) based on Mason-Jones and 
Towill’s (1998). Three main risk categories are proposed: internal to the firm 
(includes the process risk and the control risk), external to the firm but internal 
to the supply chain network (includes demand risk and supply risk), and 
external to the network (called as environmental risk). Process risk relates to 
disruption to the internal-organisation processes, which are the arrangements of 
management activities undertaken by the company. Control risk refers to the 
risks arising from the application or misapplication of some rules that control the 
process, such as the risk from order quantities or safety stock policies. Demand 
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risk refers to the risks from the product flow, information flow, and cash flow in 
the network from the focal company to its downstream entities; whilst supply 
risk arises in the network from the focal firm to its upstream entities. 
Environment risk refers to the risks that are external to the network of 
organisations, and it may have impact on the focal company or on the upstream 
or downstream entities.  
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Figure 3.8 Sources of risk in the supply chain 
Source: Christopher and Peck (2004) 
Jüttner et al. (2003) presented a basic supply chain risk management model 
(Figure 3.9) including risk sources, risk drivers, risk mitigating strategies, and risk 
consequence. Within this model, the risk sources have the impact on supply 
chain risk consequence. However, the path of the impact could be impacted by 
the other two dimensions. The “supply chain risk drivers” has a positive impact 
on this path; whilst the “supply chain risk mitigating strategies” has a negative 
impact on this path. The model is designed for general supply chain systems but 
is rather conceptual. No applications have been reported. 
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Figure 3.9 Supply chain risk management model  
Source: Juttner et al. (2003) 
Trkman and McCormack (2009) proposed a model for managing supply chain 
network risk with the emphasis on supplier risks (Figure 3.10). The model is built 
based on the characteristics and the structure of the supply chain, a supplier’s 
attributes and performance, and two supplier’s specific environment 
uncertainties (endogenous and exogenous). The endogenous uncertainty 
(market turbulence and technology turbulence) and the exogenous uncertainty 
(such as interest rates, terrorism, and strikes) of each supplier are key factors to 
affect the relationships between supplier attribute, supply chain strategy and 
structure, and supplier risk of non-performance or disruption in a supply chain. 
Although this model includes various types of uncertainty in supply chains, some 
of them such as CPI and GDP and even endogenous uncertainty are beyond the 
scope of this study, because this thesis only focuses on the risks happened 
during cargo transportation. 
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Figure 3.10 A model for managing supply chain network risk 
Source: Trkman and McCormack (2009) 
Based on the above models (i.e. Figure 3.6, Figure 3.7, Figure 3.8, 
Figure 3.9, and Figure 3.10), the literature review in Chapter 2, and the 
emphasis on logistics flows, this thesis proposes a research conceptual 
model as shown in Figure 3.11. This conceptual model firstly identifies 
risk and categorises the risks in container shipping operations into three 
groups, i.e. risks associated with information flow, risks associated with 
physical flow, and risks associated with payment flow. The literature 
review related to the risks associated with these three flows will be 
discussed in Chapter 5 as the literature review is one of the methods for 
risk identification that has been used in this thesis and therefore should 
be located at that point in the discussion. Secondly, the risk factors are 
analysed through risk scale, which is multiplied by risk likelihood and 
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risk consequence (the details of risk likelihood, risk consequence, and 
risk scale will be discussed in Section 4.2.1.3). Thirdly, risk mitigation 
strategies are to be identified to improve shipping companies’ 
performance. Finally, the impact from risk mitigation strategies to 
company performance will be evaluated.   
Figure 3.11 Conceptual model 
Source: author 
The three logistics flows between relevant entities in the container shipping 
business are illustrated in Figure 3.12, which includes three flows that have 
been presented in previous sections, and multiple entities such as shipping 
companies, other transport companies, agency related companies, consigner, 
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consignee, and bank. One objective of this thesis is to identify the risk factors 
within the three flows in container shipping operations. 
 
Figure 3.12 The three flows in container shipping operations in the conceptual 
model   
Source: author 
3.3 Risk management steps 
The process of risk management has been addressed by many researchers. 
For example, Norrman and Jansson (2004) stated that the risk management 
processes broadly include understanding the risks, and managing the risks to 
minimise their impact by addressing probability and impact. These two 
processes can be further divided into more detailed stages from risk 
identification via risk analysis to different ways of risk management. Sung 
(2005) reported five steps of risk management as: (1) Identifying and measuring 
loss exposure; (2) Identifying and examining alternative techniques for dealing 
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with this exposure; (3) Selecting the most appropriate risk management 
alternatives consistent with the organisation’s risk financing philosophy; (4) 
Implementing the selected alternatives; and (5) Monitoring and improving the 
selected alternatives. Several studies use the term “risk assessment” to 
represent risk management. For example, Christopher et al. (2002) stated that 
“to assess supply chain risk exposures, the company must identify not only 
direct risks to its operation, but also the potential causes or sources of those 
risks at every significant link along the supply chain”. van Duijne et al. (2008) 
stated three stages of risk assessment including risk identification, risk 
estimation, and risk evaluation. Blackhurst et al. (2008) claimed that the most 
important step in the process of risk assessment is the selection and definition 
of the risk categories, which can be weighted, compared and quantified. Zsidisin 
and Ellram (1999) organised the supply risk management process for a 
high-tech company and proposed ten sub-processes (Figure 3.13): identify 
material or service, appoint manager to own the process, initiated risk 
assessment score card (which includes eight risk factors: design, cost, legal, 
availability, manufacturability, quality, supply base, and environmental, health 
and safety impacts), review criteria for each risk factor, collect data for each risk 
factor, assign risk scores, conduct impact analysis, document analysis and 
actions, monitoring, and determine to cease assessment.  
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Appoint
manager to
own the
process
Initiate risk
assessment
score card
Review
criteria for
each risk
factor
Collect data
for each risk
factor
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Figure 3.13 Supply risk assessment processes  
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Source: Zsidisin and Ellram (1999) 
Generally speaking, the steps of risk management include risk identification, 
risk measurement and analysis, and risk mitigation strategies development and 
evaluation. This thesis will follow the above risk management steps. 
3.3.1 Risk identification  
Risk identification is the first step in the process of risk management (e.g., 
Waters, 2007; Tummala and Schoenherr, 2011), and it is an important stage in 
the risk management process because decision-makers can become aware of 
the unfavourable factors in the projects by risk identification (Norrman and 
Jansson, 2004). Risk identification produces a list of risks that impacts on an 
organisation or even the whole supply chain (Waters, 2007). There are various 
risk classifications in the literature. For example, Jason-Jones and Towill (1998) 
stated that risks within supply chains can be divided into internal risks, supply 
chain risks, and external risks. Shimpi (2001) illustrated that organisational risks 
consist of financial, political, operational, and legal liability. The Institute of Risk 
Management (2002) stated that risk categories include strategic risk, 
operational risk, financial risk, and hazard risk. Waters (2007) identified several 
risks in a supply chain, such as physical risks, financial risk, information risks, 
and organisational risks. Manuj and Mentzer (2008a) classified risks into eight 
categories: supply risks, operational risks, demand risks, security risks, macro 
risks, policy risks, competitive risks, and resource risks. Vilko and Hallikas 
(2011) selected five risk categories out of the above eight (by excluding demand 
risks, competitive risks and resource risks) and added a new risk category 
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called environment risk. In this thesis, we try to identify risks from the three 
logistics flows in container shipping operations. 
3.3.2 Risk measurement and analysis 
Risk measurement and analysis is the second step in the risk management 
process. It provides a quantitative view of the severities of the risks and helps 
decision-makers know which risks should priority to be managed.  
There are various methods for risk measurement and analysis. One common 
method is to compare the risk factors through their likelihood and consequences 
(Tummala and Schoenherr, 2011) and put them into a risk matrix/map (Yang, 
2010, 2011), which can provide a straightforward ranking according to the risk 
severity. However, the risk consequence varies (NPSA, 2008): some 
consequences are more tangible and easy to evaluate, such as financial loss; 
whereas the others may be intangible and difficult to evaluate (Waters, 2007), 
such as reputational loss. Damage to maritime safety and security caused by, 
e.g., piracy attacks, bad weather conditions and dangerous working 
environment in container shipping operations is indeed a serious risk 
consequence (Tzannatos, 2003; IMO, 2009). Notably, some of the damages are 
measurable by monetary terms and some, such as pain and suffering of the 
crew and their families, may not be measured directly by monetary terms. The 
following sections introduce the three risk consequences, including financial 
loss, reputation loss, and safety and security incident related loss.  
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3.3.2.1 Financial loss 
Financial loss is the most common measure phrased in terms of a cost and it 
can be obtained by actual calculations or estimated from historical data, e.g. a 
lost load of goods which may have a clear monetary value. Container shipping 
companies have to tackle many risks that cause financial loss. A number of 
studies have addressed different financial related loss, e.g., Tzannatos (2003), 
Elky (2006), Notteboom (2006), Notteboom and Vernimmen (2009), Ronen 
(2011) and Vilko and Hallikas (2011). 
3.3.2.2 Reputational loss 
Although financial loss is probably the most concerned consequence in relation 
to risks, the monetary value is not always appropriate or obtainable, e.g. a 
delivery may be delayed, which may incur not only penalty but also loss of 
goodwill. Due to the intangible characteristics of some risk consequence and/or 
the difficulty to quantify the impact, this type of consequence is not very suitable 
to be measured in financial terms. Alternative measures may be more 
appropriate, e.g. reputation loss (Bebbington et al., 2008). Many studies have 
pointed out that the reputation of container shipping companies is an important 
asset and can be a critical factor for shippers selecting the container shipping 
companies (e.g., Brooks, 1985; Javidan, 1998; Yang et al., 2009). 
3.3.2.3 Safety and security incident related loss 
Safety and security has been an increasing concern in the maritime domain over 
the past few decades; and it has been further highlighted recently by the 
problem of piracy in Somalia. A number of international conventions and 
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legislation, such as SOLAS (International Convention for the Safety of Life at 
Sea) and IMDG code (the International Maritime Dangerous Goods code), have 
been adopted by the International Maritime Organization (IMO) in order to 
reduce the risks and the impact of damage in relation to maritime safety and 
security incidents. However, maritime safety and security incidents still occur 
from time to time and in most cases, huge damage could be incurred.  
There have been a great number of studies on maritime safety and security in 
the academic field. It is commonly recognised that maritime safety and maritime 
security are quite different from each other in their nature and cause. Maritime 
safety incidents are normally caused by technical failure or human elements 
whereas maritime security incidents are normally caused by piratical or terrorist 
attacks. In the thesis, however, these two phenomena are analysed together as 
a group from the perspective of risk consequence, which is the standpoint of this 
thesis.  
A number of articles focus on maritime safety. For example, Håvold (2005) 
addressed safety culture in a Norwegian shipping company and classified the 
risks into 11 factors, including knowledge, management attitude to safety, safety 
behaviour, attitude to safety rules/instruction, employees satisfaction with safety 
and quality, concentration of authority, training experience, quality experience, 
stress experience, actions after an unsafe act, and environmental systems. 
Hetherington et al. (2006) state that human factors issues (including fatigue, 
stress, health, situation awareness, teamwork, decision-making, communication, 
automation, and safety culture) are the major one which cause maritime 
problems. The articles focusing on security in the shipping industry have been 
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increasing recently. For example, Roach (2004) focused on the security 
management to terrorism threats in a shipping company, such as the principles 
of co-operation and flag state jurisdiction which provide the legal foundation for 
ship boarding and enforcement; Thai (2007) investigated the impacts of security 
improvements in maritime transport using an empirical study of Vietnam; Lun et 
al. (2008) discussed the security enhancement of container transportation 
through the adoption of technology. Yang (2010, 2011) focused on the risk 
management of Taiwan’s container shipping supply chain security, and the 
result was reported that “cargo cannot be shipped on time and is shut out by the 
customs authority” is the top container security initiative related factor in terms of 
risk severity (see Chapter 2). 
3.3.3 Development and evaluation of risk mitigation strategies  
Risk mitigation strategies making, monitoring and evaluation is the last step in 
the risk management processes. Managers need to make the right strategies 
corresponding to the risks to mitigate their impacts on the companies. In some 
studies, this step is also called risk management, which is defined as “the 
process whereby decisions are made to accept a known or assessed risk and/or 
the implementation of actions to reduce the consequences or probability of 
occurrence” (Norrman and Jansson, 2004, p.438).  
3.4. Chapter summary 
This chapter develops a conceptual model based on several existing risk models 
and the consideration of three flows in container shipping logistics operations. 
This thesis classifies the risks into three categories, namely, risks associated 
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with information flow, risks associated with physical flow, and risks associated 
with payment flow. The conceptual model includes three parts, i.e., container 
shipping operations (which is organised by the three logistics flows), three risk 
categories (which have negative impact to the container shipping service and 
include financial loss, reputation loss, and safety and security incident related 
loss), and several risk mitigation strategies (which have positive impact on the 
container shipping service). The steps of risk management were also introduced, 
including risk identification, risk measurement and analysis, and risk mitigation 
strategies development and evaluation. 
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Chapter 4 Research methodology 
Chapter 4 presents the research methodologies that will be used in this thesis. 
Section 4.1 introduces Taiwan’s container shipping industry; Section 4.2 
presents the data collection methods; Section 4.3 discusses several methods 
for data analysis, which includes two major parts: risk analysis methods (risk 
scale ranking, risk matrix, risk map, and P-I graph) and risk mitigation strategy 
evaluation methods (classic AHP and fuzzy AHP); and Section 4.4 summarises 
the chapter. 
4.1 Case study: Taiwan’s container shipping industry  
Owing to its island geography, Taiwan largely relies on international trade. Most 
of the materials for manufacturing are imported by ships, and therefore the 
shipping industry plays an important role in Taiwan’s economy. According to 
official statistics (Ministry of Transportation and Communications, 2011), around 
99% of international trade in Taiwan is transported by sea.  
Based on the reason above, this thesis uses Taiwan’s container shipping 
industry as a case study. Case study is defined as “analyses of persons, events, 
decisions, periods, projects, policies, institutions, or other systems that are 
studied holistically by one or more methods. The case that is the subject of the 
inquiry will be an instance of a class of phenomena that provides an analytical 
frame — an object — within which the study is conducted and which the case 
illuminates and explicates” (Thomas, 2011). This case study will focus on 
Taiwan’s main container shipping companies and shipping agents (also called 
freight forwarders), from which the empirical data will be collected. The results 
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will be expanded to general research as the obtained samples are represented. 
The author first introduces the three largest Taiwan container shipping 
companies: Evergreen Line, Yang Ming Marine Transport Corp., and Wan Hai 
Lines, and then discuss the shipping agent industry in Taiwan. 
According to Alphaliner database (2012), Evergreen Line is the 4th large 
container shipping company in the world in 2012. Owning 187 container ships, 
Evergreen Line services more than 80 countries and covers Asia, America, 
Europe, Middle-East, Austria, and Africa. A total 735,662 TEU capacity was 
provided in 2012 (Alphaliner, 2012). Evergreen Group has also invested several 
sub-companies such as Evergreen International Storage & Transport Corp. and 
Evergreen Logistics Corp. (www.evergreen-group.com). Evergreen Line also 
joins a strategic alliance with Yang Ming Marine Transport Corp. and Orient 
Overseas Container Line (OOCL) to provide Taiwan/Hong Kong/Ho Chi Minh 
Express Service (THX).  
According to Alphaliner (2012) database, Yang Ming Marine Transport Corp. 
was the 16th container shipping company in the world in 2010 and grew to 15th 
in 2012. Yang Ming Marine Transport Corp. is the second largest container 
shipping company in Taiwan, and it owns 82 container ships with total 346,972 
TEU carrying capacity in 2012 (Alphaliner, 2012). The service covers Asia, 
Europe, America, Australia, and Africa with more than 190 branches. Several 
sub-companies are invested by Yang Ming Group to enhance their service 
quality such as YES Logistics Corp., Kao Ming Container Terminal Corp., and 
Jing Ming Transport Corp. Yang Ming Marine Transport Corp. is a member of 
CKYH Alliance (including COSCO, K-Line, Yang Ming and Hanjin shipping), 
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which is the top container shipping strategic alliance in the world 
(www.yangming.com).  
Wan Hai Lines is the 21st largest container shipping company in the world with a 
total 75 container ships and 158,048 TEU carrying capacity in 2012 (Alphaliner, 
2012). The main business of Wan Hai Lines focuses on Asia, and it has the 
more routes in Asia countries than the previous two companies. Its service also 
covers Middle-East, America, Europe, and Africa. Wan Hai Group also invested 
several sub-companies to provide a quality shipping supply chain service, 
including Wan Hai Logistics and several related companies. Wan Hai Lines 
co-operates several service routes with other container shipping companies 
such as Yang Ming Marine Transport Corp. and Evergreen Line. 
(web.wanhai.com.tw)  
In terms of shipping agents in Taiwan, there are 333 companies registered in 
Taiwan Shipping Agencies Association in 2011 (unpublished list), in which 155 
companies are in Taipei, 41 companies in Keelung, 97 companies in Kaohsiung, 
29 companies in Taichung, and 11 companies in Hualien. Shipping agent means 
“person and establishment who act on behalf of ship owner, captain, operator or 
ship leaser by the agreements entered between them, and who protect their 
rights against third parties and establishments, who perform their obligations in 
the agreement, and get paid for these actions” (www.deepbluemaritime.com/).  
Due to the research topic of this thesis which focuses on risk management in the 
container shipping industry, many companies in the list of Taiwan Shipping 
Agencies Association are not suitable because this list includes some 
companies not related to container shipping such as bulk shipping companies. 
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This thesis has to narrow down the target population to the companies related to 
container shipping, so that this can match our research objective 2, 3 and 4. This 
thesis therefore identified 116 container shipping companies and container 
shipping agents from the list as the target population. The whole identified 
population will be used as samples in this study. Table 4.1 presents part of the 
target samples: ten selected container shipping agencies (in the right column) 
who serve international container shipping companies in Taiwan (in the left 
column). 
Table 4.1 Selected container shipping agents 
International container shipping 
companies 
General agent in Taiwan 
Maersk Sealand Maersk Taiwan 
CMA/CGM/ANL CMA CGM (Taiwan) Ltd 
CCNI Wilhelmsen Ships Service Inc. 
CSAV CSAV Group Agencies (Taiwan) Ltd. 
(Taipei) 
Hyundai Merchant Marine Hyundai Merchant Marine (Taiwan) Co., 
Ltd. 
K LINE "K"LINE (Taiwan) Ltd. 
Hapag-Lloyd Hapag-Lloyd (Taiwan) Ltd 
Korea Marine Transport Co., Ltd Trans Vantage Shipping Agency Ltd. 
MOL MOL (Taiwan) Co., Ltd. 
PIL Pacific International Lines (Taiwan) Ltd 
4.2 Data collection methods 
The data collection methods will be presented in relation to the steps of the risk 
management process. The first sub-section introduces the data collection 
methods in risk identification, validation and measurement. The second 
sub-section discusses the data collection methods in risk mitigation strategies 
identification, validation and analysis. 
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4.2.1 Data collection methods in risk identification, validation and 
measurement  
4.2.1.1 Identification of risks  
Yang (2010) listed several tools that can be used to systematically identify risks, 
including questionnaire surveys, review of corporate loss history, analysis of 
corporate financial reports and meeting records, checking of other corporate 
records and documents, construction of operational flow charts, continuous 
facility examinations, and consulting form internal and external experts, etc. 
Waters (2007) also suggested several common methods for identifying risk, 
including historical data collection/ relative document review, interviews, and 
group meetings.  
The general process for risk identification has the following five steps: (i) define 
the overall process; (ii) divide this into a series of distinct, related operations; (iii) 
systematically consider the details of each operation; (iv) identify the risks and 
their main features; and (v) describe the most significant risks (Waters, 2007). 
This thesis first reviews the relevant literature to identify all the risk factors that 
have been directly addressed in container shipping operations (in Chapter 2) 
and then conduct a more comprehensive literature review in the general supply 
chain context to identify relevant risks (which will be conducted in Chapter 6). 
Several studies have also used a literature review to identify the risk factors, 
e.g., Knemeyer et al. (2009), Rao and Glodsby (2009), Yang (2010, 2011), and 
Jackson et al. (2012).  
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4.2.1.2 Validation of risks 
When the risks are unclear and complex, interview perhaps is the most suitable 
way to collect new information from the people who are most familiar with 
conditions to clarify the ambiguity (Waters, 2007). Several studies have used 
interviews to identify and validate risks, e.g. Yang (2011) used interviews to 
validate and identify risk factors in Taiwan’s maritime supply chain security. 
Based on the reviews of previous literature, considering the time limitation and 
the complex degree of data analysis, this thesis uses semi-structured 
face-to-face interviews with experts to validate the identified risks, and explore 
other potential risks in container shipping operations. In order to explore more 
risk factors, the interview includes several open questions such as “what kinds 
of risk”. Moreover, three flow charts (information flow, physical flow, and 
payment flow) in container shipping operations were also confirmed by the 
container shipping experts. The semi-structure interview questions are listed in 
Appendix 1. 
Several methods/tools for recording interviews are widely used, such as digital 
recorder machines and note writing. This thesis uses both methods to collect 
the interview data. Transcription is produced if the interviewee agrees using the 
digital recorder machine to record the content of the interview; whilst note 
writing is taken if the interviewee does not want to be recorded in the interview.  
In terms of the sample size of the interview, the author has connected with 12 
container shipping companies in Taiwan; however, only seven managers of two 
companies replied to the author during one month. These two companies are 
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two of the top three container shipping companies in Taiwan, so they are able to 
reasonably represent the container shipping industry in Taiwan. These seven 
managers of container shipping companies in Taiwan have been face-to-face 
interviewed in February 2011. In order to balance the interviews’ professional 
area, the interviewees include two information managers, two vice presidents, 
and three senior managers. Some of the interviewees did not want to be 
recorded by the digital recorder machine, as mentioned before, we therefore 
used note writing to take the important information mentioned by the 
interviewers instead of transcription. The transcriptions and notes from the 
interviews are presented in Appendix 2. 
After producing the transcriptions and organising the note writing, the results of 
the interviews were summarised. A table of risk factors was generated by taking 
into account the interview results. The three flows were also modified 
accordingly to reflect the face-to-face interview results. 
The table of risk factors generated from the literature review, face-to-face 
interviews and email interview is then organised in a hierarchical structure: risk 
categories, risk elements, and risk factors. Three risk categories are formed 
according to three logistics flows, i.e. physical flow, information flow, and 
payment flow. Each risk category is divided into several risk elements and each 
risk element is a group of closely related risk factors. Before conducting a 
large-scale risk-factor survey (to measure their likelihood and consequence), 
the author conducts another semi-structure email interview to confirm the 
appropriateness of risk element classification. This email interview can be 
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regarded as a pilot test for the following large-scale questionnaire. The email 
interview is listed in Appendix 3. 
4.2.1.3 Measurement of risks 
Risk measurement methods are often used in quantitative way, and most of 
them are based on two factors: 1) the likelihood of a risky event occurring; and 
2) the consequences when the event does occur (Waters, 2007; Cox, 2008; 
Beretta and Bozzolan, 2008). Waters (2007) stated that likelihood and 
consequence are just two considerations in many factors when managers do 
risk analysis. 
In this study, a questionnaire survey with five-point Likert scale is used to 
measure the level of agreement of each question from the respondents. This 
survey is called risk-factor questionnaire survey. The target sample is selected 
from the list of ROC National Association of Shipping Agencies, a total 116 
container shipping related companies were selected and each company was 
sent several questionnaire surveys to relevant departments, e.g. 
president/vice-president, information/document department, operation/shipping 
department, and financial department in order to cover all three logistics flows. In 
total, 342 questionnaires were sent out on 14th July 2011. 
The questionnaire survey includes five major parts: the level of risks associated 
with information flow, the level of risks associated with physical flow, the level of 
risks associated with payment flow, the impact of risk mitigation strategies, and 
the respondents’ profile. In order to measure the level of risk scale, this 
questionnaire measure both risk likelihood and three risk consequences 
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(financial loss, reputation loss, and safety and security incident related loss) in 
each question of the three risk parts (i.e. risks associated with information flow, 
risks associated with physical flow and risks associated with payment flow). The 
last part of this questionnaire is the respondents’ profile. The following sections 
discuss the risk likelihood, risk consequence, and risk scale that will be used in 
this thesis. The whole questionnaire is list in the Appendix 4. 
Risk likelihood 
Risk likelihood is defined as the probability of the risk will occur (Garvey and 
Lansdowne, 1998). It is often a subjective view of whether the risk will 
materialise (Waters, 2007). More specifically, the value of likelihood is located 
between 0 and 1, in which 0 means never happen and 1 means always happen. 
However, an accurate numerical percentage is sometimes difficult to identify. 
Many studies use five abstractive categories to describe the probability of events 
(e.g. Hallikas et al. 2004; NPSA, 2008): very unlikely (or very low; impossible; 
rare), improbable (or low; unlikely), moderate (or medium; occasional; possible), 
probable (or high; frequent; likely), and very probable (or very high; almost 
certain). In this thesis, a questionnaire with Likert five-point scale is used to 
collect the likelihood of risks occurred in container shipping operations. We 
follow this format and use 1, 2, 3, 4 and 5 to represent “rare”, “unlikely”, 
“possible”, “likely”, and “almost certain” respectively. Table 4.2 shows the 
classification for probabilities in this thesis.  
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Table 4.2 Definition of risk likelihood 
Likelihood 
Likert 
scale 
Definition 
Rare 1 
The occurrence is not anticipated  
May only occur in exceptional circumstances; simple 
process; no previous incidence of non-compliance 
Unlikely 2 
Trivial likelihood however could occur  
Could occur at some time; non-complex process and/or 
existence of checks and balances 
Possible 3 
Possibility less than 50 -50  
Might occur at some time; complex process with 
extensive checks and balances; impacting factors outside 
control of organisation 
Likely 4 
Possibility more than 50 -50  
Will probably occur in most circumstances; complex 
process with some checks and balances; impacting 
factors outside control of organisation 
Almost 
certain 
5 
Almost certain it would occur  
Can be expected to occur in most circumstances; 
complex process with minimal checks and balances; 
impacting factors outside control of organisation 
Risk consequence 
Risk consequence is regarded as an outcome (losses or gains) of a risk event 
(Waters, 2007; NPSA, 2008). Jüttner et al. (2003, p. 200) also stated that risk 
consequences are “the focused supply chain outcome variables like costs or 
quality, i.e. the different forms in which the variance becomes manifest”. 
Norrman and Jansson (2004, p.437) defined risk consequences as “the focused 
supply chain outcome variables like costs or quality (but also health and safety), 
i.e. the different forms in which the variance becomes manifest.” 
The level of risk consequence can be described in different ways. Some 
scholars use “negligible, minor, moderate, serious, and critical” (Garvey and 
Lansdowne, 1998; NPSA, 2008); some use “no safety effect, minor, major, 
hazardous, and catastrophic” (Cox, 2008); “no impact, minor impact, medium 
impact, serious impact, and catastrophic impact” (Hallikas et al., 2004), “low, 
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moderate, and high” (Elky, 2006) and “negligible, marginal, critical, and 
catastrophic” (Tummala and Schoenherr, 2011) have also been used. This 
thesis uses “insignificant, minor, moderate, major, and catastrophic” to describe 
the level of risk consequence. Each of three risk consequences mentioned 
above is measured at five levels from 1 to 5. The classification for risks impact 
and their definition are illustrated in Table 4.3. 
Table 4.3 Definition of risk consequence  
Consequence 
categories 
Likert 
scale 
Definition  
Insignificant 1 
An event that, if it occurred, would have no effect on the 
programme. 
Minor  2 
An event that, if it occurred, would cause only a small 
cost/schedule increase. Requirements would still be 
achieved. 
Moderate 3 
An event that, if it occurred, would cause moderate 
cost/schedule increase, but important requirements 
would still be met. 
Major 4 
An event that, if it occurred, would cause major 
cost/schedule increase 
Catastrophic 5 
An event that, if it occurred, would cause programme 
failure (inability to achieve minimum acceptable 
requirements) 
4.2.2 Data collection methods in risk mitigation strategies identification 
and analysis 
The use of data collection methods in risk mitigation strategies is similar to the 
case of risks in Section 4.2.1, including relevant literature review and a set of 
interview. The risk mitigation strategies will firstly be identified, validated, and 
then ranked, and finally evaluated. The following present the detailed 
information of this process. 
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4.2.2.1 Identification of risk mitigation strategies 
Similar to Section 4.2.1.1, this thesis first reviews the most relevant literature to 
identify the risk mitigation strategies in the container shipping sector (in Chapter 
2) and then reviews more literature in a broaden supply chain context to identify 
other relevant risk mitigation strategies (which will be discussed in Chapter 7). 
Several studies have used the literature review method to identify risk mitigation 
strategies, e.g., Mitchell (1995), Ellegaard (2008), and Veselko and Bratkovič 
(2009). 
4.2.2.2 Validation of risk mitigation strategies 
Similar to the case of risk validation in Section 4.2.1.2, the validation and 
exploration of risk mitigation strategies are also conducted through 
semi-structured face-to-face interviews after identifying the risk mitigation 
strategies from reviewing literature in the general supply chain context. In order 
to explore more risk mitigation strategies, the interview includes several open 
questions such as “how do you manage the risks”. The interview questions are 
put together with those used in the validation of risk factors in Appendix 1.  
4.2.2.3 Ranking of risk mitigation strategies 
The same as Section 4.2.1.3 (measurement of risk), a mitigation-strategy 
survey with a five-point Likert scale is used to measure the levels of 
effectiveness of these strategies in container shipping operations. This survey is 
conducted together with the risk-factor questionnaire survey. However, this 
survey only focuses on the effectiveness of these strategies rather than the 
likelihood and the consequence in the risk-factor survey. The terms of 
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measurement used are from “no impact” to “very positive impact”, and the 
definitions are presented in the Table 4.4. 
Table 4.4 Definition of the effectiveness category of risk mitigation strategies 
Effectiveness 
category 
Likert 
scale 
Definition  
No impact 1 
The strategy would impact nothing on the shipping 
company on risk management 
Slight impact 2 
The strategy would impact slightly on the shipping 
company on risk management 
Medium 
impact 
3 
The strategy would have medium impact on the shipping 
company on risk management 
Good impact 4 
The strategy would impact well on the shipping company 
on risk management 
Very positive 
impact 
5 
The strategy would have very positive impact on the 
shipping company on risk management 
4.2.2.4 Evaluation of risk mitigation strategies 
Risk mitigation strategy evaluation is regarded as the last step of the risk 
management process. After analysing the risk mitigation strategies in the 
previous questionnaire survey (called mitigation-strategy survey), several top 
strategies according to their overall importance will be selected to be further 
evaluated. The purpose is to examine the relationships of these selected 
mitigation strategies in more details under different performance criteria. This is 
done using the Analytical Hierarchical Process (AHP) analysis method based on 
the primary data collected through a purposely designed questionnaire, called 
an AHP questionnaire survey. 
To apply the AHP method, we firstly need to build up a hierarchical 
structure to achieve the research goal: mitigating the impacts of risks in 
container shipping operations. Two different structures could be 
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constructed in our research context for AHP decision analysis, as 
shown in Figure 4.1 and Figure 4.2 respectively. In Model 1 (Figure 
4.1), the top level is the goal of this model, which aims to mitigate the 
impact of risks on shipping operations. The second level is the criteria 
level, which represents three consequence criteria, i.e. “Reducing 
financial loss”, “Reducing reputation loss”, and “Reducing safety and 
security incident related loss”. The three consequence criteria can be 
affected by each of three groups of risk mitigation strategies, which are 
listed at the alternative level 1, and temporarily named as strategy 
group A, strategy group B, and strategy group C. The alternative level 2 
lists more detailed mitigation strategies. In this model, the relative 
importance of different groups at Alternative level 1 can be evaluated 
using AHP method; however, it is not possible to make comparison 
between individual mitigation strategies. It should also be noted that the 
three groups of risk mitigation strategies and the detailed risk mitigation 
strategies are identified through literature review and confirmed by the 
shipping managers from the interviews.  
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Goal 
 
Criteria 
 
 
Alternative  
Level 1 
 
Alternative  
Level 2 
 
 
Figure 4.1 Hierarchical Model 1 of mitigation strategies 
Source: author 
In Model 2 (Figure 4.2), the goal and criteria are the same as those in Model 1. 
However, there is only one alternative level, at which the mitigation strategies 
are put at the same level. The advantage of this structure is enable us to 
evaluate the relative importance of all the mitigation strategies at the alternative 
level so that shipping companies could prioritise the strategies. However, it is 
suggested that the number of different items at the same level should not be 
greater than seven when using AHP method, because the human being brain 
will be confused when comparing more than seven items (Saaty, 1977a). 
Therefore, the items at the alternative level in Model 2 have to be limited to 
seven strategies.  
Strategy group A Strategy group B Strategy group C 
1. Strategy A-1 1. Strategy C-1 
3. Strategy C-3 
2. Strategy C-2 
1. Strategy B-1 
Reducing 
financial loss  
Reducing 
reputation loss  
Reducing safety and 
security incident 
related loss 
Mitigating the impact of risks on container shipping operations 
5. Strategy A-5 
4. Strategy A-4 
3. Strategy A-3 
2. Strategy A-2 
3. Strategy B-3 
2. Strategy B-2 
4. Strategy B-4 
5. Strategy B-5 
72 
 
Goal 
 
Criteria 
 
 
Alternatives 
Figure 4.2 Hierarchical Model 2 of mitigation strategies 
Source: author 
One of the research objectives in this thesis is to understand and evaluate the 
importance of the risk mitigation strategies as well as the relationships between 
these strategies. In Model 1, two type of comparison can be evaluated: (i) the 
comparison between the three risk mitigation strategy groups and (ii) the 
comparison of the risk mitigation strategies within the group. However, the 
comparison of the strategy groups is not the main purpose of this thesis, and 
some important strategies might be hidden in a less important group. Moreover, 
it cannot compare the strategies across different groups. In Model 2, only seven 
risk mitigation strategies are chosen to compare, and a full scale of comparison 
is achievable. With the assumption that the top seven mitigation strategies are 
selected (e.g. through the mitigation-strategy questionnaire survey, cf. Section 
4.2.2.3), it is interesting to examine the relationship of these strategies in more 
detail. In light of the above, this thesis chooses Model 2 as the hierarchical 
structure in the AHP analysis method. 
To perform the AHP analysis, a questionnaire survey (called AHP survey) is 
designed to collect primary data from the container shipping industry. The 
Mitigating the impact of risks on container shipping operations 
Reducing 
financial loss 
Reducing 
reputation loss 
Reducing safety and 
security incident related 
loss 
Strategy 
A 
Strategy 
B 
Strategy 
C 
Strategy 
D 
Strategy 
E 
Strategy 
F 
Strategy 
G 
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survey consists of three parts, including an introduction (to show the 
respondents the outline of this questionnaire, and explain the terms and nature 
of the questions), the main questionnaire per se (the questions to compare all 
items at the same hierarchical level on a pairwise basis), and the respondent’s 
profile. The questions in the main part are constructed in the form of the 
traditional nine-point pair-comparison scale that will be explained later.  
After designing the AHP questionnaire, the author sent the draft of the 
questionnaire to two experts in November 2011. One is a senior manager in 
container shipping company, and the other is an expert of AHP method. This is 
deemed as a pilot test for the AHP questionnaire. The modified questionnaire is 
given in Appendix 5.  
4.3 Data analysis methods 
The data analysis methods used in this thesis can be classified into two groups: 
risk analysis methods and risk mitigation strategies evaluation methods. The risk 
analysis methods include risk scale analysis (which is the main risk analysis in 
this thesis) and risk scale presentation. The risk mitigation strategies evaluation 
methods include the classic AHP method and a fuzzy AHP method.   
4.3.1 Risk analysis method  
There are several common methods for risk analysis. For example, scenario 
analysis is used to analyse the possible effects of a series of decisions (Waters, 
2007). Hazard Operability (HAZOP) analysis is a structured and systematic 
technique for predicting the various adverse factors that might arise in a 
chemical factory (Vaidhyanathan and Venkatasubramanian, 1995). Failure 
74 
 
Mode and Effect Analysis (FMEA) is a procedure in operations management for 
identifying potential failure modes, and then establishing the impact of each 
type of failure (Waters, 2007; Tummala and Schoenherr, 2011). Fault Tree 
Analysis (FTA) is a top down, logic and probabilistic technique used in 
probabilistic risk assessment and system reliability assessment (NASA, 2002; 
Tummala and Schoenherr, 2011). Risk scale is a simple method to analyse the 
impact of risks through multiplying risk likelihood and risk consequence (Waters, 
2007; NPSA, 2008). This thesis uses the risk scale method to analyse the 
importance of the identified risk factors due to its simplicity and the ability to 
rank different risk factors over a population of respondents. 
Before the risk scale analysis, descriptive statistics will be used to present the 
respondents’ profile of the questionnaire. Descriptive statistics is the discipline 
of quantitatively describing the main features of a collection of data (Mann, 
1995). Descriptive statistics can present meaningful information or statistics 
data after organising the raw data. There are several attributes that are used 
commonly in descriptive statistics, including frequency, percentage, mean 
value, standard deviation, minimum value, and maximum value, etc. Moreover, 
several tools for presenting these attributes include table, bar chart, and pie 
chart. In this thesis, the frequency, percentage, mean value, and standard 
deviation are chosen as the major features in descriptive statistics analysis; and 
table presentation is the main tool to show these features. We use SPSS 
version 19 to obtain these descriptive statistics.  
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4.3.1.1 Risk scale analysis 
Managers need to know the most serious risk factors before making appropriate 
strategies to mitigate risks. The level of risk is also termed the risk scale, which is 
calculated by the following formula (Mitchell, 1995; Norrman and Jansson, 2004; 
Kleindorfer and Saad, 2005; Cox, 2008; Manuj and Mentzer, 2008a; Vilko and 
Hallikas, 2011): 
                                                          
                                                            
In this thesis, the risk scale is given by 
                                             
Risk scale is used to identify the relative importance of each risk factor in this 
thesis. A key step to perform risk analysis is to calculate the risk scale for each 
risk factor over all respondents, which enables us to draw risk maps to compare 
the relative importance of each risk factor. In the following we discuss two 
methods to calculate the risk scale. To simplify the discussion, we introduce the 
notations below 
 M : the total number of risk factors 
 N : the total number of respondents 
 lri: the likelihood of risk factor r  by the respondent i, 1≤r≤M and 1≤i≤N. 
 cri : the consequence of risk factor  r by the respondent i, 1≤r≤M and 
1≤i≤N.  
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Note that the risk scale is the product of the likelihood and the consequence of a 
risk factor. Two methods could be used to calculate the risk scale over multiple 
respondents. The first method is to multiply the average likelihood over all 
respondents with the average consequence over all respondents for each risk 
factor. We call this method as Risk Scale Average Likelihood and Consequence 
(RSALC). The formula is in the following -  
          ̅ *   ̅ 
Where 
  ̅  
 
 
 ∑    
 
    and    ̅   
 
 
∑    
 
    
The second method is to obtain the risk scale for each individual respondent on 
each risk factor first, then do the average of those risk scales over all 
respondents. We call this method as Average Risk Scale (ARS). The formula is 
in the following -  
       
 
 
∑           
 
    
The first method provides three pieces of results for each risk factor, i.e. 
average likelihood, average consequence, and the risk scale. Therefore it is 
easy to apply and the results can be directly shown in the risk map in which all 
three pieces of results are required. However, there is a drawback in this 
method because the final result of RSALCr includes components which 
represent one respondent’s likelihood multiplied by another respondent’s 
consequence. This may distort the statistic results. 
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The second method is more reasonable to calculate the risk scale because it is 
obtained by multiplying the risk likelihood with the risk consequence from each 
respondent respectively first, and then averaging over all respondents. This 
thesis therefore selects the second method – ARS – as the measurement to 
evaluate the risk scale for each risk factor. 
However, the second method only provides the result of risk scale over all 
respondents. It does not generate the corresponding risk likelihood and risk 
consequence. We present a method to solve this problem based on the concept 
of the shortest distance. Consider a two-dimension state space in which the 
x-axis represents the risk likelihood and the y-axis represents the risk 
consequence. Each respondent can be represented by a point in the state 
space. The distance between any two points (x1, y1) and (x2, y2) is given by 
   √                 . Our purpose is to find the best pair of likelihood 
and consequence, whose product is equal to ARS, while the corresponding 
point has the shortest total distance with all respondents.   
Let  ̂  be the candidate risk likelihood, and  ̂  be the candidate risk 
consequence. For a given risk factor r, the total distance between ( ̂ , ̂ ) and 
(   ,    ) for 1≤i≤N can be formulated as  
     ∑√  ̂          ̂       
 
   
                
The objective is to seek the optimal ( ̂ , ̂ ) for 1≤r≤M by minimizing the following 
constrained optimisation problem,  
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     ∑  
 
   
 ∑∑√  ̂          ̂       
 
   
 
   
 
Subject to  
 ̂    ̂       
The above optimisation problem can be easily solved using existing software 
tools, e.g. Excel solver. After obtaining the best ( ̂ , ̂ ) for 1≤r≤M, we are able to 
present the risk scale in a further presentation, the risk map. 
4.3.1.2 Risk scale presentation: risk matrix, risk map, and P-I graph 
Business managers are usually required to evaluate the possible risks 
according to their estimated impact and expected likelihood of occurrence 
(Beretta and Bozzolan, 2008). To better understand the risks and their relative 
importance, the risk scales can be presented in different ways including risk 
matrix (Yang, 2010; Tseng et al., 2012), risk map (Waters, 2007), and P-I graph 
(Vose, 2008). Risk matrix or a Probability-Impact matrix (P-I table) is a common 
method that identifies the critical risks in a program and provides an approach 
to evaluate the potential impacts of a risk (Garvey and Lansdowne, 1998; Vose, 
2008). Risk matrix has been used in various areas such as technology (Eleky, 
2006), health (NPSA, 2008), and supply chain management (Knemeyer et al., 
2009). These methods bear some similarity but also have different features. 
They are briefly introduced below. 
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Risk matrix 
A risk matrix (Table 4.5) is a two-dimension table which consists of several 
categories of “probability” (“likelihood” or “frequency”) in the horizontal dimension 
and several categories of “severity” (“impact” or “consequences”) in the vertical 
dimension (Cox, 2008). Each category of probability is given an estimated 
numerical value, typically on a scale of 1 to about 5 – individually means rare, 
unlikely, possible, likely and almost certain. Each category of consequence is 
also represented by numerical values from 1 to 5 (insignificant, minor, moderate, 
major, and catastrophic). After that, a score multiplied these two values together 
reflects the impact of the risk and is shown in the matrix (Waters, 2007).  
Table 4.5 Risk matrix 
 Likelihood 
Rare Unlikely Possible Likely Almost 
certain 
1 2 3 4 5 
Consequence  
Catastrophic 5 5 10 15 20 25 
Major 4 4 8 12 16 20 
Moderate 3 3 6 9 12 15 
Minor 2 2 4 6 8 10 
Insignificant 1 1 2 3 4 5 
When multiple respondents are involved, the likelihood and the consequence of 
a specific risk factor can be calculated by averaging over the samples. The 
corresponding risk factors can be located in the risk matrix (Yang, 2010). 
Normally, four levels of risk scale are categorised in the risk matrix, which are 
defined as follows – 
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 Low risk: risk scores from 1 to 5, tagging with green colour in the above 
matrix. This type of risks has minor impacts on companies, and managers 
could ignore them or accept the impacts.  
 Moderate risk: 5.01 – 10, in yellow colour. A certain level of attention 
should be paid to this type of risks since they have moderate impacts on 
the companies. 
 High risk: 10.01 – 15, in orange colour. Managers should pay more 
attention on this type of risks to mitigate their impacts on companies. 
 Extreme risk: 15.01 – 25, in red colour. This type of risks has serious 
consequences with high possibilities. It should be managed cautiously by 
either reducing its occurring probability or its consequence level. 
NPSA (2008) described several advantages of using risk matrix as follows - 
1. It is a simple yet flexible concept, which can be used in a variety of 
various research projects. 
2. Equal weighting of consequence and likelihood prevents disproportionate 
effort directed at highly unlikely but high consequence risks. 
3. The above four levels (low risk, moderate risk, high risk, and extreme risk) 
of risk categories may help managers for differentiating risks. 
On the other hand, Cox (2008, p.497) pointed out several disadvantages of 
using risk matrix method –  
1. In some cases (e.g. risk likelihood and risk consequence are negatively 
correlated), risk matrices would ambiguously compare the selected risk 
factors as they are all in the medium risk. 
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2. Risk matrices would mistakenly give a higher qualitative rating to a lower 
quantitative risk. For example, a risk factor with 0.1 risk likelihood and 0.6 
consequence would be classified as a medium risk (although its risk 
scale is 0.1X0.6=0.06), whilst another risk factor with 0.35 risk likelihood 
and 0.35 risk consequence would be classified as a low risk (even its risk 
scale is 0.35X0.35=0.12). 
3. Effective allocation of resources to risk mitigation strategies cannot only 
be based on the categories provided by risk matrices, the strategies 
should also depend crucially on other quantitative information. 
An additional disadvantage of risk matrix that we notice is that the risk matrix 
does not provide an overall picture of multiple risk factors. For example, the 
relative differences between different risk factors are not obvious, in particular in 
relation to risk likelihood and risk consequence.  
Risk map 
Norrman and Jansson (2004) stated that there are various methods to analyse 
risks, and risk mapping is one of the important tools, i.e. using a structured 
approach and mapping risk sources to understand their potential 
consequences. They also suggested that the risk mapping tool can be used 
after risk analysis, because it is important to “assess and prioritise risks to be 
able to choose management actions appropriate to the situation” (Norrman and 
Jansson, 2004, p.438).  
A risk map is a two-dimension diagram in which the y-coordinate represents the 
risk consequence and the x-coordinate represents the risk probability 
(likelihood), in which the levels of multiple risks and their likelihoods and 
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consequences can be visualised and contrasted in the same diagram (see 
Figure 4.3, in which one diamond point represents a specific risk factor). 
Through risk map analysis, managers could have a clearer idea of which risks 
(extreme risk) require most attention and which risks (low risk) require less 
attention, and associate them with likelihood and consequence. 
 
Figure 4.3 An illustrative risk map with multiple risk factors 
Similar to the risk matrix, we can also classify the value of risks into four 
categories from the scores in the risk map as follows – 
 Low risk: risk scores from 1 to 5, located in the area under the green 
dashed line in Figure 3.16.  
 Moderate risk: 5.01 – 10, located in the area between the green dashed 
line and the yellow dashed line. 
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 High risk: 10.01 – 15, located in the area between the yellow dashed line 
and the red dashed line. 
 Extreme risk: 15.01 – 25, located in the area above the red dashed line. 
Compared to the risk matrix, risk map has a higher resolution and provides an 
overall picture of multiple risk factors to visualise their relative differences in 
relation to risk likelihood and risk consequence.  
P-I graph (risk map with four risk responses) 
Hillson (2002) used a probability-impact (P-I) matrix to analyse risk, whilst Vose 
(2008) introduced a P-I graph (see Figure 3.17) that is very similar to a risk 
map, in which risk factors are displayed in a two-dimension diagram 
corresponding to probability (likelihood) and impact (consequence) of risks. The 
risk levels have also been applied in the P-I graph, which can be categorised 
into low-level risk, moderate risk, and high-level risk. According to Vose (2008), 
four risk response options are discussed in a P-I graph, i.e. avoid, control, 
transfer, and accept; whilst Hillson (2002) categorised the four risk responses 
as avoid, transfer, mitigate, and accept. Waters (2007) also stated eight risk 
responses include: (1) ignore or accept the risk, (2) reduce the probability of the 
risk, (3) reduce or limit the consequences, (4) transfer, share or deflect the risk, 
(5) make contingency plans, (6) adapt to it, (7) oppose a change, and (8) move 
to another environment. Some of the responses from Waters (2007) can be 
categories into the four responses from Hillson (2002) or Vose (2008). The four 
responses categorised by Hillson (2002) are regarded as follows- 
 Avoid: seeking to eliminate the uncertainty by reducing its probability to 
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zero, or by reducing its impact to zero. 
 Transfer: identifying another stakeholder who is in better position to 
manage the risk, and pass the liability and responsibility of action to such 
a stakeholder. 
 Mitigate: reducing the impact of the risk factor in order to make it more 
acceptable to the organisation, which may be done by reducing the 
probability and/or the severity. 
 Accept: responding either actively by allocating appropriate contingency, 
or passively doing nothing except monitoring the status of the risk. 
Whereas Vose (2008) stated – 
 Avoid: managers should avoid this type of risks which has high 
probability and high impact. 
 Control: managers should make some regular plans for controlling this 
type of risks with high probability and low impact. 
 Transfer: managers could reduce the influence to companies through 
insurance or transferring the risks to other partners.  
 Accept:  managers do not need to pay much attention on this type of 
risks with low probability and low impact.  
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Figure 4.4 P-I graph 
Source: Vose (2008) 
Because Hillson’s (2002) definition of risk responses is more comprehensive 
and more specific than Vose’s (2008) one, this thesis combines Vose’s (2008) 
P-I graph with Hillson’s (2002) definition of four risk responses in the later risk 
scale analysis. 
The advantage of using a P-I graph is that it can further present the related risk 
responses of each risk factor, which can provide a basic risk management 
thinking for managers. However, as Figure 4.4 shows, the coverage of the four 
risk responses is sometimes redundant and the central area is ambiguous to 
distinguish the belonging risk response of the risk factors.  
4.3.2 Risk mitigation strategies evaluation methods 
In a competitive business environment, managers have to make many decisions 
in very changeable and difficult situations. A number of methods have been 
proposed in assisting decision making, including Multiple Criteria/attribute 
Decision Making, Analytic Hierarchy Process (AHP), Data Envelopment Analysis 
(DEA), Fuzzy Theory, Data Mining, Artificial Neural Networks, Genetic 
Algorithms, Simulation-based Methods, Scenario Analysis, Delphi Method, and 
Probability 
Impact 
Avoid 
Control  
Transfer 
High-Level Risks 
Moderate Risks 
Low-Level Risks 
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Structural Equation Modelling (SEM), etc. (Chang, 2007). However, there are 
some limitations in each of these methods. For example, SEM needs at least 
200 questionnaire replies in order to generate stable results; DEA focuses on 
measuring organisational performance in relation to the inputs; high computer 
language design skills and extensive quantitative data are usually required in 
order to apply Artificial Neural Networks, Genetic Algorithms, and 
Simulation-based Methods. As this study is an empirical research and has 
relatively limited number of population and samples (116 companies in total), it is 
unlikely to achieve over 200 valid replies although three or four participants 
could be selected from each company. There are several advantages of using 
AHP method, such as it provides a meaningful integration of systems, it is easy 
to calculate, and it is reliable and flexible (The details will be discussed in next 
section). We believe AHP is probably a more appropriate method to evaluate 
and compare different risk mitigation strategies, therefore, AHP is used in this 
study. However, there are still some shortcomings of using the classic AHP due 
to the uncertainty in subjective perception. This thesis therefore also uses Fuzzy 
AHP as an additional method to overcome such shortcoming. In the remainder 
of this section, the classic AHP and the Fuzzy AHP will be introduced. 
4.3.2.1 Analytic Hierarchy Process (AHP) 
This section presents the classic AHP method including an overview of AHP, the 
axioms of AHP, the process of classic AHP, and software for classic AHP. 
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Overview of Analytic Hierarchy Process (AHP) 
Analytical hierarchy process (AHP) was first proposed by Satty (1988) to 
identify the best decision in dealing with complex social problems. In order to 
distinguish it from Fuzzy AHP, the original AHP proposed by Saaty is called 
classic AHP in this thesis.  
The classic AHP method has two main purposes: to provide an overall view of 
the complex relationships inherent in the situation; and help the decision maker 
assess whether the issues in each level are of the same order of magnitude, so 
that he/she can compares such homogeneous element accurately (Saaty, 
1990). In other words, it provides the decomposition of a complex problem into 
a systematic hierarchical level constituting the decision alternatives. These 
alternatives are compared so as to determine the objectives of the problem 
(Saaty, 1988). According to Saaty (1988) and Saaty and Vargas (1982), classic 
AHP can be used in the following areas: 1) Planning; 2) Generating a set of 
alternatives; 3) Setting priorities; 4) Choosing a best alternative/policy; 5) 
Allocating resources; 6) Determining requirements; 7) Predicting outcome/ risk 
assessment; 8) Designing systems; 9) Measuring performance; 10) Insuring the 
stability of a system; 11) Optimization; 12) Resolving conflict.  
In the application of the classic AHP, several principles need to be followed 
(Saaty, 1986): 
1. Decomposition: a problem can be decomposed into some basic 
elements for structuring the hierarchy through working downward from 
the focus in the top level to criteria on the focus in the second level. 
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2. Comparative judgments: a ratio scale is used for pairwise comparison, 
and then a matrix is created for setting up the result of pairwise 
comparisons from the elements in the same level. 
3. Synthesis of priorities: “Priorities are synthesized from the second level 
down by multiplying local priorities by the priority of their corresponding 
criterion in the level above, and adding them for each element in a level 
according to the criteria it affects” (Saaty, 1986, p. 842).  
Some advantages of hierarchies are described as follows:  
1. AHP provides a meaningful integration of systems. After analysing the 
decomposed elements, AHP will integrate these elements into an 
integrated system. The integrated behaviour or function of a hierarchical 
organisation accounts for the fact that complicated changes in a large 
system can result in a single component (Saaty, 1977a). 
2. Hierarchical representation of a system can be used to describe how 
changes in priority at upper levels would affect the priority of elements in 
lower levels (Saaty, 1988).  
3. AHP uses an easy to calculate the observed data and can be used in 
various test applications (Saaty, 1977b). 
4. Greater detail occurs down the hierarchy levels; greater depth in 
understanding its purpose occurs up the hierarchy levels (Saaty, 1977b, 
1988). 
5. AHP is efficient and will evolve in natural systems much more rapidly 
than non-hierarchic systems having the same number of elements 
(Saaty, 1977a, 1977b, 1988). 
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6. AHP is reliable and flexible. Local perturbation does not disturb the whole 
structure (Saaty, 1977a, 1988). 
On the other hand, several researchers have raised concerns to the classic AHP 
method. For example, Belton and Gear (1983) and Dyer (1990) argued that this 
method has a rank reversal problem; Belton and Gear (1985) and Dyer and 
Wendell (1985) claimed that classic AHP lacks a strong theoretical support. 
Nevertheless, Harker and Vargas (1987) stated that “the lacked a strong theory 
support” can be solved by constructing a network.  
Moreover, Millet and Harker (1990) pointed out that the numbers of questions 
would increase exponentially because of the redundant judgements for checking 
consistency.  
Axioms of AHP 
According to Saaty (1994, 1995), four important axioms are assumed when 
applying the AHP method. 
 
Axiom 1: Reciprocal comparison 
When making paired comparisons, both members of the pair need to be 
considered to judge the relative value. The comparison matrices that we 
consider are formed by making paired reciprocal comparisons. Decision makers 
make comparisons and state the strength of their preferences. The intensity of 
these preferences must satisfy the reciprocal condition, i.e.,             for all 
    (If element A is x times more preferred than element B, then B is 1/x times 
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more preferred than A).The violation of Axiom 1 indicates that the questions 
used to elicit the judgements or paired comparisons are not clearly or correctly 
stated. 
Axiom 2: Homogeneity 
Homogeneity is essential for comparing similar things, as the mind tends to 
make large errors in comparing widely disparate elements. When the disparity 
is great, the elements are placed in separate clusters of comparable size giving 
rise to the idea of levels and their accommodation. Therefore the preferences 
are presented by means of a bounded scale for the comparison of elements at 
the same level. It means that the decision maker never judges one to be 
infinitely better than another, i.e.,                      . If Axiom 2 is not 
satisfied, then the elements being compared are not homogeneous and one 
may need to form clusters. 
Axiom 3: Dependence 
Decomposition implies the containment of the small elements by the large 
clusters or levels. In turn, this means that the smaller elements depend on the 
outer parent elements to which they belong, which themselves fall in a large 
cluster of the hierarchy. The process of relating elements in one level of the 
hierarchy according to the elements of the next higher level expresses the outer 
dependence of the lower elements on the higher elements. In this way 
comparison can be made between them and the steps are repeated upward in 
the hierarchy through each pair of adjacent levels to the top element, the goal. If 
Axiom 3 is not satisfied, the principle of hierarchical composition would no 
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longer apply because of outer and inner dependence among levels or 
components which need not form a hierarchy. 
Axiom 4: Expectations 
For the purpose of making a decision, the hierarchic structure is assumed to be 
complete. All criteria and alternatives which impact on the given decision 
problem are represented in the hierarchy. If Axiom 4 is not satisfied, then the 
decision maker is not using all the criteria and/or all the alternatives available or 
necessary to meet his reasonable expectations and hence the decision is 
incomplete. 
The process of classic AHP 
The procedure of applying the classic AHP can be summarised into the following 
four main phases (Saaty, 1990) -  
1. The structuring of a decision problem; 
2. The conduct of measurement and data collection; 
3. The computation of normalized weights; and 
4. The determination of a synthesis-finding solution to the problem. 
Phase1 includes the identification and classification of the decision elements 
(  ) into three to four levels of hierarchies (Pun and Hui, 2001), e.g. goal, 
criteria, sub-criteria, alternative (Figure 4.5). “A hierarchy is an abstraction of the 
structure of a system to study the functional interactions of its components and 
their impacts on the entire system” (Saaty, 1988). Each level is composed of 
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several decision elements which can help managers to choose the suitable 
decisions. 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4.5 An illustrative example of AHP hierarchy 
In Phase 2, the relative importance of criteria, sub-criteria, and alternatives in 
the AHP model will be measured. This is done by performing paired 
comparisons between all elements at the same level usually through 
questionnaire survey. In our study, a questionnaire survey (called the AHP 
survey in this thesis) is sent to industrial experts to assess the relative 
importance and priority weights of the criteria and risk mitigation strategies in 
container shipping operations.  
The AHP questionnaire survey is composed of several sets of pairwise 
comparisons, by lifting one and then lifting another and then back to the first 
and then again the second and so on until each pair of decision elements have 
been formulated to the relative weight (Saaty, 1988). In Table 4.6, the definition 
and description of AHP measure scale is illustrated to assign the relative scales 
and priority weights of the decision criteria and sub-criteria with the nine-point 
pairwise comparison scale.  
  
Goal 
Criteria 1 Criteria 2 Criteria 3 Criteria 4 
Alternative A Alternative B Alternative C 
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Table 4.6 Nine-point pairwise comparison scale (Saaty, 1988) 
Measure 
scale 
Definition Description 
1 Equal importance Two factors contribute equally to the objective  
3 Weak importance of 
one over another 
Experience and judgement slightly favour one 
over another. 
5 Essential or strong 
importance 
Experience and judgement strongly favour one 
over another. 
7 Very strong or 
demonstrated 
importance 
A decision element is favoured very strongly 
over another. Its dominance demonstrated in 
practice. 
9 Absolutely importance The evidence favouring one decision element 
over another is of the highest possible order of 
affirmation. 
2, 4, 6, 8 Intermediate values When compromise is needed.  
Reciprocals 
of above 
nonzero 
If decision element i 
has one of the above 
nonzero numbers 
assigned to it when 
compared with 
decision element j, 
then j has the 
reciprocal value when 
compared with i 
A reasonable assumption 
Rational Ratios arising from the 
scale 
If consistency were to be forced by obtaining n 
numerical values to span the matrix 
The following gives an example of AHP questionnaire with the structure of 
Figure 4.5. Respondents will be asked to evaluate each set of decision elements 
in a pairwise comparison questionnaire. For the Criteria level, respondents need 
to answer 
      
 
, where   represents the number of decision elements at the 
criteria level. In this example, 
      
 
   questions are presented to compare 
the relationship between these 4 criteria. The questions are designed with the 
nine-point pairwise comparison scale at the criteria level for the example in 
Figure 4.5 that has been presented in Table 4.7. Respondent can mark the left 
side of the scale 3 if he/she thinks criterion A is 3 times more important than 
criterion B (it means Criterion A has a weak importance over Criterion B). For the 
94 
 
alternative level, the three alternatives will be compared under four different 
criteria. A total of 12 questions will be asked at the alternative level in this 
example.  
Table 4.7 Example of AHP questionnaire survey 
Criteria  ←More important                    More important→ Criteria 
Criterion A 9  8  7  6  5  4  ○3  2  1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9 Criterion B 
Criterion A 9  8  7  6  5  4  3  2  1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9 Criterion C 
Criterion A 9  8  7  6  5  4  3  2  1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9 Criterion D 
Criterion B 9  8  7  6  5  4  3  2  1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9 Criterion C 
Criterion B 9  8  7  6  5  4  3  2  1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9 Criterion D 
Criterion C 9  8  7  6  5  4  3  2  1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9 Criterion D 
 
Note: Regarding the 4 criteria at the second level, in your opinion what is 
the relative importance of “criterion A”, “criterion B”, “criterion C” and 
“criterion D” in the overall goal?  
 
Phase 3 includes several detailed steps. The main purpose is to compute the 
normalized weights and examine the survey consistency. First of all, after 
comparing all the pair decision elements (       …,   ), a set of numerical 
weights (       …,   ) will be calculated. The data will be organised as a 
reciprocal matrix    composed of numbers     – a value indicating the 
strength of decision element    when compared with decision element    
(Saaty, 1988). The     should use geometric mean approach to combine the 
pairwise comparison judgement when the respondents are more than two.  
The matrix can be illustrated as follow - 
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The equation above can be transferred as  
                             
Where Saaty (1988) suggested an alternative presentation form from the more 
realistic relations as 
    
 
 
∑     
 
   
                    
and consequently 
∑     
 
   
                        
which is equivalent to (where w is a column vector consisting of wj) 
        
The above equation with matrix presenting can be fully expressed as  
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In this thesis,    and    can be regarded as both risk criteria and risk mitigation 
strategies,     represents the weight pair-compared between decision elements 
   and   . For instance, the managers regard “Using different communication 
channels in the supply chain increases the time of information transmission” (  ) 
as five times more important as “Supply chain partners do not transmit essential 
information on time” (  ), then the     equals 5.   
However,   is an unknown vector to the evaluator and is not possible to 
accurately produce the weights in matrix  . In order to solve this problem, the 
eigenvector method is proposed through estimating the consistency of the 
judgement. The eigenvector method can be formulated as  ̂  ̂         ̂ , 
where  ̂ is the eigenvector and      is the maximum eigenvalue of the matrix 
 . According to Saaty (1988, p.21), “     is used in estimating the consistency 
as reflected in the proportionality of preferences. The closer      is to   (the 
number of decision elements in the matrix) the more consistent is the result”. In 
a perfectly consistent matrix, the maximum eigenvalue      is equal to  . For 
a positive reciprocal matrix,      is always greater than    The maximum 
eigenvalue      can be derived from above equation as follow – 
      ∑     
 
   
       
After obtaining the maximum eigenvalue     , consistency index (C.I.) can be 
calculated to examine whether the respondent has a consistent scaling system 
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to complete the AHP questionnaire. The consistency index C.I. is defined as 
follow – 
      
      
   
 
According to Saaty (1980), a questionnaire survey is acceptable when the C.I. 
is smaller than 0.1. However, the value of C.I. is difficult to be smaller than 0.1 
when the number of decision elements (ranks) increase. Therefore, Saaty 
(1988) proposed the random index (R.I.) (Table 4.8) to adjust the value of C.I. 
under different ranks and produced a new value, which is called consistency 
ratio (C.R.), to examine the consistency of the whole questionnaire. C.R. is the 
ratio of C.I to the average R.I. for the same order matrix and it is acceptable for 
the consistency degree of the hierarchy structure when C.R. is smaller than 0.1. 
The equation of C.R. is presented as follow –  
      
    
    
 
Table 4.8 Random index table 
 N 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 
R.I. 0 0 0.58 0.90 1.12 1.24 1.32 1.41 1.45 1.49 1.51 1.48 1.56 1.57 1.59 
*N is the number of ranks 
Phase 4 is about “The determination of a synthesis-finding solution to the 
problem”. If the hierarchy structure fits the requirement of consistency test, the 
evaluator can calculate the weight of each decision element and rank the 
priority. The priorities are pulled together through the principle of hierarchic 
composition to provide the overall assessment (global priority) of the alternative. 
The resulting priorities of each level represent the intensity of the respondents’ 
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judgements as to the relative importance of the element represented in the 
hierarchy considering the importance of and trade-off among criteria, and the 
global priorities represent the preference among alternatives and so they are 
used in making final decisions. 
The above four phase procedure can be further expanded to the following 
eleven step procedure (Saaty, 1988) - 
1. State the problem 
2. Put the problem in broad context – embed it if necessary in a larger 
system including other actors, their objectives, and outcomes. 
3. Identify the criteria that influence the behaviour of the problem. 
4. Structure a hierarchy of the criteria, sub-criteria, properties of 
alternatives, and the alternatives themselves. 
5. In a many-party problem, the levels may relate to the environment, 
actors, actor objectives, actor policies, and outcomes, from which one 
derives the composite outcome. 
6. To remove ambiguity carefully define every element in the hierarchy. 
7. Prioritise the primary criteria with respect to their impact on the overall 
objective called the focus. 
8. State the question for pairwise comparisons clearly above each matrix. 
Pay attention to the orientation of each question, e.g. costs go down, 
benefits go up. 
9. Prioritise the sub-criteria with respect to their criteria. 
10. Enter pairwise comparison judgments and force their reciprocals. 
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11. Calculate priorities by adding the elements of each column and dividing 
each entry by the total of the column. Average over the rows of the 
resulting matrix and then get the priority vector. 
Software for classic AHP 
There are quite a few software tools that support the application of AHP, 
including Export Choice, HIPEW 3, REMBRANDT, and Microsoft Office Excel. 
Expert Choice is a well-established computer programme, which make it very 
easy and natural to go through the entire AHP process, including building the 
hierarchy. Criterium is a newer product, which allows users to use a 
spreadsheet oriented approach. It can be effective as well. Both of these 
computer programmes have been noted to be quite easy to use, even for large 
AHP models (Olson, 1996). 
HIPRE 3 is another computer programme with different aspects of pairwise 
comparisons. HIPRE 3 incorporates the idea of interval pairwise comparisons. 
With this approach, decision makers are not asked for a precise ratio of the 
relative value of one element over another, but rather are asked for a range of 
relative advantages. If the system is able to prove that the final score of the 
leading alternative could be no worse than the best of all other alternatives, it 
concludes with a recommendation. The benefit of this approach is that ranges 
of preference might be more accurate representations of decision maker 
preferences than some precise value. The problem is that the analysis may take 
considerable time if the first two alternatives are very close in value (Olson, 
1996). 
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REMBRANDT is a piece of software which uses geometric means rather than 
eigenvalues to calculate weights. It uses a logarithmic scale rather than the 1-9 
verbal scale in standard AHP, and aggregates scores by weighted products 
rather than by arithmetic means. REMBRANDT also provides the option of 
assessing relative advantage by standardised scoring rather than by pairwise 
comparisons. This package provides computer support to those who have 
questioned some of the approaches incorporated into AHP (Olson, 1996).  
Microsoft Office Excel can also be used to support the AHP, and this thesis 
uses it as the software tool to solve the AHP problem. The reason of choosing 
Excel includes it is free and easy to operate. The steps of using Excel in our 
thesis can be described as follows. We firstly enter the data into a sheet by 
individual respondents respectively. The data include the weight of the three 
criteria and the seven strategies under the three criteria respectively, this 
produces one reciprocal matrix at criterion level and three reciprocal matrices at 
strategy level. Secondly, the weights of the criteria and strategies will be 
calculated by geometric mean. The standard weights of the criteria will be 
calculated by using the criterion’s weight divided by the sum of the criteria’s 
weights. Thirdly, an eigenvalue      and a consistency ratio (C.R.) test are 
then implemented to exam the consistency of the respondent’s opinions. The 
C.R. value must be smaller than 0.1, which means the opinions of each 
respondent are consistent. Fourthly, integrate all the respondents’ opinion on 
the standard weights of the three criteria and the seven strategies through using 
arithmetic mean. Finally, calculate the global weight of each strategy and overall 
priority of each strategy. 
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4.3.2.2 Fuzzy set theory and fuzzy AHP 
There are several shortcomings of the classic AHP. For example, respondents 
usually cannot present objective thinking and judgment when measuring the 
weight of criteria in a high-level hierarchy (Millet and Harker, 1990). Sometimes 
respondents cannot give a crisp number when answering multiple criteria 
questions (Belton and Gear, 1983, 1985). In order to remedy these 
shortcomings, Fuzzy AHP has been developed since 1983 (van Laarhoven and 
Pedrycz, 1983), which combines the advantages of Fuzzy set theory (fuzzy 
objective judgement) and AHP (easily analyse the nature of the question), as 
discussed below: 
Fuzzy set theory 
Fuzzy set theory is used to deal with the problem with ambiguity, vagueness, or 
blur. For example, people may say “this person is very tall”. But how tall can a 
person be called a tall person? We might say that a person higher than 190 cm 
can definitely be called a tall person, and a person shorter than 160 cm can be 
called a short person. The major problem is “how to tell a person is tall if the 
person’s height is between 160 and 190 cm?” The fuzzy set theory is therefore 
regarded as a class of objects that do not have precisely defined criteria of 
membership (Zadeh, 1965).  
The process of fuzzy theory can be illustrated as Figure 4.6. A crisp number 
inputs into a fuzzy controller and then outputs another crisp number for the 
further analysis. There are four main elements in the fuzzy controller (Passino 
and Yurkovich, 1998, p.10): “(1) the rule-base holds the knowledge, in the form 
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of a set of rules, of how best to control the system; (2) the inference mechanism 
evaluates which control rules are relevant at the current time and then decides 
what the input to the plant should be; (3) the fuzzification interface simply 
modifies the inputs so that they can be interpreted and compared to the rules in 
the rule-base; and (4) the defuzzification interface converts the conclusions 
reached by the inference mechanism into the inputs to the plant”. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4.6 The fuzzy controller 
Source: Saade and Diab (2004) 
The first stage of fuzzy theory is fuzzification defined by Huang (1997, p.16) as 
“a mapping from an observed input space to fuzzy sets in a certain input 
universe of discourse”, which means it makes a crisp number become a fuzzy 
set number. A set is characterised by a membership function, which assigns to 
each object a grade of membership ranging between zero and one. A tilde “~” is 
placed above a symbol if the symbol represents a fuzzy set. 
A membership function is usually presented by a set of triangular fuzzy numbers 
(TFN)  ̃= (     ). The TFN membership function (called   ̃    in this thesis) is 
defined as follows  
(3) 
Fuzzification 
(1) Fuzzy 
rule-base 
(4) 
DeFuzzification 
(2) Fuzzy 
inference 
engine 
Crisp inputs Crisp outputs Fuzzy 
outputs 
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Where  
 : the minima value of TFN 
 : the mean value of TFN 
 : the maxima value of TFN  
The membership function of TFN is illustrated in Figure 4.7. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4.7 Membership function of TFN 
The defuzzification stage can produce a crisp number from a fuzzy number. 
Three common defuzzificaiton methods are introduced as followings:  
(1) Centre of Gravity/Area (COG/COA) (Liu, 2007; Ross, 2009):  
Centre of Gravity (or called Centre of Area) method is the most prevalent 
and physically appealing defuzzification method (Sugeno, 1985; Lee, 1990; 
0 
𝜇?̃? 𝑥  
𝑙 𝑚 𝑢 
𝑥 
1 
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Ross, 2009). This method generates the centre of gravity of the probability 
distribution of a control action. The formula is presented as follows 
   
∫  ̃       
∫  ̃     
 
(2) Mean of Maximum method (Ross, 2009): 
The Mean of Maximum method produces a control action which represents 
the mean value of all local control actions whose membership functions reach 
the maximum. In the case of a discrete universe, the control action will be 
presented as 
   ∑
 
 
 
(3) Middle of Maxima (Liu, 2007; Ross, 2009): 
Middle of Maxima takes the average of the greatest and smallest value of 
the largest degree of membership. The formula is presented as follows 
    
   
 
 
As the Centre of Gravity method is the most reasonable and common 
defuzzification methods (e.g. Huang, 1997), this thesis uses Centre of Gravity 
method as the tool for defuzzification.  
The two basic algebraic operations, addition and multiplication, used to deal 
with the fuzzy numbers are introduced as follows. Let               and  
              as two fuzzy set number. The algebraic operations of    and 
   can be expressed as: 
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 Fuzzy addition ⨁  
   ⨁                           
 Fuzzy multiplication ⨂ 
   ⨂                        
Fuzzy AHP 
Fuzzy AHP is a systematic method to solve the multi-criteria decision making 
problem by combining the concepts of fuzzy set theory with the classic AHP 
method. Buckley (1985, p. 233) proposed a Fuzzy Hierarchy Analysis, which 
“the experts are allowed to use fuzzy ratio in place of exact ratios”. 
The Fuzzy AHP can be organised in eight steps (Buckley, 1985; Ding, 2010; 
Ding and Tseng, 2012). These are described one by one as follows: 
Step 1: Develop a hierarchical structure with   criteria and   alternatives (the 
same as classic AHP Phase 1); 
Step 2: Collect pairwise comparison matrix of decision elements 
Let    
 ,          , be the relative importance given to criterion   
compared to criterion   by expert   at the criteria level; whilst let    
 , 
         , denote the relative importance given to alternative   
compared to alternative   by expert   at the alternative level. 
Step 3: Transform relative importance into Triangular Fuzzy Number (TFN) 
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TFN combines the min value, max value, and mean value of the 
opinions of all experts. The meaning of TFN using in Fuzzy AHP is 
presented in Table 4.9, and the illustration of membership function of 
triangular fuzzy numbers used in Fuzzy AHP is presented in Figure 4.8. 
Table 4.9 TFN of Fuzzy AHP 
Meaning  Triangular fuzzy number 
Equally Preferred   ̃ = (1,1,2) 
Equally to Moderately Preferred   ̃ = (1,2,3) 
Moderately Preferred   ̃ = (2,3,4) 
Moderately to Strongly Preferred   ̃ = (3,4,5) 
Strongly Preferred   ̃ = (4,5,6) 
Strongly to Very Strongly Preferred   ̃ = (5,6,7) 
Very Strongly Preferred   ̃ = (6,7,8) 
Very Strongly to Extremely Preferred   ̃ = (7,8,9) 
Extremely Preferred   ̃ = (8,9,9) 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4.8 Membership function of TFN used in Fuzzy AHP 
Step 4: Build Fuzzy positive reciprocal matrix 
The TFN is used to build fuzzy positive reciprocal matrix. At the criteria 
level, the fuzzy positive reciprocal matrix can be generated by  
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where  ̃  
  ⨂  ̃  
                  . 
At alternative level, the fuzzy positive reciprocal matrix is given by 
[ ̃  
 ]    
[
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  ̃  
 ⁄
 
  ̃  
 ⁄
 ̃  
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 ̃  
 
 ̃  
 
      
       ̃  
 ⁄   ̃ ]
 
 
 
 
, 
where  ̃  
  ⨂  ̃  
                  . 
Step 5: Calculate the fuzzy weights of the fuzzy positive reciprocal matrices 
The method for calculating the fuzzy weights  ̃ can be separated into 
two steps: (i) calculate the geometric mean  ̃  and  ̃ of fuzzy 
comparison value of criteria   and alternative  ; (ii) calculate the fuzzy 
weight  ̃  and  ̃  of the criterion    and alternative   (Kahraman et 
al., 2009). At the criteria level, the geometric mean value of TFN of  th 
criteria can be given by  
 ̃ 
  √( ̃  
 ⨂ ̃  
 ⨂ ⨂  ̃  
 )
 
            
and the fuzzy weight of  th criteria is given by  
 ̃ 
   ̃ 
 ⨂( ̃ 
 ⨁ ̃ 
 ⨁ ⨁ ̃ 
 )
  
 
To simplify the notation, the fuzzy weight can be further denoted by  
 ̃ 
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Similarly, the geometric mean value of TFN of  th alternative at 
alternative level can be expressed by 
 ̃ 
  √( ̃  
 ⨂ ̃  
 ⨂ ⨂  ̃   )
 
            
The fuzzy weight of  th alternative is given by  
 ̃ 
   ̃ 
 ⨂( ̃ 
 ⨁ ̃ 
 ⨁ ⨁ ̃ 
 )
  
     
     
     
   
Step 6: Defuzzify the Fuzzy weights to crisp weights 
After obtaining the fuzzy weights, they will be converted into crisp 
weights using the defuzzification methods. Various difuzzification 
methods have been used in different studies such as    
      
 
 
(Durán and Aguilo, 2008),    
      
 
 (Ding, 2010), and    
             
 
   (Ali et al., 2012), where Ali et al. (2012) is the Centre of 
Gravity/Area that have been introduced in previous section. 
Step 7: Standardise the crisp weights 
To facilitate the comparison of the relative importance between 
elements at the same level, these crisp weights should be standardised. 
For example, at the criteria level, the standardised crisp weights are 
given by,  
   
  
  
 
∑   
  
   
 
At the alternative level, the standardised crisp weights are given by 
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∑    
 
   
 
Step 8: Calculate the integrated weight for each level 
After standardising the crisp weights, the integrated weight for each 
element at each level in the AHP model can be computed by taking into 
account the weight at the current level and its upper level. More 
specifically,  
(1) the integrated weights of each criterion at the criteria level is given by 
(note that the weight at its upper level is 1), 
   
      
            ; and  
(2) the integrated weights of each alternative at the alternatives level is 
given by 
   
     
      
                            
Software for Fuzzy AHP 
There are relatively few previous studies addressing the software tools for 
Fuzzy AHP. Matlab and Microsoft Excel are the two common computer 
programmes that can be used to support the application of the Fuzzy AHP. 
Matlab can be used to deal with the time-consuming calculations of fuzzy AHP. 
Firstly, the user has to input the selected criteria and strategies into Matlab. The 
software keeps a database with a series of attributes that the user can select to 
conduct the comparison analysis. Next, the user has to key in the pair-wise 
comparisons matrix for the decision elements. Secondly, the software solves 
110 
 
and obtains an eigenvector, eigenvalue and C.R. that produce the priority 
weight for each decision element. (Durán and Aguilo, 2008). 
Microsoft Excel is another piece of software for fuzzy AHP method. The benefits 
of using Excel are because it is free and easy to operate. The procedure to 
implement the Fuzzy AHP in Excel includes the following four steps:  
1.  Enter all the data from respondents into Excel sheets and transfer the 
data into TFN.  
2. The information including the weight of each criterion, the  max, the CI 
and the CR, are then calculated and presented.  
3. Defuzzify the fuzzy weights and normalise the crisp weights. Fourthly, a 
new Excel sheet is created to integrate the respondents’ opinion by using 
arithmetic mean.  
4. Calculate the global weight of each strategy and overall priority of each 
strategy. 
4.4 Chapter summary 
This chapter firstly introduces the case study, Taiwan’s container shipping 
industry, and the population for data collection.  
Secondly, the data collection methods are discussed, which include two main 
parts: (1) data collection methods in risk factor identification, validation and 
measurement, and (2) data collection methods in risk mitigation strategies 
identification and evaluation. In the first part, the risk factors are identified 
through literature review; risk validation and exploration are done through 
semi-structured face-to-face interviews with industrial experts; the measurement 
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of risk factors is conducted through a risk-factor questionnaire survey. In the 
second part, the risk mitigation strategy identification, validation, and exploration 
are done in a similar way to the risk factors, i.e. through literature review and 
semi-structured interviews. In order to rank the identified risk mitigation 
strategies, a mitigation-strategy questionnaire survey is conducted. This 
enables the author to selected several most important risk mitigation strategies, 
which are then further evaluated through a AHP questionnaire survey to 
examine their relative importance in relation to different performance criteria. 
Thirdly, the data analysis methods are discussed, which also include two main 
parts: (1) risk analysis methods and (2) risk mitigation strategies evaluation 
methods. In the first part, the methods including risk scale analysis, risk matrix, 
risk map, and P-I graph (risk map with risk responses) are introduced. In order 
to estimate the risk likelihood and risk consequence over a population of 
respondents more accurately, we propose the Average Risk Scale (ARS) 
method. The Average Risk Scale (ARS) method firstly calculates the risk scale 
for each individual respondent, then averages over all respondents to obtain the 
average risk scale for each risk factor, finally determines the likelihood and 
consequence based on the shortest distance rule. In the second part, the risk 
mitigation strategies evaluation methods are discussed. This thesis will use 
classic AHP and Fuzzy AHP to evaluate the relationships between several most 
important risk mitigation strategies.  
Finally, the methods mentioned above can be summarised into Table 4.10, 
which include the four main risk management steps, and the related 
approaches and purposes of these approaches. 
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Table 4.10 Summaries of the research methods 
Steps Approaches Purposes 
Risk 
identification 
Literature review To identify the existing risk factors in 
container shipping operations and in 
general supply chains. 
Interviews  To validate that the risk factors from the 
literature review are appropriate in 
container shipping operations, and 
explore more risk factors that are not 
mentioned in previous studies. 
Risk analysis Risk-factor survey To collect the data about the likelihood 
and three different consequences of the 
risk factors  
Risk ranking To rank the importance of the risk factors 
from three different consequences 
Risk matrix To classify the level of these risk factors 
Risk map To show the detailed relationship and to 
classify the level of these risk factors 
P-I graph To identify the risk response of each risk 
factor 
Risk mitigation 
strategies 
identification 
Literature review To identify the existing risk mitigation 
strategies in container shipping 
operations and in general supply chains. 
Interviews  To validate that the risk mitigation 
strategies from the literature review are 
appropriate in container shipping 
operations, and explore more risk 
mitigation strategies that are not 
mentioned in previous studies. 
Risk mitigation 
strategies 
evaluation 
Mitigation-strategies 
survey 
To collect the data about the importance 
of the risk mitigation strategies 
Risk mitigation 
strategies ranking 
To rank the importance of the risk 
mitigation strategies from 
mitigation-strategies survey, and to 
select the top 7 strategies to conduct the 
following AHP survey 
AHP survey To collect the data about the relationship 
between the three criteria, and the seven 
strategies under the three criteria 
Classic AHP To evaluate the relationship of the seven 
strategies under the three criteria, and 
the importance of the seven strategies 
after integrating the three criteria 
Fuzzy AHP To overcome the uncertainty in 
subjective perception by using classic 
AHP 
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Chapter 5 Identification of risks in container shipping 
operations 
Chapter 5 focuses on the first step of risk management, i.e. risk identification 
and validation. Section 5.1 identifies risks through a systematic review of 
relevant literature on risks associated with the three logistics flows. Section 5.2 
validates the identified risks and explores new risks through interviews, which 
include a set of face-to-face interviews and a set of email interviews. Section 5.3 
is the summary of this chapter. 
5.1 Risk identification through review of the relevant literature 
Risk identification is deemed as the first step of risk management (Norrman and 
Jansson, 2004; Sung, 2005; Waters, 2007; van Duijne et al., 2008; Tummala 
and Schoenherr, 2011). In order to make the risk identification 
comprehensively, apart from the existing studies on risks in container shipping 
(see in Chapter 2), the risks in general supply chains are also included to be the 
background of risk identification. The following sections discuss risk 
identification from the three logistics flows that have been introduced in Section 
3.1, i.e., information flow, physical flow, and payment flow.  
5.1.1Risks associated with information flow 
From the initial literature review in Chapter 2, the risk factors associated with 
information flow may be categorised into three elements: information delay, 
information inaccuracy, and IT (information technology) problem. The following 
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discussion concentrates on risks associated with information flow in general 
supply chains.  
The speed of information transfer between supply chain partners is a key 
element for a successful business, and it depends on different channels. Many 
information channels for transferring data have been widely used including 
face-to-face meetings, telephone calls, email, fax, and Electronic Data 
Interchange (EDI), etc. Using different communication channels in a supply 
chain may increase time in information transmission due to un-uniform data. 
Delay in information transfer can increase information risks in the global supply 
chain business as it may affect the subsequent information transmissions. 
According to Ramayah and Omar (2010), information delay and inaccurate 
information mean poor information quality. They also pointed out that lack of 
advanced IT may be a cause for poor information quality. Angulo et al. (2004, 
p.102) stated that information delay is an important risk element in information 
flow; they defined it as “the wait time that shared information experiences before 
it is used by an internal supply chain functions”. Metters (1997, p. 99) explained 
that “lack of inter-company communication combined with large time-lags 
between receipt and transmission of information are the root cause of 
information delay”. He suggested that using EDI to transfer information can 
reduce the impact from information delay; however, not every company can 
afford the huge investment of EDI. It increases the time of information 
transmission when supply chain partners use different communication channels 
for exchanging information.  
115 
 
With regard to the element of information inaccuracy, DeLone and McLean 
(1992) pointed out that it may lead to wrong decision making. Several studies 
suggested that lack of information security may affect information accuracy as it 
can lead the transferring data to being tampered or leaked (e.g. Sharma and 
Gupta, 2002; Finch, 2004; Qi and Zhang, 2008). Angulo et al. (2004) stated that 
using inaccurate information may lead to costly investment and work 
inefficiencies and it might be caused by customer’s poor inventory integrity. 
Forrester (1961) and Lee et al. (1997) found that information asymmetry or lack 
of communication can lead to inaccurate or distorted information flow in a supply 
chain. Fawcett et al. (2007) stated that supply chain managers often get 
inadequate information when making decisions. Although technology can reduce 
the possibility of information missing or error, most managers still think that 
inaccurate information is a significant barrier to decision making. Inadequate 
information usually leads to bad decisions, and inaccurate information might 
lead to disasters. Lack of common terminology or communication standards is 
also a challenge to supply chains. Husdal and Bråthen (2010) identified several 
risks relating to information flow in the context of Norwegian freight transport; 
these risks are disregard of rules and regulations, wrong or erroneous lading 
permits, wrong or erroneous documents (e.g. customs declaration), and wrong 
or erroneous information from or to other players in the supply chain. 
A number of studies have addressed the importance of the element of IT 
problem. Lack of necessary IT and IT problems are also considered as important 
elements in information risk as they may disrupt the process of information 
transmission (e.g. Lyytinen and Hirschheim, 1987; Sharma and Gupta, 2002; 
Tummala and Schoenherr, 2011). Tummala and Schoenherr (2011) suggested 
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that lack of necessary IT or IT problems should be considered as an important 
risk element associated with information flow as they may disrupt the process of 
information transmission. They stated that the triggers that may cause system 
risks include information infrastructure breakdowns, lack of effective system 
integration or extensive system networking, and lack of compatibility in IT 
platforms among supply chain partners. Swabey (2009) and Qi and Zhang (2008) 
stated that IT infrastructure breakdown is a risk factor. Millman (2007) pointed 
out that human error is the biggest risk to an organisation’s network security. 
All the above identified risk factors and their categorisations are summarised in 
Table 5.1. 
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Table 5.1 The risk elements and factors associated with information flow 
Risk element Risk factors Authors 
Information 
delay 
 
Using different communication channels in 
the supply chain and consequently 
increasing the time of information 
transmission. (e.g. telephone, Email, EDI) 
Metters (1997) 
Supply chain partners not transmitting 
essential information on time 
Angulo et al. 
(2004); Yang 
(2010), (2011) 
Processing documents being detained by 
government departments (e.g. customs) 
Husdal and 
Bråthen (2010); 
Yang, (2010) 
Shipping company not transmitting 
essential information on time 
Angulo et al. 
(2004) 
Information 
Inaccuracy  
 
Lack of information security during the 
information flow 
Sharma and Gupta 
(2002); Finch 
(2004); Qi and 
Zhang (2008) 
Information asymmetry/incompleteness Forrester (1961); 
Lee et al. (1997); 
Angulo et al. 
(2004); Husdal and 
Bråthen (2010) 
Lack of information standardisation and 
compatibility 
Tummala and 
Schoenherr (2011) 
IT Problem 
 
IT infrastructure breakdown or crash Qi and Zhang 
(2008); Swabey 
(2009); Tummala 
and Schoenherr 
(2011) 
Unsuitable human operation on IT 
infrastructure 
Millman (2007) 
Unsuitable human operation on application 
software 
Millman (2007) 
Source: author 
5.1.2 Risks associated with physical flow 
There are a significant number of studies that focus on risks associated with 
physical flow in container shipping or general supply chains. A number of risk 
factors have been identified in Chapter 2. These include: port strike, port 
congestion (unexpected waiting times before berthing or before starting 
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loading/discharging), port/terminal productivity below expectations 
(loading/discharging), unstable weather, inappropriate empty container 
transportation, oil price rising, cargo stolen from unsealed containers, damage to 
ship or quay due to improper berth operations, damage to frozen cargo, and 
attack from pirates or terrorists. They may be categorised into two broad 
elements: transportation delay and cargo/asset loss or damage. Almost all 
studies mentioned in the Introduction (e.g. Talley, 1996; Noda, 2004; Drewry, 
2009; Fu et al., 2010) in this thesis fall into these two domains. In addition to that, 
the following papers need to be mentioned.  
Although delivering cargo on time is a basic requirement for a logistics company, 
delay in delivery is sometimes unavoidable. Schary (1970) stated that “time” is 
an important risk which may impact on physical distribution in cargo 
transportation. Transportation delay is therefore considered as one significant 
risk factor in physical flow. Transportation delay may have adverse impacts on 
both shippers and transportation companies. The shippers may lose profit if they 
cannot receive the cargo on time. The delay may also impact on the reputation 
of the transportation company. Vernimmen et al. (2007) reported, based on a 
large-scale survey, that over 40% of the vessels deployed on worldwide liner 
services arrive one or more than one day behind schedule. They found several 
risk factors that may cause transportation delay including bad weather at sea, 
congestion or labour strikes at the different ports of call, and knock-on effects of 
delays suffered at previous ports. Notteboom (2006) stated that transportation 
delay may incur extra logistics costs to the shippers and damage the container 
companies’ reputation. Husdal and Bråthen (2010) identified several risk factors; 
those are relevant to this context include unstable weather and road conditions, 
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lack of fuel supply, and strikes and other work-related issues. Tummala and 
Schoenherr (2011) classified several risk factors into transportation delay 
including port capacity and congestion, port strikes, and delay at ports due to 
port capacity. Chopra and Meindl (2010) stated that transportation delay may 
also be caused by the limited availability of transportation or infrastructure 
capacity 
In relation to cargo/company asset loss or damage, Husdal and Bråthen (2010) 
suggested that accidents, engine/vehicle breakdowns, theft, and errors in 
loading (e.g., mixing hazardous and non-hazardous goods may cause explosion 
accidents) may affect supply chains. Dangerous Goods (DG) transportation is a 
special risk factor in the transportation industry supply chains compared to other 
general supply chains because a DG explosion may cause huge damage to the 
cargo, the ship and even the nearby port. Tummala and Schoenherr (2011) 
stated that terrorism and wars may lead to disruption risk. 
Table 5.2 summarises the risk factors associated with physical flow, which have 
been mentioned in Chapter 2 (related to container shipping operations) and 
above (related to general supply chain operations).  
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Table 5.2 The risk elements and factors associated with physical flow 
Risk element Risk factors Authors 
Transportation 
delay 
 
Port strike Notteboom (2006); 
Drewry (2009); 
Husdal and Bråthen 
(2010); Tummala 
and Schoenherr 
(2011) 
Port congestion (unexpected waiting 
times before berthing or before starting 
loading/discharging) 
Notteboom (2006); 
Drewry (2009); 
Tummala and 
Schoenherr (2011) 
Port/terminal productivity being below 
expectations (loading/discharging) 
Notteboom (2006); 
Tummala and 
Schoenherr (2011) 
Unstable weather Notteboom (2006); 
Husdal and Bråthen 
(2010) 
Inappropriate empty container 
transportation  
Song et al. (2005); 
Drewry (2006); 
Song and Dong 
(2011)  
Lack of flexibility of fleet size and 
designed schedules  
Song et al. (2005); 
Qi and Song (2012) 
oil price rise Notteboom and 
Vernimmen (2009); 
Husdal and Bråthen 
(2010) 
Cargo/asset loss 
or damage 
 
Damage to containers or cargo due to 
terminal operators’ improper loading/ 
unloading operations 
Husdal and Bråthen 
(2010) 
Cargo being stolen from unsealed 
containers 
Drewry (2009); 
Husdal and Bråthen 
(2010) 
Damage caused by transporting 
dangerous goods  
Talley (1996); 
Husdal and Bråthen 
(2010) 
Damage to ship or quay due to improper 
berth operations  
Talley (1996); 
Husdal and Bråthen 
(2010) 
Attack from pirates or terrorists  Drewry (2009); Fu et 
al. (2010); Tummala 
and Schoenherr 
(2011) 
Source: author 
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5.1.3 Risks associated with payment flow 
There has been no specific literature on risks associated with payment flow in 
container shipping operations. However, in the general supply chain context, a 
number of risk factors associated with payment flow have been identified in 
previous studies. They may be categorised into three elements: currency 
exchange, payment delay, and non-payment. 
Tummala and Schoenherr (2011) pointed out that an international business may 
lose profit if the fees are paid in a weak currency. They also suggested that 
unrealised contracts with partners may lead to payment delay, and shippers 
going into bankruptcy or having partners with bad credit may lead to 
non-payment. Husdal and Bråthen (2010) stated that bankruptcy or other 
financial difficulties faced by one player in a supply chain may cause risks to the 
other players in the supply chain. Seyoum (2009) pointed out that if a consignee 
delays or does not make the payment, it would have a direct impact on the 
consignor’s financial performance. Seyoum (2009, p.240) also stated that 
payment delay may not have any impact on the buyers, but it “often creates 
liquidity problems for many exporting firms”. Chen (2008) stated that a break of 
trade caused by one company usually causes big losses to the others in the 
supply chain. Notably there are several payment methods in international trade, 
e.g., Open Account, Letter of Credit (L/C), and Cash-in-Advance (U.S. 
Department of Commerce, 2008). Each payment method imposes different level 
of risks to different parties. For example, an open account imposes the highest 
risk to the sellers.  In container shipping business, different international 
contracts of sale have been used, e.g., Free On Board (FOB), and Cost, 
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Insurance and Freight (CIF). Under FOB, the shipping companies may not 
receive payment if the buyers have gone bankrupt.  
The risk factors associated with payment flow discussed above are summarised 
in Table 5.3. 
Table 5.3 The risk element and factors associated with payment flow 
Risk element Risk factors Authors 
Currency 
exchange 
Change of currency exchange rate during 
payment process 
Tummala and 
Schoenherr (2011) 
Payment delay Payment delay from partners or shippers Seyoum (2009) 
Unrealised contract with partners Tummala and 
Schoenherr (2011) 
Non-payment Shippers going into bankruptcy Husdal and 
Bråthen (2010); 
Tummala and 
Schoenherr (2011) 
Shippers breaking the contract or 
reducing the container volume 
Chen (2008) 
Having partners with bad credit Tummala and 
Schoenherr (2011) 
Source: authors 
5.2 Validation and further exploration of risk factors though Interviews 
The risk validation and exploration procedure in this study includes two major 
parts: (i) the results of the seven semi-structured face-to-face interviews and (ii) 
the results of six email interviews. Within the result of face-to-face interview, this 
thesis firstly presents the risk factors confirmation, and then the risk factors 
exploration. In the results of six email interviews, the overall categorisation of 
risk factors in container shipping operations is confirmed by the six interviewees 
and this set of email interviews can be deemed as the pilot test for the risk-factor 
questionnaire survey to be conducted in next Chapter. 
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5.2.1 Results from face-to-face interview 
The interviewees were invited from two Taiwan’s container shipping companies. 
In order to obtain a balanced view from different professional areas, the invited 
interviewees consisted of two information managers, two vice presidents, and 
three senior operation managers. The series of face-to-face interviews were 
conducted between February and March 2011. The semi-structured face-to-face 
interview questions can be referred to Appendix 1, and the transcriptions are 
presented in Appendix 2. 
During the interview survey, all the risk factors identified in the literature review 
were confirmed. In addition, a number of risk factors that have not been 
addressed in previous studies were suggested by the interviewees. Details are 
presented below.  
Using different communication channels is suggested as a risk factor associated 
with information flow. Using different communication channels produces 
un-standardised data, which may lead to inaccurate data input or engaging extra 
human resource and extra time to organise the data. An information manager 
mentioned:  
“EDI is the most popular IT system used in shipping companies ... 
However, there are still some supply chain partners who cannot afford the 
investment of EDI, and they transmit the required information through other 
information channels such as email or telephone. The information 
transmitted through these different information channels is neither 
organised nor standardised.  The dis-integrated information transmission 
may cause information delay and inaccuracy.” 
Another added risk factors is “shippers requesting extra service information”. 
Container shipping companies usually pay more attention to large shippers. 
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However, the influential negotiation power of large shippers sometimes creates 
risks associated with information flow to container shipping companies. For 
example, a large shipper may use its negotiation power in making unreasonable 
requests to the shipping company. As a manager explained:   
“… large shippers often request for extra service, such as organising 
holistic logistic information which includes inland transportation shifts and 
customs clearance date.… Large shippers may even request for 
forecasting inland transportation timetable for several months in the future.”  
Shippers hiding cargo information is also considered as a risk factor. Some 
shippers used the wrong cargo information to reduce the transportation fee or 
insurance payment, including declaring cheaper cargo category and declaring 
lighter cargo weight. A shipping manager mentioned:  
“We have paid some penalties and our ship has once been detained 
because the documents for customs clearance were inconsistent with the 
shipper and the process was delayed. The reason is that our customer [the 
shipper] did not inform us that the contents of the cargos had been 
changed, or even the cargo information was hidden by the shipper.” 
It has also emerged during the interviews that asset and cargo damage is a 
serious risk faced by shipping companies. As a manager explained:  
“The majority of the cargos in freezer container transportation are fruit, high 
technology products, and chemistry material. These types of cargos need 
to be kept in certain and stable temperature.… Sometimes the electricity 
failure in ports or on ships damages the high value cargos, and makes fruit 
decayed or high technology products overheated. … The risk of dangerous 
goods transportation could damage not only cargos, but also ships, which 
is more serious than cargo damage or transportation delay. Sometimes we 
lose the whole ship, cargos, and reparations because of the dangerous 
goods explosion.” 
Cargo stolen could be classed into risks associated with physical flow. In order 
to avoid the cargo stolen, the container seal is a common method used in 
shipping companies and Customs. However, cargo is still stolen and it generates 
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financial and reputation loss to shipping companies. “Cargo stolen from 
unsealed containers” is confirmed as a risk factor associated with physical flow. 
A senior manager mentioned: 
“… the thieves will drive trucks to some occult places and change the 
containers if the containers have no seal security during re-export 
transportation. Even [the containers] have container seal security, they (the 
criminals) will cut off the top of containers and steal the goods without 
breaking the container seal. Sometimes, they (the criminals) have other 
trucks and containers which are exactly the same as the original one. They 
use the fake containers to replace the valued ones…” 
As an international business, a container shipping company will receive different 
currencies for the transportation fee. The unstable currency exchange rate is 
regarded as a huge risk within risks associated with payment flow. A shipping 
manager mentioned: 
“The transportation fees we get are usually calculated by USD. However, 
some shippers will still pay the bills by local currency, such as euro or JPY. 
We need to afford the risk from the unstable currency exchange rate,… 
sometimes it will make us lose the profit. … We can also transfer some 
impacts of currency exchange risk [to shippers] by doing Currency 
Adjustment Factor (CAF), but it could only be used in a huge fluctuation of 
currency exchange rate.” 
“Shippers go into bankruptcy”, “shippers break the contract and reduce the 
container volume”, and “have partners with bad credit” are confirmed as three 
risk factors by the interviewees. A shipping senior manager mentioned:  
“Sometimes we need to handle or accept the risks from the shippers who 
bankrupt before making the payment. We need to do some survey about 
the shippers or supply chain partners. Avoid doing the business with the 
shippers who have bad credit or unstable finance [is very important to 
us]…” 
In addition, “Shippers abandoning cargos when cargos have already reached 
the port of destination” is also defined as a risk factor by the interviewees. A 
senior manager stated - 
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... shippers may abandon cargos if the value of the cargos become lower 
during the transportation, we therefore cannot receive the transportation 
fee if the contract is under FOB (Free on Board). 
This thesis re-organises the possible risks within container shipping operations 
from the previous studies and interviews into Table 5.4, and uses yellow 
highlight to mark the new risk factors that explore from the face-to-face 
interviews. Six new risk factors have been added based on the results of the 
face-to-face interviews. They are “shippers requesting extra service information” 
(InfoI_4) and “shippers hiding cargo information (non-declare)” (Info_5) in the 
category of “risks associated with information flow”; “container shortage (e.g. 
shippers use containers as storage, container revamp, unexpected demand)” 
(PhTD_6) and “damage to frozen cargo/ reefer containers due to electricity 
failure” (PhCD_5) in the category of “risks associated with physical flow”; and 
“financial crisis in the loan countries” and “shippers abandoning cargos when 
cargos have already reached the port of destination” (PayNP_2) in the category 
of “risks associated with payment flow”, respectively. Eventually, a total of 34 
risk factors have been identified in container shipping operations after 
face-to-face interviews. 
These risks are roughly categorised into risks associated with information flow 
(information delay, information inaccuracy, IT problem), risks associated with 
physical flow (transportation delay, and cargo/asset damage), and risks 
associated with payment flow (curacy exchange, payment delay, and 
non-payment).  
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Table 5.4 Risks within container shipping operations (refined after face-to-face 
interview) 
Risks associated with information flow 
Information Delay (InfoD) 
1. Using different communication channels in the supply chain increases the time of 
information transmission. (e.g. telephone, Email, EDI) 
2. Supply chain partners do not transmit essential information on time 
3. Processing documents are detained by the government departments (e.g. 
customs) 
4. Shipping company cannot transmit essential information on time 
Information Inaccuracy (InfoI) 
1. Lack of information security during the information flow  
2. Information asymmetry/incompleteness  
3. Lack of information standardisation and compatibility 
4. Shippers request extra service information 
5. Shippers hide cargo information (non-declare) 
IT Problem (InfoIT) 
1. IT infrastructure breakdown or crash 
2. Unsuitable human operation on IT infrastructure 
3. Unsuitable human operation on application software 
Risks associated with physical flow 
Transportation Delay (PhTD) 
1. Port strike 
2. Port congestion (unexpected waiting times before berthing or before starting 
loading/discharging) 
3. Port/terminal productivity below expectations (loading/discharging) 
4. Unstable weather 
5. Inappropriate empty mile transportation 
6. Container shortage (e.g. Shippers use containers as storage, container revamp, 
unexpected demand) 
7. Lack of flexibility of fleet size and designed schedules  
8. Oil price rise  
Cargo/asset loss or Damage (PhCD)  
1. Damage to containers or cargos due to terminal operators’ improper 
loading/unloading operations 
2. Cargo being stolen from unsealed containers  
3. Damage caused by transporting dangerous goods  
4. Damage to ship or quay due to improper berth operations  
5. Damage to frozen cargos/ reefer containers due to electricity failure 
6. Attack from pirates or terrorists 
Risks associated with payment flow 
Currency Exchange (PayCE) 
1. Currency exchange during payment process 
2. Financial crisis in the loan countries  
Payment Delay (PayPD) 
1. Payment delay from partners or shippers 
2. Unrealised contract with partners 
Non-Payment (PayNP) 
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1. Shippers go into bankruptcy 
2. Shippers abandon cargos if the value of the cargos become lower during the 
transportation 
3. Shippers breaking the contract and reduce the container volume 
4. Having partners with bad credit 
4.2.2 Result from email interview 
Table 4.4 provides an overall structural organisation of risk factors, risk 
elements and risk categories in container shipping operations. To confirm the 
categorisation in Table 5.4, we conducted small scale email interviews with 
open and closed questions to further explore the appropriateness of the 
identified risk factors within three main constructs, i.e. risks associated with 
information flow, risks associated with physical flow and risks associated with 
payment flow.  
The samples were selected from the managers of Taiwan’s container shipping 
companies in the UK. The reason that we chose the managers who work in the 
UK is to confirm and complement the results from the face-to-face interviews 
that were conducted in Taiwan. In addition, including the view from international 
managers, the results of the risk factors in container shipping operations could 
be generalised to international container shipping companies.  
In total, six email interviews were sent out on 6th May 2011. The email interview 
questions can be referred to Appendix 3. The respondents’ profile includes 
working position and working years, as shown in Table 5.5. All of the 
interviewees have more than 17 years working experience, and some of them 
are in the high level of working positions. It is believed that these six 
interviewees have had sufficient professional experience to judge the 
appropriateness of the risk categorisation.  
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Table 5.5 Respondent’s profile in the email interviews 
Working 
position 
Managing 
Director 
CIO Chief 
Accountant 
Navigation- 
superintendent 
Senior 
consultant 
operations 
Senior 
commissioner 
Working 
years 
27 30 Over 20 17 35 20 
CIO means Chief Information Officer 
The results of the email interviews are summarised in Table 5.6, which shows 
that most of the experts agree the categories of risk element. The elements in 
the category of “risks associated with information flow” are confirmed as 
“information delay”, “information inaccuracy”, and “IT problem”; the elements in 
the category of “risks associated with physical flow” are confirmed as 
“transportation delay” and “cargo/asset loss or damage”; and the elements in 
the category of “risks associated with payment flow” are confirmed as “currency 
exchange”, “payment delay”, and “non-payment”. However, there are quite a 
few interesting comments from the email interviews that are worth mentioning 
below. 
Commenting on the category of “risks associated with information flow”, the cost 
of information/ information system (such EDI) could be deemed as a source of 
risks associated with information flow, which is consistent with the above 
face-to-face interview results. Illegal information exchange is commented as a 
risk element within the category of “risks associated with information flow”. For 
example, it is not allowed for carriers to exchange tonnage supply or capacity of 
the trade lane in shipping business. It is also not allowed for carriers to 
exchange information for freight rates or surcharges in the EU. One manager 
suggests that risks associated with information flow could be categorised into 
information processing risk, information transmission risk, and information 
storing risk. However, we believe that these three elements have been included 
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in the elements of “information delay”, “information inaccuracy”, and “IT 
problem”.  
With regard to the category of “risks associated with physical flow”, a manager 
argues that “a delay in transportation does not always mean an increase in 
risk”. This may be true in some special contexts (e.g. in order to avoid further 
congestion at ports). However, other respondents agree that transportation 
delay is an element within the category of “risks associated with physical flow”, 
and our research needs to consider a complete perspective, we therefore 
maintain “transportation delay” as an element within the category of “risks 
associated with physical flow”. One respondent regarded unstable international 
fuel price as a source of risks associated with physical flow. This may be 
explained by the fact that shipping companies sometimes implement slow 
steaming or use low quality but cheap types of fuels to reduce the operational 
cost when fuel prices are high. These strategies might lead to transportation 
delay or asset damage. Moreover, one risk factor was added after the email 
interviews, “cargos detained by customs”, which implies that the physical flow is 
suspended at some points, and it could be regarded as a type of transportation 
delay.  
In terms of the category of “risks associated with payment flow”, a manager also 
mentioned a risk factor (i.e. shippers give up the cargos when the cargos have 
already been transported to ports of destination) that was mentioned in 
face-to-face interview. In such case, the shipping company cannot get freight 
fee, and needs to absorb some extra fee such as terminal charge, storage, 
demurrage, etc. This is in agreement with the result from the face-to-face 
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interviews and can be considered as an important factor in the risk element of 
“non-payment”. 
Table 5.6 Summary of data on resources acquired 
Dimensions Element Agree Dis-a
gree 
Comments from respondents 
Risks 
associated 
with 
information 
flow 
Information 
Delay 
5 1 
 Cost of information (EDI) 
 Illegal information exchanges 
 More wide range of IR, i.e. 
information processing risk, 
information transmission risk, and 
information storing risk 
Information 
Inaccuracy 
6 0 
IT Problem 6 0 
Risks 
associated 
with 
physical 
flow 
Transportation 
Delay 
5 1 
 A delay in transportation does not 
always mean an increase in risk 
 Cost fuel, environmental 
regulation 
 Restriction by law or regulations 
 Cargos are detained by customs  
Cargo/asset 
loss or 
Damage  
6 0 
Risks 
associated 
with 
payment 
flow 
Currency 
Exchange 
5 1 
 Bad debts, credit, extra cost for 
special cargoes 
 Shippers abandon cargos when 
cargos have already reached the 
port of destination. The shipping 
company cannot get freight fee, 
and needs to absorb some extra 
fee such as terminal charge, 
storage, demurrage, etc. 
Payment Delay 5 1 
Non-Payment 6 0 
Based on the literature review (specific to container shipping and general supply 
chain operations), the face-to-face interviews and the email interviews, this 
thesis has identified a total of 35 risk factors under three categories of risks 
associated with information flow, physical flow and payment flow. This is 
summarised in Table 5.7, and the yellow highlight refers to the new risk factor 
that explore from the email interviews. One new risk factor is explored from the 
email interviews, namely, “cargos being detained by customs” (PhTD_8), which 
is deemed as a risk factor in the category of “risk associated with physical flow”. 
To facilitate the narrative, the risk factors are coded with short names. This 
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table will be used as a base risk classification when designing the risk-factor 
questionnaire in next chapter. 
Table 5.7 Classification of risks within container shipping operations 
Risk associated with information flow 
Information Delay (InfoD) 
1. Using different communication channels in the supply chain and 
consequently increasing the time of information transmission. (e.g. 
telephone, Email, EDI) 
InfoD_1 
2. Supply chain partners not transmitting essential information on time InfoD_2 
3. Processing documents being detained by government departments 
(e.g. customs) 
InfoD_3 
4. Shipping company not transmitting essential information on time InfoD_4 
Information Inaccuracy (InfoI) 
1. Lack of information security during the information flow  InfoI_1 
2. Information asymmetry/incompleteness  InfoI_2 
3. Lack of information standardisation and compatibility InfoI_3 
4. Shippers requesting extra service information InfoI_4 
5. Shippers hiding cargo information (non-declare) InfoI_5 
IT Problem (InfoIT) 
1. IT infrastructure breakdown or crash InfoIT_1 
2. Unsuitable human operation on IT infrastructure InfoIT_2 
3. Unsuitable human operation on application software InfoIT_3 
Risk associated with physical flow 
Transportation Delay (PhTD) 
1. Port strikes PhTD_1 
2. Port congestion (unexpected waiting times before berthing or before 
starting loading/discharging) 
PhTD_2 
3. Port/terminal productivity being below expectations 
(loading/discharging) 
PhTD_3 
4. Unstable weather PhTD_4 
5. Inappropriate empty container transportation PhTD_5 
6. Container shortage (e.g. Shippers use containers as storage, 
container revamp, unexpected demand) 
PhTD_6 
7. Lack of flexibility of fleet size and designed schedules  PhTD_7 
8. Cargos being detained by customs PhTD_8 
9. Oil price rise  PhTD_9 
Asset/cargo loss or damage (PhCD) 
1. Damage to containers or cargo due to terminal operators’ improper 
loading/unloading operations 
PhCD_1 
2. Cargo being stolen from unsealed containers  PhCD_2 
3. Damage caused by transporting dangerous goods  PhCD_3 
4. Damage to ship or quay due to improper berth operations  PhCD_4 
5. Damage to frozen cargo/ reefer containers due to electricity failure PhCD_5 
6. Attack from pirates or terrorists PhCD_6 
Risk associated with payment flow 
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Currency Exchange (PayCE) 
1. Change of currency exchange rate during payment process PayCE_1 
2. Financial crisis in the loan countries  PayCE_2 
Payment Delay (PayPD) 
1. Payment delay from partners or shippers PayPD_1 
2. Unrealised contract with partners PayPD_2 
Non-Payment (PayNP) 
1. Shippers going into bankruptcy PayNP_1 
2. Shippers abandoning cargos when cargos have already reached the 
port of destination 
PayNP_2 
3. Shippers breaking the contract or reducing the container volume PayNP_3 
4. Having partners with bad credit PayNP_4 
Source: author 
5.3 Chapter summary  
In order to identify the risks as complete as possible, this chapter reviews more 
literature in the broad supply chain context from three logistics flows 
perspective. Based on the initial literature review in Chapter 2 and more general 
literature review in this Chapter, a hierarchical risk classification is presented, 
which consists of risk categories, risk elements, and risk factors. The category 
of “risks associated with information flow” includes three risk elements, namely, 
information delay, information inaccuracy, and IT problem. The element of 
“information delay” includes four risk factors, the element of “information 
inaccuracy” includes three risk factors, and the element of “IT problem” includes 
three risk factors. The category of “risks associated with physical flow” includes 
two risk elements, namely, transportation delay and cargo/asset loss or 
damage. The element of “transportation delay” includes seven risk factors, and 
the element of “cargo/asset loss or damage” includes five risk factors. The 
category of “risks associated with payment flow” includes three elements, 
namely, currency exchange, payment delay, and non-payment. The element of 
“currency exchange” includes one risk factor, the element of “payment delay” 
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includes two risk factors, and the element of “non-payment” includes three risk 
factors. Eventually, a total of 35 risk factors are identified through literature 
review and a set of face-to-face interview and a set of email interview.  
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Chapter 6 Measurement and analysis of risks in 
container shipping operations 
Chapter 5 focuses on the second step of risk management, i.e. risk 
measurement and analysis. A risk-factor questionnaire survey is conducted to 
collect the primary data on risk likelihood and risk consequence, which are then 
analysed using several methods. Section 6.1 reports the respondents’ profile in 
the risk-factor survey; Section 6.2 presents the results of validity and reliability 
test; Section 6.3 presents the results of risk measurement from the survey, 
including the results of risk likelihood and the risk consequences under three 
different criteria. Section 6.4 performs risk analysis, including risk scale, three 
risk matrices (i.e. financial loss risk matrix, reputation loss risk matrix, and safety 
and security incident related loss risk matrix), three risk maps, and four risk 
management responses in association with the three risk maps. Section 6.5 is 
the summary of this chapter. 
6.1 Respondents' profile in the risk-factor survey 
The target sample is selected from the list of ROC National Association of 
Shipping Agencies. A total 116 container shipping related companies were 
selected and each company was sent several questionnaire surveys to relevant 
departments, e.g. President/vice-President, information/document department, 
operation/shipping department, and financial department, etc. In total, 342 
questionnaires were sent out on 14th July 2011 and received 88 replies in two 
months, including 62 valid ones and 26 invalid ones as the respondents did not 
136 
 
answer all the questions of this survey, within a month. The valid return rate is 
18.13% (Table 6.1).  
Table 6.1 Questionnaires reply detail 
Questionnaire 
distributed 
Questionnaire 
returned 
Invalid replies Valid replies Valid reply 
rate 
342 88 26 62 18.13% 
The 62 respondents’ profile in the survey is presented in Table 6.2. 
Approximately 75% of respondents have already worked within the shipping 
industry for more than 16 years. This indicates that most of the respondents 
have very long professional working experience in container shipping operations 
and therefore the results of this questionnaire have a high reliability.  
From a working department aspect, most respondents are working in operation/ 
shipping department (48.4%), followed by the financial/accounting department 
(19.4%), the information/ document department (12.9%) and president/ 
vice-president (11.3%). Although in this survey the author have tried to distribute 
similar numbers of questionnaires among information, financial and operation 
departments, the response rates from different departments appeared to be 
quite different. The unbalanced samples might cause a bias in the results of risk 
identification and risk mitigation strategies choice. Nevertheless, each 
department did have a representative size of samples and the inclusion of 
President and vice-President may reduce such bias.  
In terms of the professional role, the largest type of respondents’ role is 
manager/ assistant manager (35.5%), and the second one is director/ vice 
director (29%). There are 48.4% of the respondents who hold a position at or 
above the manager level, and have the power to make decisions within shipping 
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companies. From the company’s main business aspect, more than 60% of 
respondents are working in container shipping agency, and approximately 30% 
of respondents are working in container shipping company. In the ownership 
type section, more than 70% of respondents work in local container shipping 
companies. From the company size aspect, 35.5% of respondents work in small 
companies (fewer than 50 employees), and around 45% of respondents work in 
companies which have more than 200 employees.  
Table 6.2 respondents’ profile 
  number % 
How many years 
have you worked 
in the shipping 
industry? 
1 - 5 years 9 14.5 
6 - 10 years 4 6.5 
11 - 15 years 3 4.8 
16 - 20 years 12 19.4 
21 - 25 years 17 27.4 
Over 25 years 17 27.4 
What is your 
department in 
your company? 
President/ vice-president 7 11.3 
Information/ document  8 12.9 
Financial/ accounting  12 19.4 
Operation/ shipping 30 48.4 
Other  5 8.1 
What is your 
professional role 
in your company? 
Vice president or above 8 12.9 
Manager/Assistant manager 22 35.5 
Director/Vice Director 18 29.0 
Clerk 10 16.1 
Sales representative 3 4.8 
Others 1 1.6 
What is your 
company’s main 
business? 
Container shipping company 19 30.6 
Container shipping agency 38 61.3 
Others 5 8.1 
What is your 
company’s 
ownership type? 
Local firm 44 71.0 
Foreign-owned firm 10 16.1 
Foreign-local firm 7 11.3 
Others 1 1.6 
How many 
employees are in 
your company? 
1 - 50 people 22 35.5 
51 - 100 people 11 17.7 
101~200 people 1 1.6 
201~500 people 15 24.2 
over 500 people 13 21.0 
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6.2 Validity and reliability test for risk-factor survey 
A validity test is to examine whether “a measurement scale is valid, if it does 
what it is supposed to do and measures what it is supposed to measure” (Davis, 
2000, p.177). In order to obtain a high level of validity test, Davis (2000, 
pp.177-178) proposed a set of processes for improving validity, including the 
following four steps: 
1. Conduct an exhaustive search of the literature for all possible items to be 
included in the scale 
2. Solicit expert opinions on the inclusion of items 
3. Pre-test the scale on a set of respondents similar to the population to be 
studied. 
4. Modify as necessary.  
The questions of this thesis are identified from previous literature addressed in 
container shipping operations and general supply chains, and have been 
validated through a set of face-to-face interviews and a set of email interviews 
from container shipping managers. Moreover, in order to make an inclusive risk 
picture for designing the questions, the face-to-face interviewees include 2 
vice-presidents, 2 senior managers in the IT department, and 3 senior 
managers in the operations department; whilst the email interviewees include a 
managing director, a Chief information officer, a Chief Accountant, a Navigation 
superintendent a senior consultant operations, and a senior commissioner. 
Therefore, this survey is believed to have a high level of validity.  
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Reliability refers to “the consistency and stability of a score from a 
measurement scale” (Davis, 2000, p.179). After collecting data, the author 
conducted a reliability test for the whole survey and the results are shown in 
Table 6.3. A total of 140 questions were tested, including risk likelihood (35 
questions), risk consequence on financial loss (35 questions), risk consequence 
on reputation loss (35 questions), and risk consequence on safety and security 
incident related loss (35 questions). The Cronbach’s Alpha is 0.991, whilst the 
Cronbach’s Alpha based on standardised items is also 0.991. According to 
Camines and Zeller (1979) and Bryman and Cramer (1997), the Cronbach’s 
Alpha should more than 0.80 to achieve a high level of reliability test. Therefore, 
this survey achieves a high level of reliability.  
Table 6.3 Reliability test for the whole survey 
Cronbach's Alpha Cronbach's Alpha Based on 
Standardised Items 
Number of 
question 
0.991 0.991 140 
In addition to the reliability test for the whole survey, the author further 
conducted a reliability test for the questions of risk likelihood and the results are 
shown in Table 6.4. The Cronbach’s Alpha is 0.969 (>0.8), whilst the 
Cronbach’s Alpha based on standardised items is also 0.970 (>0.8), which 
illustrates that the questions of risk likelihood are reliable. 
Table 6.4 Reliability test for risk likelihood 
Cronbach's Alpha Cronbach's Alpha Based on 
Standardised Items 
Number of question 
0.969 0.970 35 
The author also a conducted reliability test for the questions of risk 
consequence on financial loss and the results are shown in Table 6.5. The 
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Cronbach’s Alpha is 0.976 (>0.8), whilst the Cronbach’s Alpha based on 
standardised items is also 0.975 (>0.8), which illustrates that the questions of 
risk consequence on financial loss are reliable. 
Table 6.5 Reliability test for risk consequence on financial loss 
Cronbach's Alpha Cronbach's Alpha Based on 
Standardised Items 
Number of question 
0.976 0.977 35 
The author also conducted a reliability test for the questions of risk 
consequence on reputation loss and the results are shown in Table 6.6. The 
Cronbach’s Alpha is 0.975 (>0.8), whilst the Cronbach’s Alpha based on 
standardised items is also 0.975 (>0.8), which illustrates that the questions of 
risk consequence on reputation loss are reliable. 
Table 6.6 Reliability test for risk consequence on reputation loss 
Cronbach's Alpha Cronbach's Alpha Based on 
Standardised Items 
Number of question 
0.975 0.975 35 
Finally, the author conducted a reliability test for the questions of risk 
consequence on safety and security incident related loss and the results are 
shown in Table 6.7. The Cronbach’s Alpha is 0.968 (>0.8), whilst the 
Cronbach’s Alpha based on standardised items is also 0.969 (>0.8), which 
illustrates that the questions of risk consequence on safety and security incident 
related loss are reliable. 
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Table 6.7 Reliability test for risk consequence on safety and security incident 
related loss 
Cronbach's Alpha Cronbach's Alpha Based on 
Standardised Items 
Number of question 
0.968 0.969 35 
6.3 Risk measurement  
This section presents the result of the risk-factor questionnaire survey (see 
Appendix 4), including the level of risk likelihood and the level of risk 
consequences from three aspects (i.e. financial loss, reputation loss, and safety 
and security incident related loss as identified in Section 3.2.3.2).  
6.3.1 Results in relation to risk likelihood 
Table 6.8 shows the risk likelihood in container shipping operations from the 
risk-factor survey. Although the survey used a five point scale to measure the 
likelihood, no risk factor falls into scale 1, 4, and 5 after averaging the 
respondents’ opinions. We therefore further classify the risk likelihoods into three 
levels: (1) high likelihood (red colour, the mean value of a risk factor is greater 
than 3): this risk factor is more likely happened compared with others; (2) 
moderate likelihood (orange colour,  the mean value of a risk factor is between 
2.8 and 2.99): this risk factor has somewhat high likelihood of happening; and (3) 
low likelihood (no colour marked): this risk factor is unlikely to happen compared 
with others. Moreover, the least occurring risk factor will be marked as blue 
colour. 
Among the three risk categories, the category of the risks associated with 
physical flow has the highest likelihood (mean value is 2.88); whilst the other two 
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categories, i.e. the risks associated with information flow and the risks 
associated with payment flow, have similar likelihood (mean value: 2.71). Among 
all risk factors in all three categories, the top three risks in terms of likelihood are 
“oil price rise”, “unstable weather” and “port congestion”, and all of them belong 
to the category of risks associated with physical flow. This reveals that the risks 
associated with physical flow are more likely to happen.   
There are three risk elements within the category of risks associated with 
information flow, i.e. “Information delay”, “information inaccuracy”, and “IT 
problem”. The results show that the first two elements have the same mean 
value (2.77), which is greater than the third risk element – “IT problem” (with 
mean value: 2.55). This indicates that in general “Information delay” and 
“information inaccuracy” are more likely to happen in container shipping 
operations compared to “IT problem”. Each risk element consists of a set of risk 
factors. Among all risk factors in the category of risks associated with information 
flow, the top three risk factors are “shippers hiding cargo information 
(non-declare)” (InfoI_5: 3.26), “shippers requesting extra service information” 
(InfoI_4: 2.84) and “using different communication channels in the supply chain 
and consequently increasing the time of information transmission. (e.g. 
telephone, Email, EDI)” (InfoD_1: 2.82). Especially InfoI_5 has a significantly 
higher likelihood than the other risk factors, which reveals that shipping 
companies need to pay more attention to the information of the cargos, e.g. 
through confirming and checking the cargo content more frequently to reduce 
the occurring of such risk. The least likely risk factor is “lack of information 
security during the information flow” (InfoI_1: 2.40). However, its Standard 
Deviation (S.D.) is the greatest one within the category of risks associated with 
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information flow. This indicates that some shipping companies may regard it as a 
risk factor that is likely to occur. In fact, our interviews confirmed that some 
shipping companies do place a heavy emphasis upon information security in 
order to reduce its likelihood, e.g. several shipping companies have applied the 
new international regulation – ISO27001 – to protect confidential business 
information so that it is not exposed within the competitive marketplace. 
There are two risk elements within the category of risk associated with physical 
flow, i.e. “transportation delay” and “cargo/asset loss or damage”. The results 
show that the former element has a higher mean value of the likelihood (2.96) 
than the latter one (with mean value: 2.76). This indicates that in general 
“transportation delay” is more likely to happen in container shipping operations. 
Managers should pay more attention on reducing the occurrence of transport 
delay to mitigate the impact from this risk element. Among all risk factors in the 
category of risks associated with physical flow, the top three risk factors 
associated with physical flow include “oil price rise” (PhTD_9: 3.68), “unstable 
weather” (PhTD _4: 3.35) and “port congestion (unexpected waiting times before 
berthing or before starting loading/discharging)” (PhTD _2: 3.27). All of these 
three risks belong to the element of “transportation delay”, this shows that this 
element is more likely to happen than the element of “cargo/asset loss or 
damage” in container shipping operations. The least likely occurring risk factor is 
“Damage to ship or quay due to improper berth operations” (PhCD_4: 2.53), 
which has a big gap with PhTD_9 (mean value: 3.68) (i.e. the most frequently 
happening risk factor in this risk category), and the difference of the mean values 
is 1.12. Piracy at sea has received a lot of attention in recent years with more 
and more newspapers and research reporting or addressing this issue (e.g. 
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Kaye, 2011; Nkwocha, 2011). From our result, it appears that its likelihood does 
not stand out (PhCD_6: 2.66); it actually ranks 12th among all risk factors 
associated with physical flow. However, its S.D. is the greatest one (S.D. = 1.12) 
in the category of risks associated with physical flow, which indicates that some 
respondents (e.g. shipping agencies or some shipping companies) may less 
care about the pirate problem whereas other companies (e.g. shipping 
companies) may consider that it can happen quite often (e.g. if they have their 
ships sailing in some pirate-prone routes). This thesis therefore speculates that 
some responding companies may not have the routes through pirate sea areas. 
There are three risk elements within the category of risks associated with 
payment flow, i.e. “currency exchange”, “payment delay” and “non-payment”. 
The results show that the first element has the largest mean value (2.79), whilst 
the second element has a mean value 2.74, and the third element has a mean 
value 2.65. There is a more notable difference of likelihood between the first two 
risk elements (“currency exchange” and “payment delay”) and the third element 
(“non-payment”). Among all risk factors in the category of risks associated with 
payment flow, the top three risk factors are “change of currency exchange rate 
during payment process” (PayCE_1: 3.08), “payment delay from partners or 
shippers’ (PayPD_1: 2.82) and “shippers breaking the contract or reducing the 
container volume” (PayNP_3: 2.73). The least likely risk factor is “financial crisis 
in the loan countries” (PayCE_2: 2.49). It is worth noting that after the financial 
crisis in 2008, many currencies become fluctuated more, including some global 
general currency such as the American dollar. According to Wang (2011), China 
Shipping Container Lines (CSCL) is facing a big risk caused by foreign 
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exchange. This may explain why “change of currency exchange rate during 
payment process” is ranked as the top one.  
Table 6.8 Risk likelihood 
Risks associated with information flow Mean S.D. Rank 
Information Delay (InfoD) A D 
1. Using different communication channels in the supply chain and 
consequently increasing the time of information transmission. 
(e.g. telephone, Email, EDI) 
2.82 1.12  3 
2. Supply chain partners not transmitting essential information on 
time 
2.76 0.94  5 
3. Processing documents being detained by the government 
departments (e.g. customs) 
2.81 1.01  4 
4. Shipping company not transmitting essential information on time 2.68 0.92  7 
Mean value of InfoD 2.77 
Information Inaccuracy (InfoI) 
1. Lack of information security during the information flow  2.40 1.23  12 
2. Information asymmetry/incompleteness  2.61 1.03  8 
3. Lack of information standardisation and compatibility 2.73 1.01  6 
4. Shippers requesting extra service information 2.84 0.98  2 
5. Shippers hiding cargo information (non-declare) 3.26 1.07  1 
Mean value of InfoI 2.77 
IT Problem (InfoIT) 
1. IT infrastructure breakdown or crash 2.56 0.86  9 
2. Unsuitable human operation on IT infrastructure 2.53 0.86  11 
3. Unsuitable human operation on application software 2.56 0.78  9 
Mean value of InfoIT 2.55 
Mean value of risks associated with information flow 2.71 
Risks associated with physical flow 
Transportation Delay (PhTD) 
1. Port strike 2.56 0.99  14 
2. Port congestion (unexpected waiting times before berthing or 
before starting loading/discharging) 
3.27 0.94 3 3 
3. Port/terminal productivity being below expectations  
(loading/discharging) 
2.82 0.97  6 
4. Unstable weather 3.35 0.85 2 2 
5. inappropriate empty container transportation 2.77 1.00  8 
6. Container shortage (e.g. Shippers use containers as storage, 
container revamp, unexpected demand) 
2.82 0.84  6 
7. Lack of flexibility of fleet size and designed schedules  2.73 0.87  10 
8. Cargos are detained by customs 2.63 0.91  13 
9. Oil price rise  3.68 1.00 1 1 
Mean value of PhTD 2.96 
Cargo/asset loss or damage (PhCD) 
1. Damage to containers or cargos due to terminal operators’ 
improper loading/unloading operations 
3.03 1.02  4 
2. Cargo being stolen from unsealed containers  2.77 1.05  8 
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3. Damage caused by transporting dangerous goods  2.90 0.90  5 
4. Damage to ship or quay due to improper berth operations  2.53 0.95  15 
5. Damage to frozen cargos/ reefer containers due to electricity 
failure 
2.68 0.92  11 
6. Attack from pirates or terrorists 2.66 1.12  12 
Mean value of PhCD 2.76 
Mean value of risks associated with physical flow 2.88 
Risks associated with payment flow 
Currency Exchange (PayCE) 
1. Change of currency exchange rate during payment process 3.08 1.08  1 
2. Financial crisis in the loan countries  2.49 1.07  8 
Mean value of PayCE 2.79 
Payment Delay (PayPD) 
1. Payment delay from partners or shippers 2.82 0.97  2 
2. Unrealised contract with partners 2.66 0.97  5 
Mean value of PayPD 2.74 
Non Payment (PayNP) 
1. Shippers going into bankruptcy 2.61 1.06  6 
2. Shippers abandoning cargos when cargos have already 
reached the port of destination 
2.68 0.88  4 
3. Shippers breaking the contract or reducing the container 
volume 
2.73 0.96  3 
4. Having partners with bad credit 2.58 0.88  7 
Mean value of PayNP 2.65 
Mean value of risks associated with payment flow 2.71 
*S.D. = Standard Deviation 
*red colour means the mean value is more than 3 
*orange colour means the mean value is between 2.8 and 2.99 
*blue colour means the mean value is the smallest one 
*Rank A means the overall risks rank (only shows the top three ones) 
*Rank D means the risk rank within the dimension risks, i.e. risks associated with information flow, risks 
associated with physical flow, and risks associated with payment flow 
6.3.2 Results in relation to financial loss consequence 
Table 6.9 shows that the risk consequences from the financial loss perspective 
from the risk-factor survey. Among three risk categories, the category of risks 
associated with physical flow has the greatest mean, which is 3.22 and is 
regarded as the most serious risk category in terms of financial consequence. 
The category of risks associated with payment flow (mean value: 2.95) ranks the 
second and the category of risks associated with information flow (mean value: 
2.87) is the third one. However, all three categories of risks deserve a lot of 
attention if managers aim to reduce the financial loss consequence as their 
147 
 
mean values are all reasonably high (e.g. greater than 2.8). Among all risk 
factors in all three categories, the top three risk factors in terms of financial 
consequence are PhTD_9, PhCD_4, and PhTD_1. All these three risk factors 
belong to the category of risks associated with physical flow, which means that 
the main risks that impact on the financial loss are among the risks associated 
with physical flow.  
Among three risk elements within the category of the risks associated with 
information flow, “IT problem” (mean value: 2.90) has the most serious financial 
consequence; whilst “information inaccuracy” (mean value: 2.89) ranks the 
second, and “information delay” (mean value: 2.82) is the least serious one yet it 
still plays an important role in financial loss consequence. Among all the risk 
factors within the category of the risks associated with information flow, the top 
three risk factors in terms of financial loss consequence are “shippers hide cargo 
information” (InfoI_5: 3.34), “shipping company cannot transmit essential 
information on time” (InfoD_4: 3.18), and “lack of information security during the 
information flow” (InfoI_1: 3.15). This indicates that shipping companies may 
suffer serious financial loss if shippers hide cargo information. Shipping 
companies also need to make some strategies for transmitting the information 
on time by itself, such as regular employee training. The third risk factor, “lack of 
information security”, has the greatest S.D. (1.23) in the category of risks 
associated with information flow, and this means that some companies consider 
it being rather serious (e.g. may be more serious than the second one, i.e. 
“shipping company cannot transmit essential information on time”). Although 
“using different communication channels in the supply chain increases the time 
of information transmission” it has the least impact upon financial loss (InfoD_1: 
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2.56), and does not have a huge gap with other risk factors associated with 
information flow. Therefore, it may still need to be considered in container 
shipping operations. 
Among two risk elements within the category of the risks associated with 
physical flow, “cargo/asset loss or damage” (mean value: 3.39) has a greater 
impact on financial loss consequence than “transportation delay” (mean value: 
3.10). All mean values of risk factors within the risk element, “cargo/asset loss or 
damage”, are greater than 3, which illustrates the important severity of 
“cargo/asset loss or damage” from the financial loss consequence aspect. 
Among all the risk factors within the category of the risks associated with 
physical flow, the top three risk factors in terms of financial loss consequence 
include “oil price rise” (PhTD_6: 3.66), “damage to ship or quay due to improper 
berth operations” (PhCD_4: 3.56), and “port strike” (PhTD_1: 3.53). 
Undoubtedly, unstable oil price has become an important issue from 2007. Many 
studies indicated that the dramatic fluctuation of oil price makes many shipping 
companies suffer huge financial crises (e.g. Michaelowa and Krause, 2000; 
Goulielmos and Psifia, 2006). There were some reports on the accidents caused 
by improper berth operations, e.g. a containership capsized when loading in 
Antwerp on 8th March 2007, which caused about 100 containers and cars to fall 
overboard (IMC, 2007). Port strikes also lead to serious financial loss to 
container shipping companies. The well-known example is the strike in the U.S. 
in 2002 that cost America’s economy 1 to 2 billion dollars per day (Park et al., 
2008). Although the risk factor, “attack from pirates or terrorists”, is not in the top 
three, its mean value is noticeably high (PhCD_6: 3.50). This may be supported 
by Ewence’s (2011) report, which stated that it could cost shipping companies 
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and the governments $7bn to $ 12bn per year to deal with the Somalia piracy. 
Moreover, except “inappropriate empty container transportation” (PhTD_5: 
2.79), other risk factors’ mean values in the element of “transportation delay” are 
all greater than 2.8. However, the mean value of PhTD_5 is very close to 2.8. In 
addition, the gaps of these mean values are marginal (difference of the 
maximum and minimum mean = 0.2), which means the risks associated with 
payment flow have similar effect in terms of the financial loss consequence. 
Among three risk elements within the category of the risks associated with 
payment flow, “payment delay” (mean value: 3.00) has the most serious financial 
loss consequence; however, “currency exchange” (mean value: 2.96) and 
“non-payment” (mean value: 2.91) also have quite close severity in financial loss 
consequence. Among all the risk factors within the category of risks associated 
with payment flow, the top three top risk factors in terms of financial loss 
consequence are “change of currency exchange rate during payment process” 
(PayCE_1: 3.02), “payment delay from partners or shippers” (PayPD_1: 3.02), 
and “shippers going into bankruptcy” (PayNP_1: 3.02). It is interesting that all of 
the mean values of these three risks are the same and the S.D. are close, which 
shows that these three risk factors have similar levels of impact upon the 
financial loss within shipping operations.  
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Table 6.9 Risk consequence - financial loss 
Risks associated with information flow Mean S.D. Rank 
Information Delay (InfoD) A D 
1. Using different communication channels in the supply 
chain and consequently increasing the time of information 
transmission. (e.g. telephone, Email, EDI) 
2.56 1.10  12 
2. Supply chain partners not transmitting essential 
information on time 
2.68 1.05  9 
3. Processing documents being detained by government 
departments (e.g. customs) 
2.84 1.13  5 
4. Shipping company not transmitting essential information 
on time 
3.18 1.13  2 
Mean value of InfoD 2.82 
Information Inaccuracy (InfoI) 
1. Lack of information security during the information flow  3.15 1.23  3 
2. Information asymmetry/incompleteness  2.71 1.11  8 
3. Lack of information standardisation and compatibility 2.58 0.98  11 
4. Shippers requesting extra service information 2.66 1.14  10 
5. Shippers hiding cargo information (non-declare) 3.34 1.17  1 
Mean value of InfoI 2.89 
IT Problem (InfoIT) 
1. IT infrastructure breakdown or crash 3.03 1.02  4 
2. Unsuitable human operation on IT infrastructure 2.82 1.00  7 
3. Unsuitable human operation on application software 2.84 0.93  5 
Mean value of InfoIT 2.90 
Mean value of risks associated with information flow 2.87 
Risks associated with physical flow 
Transportation Delay (PhTD) 
1. Port strikes 3.53 1.22 3 3 
2. Port congestion (unexpected waiting times before berthing 
or before starting loading/discharging) 
3.18 0.97  8 
3. Port/terminal productivity being below expectations 
(loading/discharging) 
3.03 0.96  11 
4. Unstable weather 3.08 0.98  10 
5. Inappropriate empty container transportation 2.79 1.03  15 
6. Container shortage (e.g. Shippers use containers as 
storage, container revamp, unexpected demand) 
2.90 0.97  13 
7. Lack of flexibility of fleet size and designed schedules  2.95 1.03  12 
8. Cargos being detained by customs 2.81 1.01  14 
9. Oil price rise  3.66 0.92 1 1 
Mean value of PhTD 3.10 
Cargo/asset loss or damage (PhCD) 
1. Damage to containers or cargo due to terminal operators’ 
improper loading/unloading operations 
3.15 1.02  9 
2. Cargo being stolen from unsealed containers  3.24 1.18  7 
3. Damage caused by transporting dangerous goods  3.43 1.01  6 
4. Damage to ship or quay due to improper berth operations  3.56 1.17 2 2 
5. Damage to frozen cargo/ reefer containers due to 
electricity failure 
3.48 1.08  5 
6. Attack from pirates or terrorists 3.50 1.33  4 
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Mean value of PhCD 3.39 
Mean value of risks associated with physical flow 3.22 
Risks associated with payment flow 
Currency Exchange (PayCE) 
1. Change of currency exchange rate during payment 
process 
3.02 1.12  1 
2. Financial crisis in the loan countries  2.90 1.22  6 
Mean value of PayCE 2.96 
Payment Delay (PayPD) 
1. Payment delay from partners or shippers 3.02 1.12  1 
2. Unrealised contract with partners 2.97 1.14  4 
Mean value of PayPD 3.00 
Non Payment (PayNP) 
1. Shippers going into bankruptcy 3.02 1.14  1 
2. Shippers abandoning cargos when cargos have already 
reached the port of destination 
2.97 1.06  4 
3. Shippers breaking the contract or reducing the container 
volume 
2.84 1.03  7 
4. Having partners with bad credit 2.82 1.05  8 
Mean value of PayNP 2.91 
Mean value of risks associated with payment flow 2.95 
*S.D. = Standard Deviation 
*red colour means the mean value is more than 3 
*orange colour means the mean value is between 2.8 and 2.99 
*blue colour means the mean value is the smallest one 
*Rank A means the overall risks rank (only shows the top three ones) 
*Rank D means the risk rank within the dimension risks, i.e. risks associated with information flow, risks 
associated with physical flow, and risks associated with payment flow 
6.3.3 Results in relation to reputation loss consequence 
Table 6.10 shows the risk consequences in relation to the reputation loss from 
the risk-factor survey. Among three risk categories, the category of risks 
associated with information flow (with mean value: 2.70) and the category of 
risks associated with physical flow (with mean value: 2.71) in the reputation loss 
consequence are similar yet not as important as in the financial loss 
consequence (with mean values 2.87 and 3.22 respectively in Table 5.4); whilst 
the category of risks associated with payment flow (with mean value: 2.42) is the 
least serious one that impacts on reputation loss, which is also significantly less 
than on the financial loss (with mean value 2.95 in Table 5.4). Among all the risk 
factors in all three categories, the top three risk factors in terms of reputation loss 
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consequence are PhCD_3, InfoI_5, and PhCD_4. Compared to other risk 
consequences, the mean value of these risks in reputation loss are smaller. 
These are the only three risk factors with mean value greater than 3 and the 
greatest mean value is solely 3.08. This result indicates that these risk factors 
may be the main ones that lead to reputation loss. On the other side, it is noted 
that the mean value of InfoD_1, i.e. “Using different communication channels in 
the supply chain and consequently increasing the time of information 
transmission”, is the least serious one (InfoD_1: 2.24) in reputation loss 
consequence. 
Among three risk elements within the category of the risks associated with 
information flow, “IT problem” (mean value: 2.76) and “information inaccuracy” 
(mean value: 2.73) are the first and second risk elements that causes reputation 
loss, whilst “information delay” (mean value: 2.62) is the least serious one. 
However, all three risk elements’ mean values are not greater than 2.8, which 
indicate that these three risk elements may not hugely impact on the reputation 
loss. Among all the risk factor within the category of the risks associated with 
information flow, the top three risk factors in reputation loss consequence 
include “shippers hiding cargo information (non-declare)” (InfoI_5: 3.03), 
“shipping company not transmitting essential information on time” (InfoD_4: 
2.92), “processing documents being detained by the government departments 
(e.g. customs)” (InfoD_3: 2.89), and “IT infrastructure breakdown or crash” 
(InfoIT_1: 2.89). Although InfoD_3 and InfoIT_1 have the same mean value, the 
S.D. of InfoIT_1 (S.D. = 1.22) is greater than InfoD_3 (S.D. = 1.10). This result 
illustrates that some companies may regard “processing documents are 
detained by the government departments” is more important than “IT 
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infrastructure breakdown or crash”, but other companies may think in the 
opposite way, whereas overall their impact on reputation loss is similar.  
Among the two risk elements within the category of risks associated with 
physical flow, “cargo/asset loss or damage” (mean value: 2.96) is more serious 
than “transportation delay” (mean value: 2.58). Moreover, all of the mean values 
of transportation delay are smaller than 2.8. This means that the risk element of 
“cargo/asset loss or damage” causes more reputation loss compared to the 
other one and more attention should be paid to reducing its impact. Among all 
the risk factors within the category of the risks associated with physical flow, the 
top three ones are “damage caused by transporting dangerous goods” 
(PhCD_3: 3.08), “damage to ship or quay due to improper berth operations” 
(PhCD_4: 3.00), and “damage to frozen cargos/ reefer containers due to 
electricity failure” (PhCD_5: 2.97). It is easy to understand that the above three 
risk factors would lead to the companies’ reputation loss. The least serious risk 
factor is “oil price rise” (with mean value: 2.31).  
Among three risk elements within the category of risks associated with payment 
flow aspect, all of the mean values are not more than 2.5. This indicates that the 
category of risks associated with payment flow is relatively less important on the 
reputation loss consequence to shipping companies. However, the S.D. of the 
two risk factors in currency exchange is relatively large, which means the 
currency exchange risks may still need to be considered in shipping operations. 
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Table 6.10 Risk consequence - reputation loss 
Risks associated with information flow Mean S.D. Rank 
Information Delay (InfoD) A D 
1. Using different communication channels in the supply chain and 
consequently increasing the time of information transmission. 
(e.g. telephone, Email, EDI) 
2.24 1.07  12 
2. Supply chain partners not transmitting essential information on 
time 
2.44 1.07  11 
3. Processing documents being detained by government 
departments (e.g. customs) 
2.89 1.10  3 
4. Shipping company not transmitting essential information on time 2.92 1.22  2 
Mean value of InfoD 2.62 
Information Inaccuracy (InfoI) 
1. Lack of information security during the information flow  2.82 1.19  5 
2. Information asymmetry/incompleteness  2.66 1.14  8 
3. Lack of information standardisation and compatibility 2.48 1.00  10 
4. Shippers requesting extra service information 2.65 1.12  9 
5. Shippers hiding cargo information (non-declare) 3.03 1.12 2 1 
Mean value of InfoI 2.73 
IT Problem (InfoIT) 
1. IT infrastructure breakdown or crash 2.89 1.22  3 
2. Unsuitable human operation on IT infrastructure 2.69 1.14  6 
3. Unsuitable human operation on application software 2.69 1.05  6 
Mean value of InfoIT 2.76 
Mean value of risks associated with information flow 2.70 
Risks associated with physical flow 
Transportation Delay (PhTD) 
1. Port strikes 2.79 1.36  6 
2. Port congestion (unexpected waiting times before berthing or 
before starting loading/discharging) 
2.73 1.15  8 
3. Port/terminal productivity being below expectations 
(loading/discharging) 
2.69 1.06  10 
4. Unstable weather 2.44 1.15  13 
5. Inappropriate empty container transportation 2.42 1.18  14 
6. Container shortage (e.g. Shippers use containers as storage, 
container revamp, unexpected demand) 
2.55 1.11  11 
7. Lack of flexibility of fleet size and designed schedules  2.76 1.04  7 
8. Cargos being detained by customs 2.53 1.16  12 
9. Oil price rise  2.31 1.18  15 
Mean value of PhTD 2.58 
Cargo/asset loss or damage (PhCD) 
1. Damage to containers or cargo due to terminal operators’ 
improper loading/unloading operations 
2.82 1.09  5 
2. Cargo being stolen from unsealed containers  2.85 0.92  4 
3. Damage caused by transporting dangerous goods  3.08 1.11 1 1 
4. Damage to ship or quay due to improper berth operations  3.00 1.10 3 2 
5. Damage to frozen cargo/ reefer containers due to electricity 
failure 
2.97 1.06  3 
6. Attack from pirates or terrorists 2.73 1.27  8 
Mean value of PhCD 2.91 
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Mean value of risks associated with physical flow 2.71 
Risks associated with payment flow 
Currency Exchange (PayCE) 
1. Change of currency exchange rate during payment process 2.37 1.24  6 
2. Financial crisis in the loan countries  2.41 1.33  5 
Mean value of PayCE 2.39 
Payment Delay (PayPD) 
1. Payment delay from partners or shippers 2.45 1.20  3 
2. Unrealised contract with partners 2.55 1.21  1 
Mean value of PayPD 2.50 
Non Payment (PayNP) 
1. Shippers going into bankruptcy 2.37 1.22  6 
2. Shippers abandoning cargos when cargos have already 
reached the port of destination 
2.34 1.14  8 
3. Shippers breaking the contract or reducing the container 
volume 
2.42 1.22  4 
4. Having partners with bad credit 2.48 1.18  2 
Mean value of PayNP 2.40 
Mean value of risks associated with payment flow 2.42 
*S.D. = Standard Deviation 
*red colour means the mean value is more than 3 
*orange colour means the mean value is between 2.8 and 2.99 
*blue colour means the mean value is the smallest one 
*Rank A means the overall risks rank (only shows the top three ones) 
*Rank D means the risk rank within the dimension risks, i.e. risks associated with information flow, risks 
associated with physical flow, and risks associated with payment flow 
6.3.4 Results in relation to safety and security incident related loss 
consequence 
Table 6.11 shows the risk consequence in relation to the safety and security 
incident related loss from the risk-factor survey. The category of risks associated 
with physical flow (mean value: 2.93) and the category of risks associated with 
information flow (mean value: 2.91) are the first and second important risk 
categories, and both of their mean values are greater than 2.9; this indicates that 
both of them may lead to serious safety and security incident related loss in 
container shipping operations. The category of risks associated with payment 
flow has the least serious impact (mean value: 2.29). Among all risk factors in all 
three categories, the top three risk factors are “attack from pirates or terrorists” 
(PhCD_6: 3.95), “damage to ship or quay due to improper berth operations” 
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(PhCD_4: 3.84), and “damage caused by transporting dangerous goods” 
(PhCD_3: 3.74). All of these three risk factors belong to the category of risks 
associated with physical flow, which means that the main risks that impact on the 
safety and security loss are among the risks associated with physical flow. It is 
noted that the least serious risk factor is “shippers breaking the contract or 
reducing the container volume” (mean value: 2.21), which may be explained by 
the fact that this risk factor is not directly related to the safety and security. 
Among three risk elements within the category of risks associated with 
information flow, “IT problem” (mean value: 3.13) has the most serious impact on 
safety and security incident related loss; whilst “information inaccuracy” (mean 
value: 3.09) is quite close to the former one. Both these two risk elements have 
mean values greater than 3, which reveal that the consequences of these two 
elements are quite serious in terms of safety and security. The least serious 
element is “information delay” with a mean value 2.53, which is significantly 
lower than the other two risk elements. Among  all the risk factors within the 
category of the risks associated with information flow, the top three risk factors in 
terms of safety and security incident related loss consequence are “shippers 
hiding cargo information (non-declare)” (InfoI_5: 3.56), “lack of information 
security during the information flow” (InfoI_1: 3.31), and “IT infrastructure 
breakdown or crash” (InfoIT_1: 3.23). The importance of InfoI_5 is supported by 
Mele’s (2011) report: the potential threat of cargo fraud is more damaging than 
the cargo theft. Additionally, all the mean values of the risk factors in the element 
of “IT problem” are greater than 3, which show IT problems could have serious 
effect on safety and security. Moreover, the S.D. of “information 
asymmetry/incompleteness” (1.30) and “shippers request extra service 
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information” (1.31) are quite large; this result indicates that although these two 
risk factors are not in the top three risk factors within the category of risks 
associated with information flow in terms of the safety and security incident 
related loss consequence, some companies may still consider them.  
Among the two risk elements within the category of risks associated with 
physical flow, “cargo/asset loss or damage” (with mean value: 3.61) plays a 
much more important role than the other one, i.e. “transportation delay” (mean 
value: 2.48), in terms of safety and security incident related loss consequence. 
This may be explained by the fact that “cargo/ asset loss or damage” is directly 
linked to safety and security performance, whereas “transportation delay” is not. 
Among all the risk factors within the category of risks associated with physical 
flow , the top three risk factors are “attack from pirates or terrorists” (PhCD_6: 
3.95), “damage to ship or quay due to improper berth operations” (PhCD_4: 
3.84), and “damage caused by transporting dangerous goods” (PhCD_3: 3.74). 
The piracy issue has been emphasised in recent years, and its damage to 
employee safety and the security of ships is countless (Kaye, 2011; Nkwocha, 
2011). The ships that transport dangerous goods also need much attention 
because of its serious damage to employees. For example, according to AP’s 
(2011) report, an explosion accident happened on a ship and it killed three crew 
members on 8th September 2011 because an unknown substance leaked into 
water.  Additionally, all the mean values of the risk factors in the element of 
“cargo/asset loss or damage” are greater than 3 (similar to the case of financial 
loss consequence in Table 5.4) and all these six risk factors are also the top six 
risk factors within the category of risks associated with physical flow in terms of 
safety and security incident related loss consequence. Moreover, “unstable 
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weather” (PhTD_4: 2.95) and “port strike” (PhTD_1: 2.85) also have serious 
impacts on safety and security incident related loss consequence. On the other 
hand, the least serious risk factor is “container shortage (e.g. Shippers use 
containers as storage, container revamp, unexpected demand)” (PhTD _6: 
2.23). 
Among three risk elements within the category of risks associated with payment 
flow, all the mean values of three risk elements are close to 2.3. This result 
shows that the risks associated with payment flow have quite small impact on 
safety and security incident related loss consequence in container shipping 
operations. Among all the risk factors within the category of risks associated with 
payment flow, the top three risk factors in terms of safety and security incident 
related loss consequence are “shippers going into bankruptcy” (PayNP_1: 2.40), 
“having partners with bad credit” (PayNP_4: 2.34), and “financial crisis in the 
loan countries” (PayCE_2: 2.27). Except PayNP_1, all the mean values of risk 
factors within the category of risks associated with payment flow are smaller 
than 2.4. Therefore, it is suggested that shipping managers may pay more 
attention to other types of risk category (i.e. risks associated with information 
flow and risks associated with physical flow) than to risks associated with 
payment flow when reducing the safety and security incident related loss is 
concerned.  
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Table 6.11 Risk consequence - safety and security incident related loss 
Risks associated with information flow Mean S.D. Rank 
Information Delay (InfoD) A D 
1. Using different communication channels in the supply 
chain and consequently increasing the time of information 
transmission. (e.g. telephone, Email, EDI) 
2.40 1.14  12 
2. Supply chain partners not transmitting essential 
information on time 
2.45 1.22  11 
3. Processing documents being detained by government 
departments (e.g. customs) 
2.65 1.26  9 
4. Shipping company not transmitting essential information 
on time 
2.60 1.23  10 
Mean value of InfoD 2.53 
Information Inaccuracy (InfoI) 
1. Lack of information security during the information flow  3.31 1.29  2 
2. Information asymmetry/incompleteness  2.95 1.30  6 
3. Lack of information standardisation and compatibility 2.82 1.06  7 
4. Shippers requesting extra service information 2.79 1.31  8 
5. Shippers hiding cargo information (non-declare) 3.56 1.29  1 
Mean value of InfoI 3.09 
IT Problem (InfoIT) 
1. IT infrastructure breakdown or crash 3.23 0.97  3 
2. Unsuitable human operation on IT infrastructure 3.10 1.14  4 
3. Unsuitable human operation on application software 3.06 1.07  5 
Mean value of InfoIT 3.13 
Mean value of risks associated with information flow 2.91 
Risks associated with physical flow 
Transportation Delay (PhTD) 
1. Port strikes 2.85 1.29  8 
2. Port congestion (unexpected waiting times before berthing 
or before starting loading/discharging) 
2.42 1.08  9 
3. Port/terminal productivity being below expectations 
(loading/discharging) 
2.40 1.08  10 
4. Unstable weather 2.95 1.08  7 
5. Inappropriate empty container transportation 2.37 1.16  12 
6. Container shortage (e.g. Shippers use containers as 
storage, container revamp, unexpected demand) 
2.23 1.14  15 
7. Lack of flexibility of fleet size and designed schedules  2.39 1.26  11 
8. Cargos being detained by customs 2.35 1.10  13 
9. Oil price rise  2.35 1.24  13 
Mean value of PhTD 2.48 
Cargo/asset loss or damage (PhCD) 
1. Damage to containers or cargo due to terminal operators’ 
improper loading/unloading operations 
3.11 1.03  6 
2. Cargo being stolen from unsealed containers  3.27 1.10  5 
3. Damage caused by transporting dangerous goods  3.74 1.17 3 3 
4. Damage to ship or quay due to improper berth operations  3.84 1.22 2 2 
5. Damage to frozen cargo/ reefer containers due to 
electricity failure 
3.72 1.11  4 
6. Attack from pirates or terrorists 3.95 1.22 1 1 
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Mean value of PhCD 3.61 
Mean value of risks associated with physical flow 2.93 
Risks associated with payment flow 
Currency Exchange (PayCE) 
1. Change of currency exchange rate during payment 
process 
2.27 1.28  4 
2. Financial crisis in the loan countries  2.32 1.33  3 
Mean value of PayCE 2.30 
Payment Delay (PayPD) 
1. Payment delay from partners or shippers 2.26 1.09  6 
2. Unrealised contract with partners 2.26 1.10  6 
Mean value of PayPD 2.26 
Non Payment (PayNP) 
1. Shippers going into bankruptcy 2.40 1.29  1 
2. Shippers abandoning cargos when cargos have already 
reached the port of destination 
2.27 1.20  4 
3. Shippers breaking the contract or reducing the container 
volume 
2.21 1.12  8 
4. Having partners with bad credit 2.34 1.23  2 
Mean value of PayNP 2.31 
Mean value of risks associated with payment flow 2.29 
*S.D. = Standard Deviation 
*red colour means the mean value is more than 3 
*orange colour means the mean value is between 2.8 and 2.99 
*blue colour means the mean value is the smallest one 
*Rank A means the overall risks rank (only shows the top three ones) 
*Rank D means the risk rank within the dimension risks, i.e. risks associated with information flow, risks 
associated with physical flow, and risks associated with payment flow 
6.4 Risk analysis 
In this section, the results of risk scale, three risk matrices and maps 
corresponding to three different risk consequences (i.e. financial loss, reputation 
loss, and safety and security incident related loss), and risk maps with four risk 
management responses (i.e. avoid, transfer, mitigate, and accept) will be 
presented respectively. 
6.4.1 Risk scale 
Instead of multiplying the mean value of risk likelihood with the mean value of 
risk consequence to calculate the risk scale, in this thesis the risk scale is 
measured by multiplying risk likelihood and risk consequence for each individual 
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respondent, and then averaging over all respondents. This thesis uses Average 
Risk Scale (ARS) (which has been developed in Section 4.3.1.1) to calculate the 
relevant risk likelihood and risk consequence of each risk factor and then to 
locate these risk factors to the risk map.  
Three types of risk scale – financial loss risk scale, reputation loss risk scale, 
and safety and security incident related loss risk scale – have been calculated 
and the mean values are also calculated and ranked respectively (Table 6.12). 
Although we have introduced four levels of risk scale: extreme risk (risk scale: 
15.01 – 25), high risk (risk scale: 10.01 – 15), moderate risk (risk scale: 5.01 – 
10), and Low risk (risk scale: 1 to 5), all the risk scales fall between 6.5 and 14. 
This thesis therefore classifies the risk scale into the following three categories: 
high risk (the mean value of risk scale is bigger than 10, in red colour), moderate 
risk (the mean value of risk scale is between 8.01 and 9.99, in yellow colour), 
and low risk (the rest risk factors, with no colour). In addition, the least risk scale 
of the risk factor is marked in blue colour.  
Averaging over all risk factors in terms of their impact on financial loss, 
reputation loss and safety and security incident related loss, the results, as 
shown in Table 6.12, reveal that financial loss is the most affected criterion (the 
average is 9.05) and reputation loss is the least affected criterion (the average is 
7.92) with the safety and security incident related loss (the average is 8.21) 
being in the middle.  
From the financial loss risk scale perspective, the category of risks associated 
with physical flow (mean value: 9.80) is the main risk category which leads to 
financial loss; the category of risks associated with information flow is the least 
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one with a mean value 8.33. Among all the risk factors, the top three risk factors 
are “oil price rise” (PhTD_9: 14.00), “shippers hiding cargo information 
(non-declare)” (InfoI_5: 11.44), and “port congestion (unexpected waiting times 
before berthing or before starting loading/discharging)” (PhTD_2: 10.81). It is 
easy to understand that the fluctuated oil price has become one of the most 
serious risk factors in financial loss due to the rapid increasing oil price in recent 
years (e.g. up to $147.27 in July, 2008) (www.cnyes.com). Shippers sometime 
will hide cargo information to smuggle some illegal goods or to avoid the 
expensive freight of dangerous goods and high valued cargos. This leads to the 
severity of the risk factor InfoI_5 sometimes is greater than PhTD_9. The third 
risk factor, port congestions (PhTD_2), has been identified as a very important 
risk from Notteboom’s research (2006). Moreover, there are several risk factors, 
whose risk scales, although lower than the top three, are also quite high (greater 
than 10), e.g. “unstable weather” (PhTD_4: 10.63), “damage caused by 
transporting dangerous goods” (PhCD_3: 10.26), “damage to containers or 
cargos due to terminal operators’ improper loading/unloading operations” 
(PhCD_1: 10.21), and “change of currency exchange rate during payment 
process” (PayCE_1: 10.18). The results suggest that shipping managers also 
need to pay attention to these risk factors. On the other hand, “lack of 
information standardisation and compatibility” (InfoI_3: 7.66) has the least 
impact on shipping companies’ financial loss. Shipping managers could accept 
this risk and pay more attention to other more serious risks. In terms of financial 
loss, among three risk categories, the category of risks associated with physical 
flow is the most significant one (the mean is 9.80), and the category of risks 
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associated with information flow is the least significant one (the mean value is 
8.33). 
In terms of the reputation risk scale, the category of risks associated with 
physical flow is again the most significant one, but the impact is not as high as 
that in the financial risk scale (the mean here is 8.29). The category of risks 
associated with payment flow (the mean being 7.28) has the least impact on 
shipping companies’ reputation loss. Among all the risk factors, the top three risk 
factors are “shippers hiding cargo information (non-declare)” (InfoI_5: 10.61), 
“damage caused by transporting dangerous goods” (PhCD_3: 9.52), and “port 
congestion (unexpected waiting times before berthing or before starting 
loading/discharging)” (PhTD_2: 9.39); the least one is “using different 
communication channels in the supply chain and consequently increasing the 
time of information transmission. (e.g. telephone, Email, EDI)” (InfoD_1: 6.66), 
which has a big gap from the top three factors. 
In the section of the safety and security incident related loss risk scales, the 
category of risks associated with physical flow is still in first place (the average 
risk scale is 8.81) and the category of risks associated with payment flow is still 
the least one (the average risk scale is 6.88). Among all the risk factors, the top 
three risk factors include “shippers hiding cargo information” (InfoI_5: 12.08), 
“damage caused by transporting dangerous goods” (PhCD_3: 11.42), and 
“attack from pirates or terrorists” (PhCD_6: 11.03). There are another two risk 
factors with risk scale being greater than 10, i.e. “unstable weather” (PhTD_4: 
10.21) and “damage to frozen cargos/ reefer containers due to electricity failure” 
(PhCD_5: 10.06). It is noted that the risk factor “financial crisis in the loan 
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countries” (PayCE_2: 5.79) has the least impact on the safety and security 
incident related loss.   
Notably, among all the risk factors, “shippers hiding cargo information 
(non-declare)” (InfoI_5) is ranked as the first with respect to two types of 
consequence - reputation and safety and security incident related loss, and as 
the second with respect to the financial loss consequence. This suggests that 
this factor is the most serious risk factor in container shipping operations. It may 
be worth mentioning that in relation to InfoI_5, a shipping manager during the 
interview survey stated:  
“We have paid some penalties and our ship has once been detained 
because the documents for customs clearance were inconsistent with the 
shipper and the process was delayed. The reason is that our customer [the 
shipper] did not inform us that the contents of the cargos had been 
changed.” 
“Oil price rise” (PhTD_9) is another important risk factor especially in respect of 
financial loss. According to Ronen (2011), fuel price rise could substantially 
increase the operational cost of a large ship as more than 75% of the operating 
cost is used for bunker fuel. “Damage caused by transporting dangerous goods” 
(PhCD_3) and “unstable weather” (PhTD_4) are also notable factors as they 
have significant impact on employees’ safety.  
Change of currency exchange rate duing payment process (PayCE_1) is the 
only risk associated with payment flow factor, the scale of which is larger than 10 
in respect of financial loss consequence. An unstable currency exchange rate 
may explain its importance. During the interview survey, a shipping manager 
explained - 
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“The transportation fees we get are usually calculated by USD. However, 
some shippers will still pay the bills by local currency, such as Euro or JPY. 
We need to afford the risk from the unstable currency exchange rate,… 
sometimes it will make us lose the profit.”  
Table 6.12 Risk scale  
Risk  
Financial loss risk 
scale 
Reputation loss risk 
scale 
Safety and security 
incident related loss 
risk scale 
 RS S.D. Rank RS S.D. Rank RS S.D. Rank 
InfoD_1 7.81 5.42 32 6.66 4.96 35 7.40 5.52 21 
InfoD_2 7.87 4.91 30 7.13 4.90 30 7.21 5.06 23 
InfoD_3 8.34 5.36 23 8.48 5.28 6 7.79 5.17 19 
InfoD_4 8.97 5.27 15 8.18 5.16 10 7.21 4.76 23 
InfoI_1 8.34 6.05 23 7.65 5.98 21 8.77 6.24 10 
InfoI_2 7.85 5.48 31 7.76 5.60 19 8.40 5.69 12 
InfoI_3 7.66 5.12 35 7.40 5.15 25 8.16 4.89 16 
InfoI_4 8.13 5.20 26 8.15 5.52 11 8.35 5.35 13 
InfoI_5 11.44 6.13 2 10.61 6.39 1 12.08 6.38 1 
InfoIT_1 8.15 4.81 25 7.87 5.51 17 8.44 4.21 11 
InfoIT_2 7.73 5.16 33 7.48 5.47 23 8.19 4.76 14 
InfoIT_3 7.71 4.57 34 7.35 4.82 27 8.13 4.32 17 
Mean of risks 
associated with 
information flow 
8.33  7.89  8.35  
PhTD_1 9.65 5.98 10 7.79 5.99 18 7.85 5.46 18 
PhTD_2 10.81 5.24 3 9.39 5.72 3 8.19 4.79 14 
PhTD_3 9.00 5.01 14 8.00 5.17 14 7.18 4.89 26 
PhTD_4 10.63 5.05 4 8.48 5.36 6 10.21 4.95 4 
PhTD_5 8.47 5.63 22 7.39 6.04 26 7.27 5.76 22 
PhTD_6 8.77 5.05 16 7.68 5.08 20 6.71 4.94 30 
PhTD_7 8.58 5.26 20 7.98 4.96 15 7.19 5.82 25 
PhTD_8 7.89 4.75 29 7.18 5.27 29 6.65 4.79 33 
PhTD_9 14.00 6.31 1 8.73 5.77 5 9.03 6.16 9 
PhCD_1 10.21 5.93 6 9.29 6.31 4 9.77 5.31 7 
PhCD_2 9.65 5.85 10 8.48 4.92 6 9.55 5.31 8 
PhCD_3 10.26 4.86 5 9.52 5.69 2 11.42 5.87 2 
PhCD_4 9.37 5.18 12 8.11 5.45 12 9.97 5.35 6 
PhCD_5 9.85 5.34 8 8.29 5.08 9 10.06 5.48 5 
PhCD_6 9.84 5.84 9 8.03 6.22 13 11.03 6.01 3 
Mean of risks 
associated with 
physical flow 
9.80  8.29  8.81  
PayCE_1 10.18 6.44 7 7.95 6.38 16 7.69 6.42 20 
PayCE_2 8.10 5.98 27 7.10 6.57 31 6.89 6.58 28 
PayPD_1 9.21 5.65 13 7.44 5.40 24 6.82 4.76 29 
PayPD_2 8.68 5.81 17 7.55 5.90 22 6.69 5.12 31 
PayNP_1 8.66 6.01 18 6.95 5.99 33 7.13 6.22 27 
PayNP_2 8.63 5.53 19 6.92 5.45 34 6.66 5.23 32 
PayNP_3 8.48 5.73 21 7.31 5.97 28 6.58 5.33 34 
PayNP_4 7.94 5.12 28 7.03 5.34 32 6.58 5.22 34 
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Mean of risks 
associated with 
payment flow 8.73  7.28  6.88  
Total average 9.05  7.92  8.21  
*red colour means the mean value of risk scale is more than 10 
*orange colour means the mean value of risk scale is between 8.01 and 9.99 
*blue colour means the mean value of risk scale is the smallest one 
6.4.2 Risk matrix 
Based on the classification of risk matrix that has been mentioned in Chapter 4, 
the results of the risk likelihood and consequence on the risk-factor survey will 
be classified into four levels: low risk (green colour), moderate risk (yellow 
colour), high risk (orange colour), and extreme risk (red colour). The following 
sections present the risk matrix corresponding to three different consequences. 
6.4.2.1 Risk matrix in relation to financial loss 
In the financial loss risk matrix (Table 6.13), a total eighteen risk factors are in 
the moderate risk level. Six of them with the “possible” likelihood (3) and 
“moderate” consequence (3) are InfoI5, PhTD_2, PhTD_4, PhTD_9, PhCD_1, 
and PayCE_1; whilst twelve of them locate in the cell with “unlikely” likelihood (2) 
and “moderate” consequence (3). Among the above 18 risk factors, three risk 
factors are associated with information flow, seven risk factors are associated 
with physical flow, and two risk factors are associated with payment flow. The 
rest risk factors are located in the low risk cell with “unlikely” likelihood (2) and 
“minor” consequence (2). It is found that the majority of risk factors at the 
moderate risk level belong to the category of risks associated with physical flow. 
This means managers should pay more attention on risks associated with 
physical flow as far as the financial loss criterion is concerned.  
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Table 6.13 Financial loss risk matrix 
 Consequence 
  Insignificant Minor Moderate Major Catastrophic 
1 2 3 4 5 
L
ik
e
lih
o
o
d
 
Almost 
certain 
5      
Likely 4      
Possible 3   InofI_5 
PhTD_2,4,9 
PhCD_1 
PayCE_1 
  
Unlikely 2  InfoD_1-3 
InfoI_2-4 
InfoIT_2,3 
PhTD_5-8 
PayCE_2 
PayPD_2 
PayNP_2-4 
InfoD_4 
InfoI_1 
InfoIT_1 
PhTD_1,3 
PhCD_2-6 
PayPD_1 
PayNP_1 
  
Rare 1      
*red colour means the extreme risk level 
*orange colour means the high risk level 
*yellow colour means the moderate risk level 
*green colour means the low risk level 
 
6.4.2.2 Risk matrix in relation to reputation loss risk  
In the reputation loss risk matrix (Table 6.14), eight risk factors are in the 
moderate risk level. Only one risk factor (InfoI_5) locates in the “possible” 
likelihood (3) and “moderate” consequence (3); two risk factors locate in 
“unlikely” likelihood (2) and “moderate” consequence (3) (PhCD_3 and 
PhCD_4), and five risk factors locate in “possible” likelihood (3) and “minor” 
consequence (2) (PhTD_2, PhTD_4, PhTD_9, PhCD_1, and PayCE_1). Six of 
the eight risk factors belong to the category of risks associated with physical 
flow. The rest factors are located in the low risk level with “unlikely” likelihood (2) 
and “minor” consequence (2). From the results above, the most serious risk 
factor that harms companies’ reputation is InfoI_5, whilst some risk factors within 
the category of risks associated with physical flow also could harm companies’ 
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reputation. Moreover, compared to the financial loss risk matrix, only eight risk 
factors are in the “considerable” level, this might mean that only a few risk 
factors could affect companies’ reputation. 
Table 6.14 Reputation loss risk matrix 
 Consequence 
  Insignificant Minor Moderate Major Catastrophic 
1 2 3 4 5 
L
ik
e
lih
o
o
d
 
Almost 
certain 
5      
Likely 4      
Possible 3  PhTD_2,4,9 
PhCD_1 
PayCE_1 
InfoI_5   
Unlikely 2  InfoD_1-4 
InfoI_1-4 
InfoIT_1-3 
PhTD_1,3,5-8 
PhCD_2,5,6 
PayCE_2 
PayPD_1,2 
PayNP_1-4 
PhCD_3,4   
Rare 1      
*red colour means the extreme risk level 
*orange colour means the high risk level 
*yellow colour means the moderate risk level 
*green colour means the low risk level 
6.4.2.3 Risk matrix in relation to safety and security incident related loss  
In the reputation loss risk matrix (Table 6.15), a total fifteen risk factors are in the 
moderate risk level. Two of them have “possible” likelihood (3) and “moderate” 
consequence (3) (InfoI5 and PhCD_1); nine of them locate in “unlikely” likelihood 
(2) and “moderate” consequence (3) (InfoI_1, InfoIT 1-3, and PhCD_2-6), and 
four of them locate in “possible” likelihood (3) and “minor” consequence (2) 
(PhTD_2, PhTD_4, PhTD_9, and PayCE_1). Within the moderate risk level, both 
the category of risks associated with information flow (five risk factors) and the 
category of risks associated with physical flow (nine risk factors) are important. 
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The rest of the factors are located in the low risk level with “possible” likelihood 
(2) and “moderate” consequence (2). From the results above, managers have to 
pay a lot of attention on risks associated with information flow and risks 
associated with physical flow to reduce the negative impact on safety and 
security incident related loss. 
Table 6.15 Safety and security incident related loss risk matrix 
 Consequence 
  Insignificant Minor Moderate Major Catastrophic 
1 2 3 4 5 
L
ik
e
lih
o
o
d
 
Almost 
certain 
5      
Likely 4      
Possible 3  PhTD_2,4,9 
PayCE_1 
InfoI_5 
PhCD_1 
  
Unlikely 2  InfoD_1-4 
InfoI_2-4 
PhTD_1,3,5-8 
PayCE_2 
PayPD_1,2 
PayNP_1-4 
InfoI_1 
InfoIT_1-3 
PhCD_2-6 
  
Rare 1      
*red colour means the extreme risk level 
*orange colour means the high risk level 
*yellow colour means the moderate risk level 
*green colour means the low risk level 
6.4.3 Risk map 
Although the three risk matrices in the above Section have presented the level of 
each risk factor, the detailed relationships between the risk factors are not 
presented clearly. The similar scales of risk factors were just put into the same 
cell. Therefore, three risk maps are produced to show the relative position of 
each risk corresponding to three risk consequences.  
In order to produce the risk map, a risk factor’s likelihood and consequence over 
all respondents should be derived. In this thesis, the Average Risk Scale (ARS) 
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method is used as proposed in Chapter 3. Based on the risk scales, this thesis 
divides the risk map into four regions: low risk region (corresponding to risk scale 
<5), moderate risk region (5< risk scale <10), high risk region (10< risk scale 
<15), and extremely high risk region (risk scale>15) (as discussed and 
presented in Figure 4.16). 
6.4.3.1 Risk map in relation to financial loss 
As shown in the financial loss risk map (Figure 6.1), the majority of the risk 
factors (28 out of 35) fall within the moderate risk region and none of the risk 
factors falls within the low risk region or the extremely high risk region. A total 
seven risk factors fall within the high risk region including “oil price rise” 
(PhTD_9), “shippers hiding cargo information (non-declare)” (InfoI_5), ‘port 
congestion” (PhTD_2), “unstable weather” (PhTD_4), “port/terminal productivity 
being below expectations” (PhTD_3), “damage to containers or cargos due to 
terminal operators’ improper loading/ unloading operations” (PhCD_1), and 
“change of currency exchange rate during payment process” (PayCE_1). This 
result is very different compared to the result from the risk matrix (Table 6.13), 
which shows no risk factor is located within the high risk region, and the majority 
of the risk factors fall in the low risk region. This is due to the fact that the risk 
matrix is not very accurate (Cox, 2008). Notably, PhCD_5 and PhCD_6, 
although they are in the moderate risk region, are very close to the boundary of 
the high risk region. Since the majority of risk factors located in the high risk 
region belong to the physical flow risk category, the category of risks associated 
with physical flow is regarded as the major one which causes the most serious 
financial impact to the businesses. The risk factors within the moderate risk 
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region are much more centralised, so every risk factor needs to be considered 
rather equally. Most of these risk factors belong to the category of risks 
associated with physical flow; this is in agreement with the findings presented in 
the earlier sections, which state that the category of risks associated with 
physical flow is more significant than the other two risk categories in respect of 
financial loss. It is also worth mentioning that the risk factor PhTD_9 (oil price 
rise) has the highest risk scale and is quite close to the extreme risk region. 
 
Figure 6.1 Financial loss risk map 
6.4.3.2 Risk map in relation to reputation loss 
As shown in the reputation loss risk map (Figure 6.2), except for “shippers hiding 
cargo information” (InfoI_5) that falls within the high risk region, all other risk 
factors are in the moderate risk region. It is recommended that shipping 
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companies need to pay more attention to the risk factor InfoI_5 in order to 
reduce the damage to companies’ reputation.  
 
Figure 6.2 Reputation loss risk map 
 
6.4.3.3 Risk map in relation to safety and security incident related loss 
In the safety and security incident related loss risk map (Figure 6.3), five risk 
factors fall within the high risk region, including “shippers hiding cargo 
information (non-declare)” (InfoI_5), “damage caused by transporting dangerous 
goods” (PhCD_3), “attack from pirates or terrorists” (PhCD_6), “damage to 
frozen cargos/ reefer containers due to electricity failure” (PhCD_5), and 
“unstable weather” (PhTD_4). The case of cargo information hidden by shippers 
has been discussed in previous interview result. Sometimes it can cause a 
disaster to shipping companies such as putting dangerous goods into containers 
without providing appropriate information that may result in explosion during the 
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transportation process. Moreover, two risk factors within the moderate risk 
region are close to the high risk region boundary; they are “damage to ship or 
quay due to improper berth operations” (PhCD_4) and “damage to containers or 
cargos due to terminal operators’ improper loading/ unloading operations” 
(PhCD_1). Except for InfoI_5, all the other top seven risk factors in respect of 
safety and security incident related loss belong to the category of risks 
associated with physical flow; this suggests that the risks associated with 
physical flow has the most serious impact on safety and security incident related 
loss in container shipping operations. To mitigate the impact of the risk factor 
InfoI_5, shipping managers could try to reduce its likelihood via strategies such 
as checking the processing document more carefully. For the risk factors with 
high consequence and low likelihood, PhCD_6 and PhCD_4, using insurance is 
a possible option to mitigate their impact. It is also suggested (IFW, 2011) that 
shipping companies may charge more fees for protecting the cargos going 
through highly risky routes.  
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Figure 6.3 Safety and security incident related loss risk map 
 
6.4.4 P-I graph (Risk map with risk responses)  
Based on the risk responses discussed in Chapter 4, four risk responses could 
be used to tackle different risk factors including avoid response (in the upper 
right corner), mitigate response (in the lower right corner), transfer response (in 
the upper left corner) and accept response (in the lower left corner). This can 
refer to Figure 4.17 in Chapter 4. 
6.4.4.1 Risk map with risk responses in relation to financial loss 
Figure 6.4 shows the result of risk map with risk responses in relation to financial 
loss. In order to classify the risk factors into four groups corresponding to four 
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“shippers hiding cargo information (non-declare)” (InfoI_5: 3.30, 3.47) and “oil 
price rise” (PhTD_9: 3.74, 3.74), are located clearly in the “avoid response” area. 
According to Hillson’s (2002) definition of avoid response (see Section 4.3.1.2): 
seeking to eliminate the uncertainty by reducing its likelihood to zero, or by 
reducing its consequence to zero, managers should try to avoid these risks’ 
occurrence. However, sometimes it is difficult to avoid these risk factors but it 
may be possible to reduce their likelihoods or consequences. For example, a 
company can implement measures to check the cargo declaration from shippers 
more strictly to reduce the likelihood of InforI_5 to zero or to an acceptable level, 
so that it would have a lower risk scale although it may still have a high risk 
consequence. The other risk factor, i.e., PhTD_9, is difficult to reduce its 
likelihood, but it can be mitigated through reducing the risk consequence by 
hedging, adjusting the Bunker Adjustment Factor (BAF), signing a long-term 
contract with oil supplier to stabilise oil price, or adopting the strategies that have 
been mentioned in Section 2.7.3, e.g., slow steaming, form an alliance with other 
shipping companies or slot-exchange, slot charter, joint fleet, ship-charter with 
other container shipping companies. 
Five risk factors are located clearly in the “transfer response” area, including 
“lack of information security during the information flow” (InfoI_1: 2.50, 3.34), 
“port strikes” (PhTD_1: 2.62, 3.68), “damage to ship or quay due to improper 
berth operations” (PhCD_4: 2.52, 3.72), “damage to frozen cargo/ reefer 
containers due to electricity failure” (PhCD_5: 2.71, 3.63), and “attack from 
pirates or terrorists” (PhCD_6: 2.64, 3.72). According to Hillson’s (2002) 
definition of transfer: “identifying another stakeholder better able to manage the 
risk, to whom the liability and responsibility for action can be passed” (see 
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Section 4.3.1.2), managers should try to transfer the risk impact of this type of 
risk factors into other partners who can better deal with it. For example, in order 
to deal with PhTD_1, shipping companies can load/unload the cargos to the next 
port-of-call and transport the cargos by their partners (e.g. inland transportation) 
to the destination more efficiently to reduce the impact of port strikes.  
The rest of the risk factors are located in the central region in Figure 6.4, which 
is close to all four areas. This implies that there is no obvious response action 
corresponding to them. 
 
 
Figure 6.4 Financial loss risk map with four responses 
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6.4.4.2 Result of risk map with risk responses in relation to reputation loss  
Figure 6.5 shows the results of risk map with risk responses in relation to 
reputation loss. It can be observed that only one risk factor is clearly located in 
the “avoid response” area, which is “shippers hiding cargo information 
(non-declare)” (InfoI_5: 3.34, 3.18). This result indicates that InfoI_5 should have 
a priority to be avoided in order to reduce reputation loss. Some strategies 
mentioned in the above sub-section may be applied to avoid InfoI_5. Additional 
strategies could also be adopted, e.g. reward/assist partners who comply with 
shipping lines’ initiatives, and shorten/ withdraw the contract with partners who 
have bad performance. 
Three risk factors are clearly located in the “mitigate response” area, including 
“unstable weather” (PhTD_4: 3.36, 2.52), “oil price rise” (PhTD_9: 3.82, 2.28), 
and “change of currency exchange rate during payment process” (PayCE_1: 
3.18, 2.50). According to Hillson’s (2002) definition of mitigate: “reducing the size 
of the risk in order to make it more acceptable to the project or organisation, by 
reducing the likelihood and/or the consequence” (see Section 4.3.1.2), 
managers could reduce the likelihood and consequence of PhTD_4 through 
using more advanced information technology; reducing PhTD_9 through the 
strategies mentioned in Chapter 2, such as slow steaming to reduce the oil 
consumption. 
There are no risk factors that are obviously located in the “transfer response” 
area. Most of the risk factors are located in the “accept response” area close to 
the central region in Figure 5.5. According to Hillson’s (2002) definition of accept 
response (see Section 4.3.1.2): recognising that residual risks must be taken, 
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and responding either actively by allocating appropriate contingency, or 
passively doing nothing except monitoring the status of the risk. 
 
 
 
Figure 6.5 Reputation loss risk map with four responses 
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safety and security incident related loss. The strategies mentioned in previous 
sections could be adopted to reduce its likelihood.  
Three risk factors are clearly located in the “mitigate response” area, including 
“port congestion (unexpected waiting times before berthing or before starting 
loading/discharging)” (PhTD_2: 3.34, 2.45), “oil price rise” (PhTD_9: 3.76, 2.40), 
and “change of currency exchange rate during payment process” (PayCE_1: 
3.18, 2.42). Their risk consequences could be reduced through some systematic 
regulations/strategies such as reducing port time or cutting port-of-calls when 
delay occurs for the port congestion or hedge for the oil price rise and even for 
currency exchange in the payment process.  
There are six risk factors clearly located in the “transfer response” zone, 
including “lack of information security within the information flow” (InfoI_1: 2.46, 
3.56), “IT infrastructure breakdown or crash” (InfoIT_1: 2.54, 3.33), “damage 
caused by transporting  dangerous goods” (PhCD_3: 2.90, 3.93), “damage to 
ship or quay due to improper berth operations” (PhCD_4: 2.48, 4.02), “damage 
to frozen cargo/ reefer containers due to electricity failure” (PhCD_5: 2.67, 3.76), 
and “attack from pirates or terrorists” (PhCD_6: 2.59, 4.25). Four of the above six 
risk factors belong to the risk element of cargo/asset loss and damage, shipping 
companies may use some strategies to transfer these risk factors to other 
parties such as purchasing insurances or outsourcing. Shipping companies may 
also consider charging more fees (IFW, 2011) or using armed guards on ships 
(Nkwocha and Badger, 2011) to protect cargos on the routes which have high 
possibility of piracy attack.  
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The rest of risk factors are located either in the central region or in the “accept 
response” zone. 
 
 
Figure 6.6 Safety and security incident related loss risk map with four responses 
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belong to the category of risks associated with physical flow, and also belong to 
the risk element of “transportation delay”.  
In terms of the financial loss consequence, the top three risk factors are 
PhTD_9, “damage caused by transporting dangerous goods” (PhCD_3) and 
“port strikes” (PhTD_1). All these three risk factors belong to the category of 
risks associated with physical flow. Seven factors are larger than 10 (which 
represents high risk in this thesis) in risk scale, including PhTD_9, “shippers 
hiding cargo information (non-declare)” (InfoI_5), PhTD_2, PhTD_4, “damage to 
frozen cargo/ reefer containers due to electricity failure” PhCD_5, “attack from 
pirates or terrorists” PhCD_6, and “change of currency exchange rate during 
payment process” PayCE_1. Only two factors (InfoI_5 and PayCE_1) do not 
belong to the category of risks associated with physical flow. The result of the 
risk matrix shows that these risk factors are in the moderate risk level. The risk 
map analysis presents relatively clearer and more detailed information in the 
relationships between individual risk factors. Overall, the category of risks 
associated with physical flow has more serious impact on the financial loss than 
the other two categories. However, the category of risks associated with 
payment flow and the category of risks associated with information flow also play 
quite important roles in financial loss. This result reveals that although the 
priority should be given to the risks associated with physical flow, container 
shipping companies also need to pay some attention on managing the risks 
associated with payment flow and the risks associated with information flow in 
order to reduce the financial loss. From the four risk responses perspective, 
InfoI_5 and PhTD_9 should be given a priority to be avoided. InfoI_5 is 
suggested to reduce its likelihood through more strictly checking the cargo 
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declaration from shippers; whilst PhTD_9 is suggested to reduce its 
consequence through hedge, BAF, signing a long-term contract with oil suppliers 
to keep buying the same price of oil, slow steaming, forming alliances with other 
shipping companies, or slot-exchange, slot charter, joint fleet, ship-charter with 
other container shipping companies. Five risk factors are located in the “transfer 
response” area, including InfoI_1, PhTD_1, “damage to ship or quay due to 
improper berth operations” (PhCD_4), PhCD_5, and PhCD_6. These risk factors 
could be tackled by transferring the risk impact to other stakeholders who are in 
better position to deal with them.  
In terms of the reputation loss consequence, the top three factors are PhCD_3, 
InfoI_5, and PhCD_4. According to the calculated risk scale, InfoI_5 is the only 
risk factor whose risk scale is greater than 10. It is located in the high risk level in 
the risk map whilst it is in moderate risk level in risk matrix. On average, the 
category of risks associated with physical flow scale still plays the most 
important role. From the four risk responses perspective, only InfoI_5 is clearly 
located in the “avoid response” area, and it can be avoided by using the similar 
strategies to those in the  financial loss situation, or taking additional strategies 
such as reward/assist partners who comply with shipping lines’ initiatives or 
shorten/withdraw the contract with partners who have bad performance. Three 
risk factors are located in the “mitigate response” area, including PhTD_4, 
PhTD_9, and PayCE_1. This thesis suggests mitigating their risk impact through 
several strategies that have been mentioned in the previous paragraph.  
With regard to the consequence of the maritime safety and security incident 
related loss, the top three risk factors are PhCD_6, PhCD_4 and PhCD_3. 
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According to the obtained risk scale, five factors’ risk scales are larger than 10, 
including InforI_5, PhCD_3, PhCD_6, PhTD_4, and PhCD_5. These five risk 
factors are identified as at the moderate risk level in the risk matrix analysis 
whilst they are classified into the high risk level in the risk map. On the other 
hand, although the category of risks associated with physical flow as a whole is 
the most significant one among the three categories of operational risks, InforI_5 
in risks associated with information flow is the most serious one among all the 
risk factors. From the four risk response perspective, only InfoI_5 is clearly 
located in the “avoid response” area; three risk factors are notably located in the 
“mitigate response” area, including PhTD_2, PhTD_9, and PayCE_1; and six 
risk factors are clearly located in the “transfer response” area, including InfoI_1, 
InfoIT_1, PhCD_3, PhCD_4, PhCD_5, and PhCD_6. The strategies for most of 
the risk factors above have been mentioned in the previous sections.  
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Chapter 7 Identification and evaluation of risk mitigation 
strategies 
This chapter focuses on the last step of risk management, i.e. identification, 
validation and evaluation of risk mitigation strategies. In Section 7.1, the risk 
mitigation strategies are identified through reviewing more relevant literature in 
a broad supply chain context. Section 7.2 is the validation of the identified risk 
mitigation strategies and the exploration of new risk mitigation strategies 
through a set of face-to-face interviews and a set of email interviews. Section 
7.3 is the evaluation of risk mitigation strategies, which firstly conducts the 
validity and reliability test; and then ranks these risk mitigation strategies 
through the mitigation-strategy survey; and then the top seven strategies are 
selected to be further evaluated and compared in relation to different 
performance criteria through the Analytic Hierarchy Process (AHP) survey; 
finally, the classic AHP and the Fuzzy AHP methods are applied to analyse the 
relative effectiveness of these mitigation strategies. Section 7.4 is the summary 
of this chapter. 
7.1 Identification of risk mitigation strategies from existing literature 
Section 2.2 has discussed the risk mitigation strategies in container shipping 
operations. However, the direct relevant literature is rather limited and 
fragmented. This thesis therefore extends the literature to general supply chains 
so that a more comprehensive set of risk mitigation strategies could be 
identified. 
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Risk mitigation is an important part of business decisions as modern business 
operations are unavoidably subject to various tangible and intangible risks. A 
number of risk mitigation strategies have been addressed in previous studies, 
but they do not have a systematic structure. This thesis borrows the 
classification from Barratt (2004): entities in supply chains could be categorised 
into two categories: inter-organisational and intra-organisational. He divided the 
scope of collaboration into vertical and horizontal ones. In this thesis, container 
shipping is taken as a focal company in the context of supply chain and classify 
risk mitigation strategies into three categories: intra-organisational strategies 
(internal), intra-channel strategies (vertical), and inter-channel strategies 
(horizontal). Each category includes several risk mitigation strategies.  
7.1.1 Intra-organisational strategies 
Intra-organisational strategies refer to the approaches that are mainly taken by 
the focal firm. Many intra-organisation strategies have been proposed in the 
literature to reduce the impact of risks. The following sections discuss the 
details of these strategies, including buffer time, advanced equipment, security, 
and employee training.  
Including buffer time when designing timetable/schedule is considered as a risk 
mitigation strategy in the transportation-related industry. Chopra and Meindl 
(2010) stated that managers should consider the risks in transportation when 
designing transportation networks. They also suggested that designing route 
schedules with a buffer time is a way to mitigate the transportation delay caused 
by congestion or other uncertainties. As container shipping is a 
transportation-related industry and provides a regular service, including buffer 
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time when designing timetable/schedule should be considered as a risk 
mitigation strategy. 
Using advanced equipment is deemed as one risk mitigation strategy (Porter 
1998a). Porter (1998b, p.80) pointed out that “companies can be highly 
productive in any industry… if they employ sophisticated methods and use 
advanced technology”. This strategy also covers using advanced information 
communication technology (ICT), which is suggested as a risk mitigation 
strategy in several studies (e.g. Baldwin and Sabourin, 2001; Stefansson, 
2002). Baldwin and Sabourin (2001) stated that ICT revolution provides more 
timely information for a company to adjust its operations and to meet the 
changes of customer demand. Stefansson (2002) also reported that electronic 
data interchange (EDI) is the most common ICT used in large companies, as it 
provides quicker data transmission and shorter lead time. This can be linked 
back to the literature covered in Chapter 2, in which Kerr (2011a) and Marle 
(2009) stated that the use of new information exchange system can reduce 
errors and costs when processing documents in container shipping. Therefore, 
this strategy covers both hardware and software and can be named as “use 
more advanced infrastructures (hardware and software)”.  
Improving the level of security is also an important strategy for companies to 
avoid or reduce risks (Dhillon and Backhouse, 2000; Blakley et al., 2002; Lun et 
al., 2008). Dhillon and Backhouse (2000) stated that a security system is an 
important management strategy to keep information and cargo safe. Lun et al. 
(2008) focused on container transportation security and stated that using 
technology to enhance security in a container transport chain is an important 
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strategy. The technology they suggested includes radio-frequency identification 
(RFID), smart box initiative and container non-intrusive inspection (NII).   
Several studies mentioned that organising regular employee training is an 
effective strategy that mitigates the impact of risk (Richardson, 2000; 
Gunasekaran and Ngai, 2004; Elkins et al., 2005). A regular employee training 
programme could significantly reduce human-caused risks in a firm especially 
when employees face a complex IT system (Gunasekaran and Ngai, 2004) or 
work in a dangerous environment (Richardson, 2000). This point can be linked 
back to Chapter 2, in which Ganesan (2010) and Young (2010) stated that 
regular training is an important mechanism to reduce the probability of risk in 
container shipping operations. 
7.1.2 Intra-channel strategies 
Intra-channel strategies refer to the activities/ approaches that involve multiple 
channel members in the same supply chain. In supply chain management, 
channel members often form a kind of partnership. The following sections 
discuss the strategies within intra-channel level, including reduce supplier base, 
reward good partners, withdraw contracts with bad partners, trust partners, enter 
a long-term contract with suppliers, and cooperate, coordinate and collaborate 
with partners. 
Avoiding too many suppliers is deemed as a strategy to mitigate risks in a supply 
chain. Harland (1996) claimed that the supplier base reduction is an important 
strategy to improve the relationships between suppliers and the focal company. 
Morgan (1987) also reported a case study about Rank Xerox reducing its 
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partners from 5000 to 300 in 6 years to reduce the cost consumption. Moreover, 
this strategy can also reduce the probability of cooperation with 
bad-performance suppliers. 
In a supply chain, the cooperative partnership between channel members is 
often accompanied with other types of relationships such as channel power 
(Assael, 1969; Lusch, 1976; Reve and Stern, 1979; Frazier and Summer, 1984). 
Stern (1965, p.655) defined the channel power as “the ability of one member of a 
marketing channel for a given product (or brand) to stipulate marketing policies 
to other channel members”. Cox (1997) stated that a successful company 
should have power from channel relationships with its customers, employees 
and suppliers. He also reported that the main reason that demand-pull and 
Just-in-Time system could be established by Toyota was it had a strong power of 
channel relationship with its suppliers. French and Raven (1959) defined five 
possible sources of channel power including reward, legitimate, referent, expert, 
and coercive. Channel power can be a strong weapon when a company 
negotiates with its supply chain partners. Geyskens and Steenkamp (2000) 
reported that channel power could be divided into rewards, assistance, and 
punishment. A shipping company could avoid entering into contracts with 
partners with poor performance or reward or assist the partners that follow the 
shipping company’s suggestions (Cruz and Marques, 2012).  
Trusting partners is another strategy that can be deemed as a risk mitigation 
strategy. Many studies have confirmed that “trust” is an important element 
affecting channel relationships (e.g. Anderson and Narus, 1990; Barratt, 2004; 
Sodhi and Son, 2009), and “trust” should be established on a long-term 
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partnership (Dwyer et al., 1987; Claro, 2004; Kwon and Suh, 2005). A long-time 
relationship with supply chain partners and a degree of trust can strengthen the 
partner relationship between the company and their customers (Chopra and 
Meindl, 2010).  
Harrison and van Hoek (2005) classified partnership into three types: 
cooperation, coordination, and collaboration. Merriam-Webster Online defines 
cooperation as “to act together or in compliance for mutual benefit” and defines 
coordination as “the harmonious functioning of parts for effective results” 
(www.merriam-webster.com/). Schrage (1990, pp.32-33) stated “collaboration is 
the process of shared creation: two or more individuals with complementary 
skills interacting to create a shared understanding that none had previously 
possessed or could have come to on their own. Collaboration creates a shared 
meaning about a process, a product, or an event.” Harrison and van Hoek (2005) 
compared the differences between these three types of partnership: cooperation 
has fewer suppliers with single functional area; coordination has more 
information linkages with multiple functional areas; and collaboration is more 
likely in supply chain integration and/or joint planning. This can be linked back to 
Chapter 2, in which Heaver et al. (2001) stated that the dedicated terminal is an 
important form of joint venture between container shipping companies and 
container ports/terminals. 
The above partnership is highly related to the level of information exchange 
between the focal company and its partners. Information sharing has been 
evidenced as an important strategy to benefit supply chain members in various 
situations (Ellram and Cooper, 1990; Stank et al., 1996; Elkins et al., 2005; 
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Kwon and Suh, 2005). The most basic level of information sharing is that 
channel members share part of information without involving explicit cooperative 
activities. For example, Schmidt (2009) evaluated the impact of demand 
information sharing among channel members in a 
manufacturer-distributor-retailer supply chain, in which each member makes 
their own decisions. A more advanced level of information sharing is not only 
exchanges data/ ideas with partners but also cooperatively resolve problems or 
conflicts caused by incompatible goals between channel members (e.g. Stank et 
al., 1999; Lambert and Cooper, 2000; Lee and Whang, 2000; Barratt, 2004; 
Elkins et al., 2005; Sodhi and Son, 2009). In a harsh economic environment a 
closer partnership between channel members than the basic information/ideas 
exchange is often necessary to maintain the efficiency of supply chain systems 
and reduce risks (Fawcett and Magnan, 2002; Sabath and Fontanella, 2002). 
7.1.3 Inter-channel strategies 
A company would have more opportunity to achieve effective performance if it 
develops strategic alliances with other companies doing the similar business, 
and possibly even with some of its competitors (Harrison and van Hoek, 2005). 
In this thesis, the relationship of cooperation with competitors is regarded as 
happening in the “inter-channel” level because competitors often exist in parallel 
and belong to different supply chains. Therefore, inter-channel strategies refer 
to the approaches that require the involvement of multiple entities that have 
parallel relationships, e.g. belonging to different supply chains. The following 
sections discuss several common inter-channel strategies such as alliance, 
merge, and acquire. 
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Strategic alliance has been proposed for many years, and it is an important 
strategy for many contemporary companies (Harrigan, 1988; Parkhe, 1993; 
Eisenhardt and Schoonhoven, 1996). This type of cooperative relationship can 
help companies to effectively use resources/ equipment and share risks (Hamel 
et al, 1989; Ohmae, 1989). In a transportation-related industry such as air 
companies and shipping companies, inter-competitor alliance is a common 
strategy to expand the service coverage and improve the performance. The 
shipping alliance has been discussed in Chapter 2. In the air alliance aspect, 
Park and Cho (1997) found that two air companies with similar size in an 
inter-competitor alliance can threaten the positions of small companies in the 
same market. They also stated that yesterday’s competitors can be the most 
powerful partner to improve their performance if these two companies are in the 
inter-competitor alliance.  
Acquisition is deemed as a quick and effective way to increase profit, expand 
business, and improve competitive position (Bastien et al., 1996). Merger is 
viewed as the same way, and Porter (1980, p.50) stated that “a merger can 
instantaneously propel a weak competitor into prominence, or strengthen an 
already formidable one”. The merger and acquisition are also very common in 
container shipping industries, which have been mentioned by Notteboom (2004) 
that this strategy can quickly increase the company’s growth rate, economies of 
scale, market share and market power (see Chapter 2). 
Based on the above literature review and the strategies that have been 
mentioned in Chapter 2, Table 7.1 summarises the risk mitigation strategies. 
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Table 7.1 Risk mitigation strategies based on literature review 
Intra-organisation strategies level Authors 
1. Include buffer times when designing 
the timetable/schedule 
Notteboom (2006); Notteboom and 
Vernimmen (2009); Chopra and Meindl 
(2010) 
2. Omit port-of-calls to keep original 
schedule when the ship has already 
been delayed 
Notteboom (2006);  
Kerr (2011b) 
3. Slow steaming and increase ships in 
the existed routes 
Notteboom (2006); Notteboom and 
Vernimmen (2009); Ronen (2011) 
4. Use more advanced infrastructure 
(hardware and software) 
Porter (1998a), (1998b); Baldwin and 
Sabourin (2001); Stefansson (2002); 
Marle (2009); Kerr (2011a) 
5. Improve the safety and security Dhillon and Backhouse (2000); Blakley 
et al. (2002); Lun et al. (2008) 
6. Execute regular employee training 
(e.g. every year or half of year) 
Richardson (2000); Gunasekaran and 
Ngai (2004); Elkins et al. (2005); 
Young (2010); Ganesan (2010) 
Intra-channel strategies level  
1. Avoid too many partners Morgan (1987); Harland (1996) 
2. Shorten/ withdraw the contract with 
partners who have bad performance 
Geyskens and Steenkamp (2000) 
3. Reward / assist partners who comply 
with shipping lines’ initiatives 
French and Raven (1959);  Geyskens 
and Steenkamp (2000) 
4. Trust your partners Dwyer et al. (1987); Anderson and 
Narus (1990); Barratt (2004); Claro 
(2004); Kwon and Suh (2005); Sodhi 
and Son (2009)  
5. Enter into long-term contracts with 
shipper 
Notteboom (2004) 
6. Information sharing with your partners 
without co-management (cooperation 
level) 
Harrison and van Hoek (2005); 
Schmidt (2009) 
7. Exchange ideas with partners to solve 
conflict or improve service quality 
(coordination level) 
Stank et al. (1999); Lambert and 
Cooper (2000); Lee and Whang 
(2000); Fawcett and Magnan (2002); 
Sabath and Fontanella (2002); Barratt 
(2004); Sodhi and Son (2009); 
Harrison and van Hoek (2005) 
8. Collaboration with your partners Harrison and van Hoek (2005); 
Notteboom (2004), (2006) 
Inter-channel strategies level  
1. Slot-exchange, slot charter, joint fleet, 
ship-charter with other container 
shipping companies 
Cullinane and Khanna (1999); Song 
and Panayides (2002); Shry et al. 
(2003); Notteboom (2004); Lu et al. 
(2010); Chow and Chang (2011) 
2. Form alliance with other shipping 
companies 
Harrigan (1988); Hamel et al. (1989); 
Ohmae (1989); Parkhe (1993); 
Eisenhardt and Schoonhoven (1996); 
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Park and Cho (1997); Ryoo and 
Thanopoulou (1999); Heaver et al. 
(2000); Slack et al. (2002); Song and 
Panayides (2002); Notteboom (2004); 
Harrison and van Hoek (2005); Lu et 
al. (2010) 
3. Acquire and merge with other shipping 
companies 
Porter (1980); Bastien et al. (1996); 
Notteboom (2004); Barnard (2011) 
Source: author 
In the first group in Table 7.1, intra-organization mitigation strategies 1, 2 and 3 
are about shipping network design and ship operation management. They are 
rather specific compared to other strategies. The reason to include those 
specific strategies is that they have been used by shipping lines widely in recent 
years and would offer more detailed and applicable results than focusing 
general strategies only. 
7.2 Validation and further exploration of risk mitigation strategies through 
interviews 
The process to validate and further explore risk mitigation strategies is similar to 
the validation and exploration procedure of risk factors in Section 5.2; it consists 
of two major steps: (i) a set of semi-structured face-to-face interviews and (ii) a 
set of email interviews. 
7.2.1 Result from face-to-face interviews 
The face-to-face interview questions (in Appendix 1) for risk mitigation 
strategies validation and exploration were conducted together with the 
face-to-face interview for risk factors validation and exploration in Section 5.2. 
The managers were asked to modify the strategies if they thought the strategies 
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described in Table 7.1 are inappropriate; to confirm and support the strategies if 
they think the strategies were appropriate; and to propose other relevant 
strategies if they thought there were some strategies that had been used in 
container shipping operations but not mentioned in Table 7.1. 
Based on the results of seven face-to-face interviews, all mitigation strategies in 
Table 6.1 are confirmed to be appropriate by most interviewees. In addition, 
several additional strategies are proposed by some interviewees. The following 
discusses those new strategies from the interviews. 
When vessels are in the situation of transportation delay, shipping companies 
have several strategies to catch up the original service schedule. A senior 
manager stated that:  
In order to reduce the impact of delay on the ensuring part of the journey, 
three strategies are commonly used in our company for pursuing original 
schedules: (1) When the delay is not too serious, the ship will normally 
cancel the buffering time to pursue the original schedule if it is possible; 
(2) If the delay is more serious, and the buffering time if not enough for the 
ship to pursue the original schedule, the ship will normally increase her 
navigating speed; however, this strategy will also increase the fuel 
consumption; and (3) When the delay is very serious, in order to pursue 
the original schedule, some ships may skip over one or more ports on her 
route. The cargos that are therefore discharged to other ports will be 
transported to their destination ports. This strategy, however, will 
significantly increase the operational costs and may have considerable 
impact on the reliability of the company. 
A regular employee training is deemed as an important strategy to avoid or 
reduce the impacts from the pre-known risk factors. Two interviewees, both are 
information managers, mentioned that: 
we hold regular employee training sessions to train the relevant staff to 
avoid or at least reduce the effect of risks associated with information flow 
from failures caused by human errors when using IT systems. 
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An IT system is usually deemed as a professional and difficult skill to the 
employees working in a non-information department. However, almost every 
employee in container shipping has to use it to some extent; some specific 
knowledge is difficult to master for new employees. Regular employee training 
can reduce human mistakes and also improve the level of knowledge of 
employees up to standard.  
Using advanced equipment is another risk mitigation strategy in container 
shipping operations. A senior manager mentioned –  
using advanced equipment such as dead-reckoning equipment or gyro 
sextant will definitely improve the safety when ships are sailing, they can 
also reduce the mistakes caused by human error. 
As an international business, a shipping company needs to implement 
international regulations to mitigate risks in the container shipping operations. A 
senior manager said:  
we have already used ISO 27001 to increase information security. ISO 
27001 is a regulation that is used to keep business confidential. … we 
implement IMGD Code, an international regulations, which can help 
reduce potential risks in shipping operations when transporting the 
dangerous goods 
In the context of the container shipping supply chain, every entity in the channel 
is important and a weak or problematic one will cause negative impact on the 
container shipping performance or its partners’ performance. Choosing 
appropriate partners is deemed as an important issue in shipping operations. A 
senior manager mentioned: 
Sometimes we need to handle or accept the risks from the shippers who 
bankrupt before making the payment. In order to reduce this type of risk, 
we need to do some survey about the shippers or supply chain partners. 
Avoid doing business with the shippers who have bad credit or unstable 
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finance. Sometimes shipping companies will transfer the risk to 
forwarders… 
In container shipping operations, cultivating loyalty of supply chain partners can 
reduce the uncertainty of transportation demand. A manager mentioned: 
We usually cultivate loyalty of our partners and make a long-term contract 
with shippers to reduce the uncertain transportation demand and these 
strategies could also maintain minimal revenue for us. 
Based on the above discussions, this thesis formulates new mitigation strategies 
discussed as follows. Firstly, the strategies, “improve security measures, such 
as by implementing security rules and regulations such as the ISO 27001 and 
ISPS Code” and “improve safety measures, such as by implementing safety 
rules and regulations like the IMDG Code and ISM Code”, can be classified into 
the category of “intra-organisational strategies” because they can be executed 
within a shipping company. Secondly, the strategies, “enter a long-term contract 
with shippers”, “choose partners very carefully”, and “cultivate loyalty of supply 
chain partners”, can be classified into intra-channel strategies because they are 
related to collaboration with supply chain partners. Therefore, after the analysis 
of the face-to-face interviews, Table 7.2 summarises the risk mitigation 
strategies used in container shipping. 
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Table 7.2 Risk mitigation strategies based on literature review and face-to-face 
interviews 
Intra-organisation strategies Code 
1. Be flexible when designing the timetable/schedule, e.g., 
include buffer times 
IOS_1 
2. When the ship has already been delayed, omit port-of-calls to 
keep original schedule 
IOS_2 
3. Implement slow steaming and increase the number of ships on 
existing routes 
IOS_3 
4. Use more advanced infrastructures (hardware and software) IOS_4 
5. Improve safety measures, such as by implementing safety 
rules and regulations like the IMDG Code and ISM Code 
IOS_5 
6. Improve security measures, such as by implementing security 
rules and regulations like the ISO 27001 and ISPS Code 
IOS_6 
7. Execute regular employee training (e.g. every year or half of 
year) 
IOS_7 
Intra-channel strategies  
1. Avoid having too many partners IntraCS_1 
2. Choose partners very carefully IntraCS_2 
3. Shorten/withdraw contract with the partner that perform badly IntraCS_3 
4. Build trust with partners IntraCS_4 
5. Cultivate loyalty of supply chain partners IntraCS_5 
6. Reward /assist partners that comply with shipping lines’ 
initiatives 
IntraCS_6 
7. Enter a long-term contract with shippers IntraCS_7 
8. Share information with partners without co-management 
(cooperation level) 
IntraCS_8 
9. Exchange ideas with partners to solve conflicts or improve 
service quality (coordination level) 
IntraCS_9 
10. Collaboration with partners (e.g., terminal operational 
company, inland transportation) through making a joint 
long-term plan (collaboration level) 
IntraCS_10 
Inter-channel strategies  
1. Slot-exchange, slot charter, joint fleet, ship-charter with other 
container shipping companies 
InterCS_1 
2. Form alliance with other shipping companies InterCS_2 
3. Acquire and merge with other shipping companies InterCS_3 
Source: author 
In the category of intra-channel strategies, it is worth to point out that the 
partners of IntraCS_7 only refer to shippers, whilst IntraCS_10 considers 
partners who are not shippers. The reason for distinguishing the partners 
between these two strategies is because shipping companies play different 
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roles in the associated supply chains: in the cargo supply chain (IntraCS_7), the 
role of the shipping company is on the supply side and that of the shipper is on 
the demand side; whereas in the service supply chain (IntraCS_10), the role of 
shipping company is on the service demand side and its supply chain partners 
are on the service supply side (e.g. terminal operators provide lifting on/off 
services to shipping companies). 
7.2.2 Result from email interviews 
A set of email interviews were used to further explore the appropriateness of the 
identified risk mitigation strategies within the three levels of strategies. The 
samples of the email interviews are the same as that in Section 5.2.2. The 
results indicate that most of respondents agreed the risk mitigation strategies 
and the categories that this thesis identified. However, there were some 
arguments that were raised by one interviewee, which are discussed as follows. 
One manager did not totally agree one strategy that the author identified 
(Implement slow steaming and increase the number of ships on existing routes, 
IOS_3), he mentioned: “Deploying more ships in a service doesn’t necessarily 
improve reliability or mitigates risk; there will always be circumstances that 
cannot be planned for (weather, geo-politics etc.)”. However, this strategy has 
already been mentioned in many studies, e.g. Notteboom (2006), Notteboom 
and Vernimmen (2009), and Ronen (2011) (see Chapter 2). We therefore 
decided to keep this strategy as a risk mitigation strategy in container shipping 
operations, and would like to assess its effectiveness using a large scale 
questionnaire survey later on. 
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After the email interviews, the results of risk mitigation strategies in container 
shipping operations remain the same as that in Table 7.2. 
7.3 Evaluation of risk mitigation strategies 
In Table 7.2, there are 20 risk mitigation strategies. In this Section, this thesis 
aims to: (i) firstly conduct validity and reliability test for mitigation-strategies 
survey; (ii) secondly rank these twenty risk mitigation strategies through a large 
scale of questionnaire survey (called risk-mitigation survey that was described 
in Section 4.2.2.3); (iii) thirdly select the top seven strategies for a further 
investigation, in order to evaluate their relationships (relative importance with 
respect to different performance criteria) through another questionnaire survey 
(called AHP survey that was described in Section 4.2.2.4 and presented in 
Appendix 4) and the AHP analysis methods (described in Section 4.3.2). 
7.3.1 Validity and reliability test for mitigation-strategies survey 
The questions of this survey are also identified from previous literature 
addressed in container shipping operations and general supply chains, and 
have been validated through a set of face-to-face interviews (includes 2 
vice-presidents, 2 senior managers in the IT department, and 3 senior 
managers in the operations department) and a set of email interviews (includes 
a managing director, a Chief information officer, a Chief Accountant, a 
Navigation superintendent a senior consultant operations, and a senior 
commissioner). Therefore, it is believed that this survey has a high level of 
validity.  
200 
 
The author conducted a reliability test for the questions on risk mitigation 
strategies and the results are shown in Table 7.3. A total of 20 questions were 
tested, and the Cronbach’s Alpha is 0.872 (>0.8), whilst the Cronbach’s Alpha 
based on standardised items is also 0.874 (>0.8), which illustrates that the 
questions of risk mitigation strategies are reliable. 
Table 7.3 Reliability test for risk mitigation strategies 
Cronbach's Alpha Cronbach's Alpha Based on 
Standardised Items 
Number of question 
0.872 0.874 20 
7.3.2 Ranking of risk mitigation strategies 
Table 7.4 shows the mean, the standard deviation (S.D.) and the ranking of 
different risk mitigation strategies based on the data from the risk-mitigation 
survey. The results show that on average three categories have very close 
levels of overall effectiveness (Average of IOS: 3.72; Average of IntraCS: 3.68; 
Average of InterCS: 3.72), and each category appears to include highly ranked 
mitigation strategies. Moreover, based on the results in Table 6.4 and taking into 
account the scale of further data collection (to keep it at a manageable level), we 
will select the top seven mitigation strategies for the AHP analysis. This gives 
rise to a cut-off score of 3.82: the mitigation strategies with an average score of 
no less than 3.82 are included in the set of the most important strategies. Next, 
we provide some interpretation and discussion on the results in Table 7.4. 
Two intra-organisational strategies (IOS), “use more advanced infrastructures 
(hardware and software)” (IOS_4: 3.92) and “when the ship has already been 
delayed, omit port-of-calls to keep the original schedule” (IOS_2: 3.82), have a 
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mean no less than 3.82. IOS_2 is deemed an operation level of strategy, whilst 
IOS_4 tends to be more general level. That means both operation level and 
general level strategies are important when dealing with the IOS. On the other 
side, it is interesting to observe that the recent popular practice – slow steaming 
– has the lowest scores within the IOS group. Slow steaming can reduce fuel 
consumption and absorb idle ships, which is an appropriate strategy for 
shipping lines when supply exceeds demand. However, it increases the transit 
time and may incur extra inventory costs to shippers (Kloch, 2013). The low 
score of slow steaming indicates that not all of the respondents think that slow 
steaming is a better strategy to reduce risks within container shipping 
operations compared with other strategies within IOS.  
Three intra-channel strategies have average scores greater than 3.82, including 
“choose partners more carefully” (IntraCS_2: 3.87), “collaboration with partners 
(e.g., terminal operational company, inland transportation) through making a 
joint long-term plan (collaboration level)” (IntraCS_10: 3.85), and “enter a 
long-term contract with shippers” (IntraCS_7: 3.85). On the other hand, the 
strategy “avoid having too many partners” has the lowest score 3.29 in this 
group. This may reflect the fact that container shipping is a global business and 
each shipping company has to build an extensive network with many partners 
vertically and horizontally. Moreover, within three different levels of 
“cooperation” – cooperation level (IntraCS_8: 3.65), coordination level 
(IntraCS_9: 3.77), and collaboration level (IntraCS_10: 3.85) – the results show 
that shipping companies will have better risk mitigation effects if the companies 
have a higher level of “cooperation” relationship with partners. In addition, the 
different supply chains within IntraCS – cargo supply chain (IntraCS_7: 3.85) 
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and service supply chain (IntraCS_10: 3.85) – have the same emphases taken 
from the shipping managers. The result shows that shipping companies need to 
emphasise both these supply chains. 
There are two strategies having average scores greater than 3.82 within the 
inter-channel strategy group: “slot exchange, slot charter, joint fleet, ship charter 
with other container shipping companies” (InterCS_1: 4.18) and “form alliance 
with other shipping companies” (InterCS_2: 4.02). The strategy “acquire and 
merge with other shipping companies” (InterCS_3: 2.95) has the lowest score 
among all mitigation strategies.  As this strategy has a long-term and 
fundamental impact on shipping companies’ operations, it often implies a high 
degree of uncertainty and may be adopted in critical situations. This explains 
why it is less popular than other mitigation strategies.   
The results in Table 7.4 only provide overall effectiveness of those mitigation 
strategies. As we mentioned earlier on, there are different criteria to measure 
the risk consequence in container shipping such as financial loss, reputation 
loss, and safety and security incident related loss. It is therefore interesting to 
further investigate the relative importance of those mitigation strategies against 
different criteria individually and aggregately. This can be done by performing 
the AHP analysis. However, the AHP has a limitation in terms of the number of 
alternatives. If all strategies are included, the number of survey questions 
becomes too large to conduct practically. Therefore, among all strategies, we 
select the top seven risk mitigation strategies to keep the AHP analysis and 
data collection at a manageable scale. These risk mitigation strategies include: 
“slot exchange, slot charter, joint fleet, ship charter with other container shipping 
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companies” (InterCS_2), “form alliance with other shipping companies” 
(InterCS_1), “use more advanced infrastructures (hardware and software)” 
(IOS_4), “choose partners very carefully” (IntraCS_2), “collaboration with 
partners (e.g., terminal operational company, inland transportation)  through 
making a joint long-term plan (collaboration level)” (IntraCS_10), “enter a 
long-term contract with shippers” (IntraCS_7), and “when the ship has already 
been delayed, omit port-of-calls to keep original schedule” (IOS_2). These 
mean values of the selected strategies are highlighted in Table 7.4. 
Table 7.4 Risk mitigation strategies 
Strategy Mean S.D. Rank 
Intra-organisational strategies (IOS) A D 
1. Be flexible when designing the timetable/schedule, 
e.g., include buffer times 3.81 0.76  3 
2. When the ship has already been delayed, omit 
port-of-calls to keep original schedule 3.82 0.80 7 2 
3. Implement slow steaming and increase the number of 
ships on existing routes 3.52 0.82  7 
4. Use more advanced infrastructures (hardware and 
software) 3.92 0.66 3 1 
5. Improve safety measures, such as by implementing 
safety rules and regulations like the IMDG Code and 
ISM Code 3.71 0.76  3 
6. Improve security measures, such as by implementing 
security rules and regulations like the ISO 27001 and 
ISPS Code 3.58 0.78  6 
7. Execute Regular employee training (e.g. once a year 
or twice a year) 3.66 0.77  5 
Mean of intra-organisational strategies 3.72    
Intra-channel strategies (IntraCS) 
1. Avoid having too many partners 3.29 0.71  10 
2. Choose partners very carefully 3.87 0.66 4 1 
3. Shorten/withdraw contract with the partner that 
perform badly 3.52 0.72  9 
4. Build trust with partners 3.65 0.77  6 
5. Cultivate loyalty of supply chain partners 3.77 0.80  4 
6. Reward /assist partners that comply with shipping 
lines’ initiatives 3.58 0.69  8 
7. Enter a long-term contract with shippers 3.85 0.76 5 2 
8. Share information with partners without 
co-management (cooperation level) 3.65 0.66  6 
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9. Exchange ideas with partners to solve conflicts or 
improve service quality (coordination level) 3.77 0.66  4 
10. Collaboration with partners (e.g., terminal operational 
company, inland transportation) through making a joint 
long-term plan (collaboration level) 3.85 0.67 5 2 
Mean of intra-channel strategies 3.68    
Inter-channel strategies (InterCS) 
1. Slot-exchange, slot charter, joint fleet, ship-charter 
with other container shipping companies 4.18 0.67 1 1 
2. Form alliance with other shipping companies  4.02 0.67 2 2 
3. Acquire and merge with other shipping companies 2.95 0.76  3 
Mean of inter-channel strategies 3.72    
*S.D. = Standard Deviation 
*red colour means the mean value is more than 4 
*orange colour means the mean value is between 3.80 and 3.99 
*blue colour means the mean value is the smallest one 
*Rank A means the overall risk mitigation strategies rank (only shows the top three ones) 
*Rank D means the rank within the level of risk mitigation strategies 
After selecting the seven mitigation strategies, we consulted with six industrial 
experts in container shipping. One expert suggested that the range of the 
seventh strategy, “when the ship has already been delayed, omit port-of-calls to 
keep original schedule”, was too narrow as a mitigation strategy compared to 
others. Therefore, we replaced it with the next one in the ranking table, “be 
flexible when designing the timetable/schedule, e.g., include buffer times”, 
which has an average score 3.81. 
7.3.3 Classic AHP analysis 
Similar to the risk-factor survey and the mitigation-strategy survey, the target 
sample was also from the list of National Association of Shipping Agencies in 
Taiwan. However, in order to increase the valid response rate, the respondents 
who replied the risk-factor and mitigation-strategy questionnaire survey were 
selected to do the AHP questionnaire survey (in Appendix 5). Moreover, several 
important individuals who did not reply us were also included within the AHP 
survey. In total, 114 questionnaires were sent out in December 2011 and we 
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then got 21 replies in one month; include 12 valid and 9 invalid as the 
consistency ratio (C.R.) is over the standard acceptable value (0.1), within a 
month. The valid return rate is 10.53% (Table 7.5).  
Table 7.5 The reply rate of AHP survey 
Questionnaire Return Invalid reply Valid reply Valid reply rate 
114 21 9 12 10.53% 
This thesis uses the Microsoft Office Excel software to calculate the results of 
the 12 AHP questionnaires. The steps of using classic AHP have been 
discussed in Section 4.3.2.1. Firstly, the results show that the consistency ratio 
(C.R.) of each criterion is 0.01, which is less than the standard acceptable value 
(0.1). Therefore, the data meet the consistency requirement. Secondly, we are 
able to calculate the weights/ priorities of each criterion and each alternative. By 
combining the criterion priorities and the relevant alternative priorities, we are 
able to obtain an overall priority ranking of the decision alternatives, which can 
be presented as a priority matrix as shown in Table 7.6 (Al-Harbi, 2001, p.25). 
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Table 7.6 The standardised weights, the global weights, and the rank 
Criteria Weights of 
criteria (a) 
Strategies Weights of 
strategies (b) 
Global weights 
(a)*(b) 
Reduce financial 
loss 
0.412 
[2] 
A 0.189 [2] 0.078 
B 0.143 [3] 0.059 
C 0.107 [6] 0.044 
D 0.116 [5] 0.048 
E 0.131 [4] 0.054 
F 0.219 [1] 0.090 
G 0.095 [7] 0.039 
Reduce reputation 
loss 
0.159 
[3] 
A 0.141 [4] 0.022 
B 0.164 [1] 0.026 
C 0.141 [5] 0.022 
D 0.161 [2] 0.026 
E 0.146 [3] 0.023 
F 0.138 [6] 0.022 
G 0.108 [7] 0.017 
Reduce safety and 
security incident 
related loss 
0.429 
[1] 
A 0.177 [1] 0.076 
B 0.159 [2] 0.068 
C 0.150 [3] 0.064 
D 0.147 [4] 0.063 
E 0.143 [5] 0.061 
F 0.129 [6] 0.055 
G 0.094 [7] 0.040 
A: Slot-exchange, slot charter, joint fleet, ship-charter with other container shipping 
B: Form alliance with other shipping companies 
C: Use more advanced infrastructure (hardware and software) 
D: Choose partners more carefully 
E: Cooperate with your partners (e.g. terminal operational company, inland transportation) 
F: Make a long-term contract with shippers 
G: Design a flexible shipping schedule 
[n]: n is the rank of the strategy under each criterion 
 
From Table 7.6, it can be seen that the weights of criterion “reduce financial 
loss” (0.412) and “reduce safety and security incident related loss” (0.429) are 
much greater than “reduce reputation loss” (0.159). This indicates that the first 
two criteria are more important under the goal of mitigating risks in the shipping 
operations. It is easy to understand that almost every company pays a lot of 
attention to reducing financial loss. However, “reduce safety and security 
incident related loss” is also important in container shipping operations due to 
its dangerous working environment. Compared to retailer operations in which 
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maintaining reputation and brand are highly emphasised (see Dawar and 
Parker, 1994), container shipping operations tend to focus more on financial 
loss reduction and safety and security incident related loss reduction.  
Under the criterion “reduce financial loss”, Strategy F “enter a long-term 
contract with shippers” and Strategy A “slot exchange, slot charter, joint fleet, 
ship charter with other container shipping” are the top two for mitigating financial 
loss in container shipping operations. These two strategies can tackle and 
reduce the risk caused by the uncertainty in transportation demand. Moreover, 
the global weight of Strategy F (0.090) is about twice the weight of the lowest 
one, Strategy G (0.039).  
Under the criterion “reduce reputation loss”, Strategy B “Form alliance with 
other shipping companies” is the most important strategy. However, compared 
with the criterion “reduce financial loss”, the weights of the seven strategies 
under this criterion are less notable. This indicates that their contribution to 
reducing reputation loss does not have significant differences.   
Under the criterion “reduce safety and security incident related loss, Strategy A 
“slot exchange, slot charter, joint fleet, ship charter with other container 
shipping” is the most important risk mitigation strategy, and its global weight 
(0.076) is more than twice that of Strategy G (0.040). 
In order to understand the importance of the mitigation strategies over all three 
criteria, we calculate the overall priority of each strategy, which is the sum of the 
global weights of each strategy under three criteria. The calculations of overall 
priority of individual strategies are presented in the following: 
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Overall priority of Strategy A  
= 0.412 (0.189) + 0.159 (0.141) + 0.429 (0.177) 
=0.178          (6.1) 
 
Overall priority of Strategy B  
= 0.412 (0.143) + 0.159 (0.164) + 0.429 (0.159) 
=0.156                                       (6.2) 
 
Overall priority of Strategy C  
= 0.412 (0.107) + 0.159 (0.141) + 0.429 (0.150) 
=0.136                                                              
(6.3) 
 
Overall priority of Strategy D  
= 0.412 (0.116) + 0.159 (0.161) + 0.429 (0.147) 
=0.135                                            (6.4) 
 
Overall priority of Strategy E  
= 0.412 (0.131) + 0.159 (0.146) + 0.429 (0.143) 
=0.135                                           (6.5) 
 
Overall priority of Strategy F  
= 0.412 (0.219) + 0.159 (0.138) + 0.429 (0.129) 
=0.163                                                              (6.6) 
 
Overall priority of Strategy G  
= 0.412 (0.095) + 0.159 (0.108) + 0.429 (0.094) 
=0.096                                                       (6.7) 
 
Based on the results in (6.1)~(6.7), the seven strategies are ranked according 
to their overall priorities as follows: A, F, B, C, D, E, and G. This ranking is 
notably different (for the Strategy F) compared to the result from the 
mitigation-strategy survey where the ranking order is A, B, C, D, E, F, and G. 
This may be due to fact that container shipping is a logistics service provider 
industry, which does not have its own production, and the profit totally relies on 
the transportation demand from shippers. Therefore, making a long-term 
contract with shippers can reduce the future demand uncertainty and ensure 
shipping companies have a certain volume of promised cargo to transport. It 
should be also pointed out that the AHP survey compared the selected 
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strategies against three different criteria separately, whereas the 
mitigation-strategy survey only considered the overall impact of the strategies. 
The overall priority of Strategy A “slot-exchange, slot charter, joint fleet, 
ship-charter with other container shipping” has the largest overall priority 0.178, 
which plays the most important role in reducing container shipping operation 
risks. The second one is Strategy F “make a long-term contract with shippers”, 
which also has 0.156 of the overall priority. Note that the weights of the middle 
three strategies (i.e. C, D, and E) are fairly close, therefore the seven strategies 
can be divided into three groups. That is, group 1 contains Strategy A, Strategy 
F and Strategy B, which has the highest impact on reducing the container 
shipping operational risks; group 2 includes Strategy, C, D and E that have the 
medium impact; and group 3 contains Strategy G, which has the lowest impact 
on mitigating the container shipping operational risks. More specifically, the 
weight of Strategy A (0.178) in group 1 is almost two times of the weight of the 
Strategy G (0.096) in group 3; and the weights of the alternatives in group 2 are 
around one and half times of that of Strategy G.  
Comparing the above result with the overall effectiveness ranking from the first 
survey, they are generally consistent except Strategy F, which becomes second 
among the seven strategies.  
7.3.4 Fuzzy AHP analysis 
There are several steps for analysing the relative importance of seven 
strategies using the Fuzzy AHP (Ali et al., 2012), the details of the data analysis 
are described in the following (also refer to Section 4.3.2.2 in this thesis for the 
Fuzzy AHP steps): 
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Step 1 Build fuzzy positive reciprocal matrix 
This thesis uses the data of the relative importance from 12 valid questionnaires 
and then, based on the method suggested by Durán and Aguilo (2008) and Ali 
et al. (2012), transforms these crisp data into triangular fuzzy numbers by 
 ̃            ̃                ̃         . In order to save space, the author 
only presents the results of the fuzzy AHP for one selected respondent’s 
opinion, and all of the results are presented in Appendix 6. The result of the 
fuzzy positive reciprocal matrix at the criteria layer is shown as Table 7.7; the 
result for the seven alternatives under financial loss is shown in Table 7.8; the 
result for the seven alternatives under reputation loss is shown in Table 7.9; and 
result for the seven alternatives under safety and security incident related loss 
is shown in Table 7.10. The consistency ratios of the criteria level and the three 
alternative levels are in the acceptable level (i.e. the C.R. is less than 0.1). 
Table 7.7 The fuzzy positive reciprocal matrix of three criteria 
 Reduce 
financial loss 
Reduce 
reputation loss 
Reduce safety 
and security 
incident related 
loss 
Reduce financial loss (1, 1, 2) (5, 6, 7) (2, 3, 4) 
Reduce reputation loss (0.143, 0.167, 
0.2) (1, 1, 2) (0.25, 0.333, 0.5) 
Reduce safety and 
security incident related 
loss 
(0.25, 0.333, 
0.5) (2, 3, 4) (1, 1, 2) 
C.R. = 0.015771 
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Table 7.8 The fuzzy positive reciprocal matrix of seven strategies under reduce 
financial loss 
R
e
d
u
c
e
 f
in
a
n
c
ia
l 
lo
s
s
 
 A B C D E F G 
A (1, 1, 2) (2, 3, 4) (2, 3, 4) (2, 3, 4) (2, 3, 4) (1, 2, 3) (1, 2, 3) 
B 
(0.25, 
0.333, 0.5) 
(1, 1, 2) 
(0.333, 
0.5, 1) 
(0.167, 
0.2, 0.25) 
(0.167, 
0.2, 0.25) 
(0.143, 
0.167, 
0.2) 
(0.143, 
0.167, 
0.2) 
C 
(0.25, 
0.333, 0.5) 
(1, 2, 3) (1, 1, 2) (1, 1, 2) (1, 1, 2) 
(0.167, 
0.2, 0.25) 
(0.143, 
0.167, 
0.2) 
D 
(0.25, 
0.333, 0.5) 
(4, 5, 6) (0.5, 1, 1) (1, 1, 2) (1, 1, 2) 
(0.143, 
0.167, 
0.2) 
(0.167, 
0.2, 0.25) 
E 
(0.25, 
0.333, 0.5) 
(4, 5, 6) (0.5, 1, 1) (0.5, 1, 1) (1, 1, 2) 
(0.167, 
0.2, 0.25) 
(0.167, 
0.2, 0.25) 
F 
(0.333, 0.5, 
1) 
(5, 6, 7) (4, 5, 6) (5, 6, 7) (4, 5, 6) (1, 1, 2) (1, 1, 2) 
G 
(0.333, 0.5, 
1) 
(5, 6, 7) (5, 6, 7) (4, 5, 6) (4, 5, 6) (0.5, 1, 1) (1, 1, 2) 
C.R.=0.082091 
 
Table 7.9 The fuzzy positive reciprocal matrix of seven strategies under reduce 
reputation loss 
R
e
d
u
c
e
 r
e
p
u
ta
ti
o
n
 l
o
s
s
 
 A B C D E F G 
A (1, 1, 2) (1, 1, 2) (1, 1, 2) (1, 2, 3) (1, 2, 3) (1, 1, 2) (1, 1, 2) 
B 
(0.5, 1, 
1) 
(1, 1, 2) (1, 1, 2) (1, 1, 2) (1, 1, 2) 
(0.25, 
0.333, 
0.5) 
(1, 1, 2) 
C 
(0.5, 1, 
1) 
(0.5, 1, 
1) 
(1, 1, 2) (1, 1, 2) (1, 1, 2) 
(0.25, 
0.333, 
0.5) 
(0.167, 
0.2, 0.25) 
D 
(0.333, 
0.5, 1) 
(0.5, 1, 
1) 
(0.5, 1, 
1) 
(1, 1, 2) (1, 1, 2) 
(0.167, 
0.2, 0.25) 
(0.25, 
0.333, 
0.5) 
E 
(0.333, 
0.5, 1) 
(0.5, 1, 
1) 
(0.5, 1, 
1) 
(0.5, 1, 
1) 
(1, 1, 2) 
(0.25, 
0.333, 
0.5) 
(0.25, 
0.333, 
0.5) 
F 
(0.5, 1, 
1) 
(2, 3, 4) (2, 3, 4) (4, 5, 6) (2, 3, 4) (1, 1, 2) (1, 1, 2) 
G 
(0.5, 1, 
1) 
(0.5, 1, 
1) 
(4, 5, 6) (2, 3, 4) (2, 3, 4) 
(0.5, 1, 
1) 
(1, 1, 2) 
C.R.=0.043089 
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Table 7.10 The fuzzy positive reciprocal matrix of seven alternatives under 
reduce safety and security incident related loss 
R
e
d
u
c
e
 s
a
fe
ty
 a
n
d
 s
e
c
u
ri
ty
 i
n
c
id
e
n
t 
re
la
te
d
 l
o
s
s
 
 A B C D E F G 
A (1, 1, 2) (2, 3, 4) (2, 3, 4) (1, 2, 3) (2, 3, 4) (1, 1, 2) (1, 1, 2) 
B 
(0.25, 
0.333, 
0.5) 
(1, 1, 2) (1, 1, 2) (1, 1, 2) (1, 2, 3) 
(0.333, 
0.5, 1) 
(1, 1, 2) 
C 
(0.25, 
0.333, 
0.5) 
(0.5, 1, 
1) 
(1, 1, 2) (1, 1, 2) (1, 1, 2) 
(0.25, 
0.333, 
0.5) 
(0.167, 
0.2, 0.25) 
D 
(0.333, 
0.5, 1) 
(0.5, 1, 
1) 
(0.5, 1, 
1) 
(1, 1, 2) (1, 1, 2) 
(0.167, 
0.2, 
0.25) 
(0.167, 
0.2, 0.25) 
E 
(0.25, 
0.333, 
0.5) 
(0.333, 
0.5, 1) 
(0.5, 1, 
1) 
(0.5, 1, 
1) 
(1, 1, 2) 
(0.25, 
0.333, 
0.5) 
(0.167, 
0.2, 0.25) 
F 
(0.5, 1, 
1) 
(1, 2, 3) (2, 3, 4) (4, 5, 6) (2, 3, 4) (1, 1, 2) (1, 1, 2) 
G 
(0.5, 1, 
1) 
(0.5, 1, 
1) 
(4, 5, 6) (4, 5, 6) (4, 5, 6) 
(0.5, 1, 
1) 
(1, 1, 2) 
C.R.=0.037491 
Step 2 Calculate the fuzzy weights of fuzzy positive reciprocal matrix 
Using Step 5 of the fuzzy AHP approach, the geometric mean of triangular 
fuzzy number ( ̃ 
 ) and the fuzzy weights ( ̃ 
 ) of three criteria can be obtained 
as shown in Table 7.11; the geometric mean of triangular fuzzy number ( ̃ 
  ) 
and the fuzzy weights ( ̃ 
  ) of seven alternatives under financial loss are 
shown in Table 7.12; the geometric mean of triangular fuzzy number ( ̃ 
  ) and 
the fuzzy weights ( ̃ 
  ) of seven alternatives under reputation loss are shown 
in Table 7.13; and the geometric mean of triangular fuzzy number ( ̃ 
  ) and the 
fuzzy weights ( ̃ 
  ) of seven alternatives under safety and security incident 
related loss are shown in Table 7.14. 
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Table 7.11 The geometric mean of TFN and the fuzzy weights of three criteria 
   Financial loss    Reputation loss    Safety and 
security incident 
related loss 
 ̃ 
  (2.154, 2.621, 3.826) (0.329, 0.382, 0.585) (0.794, 1, 1.587) 
 ̃ 
  (0.359, 0.655, 1.167) (0.055, 0.095, 0.178) (0.132, 0.25, 0.484) 
 
Table 7.12 The geometric mean of TFN and the fuzzy weights of seven 
strategies under reduce financial loss 
   A    B    C    D    E    F    G 
 ̃ 
   
(1.486,  
2.284, 
3.337) 
(0.241,  
0.293, 
0.425) 
(0.481,  
0.581,  
0.93) 
(0.531,  
0.662, 
0.93) 
(0.492, 
0.679, 
0.869) 
(2.012,  
2.393, 
3.546) 
(1.822,  
2.393, 
3.212) 
 ̃ 
   
(0.112, 
0.246, 
0.472) 
(0.018, 
0.032, 
0.06) 
(0.036,  
0.063, 
0.132) 
(0.04, 
0.071, 
0.132) 
(0.037, 
0.073, 
0.123) 
(0.152,  
0.258, 
0.502) 
(0.138, 
0.258, 
0.455) 
Table 7.13 The geometric mean of TFN and the fuzzy weights of seven 
strategies under reduce reputation loss 
   A    B    C    D    E    F    G 
 ̃ 
   
(1,  
1.219, 
2.246) 
(0.743, 
0.855, 
1.486) 
(0.521, 
0.679,  
1) 
(0.445, 
0.615, 
0.906) 
(0.427, 
0.662, 
0.906) 
(1.486, 
2.015, 
2.852) 
(1.104, 
1.723, 
2.119) 
 ̃ 
   
(0.087, 
0.157, 
0.392) 
(0.065, 
0.11, 
0.259) 
(0.045, 
0.087, 
0.175) 
(0.039, 
0.079, 
0.158) 
(0.037, 
0.085, 
0.158) 
(0.129, 
0.259, 
0.498) 
(0.096, 
0.222, 
0.37) 
Table 7.14 The geometric mean of TFN and the fuzzy weights of seven 
strategies under reduce safety and security incident related loss 
   A    B    C    D    E    F    G 
 ̃ 
   
(1.346, 
1.768, 
2.852) 
(0.701, 
0.855, 
1.575) 
(0.472, 
0.581, 
0.906) 
(0.42, 
0.572, 
0.82) 
(0.365, 
0.526, 
0.743) 
(1.346, 
1.902, 
2.737) 
(1.346, 
1.993, 
2.38) 
 ̃ 
   
(0.112, 
0.216, 
0.476) 
(0.058, 
0.104, 
0.263) 
(0.039, 
0.071, 
0.151) 
(0.035, 
0.07, 
0.137) 
(0.03, 
0.064, 
0.124) 
(0.112, 
0.232, 
0.457) 
(0.112, 
0.243, 
0.397) 
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Step 3 Defuzzify the fuzzy weights and normalise the crisp weights 
Using Step 6 of the fuzzy AHP approach, the fuzzy weights can be defuzzified 
by the Centre of Gravity method to obtain the crisp weights (e.g. Sugeno, 1985; 
Lee, 1990; Ail et al., 2012). Then using Step 7 of the fuzzy AHP approach, the 
standardised weights can be obtained. The results of the three criteria and the 
seven strategies under the three criteria are shown in Table 7.15, Table 7.16, 
Table 7.17, and Table 7.18 respectively.  
Table 7.15 The defuzzified and standardized weights of three criteria 
 Financial loss Reputation loss Safety and security 
incident related loss 
Defuzzified 
weights 
0.727 0.11 0.289 
Standardised  
weights 
0.646 0.097 0.257 
Table 7.16 The defuzzified and standardized weights of seven strategies under 
reduce financial loss 
 A B C D E F G 
Defuzzified 
weights 
0.277 0.037 0.077 0.081 0.078 0.304 0.283 
Standardised  
weights 
0.244 0.032 0.068 0.071 0.068 0.267 0.249 
Table 7.17 The defuzzified and standardized weights of seven strategies under 
reduce reputation loss 
 A B C D E F G 
Defuzzified 
weights 
0.212 0.145 0.102 0.092 0.093 0.296 0.229 
Standardised  
weights 
0.181 0.124 0.088 0.079 0.08 0.253 0.196 
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Table 7.18 The defuzzified and standardized weights of seven strategies under 
reduce safety and security incident related loss 
 A B C D E F G 
Defuzzified 
weights 
0.268 0.142 0.087 0.081 0.073 0.267 0.251 
Standardised  
weights 
0.229 0.121 0.075 0.069 0.062 0.229 0.215 
Step 4 Calculate the global weights 
After calculating the results from the 12 respondents individually, the final results 
were aggregated and averaged over all respondents’ opinions (include the 
standardised weights of the criteria level and seven strategies under the three 
criteria) by using the arithmetic mean. Finally, global weights can be obtained by 
multiplying the standardised weights of the three criteria and the standardised 
weights of the seven strategies. 
Table 6.19 shows the results of standardised weights and global weights by 
using the fuzzy AHP method. Compared with the classic AHP (see Table 6.5), 
the weights of criteria have a slight change. The weight of “reduce financial loss” 
becomes the first place among the three criteria and it increases to 0.428 (it was 
0.412 in classic AHP). Whilst the weight of “reduce reputation loss” is still the 
least weight criterion and it decreases slightly to 0.157 (it was 0.159 in classic 
AHP). The weight of “reduce safety and security incident related loss” becomes 
the second important criterion and it decreases to 0.415 (it was 0.429 in the 
classic AHP). This reveals that the shipping companies tend to focus more on 
reducing financial loss and reducing safety and security incident related loss , 
and they seem to pay much less attention to reducing the reputation loss 
compared to reducing the financial loss or the safety and security incident 
related loss. We believe this result from the fuzzy AHP is probably more 
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reasonable than that from the classic AHP since the ultimate goal of shipping 
companies is to reduce costs and earn profits. 
Under the criterion “reduce financial loss”, Strategy F “make a long-term contract 
with shippers” is notably more important than others. Under the criterion “reduce 
reputation loss”, although Strategy B “form alliance with other shipping 
companies” takes first place, strategies A~F are all very close.  Under the 
criterion “reduce safety and security incident related loss”, the top one is 
Strategy A “slot-exchange, slot charter, joint fleet, ship-charter with other 
container shipping”. 
The top seven global weights are Strategy FF (the Strategy F under reducing 
financial loss) “make a long-term contract with shippers”, Strategy FA (the 
Strategy A under reducing financial loss) “slot-exchange, slot charter, joint fleet, 
ship-charter with other container shipping”, Strategy SA (the Strategy A under 
reducing safety and security incident related loss), Strategy SB (the Strategy B 
under reducing safety and security incident related loss) “form alliance with other 
shipping companies”, Strategy SC (the Strategy C under reducing safety and 
security incident related loss) “use more advanced infrastructure (hardware and 
software)”, Strategy FB (the Strategy B under reducing financial loss), and 
Strategy SD (the Strategy D under reducing safety and security incident related 
loss) “choose partners more carefully”. The weights of these seven critical 
strategies are all above 6%, and the sum of these seven weights account for 
51.00% (about 1/2). The results suggest that managers could pay more attention 
to making long-term contracts with shippers in order to effectively reduce 
financial loss, whereas this strategy may be not so effective in reducing the other 
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two types of loss (rank 6 in both the criterion of “reduce reputation loss” and 
“reduce safety and security incident related loss”).  
On the other hand, the bottom three strategies with the least weights are 
Strategy RG “design a flexible shipping schedule”, Strategy RF “make a 
long-term contract with shippers”, and Strategy RE “Cooperate with your 
partners (e.g. terminal operational company, inland transportation)”. The sum of 
the three weights is only 0.059%. Moreover, all the strategies belonging to the 
criterion of “reduce reputation loss” are ranked as the bottom seven places 
among the 21 strategies in Table 7.19 according to their global weights.  
Table 7.19 The standardised weights, the global weights, and the rank  
Criteria Weights of 
criteria (a) 
Strategies Weights of 
strategies (b) 
Global weights 
(a)*(b) 
Reduce financial 
loss 
0.428 
[1] 
A 0.192 [2] 0.085 
B 0.142 [3] 0.063 
C 0.114 [6] 0.051 
D 0.118 [5] 0.048 
E 0.131 [4] 0.051 
F 0.212 [1] 0.088 
G 0.092 [7] 0.042 
Reduce reputation 
loss 
0.157 
[3] 
A 0.159 [2] 0.025 
B 0.167 [1] 0.025 
C 0.145 [4] 0.023 
D 0.157 [3] 0.024 
E 0.138 [5] 0.022 
F 0.133 [6] 0.022 
G 0.100 [7] 0.015 
Reduce safety and 
security incident 
related loss 
0.415 
[2] 
A 0.192 [1] 0.078 
B 0.167 [2] 0.070 
C 0.149 [3] 0.065 
D 0.143 [4] 0.061 
E 0.134 [5] 0.056 
F 0.125 [6] 0.049 
G 0.090 [7] 0.035 
A: Slot-exchange, slot charter, joint fleet, ship-charter with other container shipping 
B: Form alliance with other shipping companies 
C: Use more advanced infrastructure (hardware and software) 
D: Choose partners more carefully 
E: Cooperate with your partners (e.g. terminal operational company, inland transportation) 
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F: Make a long-term contract with shippers 
G: Design a flexible shipping schedule 
 
Overall priority of Strategy A  
= 0.428 (0.192) + 0.157 (0.159) + 0.415 (0.192) 
=0.189                                                   (6.8) 
 
Overall priority of Strategy B  
= 0.428 (0.142) + 0.157 (0.167) + 0.415 (0.167) 
=0.158                                                   (6.9) 
 
Overall priority of Strategy C  
= 0.428 (0.114) + 0.157 (0.145) + 0.415 (0.149) 
=0.138                                                   (6.10) 
 
Overall priority of Strategy D  
= 0.428 (0.118) + 0.157 (0.157) + 0.415 (0.143) 
=0.134                                                           (6.11) 
 
Overall priority of Strategy E  
= 0.428 (0.131) + 0.157 (0.138) + 0.415 (0.134) 
=0.130                                                       (6.12) 
 
Overall priority of Strategy F  
= 0.428 (0.212) + 0.157 (0.133) + 0.415 (0.125) 
=0.159                                                     (6.13) 
 
Overall priority of Strategy G  
= 0.428 (0.092) + 0.157 (0.100) + 0.415 (0.090) 
=0.092                                                          (6.14) 
 
Based on the results in (6.8)~(6.14), the seven strategies are ranked according 
to their overall priorities as follows: A, F, B, C, D, E, and G. This result is the 
same with the result of classic AHP. However, the overall priorities are slightly 
different from that of the classic AHP. The fuzzy AHP has a relatively wider 
range of the overall priorities, i.e. [0.092, 0.189], than that of the classic AHP, i.e. 
[0.096, 0.178]. This implies that the fuzzy AHP can differentiate the relative 
importance of the strategies more clearly. 
As mentioned in Section 4.3, there are different methods to defuzzify the fuzzy 
weights (e.g. Durán and Aguilo, 2008; Ding, 2010; Ding and Tseng, 2012; Ali et 
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al., 2012), in which Ali et al. (2012) used the Centre of Gravity method. Table 
7.20 presents the results of different fuzzy AHP together with results of the 
classic AHP in to make a comparison. It can be seen that the rankings of the 
seven strategies remain the same under all methods, although the overall 
priorities vary slightly. The ranges of the overall priorities under the fuzzy AHP 
methods are wider than the classic AHP, which implies that the fuzzy AHP 
methods have more power to differentiate the relative importance of different 
strategies.  
Table 7.20 The comparison of classic AHP and three different fuzzy AHP 
Strategy Classic AHP Duran and Aguilo 
(2008) 
Ding (2010); Ding 
and Tseng (2012) 
Ali et al. (2012) 
A 0.178 1 0.186 1 0.184 1 0.189 1 
B 0.156 3 0.158 3 0.157 3 0.158 3 
C 0.136 4 0.138 4 0.138 4 0.138 4 
D 0.135 5 0.134 5 0.134 5 0.134 5 
E 0.135 6 0.131 6 0.132 6 0.130 6 
F 0.163 2 0.160 2 0.161 2 0.159 2 
G 0.096 7 0.093 7 0.094 7 0.092 7 
A: Slot-exchange, slot charter, joint fleet, ship-charter with other container shipping 
B: Form alliance with other shipping companies 
C: Use more advanced infrastructure (hardware and software) 
D: Choose partners more carefully 
E: Cooperate with your partners (e.g. terminal operational company, inland transportation) 
F: Make a long-term contract with shippers 
G: Design a flexible shipping schedule 
7.4 Chapter summary 
This chapter can be summarised into two parts: the risk mitigation strategies 
identification, and the risk mitigation strategies evaluation. The former includes 
the results from a more general literature review and from seven interviews; the 
latter includes the results from two questionnaire surveys, the results from the 
risk mitigation strategies ranking, and the results from the classic AHP analysis 
and the fuzzy AHP analysis.  
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From relevant literature review, this study has identified a total of 17 risk 
mitigation strategies: 6 strategies belong to the intra-organisation level, 8 
strategies belong to the intra-channel level, and 3 strategies belong to the 
inter-channel level. Moreover, based on the results from the interviews, this 
thesis formulates a few new mitigation strategies, e.g., “implement international 
regulations (e.g. ISO 27001, IMO regulations)” can be classified into 
intra-organisational strategies owing to they can be executed within a shipping 
company; “choose partners more carefully”, and “cultivate loyalty of supply chain 
partners” can be classified into intra-channel strategies owing to they are related 
to collaboration with supply chain partners. Finally, after interviews, a total of 20 
risk mitigation strategies are identified. 
After the identification of these risk mitigation strategies, a risk 
mitigation-strategy survey is used to rank the importance of these strategies. 
The results from the mitigation-strategy survey can be summarised as follows:  
(1) The mean values of three categories (intra-organisational strategies, 
intra-channel strategies, and inter-channel strategies) are at similar levels 
of overall effectiveness (mean value of IOS: 3.72; mean value of IntraCS: 
3.68; mean value of InterCS: 3.72), and each category appears to include 
highly ranked mitigation strategies.  
(2) The top two intra-organisational strategies are “use more advanced 
infrastructures (hardware and software)” (IOS_4: 3.92) and “when the 
ship has already been delayed, omit port-of-calls to keep the original 
schedule” (IOS_2: 3.82), and both have a mean at no less than 3.8. It is 
interesting to observe that the recent popular practice – slow steaming – 
221 
 
has the lowest scores within the IOS group. Slow steaming, as Traill 
(2010) stated, increases the transit time and may incur extra inventory 
costs to shippers; which can be also supported by the interviewee’s 
opinion: “Deploying more ships in a service doesn’t necessarily improve 
reliability or mitigates risk; there will always be circumstances that cannot 
be planned for (weather, geo-politics etc.)” (see Section 7.2.2). 
(3) Three intra-channel strategies have average scores at greater than 3.8, 
including “choose partners more carefully” (IntraCS_2: 3.87), 
“collaboration with partners (e.g., terminal operational company, inland 
transportation) through making a joint long-term plan (collaboration level)” 
(IntraCS_10: 3.85), and “enter a long-term contract with shippers” 
(IntraCS_7: 3.85). On the other hand, the strategy “avoid having too many 
partners” has the lowest score 3.29 in this group. 
(4) Two strategies with average scores greater than 3.8 within the 
inter-channel strategy group are “slot exchange, slot charter, joint fleet, 
ship charter with other container shipping companies” (InterCS_1: 4.18) 
and “form alliance with other shipping companies” (InterCS_2: 4.02). The 
strategy “acquire and merge with other shipping companies” (InterCS_3: 
2.95) has the lowest score among all mitigation strategies.   
The top seven strategies are selected to do further investigation using the AHP 
methods. They are: A: Slot-exchange, slot charter, joint fleet, ship-charter with 
other container shipping; B: Form alliance with other shipping companies; C: 
Use more advanced infrastructure (hardware and software); D: Choose partners 
more carefully; E: Cooperate with your partners (e.g. terminal operational 
company, inland transportation); F: Make a long-term contract with shippers; and 
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G: Design a flexible shipping schedule. The purpose is to further evaluate their 
relative importance against three different criteria. The AHP questionnaire 
survey was conducted to collect the primary data and the data were first 
analysed using the classic AHP. The main results can be summarised into 
several points as follows:  
(1) The weights of criterion “reduce financial loss” (0.412) and “reduce safety 
and security incident related loss” (0.429) are much greater than that of 
“reduce reputation loss” (0.159). This indicates that the first two criteria 
are more important under the goal of mitigating risks in the shipping 
operations. 
(2) Under the criterion “reduce financial loss”, Strategies F “make a long-term 
contract with shippers” is the top one for mitigating financial loss in the 
container shipping operations. Under the criterion “reduce reputation loss”, 
Strategy B “form alliance with other shipping companies” is the most 
important strategy. Under the criterion “reduce safety and security 
incident related loss”, Strategy A “slot exchange, slot charter, joint fleet, 
ship charter with other container shipping” is the most important risk 
mitigation strategy. 
(3) The seven strategies are ranked according to their overall priorities as 
follows: A, F, B, C, D, E, and G, which is generally in agreement with the 
results of the mitigation-strategy survey. However, the strategy F became 
the second important strategy in the results of the AHP survey.  
The fuzzy AHP method was also applied to evaluate the relative importance of 
the selected seven mitigation strategies, the results are summarised below: 
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(1) The rank of the three criteria has changed to: “reduce financial loss” 
(0.428) is the most important criterion to container shipping risk mitigation 
management; “reduce safety and security incident related loss” (0.415) 
becomes the second important criterion; whilst “reduce reputation loss” 
(0.157) is still the slight one on container shipping operations. The first 
two criteria still dominate the third criterion. 
(2) The seven strategies are ranked according to their overall priorities as 
follows: A, F, B, C, D, E, and G. This result is the same as that of the 
classic AHP.  However, the overall priorities are slightly different from 
that of the classic AHP. The fuzzy AHP has a relatively wider range of the 
overall priorities than that of the classic AHP. This implies that the fuzzy 
AHP can differentiate the relative importance of the strategies more 
clearly. 
(3) Several defuzzification methods were used in the fuzzy AHP analysis. 
The results showed that the rankings of the seven strategies remain the 
same.  
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Chapter 8 Discussion 
This chapter presents the discussion of the main findings in this thesis. Section 
8.1 discusses the findings from the risk analysis; Section 8.2 discusses the 
findings from the risk mitigation strategy evaluation; and Section 8.3 discusses 
the generalisation of the research methodology adopted in this thesis. 
8.1 Findings from risk analysis  
One aim of this thesis is to provide an inclusive view on the risks in container 
shipping operations taking a logistics perspective. This section focuses on the 
discussion of the practical and theoretical implications of the findings from risk 
analysis, including risk identification and validation, and risk assessment.  
8.1.1 Risk identification and validation 
The majority of the discussion in this section address  the theoretical 
implications. With regards to the risk identification, the author took the logistics 
perspective which is composed of three main flows, namely, information flow, 
physical flow, and payment flow. The processes of these three flows in container 
shipping operations were elaborated based on relevant literature. This part 
achieves research objective 1: Elaborate the logistics flows (information, 
physical, payment flows) in container shipping operations (see Chapter 1). The 
conceptual framework is formulated through employing the four risk 
management steps, including identification (and validation) of risk, measurement 
and analysis of risk, identification (and validation) of risk mitigation strategy, and 
evaluation of risk mitigation strategy. The conceptual model is then applied to 
the container shipping industry in Taiwan. This part achieves research objective 
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2: Develop a conceptual framework for risk management in the context of 
container shipping operations, and apply the framework to a case study (see 
Chapter 1).  
Based on the review of relevant literature (including the risks in container 
shipping operations and the risks in general supply chains), a total of 28 risk 
factors have been identified and classified into three categories, namely, risks 
associated with information flow, risks associated with physical flow, and risks 
associated with payment flow. Each category includes several risk elements, 
and each element includes several risk factors.  
The risk validation and further risk exploration were conducted by a set of 
face-to-face interviews and a set of email interviews. After the series of 
interviews, the identified risk factors are validated and regarded as appropriate 
in the container shipping operations context. Several new risk factors were also 
identified during the interviews, including “Shippers request extra service 
information (InfoI_4)”, “Shippers hide cargo information (non-declare) (InfoI_5)”, 
“Container shortage (e.g. Shippers use containers as storage, container revamp, 
unexpected demand) (PhTD_6)”, “Cargos being detained by customs (PhTD_8)”, 
“Damage to frozen cargos/ reefer containers due to electricity failure (PhCD_5)”, 
“Financial crisis in the loan countries (PayCE_2)”, “Shippers abandoning cargos 
when cargos have already reached the port of destination (PayNP_2)”. The 
reason that these risk factors have not been seen in the existing literature may 
be because these risk factors are quite unique in container shipping operations 
and have not yet commonly happened in other general industries, such as 
PhTD_6, PhTD_8, PhCD_5, and PayNP_2.  
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Among these seven new risk factors, it is worth mentioning that the risk factor 
PhCD_5 has been mentioned in existing literature (Tseng et al., 2012). However, 
the paper Tseng et al. (2012) published later than this thesis’s data collection, 
which was conducted in 2011. Although the insight of Tseng et al. (2012) has 
been mentioned in Chapter 2, this thesis still categorises PhCD_5 into the new 
risk factor from face-to-face interview.  
Several studies found that information asymmetry is an important issue in some 
supply chains such as retailing or manufacturing (e.g. Forrester, 1961; Lee et al., 
1997). However, it is found in this thesis that in the maritime context, information 
asymmetry among the players in the market is not that important: it ranked 31st 
for causing financial loss, 19th for reputation loss, and 12th for safety and 
security incident related loss. As an interviewee put it in one of the interviews 
with the shipping companies:  
“We do not really care about information asymmetry. According to 80/20 rule, 
compared to the cargo flow that starts from small shippers through brokers 
or forwarders to our company, the large shippers who can offer large scale 
cargo directly to us without brokers or forwards are the ones that we really 
concern.” 
One interviewee stated that the risks associated with information flow may not 
be as serious as the risks associated with physical flow. He said: “information 
flow could impact on physical flow, but it cannot replace physical flow”. His point 
was supported latter through the results of risk-factor survey.  
Radio-frequency identification (RFID) has become a popular technology in 
almost every industry, especially in retailing. This technology can significantly 
improve the security of these retailers that the commodities will not be stolen. 
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RFID has been used in container transportation but is still in the period of pilot 
test. One interviewee mentioned that:   
“There are two types of RFID, passive tag and active tag. The passive tag is 
not really useful for us as it only works in a close area and has only several 
gates connecting outside world, so that the reader can set up in the gates 
and read the information on the passive tag. For us, the containers are 
transported in an open area, which means all over the world, and this should 
use the active tag to actively send the cargo information to us if the cargo 
has been stolen. However, the active tag is quite expensive and we have 
around 80,000 to 100,000 containers transporting in the world. If our 
containers are all equipped with the RFID with active tag, this will be a big 
issue, and we have to consider it very carefully. Now, we still use the normal 
seal and electronic seal and the e-seal is usually used in transit containers 
and expensive cargo containers.” 
Through a combination of comprehensive literature review, a set of face-to-face 
interviews, and a set of email interviews, this thesis has identified and validated 
a total of 35 risk factors in container shipping operations within three logistics 
flows. This achieves the research objective 3: Identify key risk factors within 
three flows in container shipping (see Chapter 1), and answers the research 
question 1 (i.e. what are the risk factors in container shipping operations? see 
Chapter 1). 
8.1.2 Risk analysis 
After identifying and validating the risk factors, the second step of risk 
management is analysing the identified risks. This thesis has used empirical 
data to measure and analyse the risks faced by container shipping companies 
from a logistics perspective in relation to three different types of risk 
consequence: financial loss, reputation loss and safety and security incident 
related loss.  
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Moreover, in order to answer research question 2 (i.e. which risk factors are 
relatively more significant to a shipping company’s performance? see Chapter 1), 
the importance of each factor has been measured by multiplying the risk 
likelihood and the risk consequence, which are collected through the risk-factor 
questionnaire survey. Several findings are worth highlighting and discussed in 
relation to existing literature from a theoretical implications perspective. 
Firstly, with regards to the risk likelihood, the top three risk factors are “oil price 
rise (PhTD_9)”, “unstable weather (PhTD_4)”, and “port congestion (unexpected 
waiting times before berthing or before starting loading/discharging) (PhTD_3)”. 
It is worth mentioning that all these three risk factors belong to the element of 
“transportation delay” in the category of “risks associated with physical flow”. 
These three risk factors are often beyond the control of container shipping 
companies, which means that it is difficult to reduce their impacts through 
likelihood reduction.  
Secondly, this research further “refines” the findings of some previous studies by 
placing the risk factors addressed therein in a full “risk picture” which was 
developed systematically. For example, this research confirms that empty 
container transportation is a risk element; but the findings show that it is not that 
important compared to the other risk factors: it ranked 22nd for causing financial 
loss, 26th for reputation loss, and 22nd for safety and security incident related 
loss out of 35 risk factors. This may be explained by the fact that although empty 
container repositioning could incur a significant amount of costs, the shipping 
industry has long been aware of the trade imbalance and has already been 
prepared to accept such risk. Notteboom (2006) found that “port/terminal 
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congestion” is the main source of schedule unreliability, followed by 
“port/terminal productivity below expectations” and “unexpected waiting times 
due to weather or on route mechanical problems”. Schedule reliability is an 
important aspect in container shipping reputation performance, transportation 
delay would undoubtedly harm shipping companies’ reputation. To put these 
factors onto the full “risk picture” developed in this research, it is obvious that 
“port congestion” and “unstable weather” are important, but “port/terminal 
productivity being below expectations” is not that important when it is compared 
to other risk factors as it ranked 14th in respect of reputation loss.  
Thirdly, the results from thesis also support some previous findings; e.g., 
findings from Fu et al. (2010), Ewence (2011), Kaye (2011), and Nkwocha 
(2011). This thesis confirms that pirate or terrorist attacks are an important risk 
element in causing financial loss and safety and security incident related loss; as 
shown in the two risk maps, it also has very serious risk consequences among 
the 35 risk factors, especially in the safety and security incident related loss risk 
map. Kaye (2011) and Nkwocha (2011) also stated that the damage to 
employee safety and the security of ships is important (see Section 5.2.4). This 
risk factor is slighter than “shipper hiding cargo information (InfoI_5)” (rank 1st) 
and “damage caused by transporting dangerous goods (PhCD_3)” (rank 2nd), 
because the characteristics of these two risk factors are similar and their 
likelihood are both higher than piracy even if the risk consequence of piracy is 
the most serious one under safety and security incident related loss. Under the 
financial loss risk scale, the findings on piracy can support the findings of Fu et al. 
(2010) who stated that piracy has forced several major container shipping 
companies to alter their service routes (see Section 2.1.2). However, it costs a 
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huge investment building service routes, and it is also expensive altering existing 
service routes. This problem has been suggested that shipping companies may 
charge more fees for protecting the cargo going through highly risky routes (IFW, 
2011) or using armed guards on ships to protect cargos on the routes which 
have high possibility of piracy attack (Nkwocha and Badger, 2011) (see Section 
5.3.3). 
Fourthly, the research findings also support the findings from Notteboon and 
Vernimmen (2009) and Ronen (2011). It is confirmed that oil price rise is an 
important risk factor, especially for financial loss where it has the largest impact. 
In the financial loss risk map, it shows that the oil price rise has the highest 
likelihood and consequence; but the consequences are not that important in the 
reputation loss risk map and safety and security incident related loss risk map. It 
is suggested to reduce the impact from the rising oil price through hedging, 
adjusting the Bunker Adjustment Factor (BAF), signing a long-term contract with 
an oil supplier to stabilise oil price (see Section 5.3.3), or adopting the strategies 
that have been mentioned in Section 2.7.3, e.g., slow steaming, form alliance 
with other shipping companies or slot-exchange, slot charter, joint fleet, 
ship-charter with other container shipping companies.   
Finally, the findings also confirm that port congestion is an important risk factor 
(Notteboom, 2006). It is found that it is the third important risk factor regarding 
both financial loss and reputation loss, and it appears in the high risk zone in the 
financial loss risk map. This research also shows that the damage to frozen 
cargo/ reefer containers has important risk consequence (Tseng et al. 2012) in 
the financial loss risk map and safety and security incident related loss risk map. 
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There are also some discussions of the finding from the practical implication 
perspective. Firstly, the risk associated with physical flow is the most important 
risk category among the three categories. It is recommended that the managers, 
if the available resources are rather limited, could perhaps give priority to risks 
associated with physical flow in designing risk control policies. This finding is 
indeed consistent with some of the previous studies in this field as mentioned in 
Chapter 2 and from the interviewees that have mentioned in previous Chapters.  
Secondly, “shipper hiding cargo information (InfoI_5)” is the most serious risk 
factor among the 35 risk factors under the reputation loss risk scale and the 
safety and security incident related loss risk scale, and it is in second place 
under the financial loss risk scale. This reflects the shippers’ opportunistic 
behaviour, which, as revealed in the interviews, has been widely recognised in 
the transportation industry. This also reflects the concern of International 
Maritime Organisation (IMO), e.g. IMO (2011, p.10), “container cargo weight 
misdeclaration remains ‘habitual’ and discovered cases form just the tip of an 
iceberg”. IMO also proposed a regulation regarding container cargo weight, and 
suggested that if a shipper fails to comply with the verified weight certificate of 
gross weight of containers, regarding containers shall be refused for loading. 
The impact of InfoI_5 under the safety and security incident related loss 
consequence can also be supported by Penton Business Media’s (2011) report: 
the potential threat of cargo fraud is more damaging than cargo theft. One 
interviewees also stated that:  
“We charge expensive freight and insurance for transporting expensive 
cargo and/ or dangerous goods. Some shippers hide the cargo information 
in order to save the money. This action may produce serious consequence, 
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such as explosion if the cargo is dangerous goods, or cargo damage if the 
cargo is frangible.” 
8.2 Findings from risk mitigation strategy evaluation  
The other aim of this thesis is to provide a systematic view of the risk mitigation 
strategies in container shipping operations. This section discusses the finding 
from risks mitigation strategy evaluation, including the risk mitigation strategies 
identification and validation, ranking, and evaluation. The theoretical and 
practical implications are discussed together in this section as the majority of 
these findings impact on both theoretical and practical sectors. 
8.2.1 Risk mitigation strategies identification and validation 
This thesis firstly identified the risk mitigation strategies in container shipping 
operations through reviewing relevant literature (including the container shipping 
sector and from a general supply chains aspect), a total of 17 risk mitigation 
strategies were identified and categorised into three levels, i.e. 
inter-organisational strategies, intra-channel strategies, and inter-channel 
strategies. Each level includes several risk mitigation strategies.  
Several new risk mitigation strategies were further identified through a set of 
face-to-face interviews and a set of email interviews. They are “improve safety 
measures, such as by implementing safety rules and regulations like the IMDG 
Code and ISM Code (IOS_5)”, “improve security measures, such as by 
implementing security rules and regulations like the ISO 27001 and ISPS Code 
(IOS_6)”, “choose partners very carefully (IntraCS_2)”, and “cultivate loyalty of 
supply chain partners (IntraCS_5)”. The first two strategies, IOS_5 and IOS_6, 
come from one simple strategy “improve the safety and security” from reviewing 
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the relevant literature. The reason that separates “improve the safety and 
security” into two strategies is although “safety” and “security” are sometime 
similar, they still have different meaning. “Safety”, in this thesis, means the risk 
that harm to human life; whilst “security” may also harm to human life, yet it also 
includes information security, which harms to companies but not to human life. A 
manager said:   
“we have already used ISO 27001 to increase information security. ISO 
27001 is an information security management system (ISMS) standard 
process that records every single employee to keep business 
confidential. … From the safety perspective, we implement IMGD Code, an 
international regulations, which can help reduce potential risks in shipping 
operations when transporting dangerous goods. This types of risk 
[dangerous goods transportation] has more serious impact than the previous 
one [information security risk], because it may harm to human life safety. In 
our company, we pay more attention on implementing safety rules and 
regulations.” 
Through literature review, face-to-face interviews, and email interviews, this 
thesis have identified and validated a total of 20 risk mitigation strategies in 
container shipping operations, which are categorised into three levels. Therefore, 
the research objective 4 (i.e. Identify typical risk mitigation strategies for 
container shipping companies see Chapter 1) has been achieved. 
8.2.2 Risk mitigation strategies ranking 
Through the mitigation-strategy survey, the author is able to rank the risk 
mitigation strategies according to their overall effectiveness. The results show 
that on average three categories have very similar levels of overall effectiveness, 
and each category appears to include highly ranked mitigation strategies. It is 
recommended that managers should consider these three levels of strategies 
when making decisions on risk management as these three levels 
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comprehensively cover all the different operational environments (i.e. internal, 
vertical, and horizontal).  
At the intra-organisational strategies (ISO) level, the strategy, “implement slow 
steaming and increase the number of ships on existing routes (IOS_3)”, is a 
popular practice recently, but it has the lowest scores within the IOS group in this 
survey. Note that slow steaming can reduce fuel consumption and absorb idle 
ships, which is an appropriate strategy for shipping lines when supply exceeds 
demand. However, it increases the transit time and may incur extra inventory 
costs to shippers (Traill, 2010). The low score of slow steaming indicates that not 
all of the respondents think that slow steaming is a better strategy to reduce risks 
in container shipping operations compared with other strategies within IOS (see 
Section 6.2.1). This is partially reflected by one email interview, in which a 
manager stated that: “Deploying more ships in a service doesn’t necessarily 
improve reliability or mitigates risk; there will always be circumstances that 
cannot be planned for (weather, geo-politics etc.)” (see Section 6.2.2).  
The inter-channel strategies (InterCS) level has the first and second important 
strategies among the 20 strategies. They are “slot-exchange, slot charter, joint 
fleet, ship-charter with other container shipping companies (InterCS_1)” and 
“form alliance with other shipping companies (InterCS_2)”. This may be because 
of the global economic depression, which has driven down cargo volume 
significantly since the financial crisis in 2008, and consequently reshaped the 
shipping industry through inter-channel collaboration and consolidation. Several 
studies also supported the importance of InterCS_1 and InterCS_2, such as 
Cullinane and Khanna (1999); Ryoo and Thanopoulou (1999); Heaver et al. 
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(2000); Slack et al. (2002); Song and Panayides (2002); Shry et al. (2003); 
Notteboom (2004); Lu et al. (2010); Chow and Chang (2011) (see Section 2.2.2).  
The Inter-channel strategies level also has the least important strategy to 
mitigate the risks among the 20 strategies, which is “acquire and merge with 
other container shipping companies (InterCS_3)”. InterCS_3 might be an 
important strategy in 1990s and the early 2000s, and it also brought several 
benefits to the container shipping companies such as rapid increase in market 
share, economies of scale, or gaining instant access to markets and distribution 
networks, obtaining access to new technologies (see Section 2.2.2). The last 
biggest acquisition and merger in container shipping occurred in 2005, in which 
Maersk Sealand acquired P&O Nedlloyd to become Maersk Line. However, it 
should be noted that there are many risks associated with acquisition and 
merger with other shipping companies, e.g. huge capital investment. In the AHP 
survey sample the author selected, the majority of the respondents were working 
in shipping agents, who did not have enough money to merge and/or acquire 
other companies. Therefore, it is understandable that InterCS_3 was regarded 
as the least important strategy among the 20 strategies to mitigate risks in 
container shipping operations. 
8.2.3 Risk mitigation strategies evaluation  
Seven most important risk mitigation strategies are then selected to compare 
their relative importance in terms of three different criteria: reducing financial loss, 
reducing reputation loss, and reducing safety and security damage. This is done 
through the Analytic Hierarchy Process (AHP) questionnaire survey and the 
AHP analysis. 
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The classic AHP analysis yields some interesting findings. Firstly, two criteria, 
“reducing safety and security damage” and “reducing financial loss”, are 
significantly more important than the criterion “reducing reputation loss”. The 
implication is that those top mitigation strategies probably have more significant 
and direct impact on the first two criteria. Compared with some general 
industries such as retailer or manufacturer operations in which reputation and 
brand are highly emphasised (Dawar and Parker, 1994), container shipping 
operations appear to focus more on financial loss reduction and safety and 
security incident related loss reduction (See Section 6.3.2). Secondly, the rank 
of the top seven strategies is A (Slot-exchange, slot charter, joint fleet, 
ship-charter with other container shipping), F (Make a long-term contract with 
shippers), B (Form alliance with other shipping companies), C (Use more 
advanced infrastructure (hardware and software)), D (Choose partners more 
carefully), E (Cooperate with your partners (e.g. terminal operational company, 
inland transportation)), and G (Design a flexible shipping schedule). The rank of 
the Strategy F is very different as it ranks second in the AHP survey while it 
ranks sixth in the mitigation-strategy survey. This may be due to fact that 
container shipping is a logistics service provider industry, which does not have 
its own production, and the profit totally relies on the transportation demand from 
shippers. Therefore, making a long-term contract with shippers can reduce the 
future demand uncertainty and ensure shipping companies have a certain 
volume of promised cargo to transport. Moreover, it should be pointed out that 
the AHP survey compared the selected strategies against three different criteria 
separately, whereas the mitigation-strategy survey only considered the overall 
impact of the strategies. Thirdly, the least important one is Strategy G, “design a 
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flexible shipping schedule”. In the AHP survey sample the author selected, the 
majority of the respondents were working in shipping agents, who did not have 
the right to adjust the shipping schedule. This may explain why this strategy 
became the least important one among the seven selected strategy. 
The fuzzy AHP analysis generally confirms the findings from the classic AHP 
method and also produces some new findings. Firstly, “reducing financial loss” 
overtakes “reducing safety and security damage” and becomes the most 
important criterion among three criteria. However, they are quite close. On the 
other hand, “reducing reputation loss” is still the least important criterion. 
Secondly, the ranking of the seven strategies according to their overall priorities 
remains the same as that under the classic AHP method. However, the overall 
priorities are slightly different from that of the classic AHP. The fuzzy AHP has a 
relatively wider range of the overall priorities than that of the classic AHP. This 
might be because the fuzzy AHP uses the interval value measurement instead of 
the exact value, which provides more flexible decision space to handle the 
uncertainty in subjective opinions 
After evaluating the risk mitigation strategies through the surveys, the classic 
AHP analysis, and the fuzzy AHP analysis, the final research objective: 
“evaluate the importance of risk mitigating strategies and their relationships” has 
been achieved.  
8.3 Generalisation of the research methods  
The majority of the discussions in the research methods address  the 
theoretical implications. This thesis is perhaps the first research that identifies 
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and analyses the risks faced by a container shipping company in their operations 
from the three main logistics flows (i.e. information flow, physical flow, and 
payment flow). It is reasonable to believe that approaching from the perspective 
of these three flows would cover all the elements in shipping companies’ 
operations and thus the possible risks associated with these operation elements 
would be inclusively identified given that a sound research method will be used. 
With this whole risk picture (the three logistics flows), it is recommended that the 
following research can consider the risk identification and analysis in any 
industry from the logistics perspective. 
In this thesis, some of the risk factors and risk mitigation strategies are identified 
from general supply chains rather than from the studies on container shipping 
operations. In order to validate whether these risk factors and risk mitigation 
strategies are appropriate in a container shipping context, this thesis uses expert 
interviews (including a set of face-to-face interviews and a set of email interviews) 
after identifying these risk factors and risk mitigation strategies from general 
supply chains. This may not be an innovation, but there are still numerous 
studies that did not validate whether the factors or elements from different 
industries are appropriate in their focus area. It is recommended that similar 
research in other industries should add one more step to confirm the 
appropriateness of the identified factors or elements. 
The conceptual model (see Section 3.2.2) developed in this thesis combines the 
four common steps of risk management (i.e. risk identification, risk analysis, risk 
mitigation strategies identification, and risk mitigation strategies evaluation) and 
the inclusive risk picture in logistics operations (i.e. risks associated with 
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information flow, risks associated with physical flow, and risks associated with 
payment flow). In addition, the flows of the three main logistics flows in container 
shipping supply chains are included in this model. Therefore, this model 
provides an abstract concept on tackling risks occurred in container shipping 
operations for container shipping managers. 
Compared to the risk matrix method that has been used in the majority of 
existing studies, the risk map method provides more detailed relationships 
between the risk factors. In order to calculate the location of each risk factor in 
the risk map, this thesis developed a new risk analysis method (i.e. Average Risk 
Scale (ARS)), which firstly multiplies the risk likelihood and risk consequence of 
each respondent and then calculates the mean value of the risk scale over all 
respondents (see Section 3.4.1.1). From the mean value of the risk scale, a 
shortest distance-based method is used to derive the corresponding risk 
likelihood and risk consequence. it can be argued that the derived risk likelihood 
and risk consequence are more accurate than the ones simply averaging over 
the respondents (which is termed as RSALC in Section 3.4.1.1 and was used in 
Yang 2011). It is recommended that the ARS method is more appropriate than 
the RSALC method when calculating the risk scale, risk likelihood, and risk 
consequence over a population in the risk map. 
Although this thesis uses Taiwan’s container shipping as a case study, the 
findings of the risk factors and risk mitigation strategies could be extended to 
almost every international container shipping company. Two reasons can be 
used to support this. The first reason is that the interviewees include the 
managers of Taiwan’s container shipping companies in the UK. Through their 
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point of view, the risk factors and risk mitigation strategies in container shipping 
operations could be generalised to international container shipping companies 
(see Section 4.2). The second reason is that although the respondents of the 
three surveys this thesis focused are working in Taiwan, these focus companies 
are also regarded as international companies as they (the container shipping 
companies) have branches in other countries or they (the container shipping 
agents) work for international container shipping companies (see Section 3.1). 
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Chapter 9 Summary and Conclusion  
This chapter concludes the highlights of this thesis. Section 9.1 summarises the 
research background. Section 9.2 summarises the key points from reviewing 
literature related to container shipping companies. Section 9.3 summarises the 
research methodology. Section 9.4 summaries the main findings of this thesis. 
Section 9.5 discusses the significance of the research. 9.6 discusses the 
research limitations, and Section 9.7 suggests the further research. 
9.1 Summary of research background 
Shipping industry plays an important role in international trade, and it is reported 
that about 90% of international trade is transported by ships (Shipping Facts, no 
date). Container shipping becomes more importation due to its efficient loading 
and unloading operations and the ability to achieve intermodalism with other 
transportation modes. At present, container ships carry around 52% of world 
seaborne trade in terms of value of the cargo (World Shipping Council, 2011a, 
2011b).  
The complex operations within and between a container shipping company and 
its partners, and the long distance of physical process may give risk to various 
types of risks, such as technical risk, market risk, business risk, and operational 
risk (Ewert, 2008). This thesis focuses on the operational risk in container 
shipping.  
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9.2 Summary of literature review 
Several risk factors in container shipping operations have been discussed in 
Chapter 2. For example, schedule unreliability (Notteboom, 2006; Drewry, 
2009) would lead to transportation delay and affect shipping companies’ 
reputation. This includes four detailed risk factors such as port strike, port 
congestion (unexpected waiting times before berthing or before starting 
loading/discharging), port/terminal productivity below expectations 
(loading/discharging), and unstable weather. Inappropriate empty container 
transportation (Song et al., 2005; Notteboom, 2006; Song and Dong, 2011) 
could incur significant costs to container shipping companies. Oil price rising 
(Notteboom and Vernimmen, 2009) would force container shipping companies 
to face the increasing operational costs and operational risks. Asset stolen or 
damage (Talley, 1996; Vernimmen et al., 2007; Drewry, 2009; Tseng et al., 
2012) would directly harm container shipping companies. This includes cargo 
stolen from unsealed containers, damage to ship or quay due to improper berth 
operations, and damage to frozen cargo. Attack from pirates or terrorists (Noda, 
2004; Drewry, 2009; Fu et al., 2010) have been a threat to container shipping 
companies for many years, this would not only harm container shipping 
companies, but also safety and security of human being. Therefore, a total of 10 
risk factors were identified from the literature related to container shipping 
sector. 
A number of risk mitigation strategies have also been discussed in Chapter 2. In 
order to reduce the impact from unreliable schedule, several risk mitigation 
strategies are suggested from previous studies, such as add buffer time when 
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designing routes (Notteboom, 2006; Notteboom and Vernimmen, 2009) and 
omit pot-of-call when transportation delay happens (Notteboom, 2006; Kerr, 
2011b). Implement slow steaming to reduce the oil price rise (Notteboom, 2006; 
Notteboom and Vernimmen, 2009; Cariou, 2011; Ronen, 2011; Qi and Song, 
2012) has become an important strategy against the rising oil price. Use more 
advanced information technology (Marle, 2009; Kerr, 2011a) such as 
e-commercial could save huge amont of money in bill of lading overcharges 
through new transport management software. Train employee regularly (Young, 
2010; Ganesan, 2010) could reduce a lot of risks in operational error or the 
probabilities of information delay and error. Enter into long-term contracts with 
shipper (Notteboom, 2004) can reduce the risk of vessel underutilisation and 
secure the cargo volume. Make collaboration with partners (Baird and Lindsay, 
1996, Graham, 1998; Carious, 2001; Heaver, 2002; Notteboom, 2004, 2006) 
could let container shipping companies provide comprehensive and reliable 
services. Several practical strategies crossing shipping companies include 
strategic alliances (Ryoo and Thanopoulou, 1999; Midoro and Pitto, 2000; 
Heaver et al., 2000; Slack et al., 2002; Song and Panayides, 2002; Notteboom, 
2004; Lu et al., 2010), exchanging slots (Song and Panayides, 2002; 
Notteboom, 2004; Lu et al., 2010), merging with (Heaver et al., 2000; Song and 
Panayides, 2002 Notteboom, 2004) or acquiring (Song and Panayides, 2002; 
Notteboom, 2004) other companies. Therefore, a total of 10 risk mitigation 
strategies were identified from the literature related to container shipping sector. 
However, the above literature only focus on one or two or several risk factors/ 
risk mitigation strategies and this is fragmental and insufficient. In order to cover 
more aspects of risk factors and risk mitigation strategies, a further identification 
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in risk factors and risk mitigation strategies from general supply chain is 
discussed in Chapter 5 and Chapter 7. 
9.3 Summary of research methodology 
This thesis aims to conduct a comprehensive empirical study on risk 
management in container shipping industry through the development of a 
tailored framework that can be used for identifying risks from the logistics 
perspective, measuring the risk likelihood and risk consequence, analysing risk 
scale, and evaluating the importance of risk mitigation strategies and their 
relationships in container shipping operations.  
Four main steps of risk management have been adopted and conducted to 
achieve the aim. They are (1) risk identification and validation through reviewing 
relevant literature (see Chapter 5), and conducting a set of face-to-face 
interviews and a set of email interviews; (2) risk analysis through risk-factor 
questionnaire survey (with five-point Likert scale to measure how important are 
these risk factors in risk likelihood and three risk consequences, i.e. financial 
loss, reputation loss, and safety and security incident related loss), and a series 
of analysis methods such as risk scale (Average Risk Scale (ARS)), risk matrix, 
risk mapping, and P-I graph; (3) risk mitigation strategies risk identification and 
validation through literature review (see Chapter 7), a set of face-to-face 
interviews and a set of email interviews; and (4) risk mitigation strategies 
evaluation through a mitigation-strategy survey (with five-point Likert scale to 
measure how important are these risk mitigation strategies) and an Analytic 
Hierarchy Process (AHP) survey (with nine-point pairwise comparison scale to 
measure the relationship between different selected risk mitigation strategies), 
245 
 
and a series of analysis methods such as risk mitigation strategies ranking, 
classic AHP analysis and fuzzy AHP analysis.  
This thesis uses reviewing relevant literature to identify risk factors and risk 
mitigation strategies in container shipping operations based on the point of 
several studies, e.g. Knemeyer et al. (2009), Rao and Glodsby (2009), Yang 
(2010, 2011), and Jackson et al. (2012). Risk scale method is commonly used 
in risk analysis as its easy calculation, and it can also be applied into a 
five-point Likert scale. In terms of the method for risk mitigation strategies 
evaluation, although many methods have been used in decision making area, 
most of them have some limitations that are difficult to overcome in this thesis. 
However, AHP does not have such difficulties to be overcome. Moreover, there 
are several advantages of using AHP method, such as it provides a meaningful 
integration of systems, it is easy to calculate, and it is reliable and flexible (see 
Section 4.3.2). Therefore, it is believed that above methods used in this thesis 
are reasonable.  
9.4 Summaries of main findings 
The main research questions in this thesis are: what are the risk factors and risk 
mitigation strategies in container shipping operations? which risk factors and 
risk mitigation strategies are relatively more significant to a shipping company’s 
performance? This thesis firstly elaborates the three main logistics flows (i.e. 
information, physical, payment) in container shipping operations. These three 
logistics flows are the main structure of this thesis as they are used to develop 
the conceptual model and conduct the first step of risk management, risk 
identification, in container shipping operations. 
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Secondly, the author identifies a comprehensive list of risk factors in container 
shipping operations. The risks are classified, according to three logistics flows, 
into three categories, including the risks associated with information flow, the 
risks associated with physical flow, and the risks associated with payment flow. 
Each category consists of several elements, i.e. the information flow category 
consists of information delay, information inaccuracy, and IT problems; the 
physical flow category consists of transportation delay and cargo/asset damage; 
and the payment flow category consists of currency exchange, payment delay, 
and non-payment. Each risk element covers a number of risk factors. In total, 
thirty five risk factors are identified in this thesis. 
Thirdly, we identify the typical risk mitigation strategies for container shipping 
operations. The mitigation strategies are classified into three major categories: 
inter-organisational strategies, intra-channel strategies, and inter-channel 
strategies. These different categories represent different levels of relationship 
between the shipping company and its supply chain partners in terms of risk 
management. A total 20 risk mitigation strategies are identified in this thesis.  
Fourthly, several findings from risk analysis are worth mentioning. (1) In order to 
determine the appropriate position of each risk factor in the risk maps, we 
develop a method, Average Risk Scale (ARS), to calculate the likelihood and 
consequence of each risk factor averaging over all respondents, which is more 
accurate than the simple risk scale averaging method. (2) In terms of the risk 
likelihood, the top three risk factors are “oil price rise” (PhTD_9), “unstable 
weather” (PhTD_4) and “port congestion (unexpected waiting times before 
berthing or before starting loading/ discharging)” (PhTD_2). All of them belong 
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to the category of risks associated with physical flow, and also belong to the risk 
element of “transportation delay”. (3) In terms of the risk scale from the financial 
loss perspective, seven factors’ risk scales are larger than 10 (which represents 
high risk in this thesis), including PhTD_9, “shippers hiding cargo information 
(non-declare)” (InfoI_5), PhTD_2, PhTD_4, “damage to frozen cargo/ reefer 
containers due to electricity failure” (PhCD_5), “attack from pirates or terrorists” 
(PhCD_6), and “change of currency exchange rate during payment process” 
(PayCE_1). Among these seven factors, only two factors (InfoI_5 and 
PayCE_1) do not belong to the category of risks associated with physical flow. 
(4) In terms of the risk scale from the reputation loss perspective, InfoI_5 is the 
only risk factor whose risk scale is greater than 10. (5) In terms of the risk scale 
from the safety and security incident related loss perspective, five factors’ risk 
scales are larger than 10, including InforI_5, “damage caused by transporting 
dangerous goods” (PhCD_3), PhCD_6, PhTD_4, and PhCD_5. (6) It is worth 
mentioning that InfoI_5 is the most serious risk factor among all risk factors 
according to three types of risk scale (e.g. financial loss: rank 2, reputation loss: 
rank 1, safety and security incident related loss: rank 1). 
Fifthly, we evaluate the importance of risk mitigating strategies and their 
relationships. It was found that the mean values of three categories (i.e. 
intra-organisation strategies, intra-channel strategies, and inter-channel 
strategies) are at similar levels according to their overall effectiveness, and 
each category appears to include highly ranked mitigation strategies.  
In order to conduct the further AHP survey, top seven strategies (coded as A, B, 
C, D, E, F, G) are selected, including “use more advanced infrastructures 
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(hardware and software)” (IOS_4: 3.92), “when the ship has already been 
delayed, omit port-of-calls to keep the original schedule” (IOS_2: 3.82), “choose 
partners more carefully” (IntraCS_2: 3.87), “collaboration with partners (e.g., 
terminal operational company, inland transportation) through making a joint 
long-term plan (collaboration level)” (IntraCS_10: 3.85), “enter a long-term 
contract with shippers” (IntraCS_7: 3.85), “slot exchange, slot charter, joint fleet, 
ship charter with other container shipping companies” (InterCS_1: 4.18) and 
“form alliance with other shipping companies” (InterCS_2: 4.02). The purpose of 
conducting the AHP survey is to further evaluate the seven selected strategies’ 
relative importance against three different criteria (i.e. reducing financial loss, 
reducing reputation loss, and reducing safety and security incident related loss). 
Several findings from the classic AHP analysis are summarised below: (i) The 
weights of criterion “reduce financial loss” (0.412) and “reduce safety and 
security incident related loss” (0.429) are much greater than that of “reduce 
reputation loss” (0.159); (ii) Under the criterion “reduce financial loss”, 
Strategies F “make a long-term contract with shippers” is the top one for 
mitigating financial loss in the container shipping operations. Under the criterion 
“reduce reputation loss”, Strategy B “form alliance with other shipping 
companies” is the most important strategy. Under the criterion “reduce safety 
and security incident related loss”, Strategy A “slot exchange, slot charter, joint 
fleet, ship charter with other container shipping” is the most important risk 
mitigation strategy; (iii) The seven strategies are ranked according to their 
overall priorities as follows: A, F, B, C, D, E, and G, which is generally in 
agreement with the results of the mitigation-strategy survey; however, the 
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strategy F became the second important strategy in the results of the AHP 
survey.  
The author further uses the fuzzy AHP analysis to refine the results of classic 
AHP analysis. The findings from fuzzy AHP analysis can be summarised as: (i) 
The rank of the three criteria has changed to: “reduce financial loss” (0.428) is 
the most important criterion to container shipping risk mitigation management; 
“reduce safety and security incident related loss” (0.415) becomes the second 
important criterion; whilst “reduce reputation loss” (0.157) is still the slight one 
on container shipping operations. The first two criteria still dominate the third 
criterion; (ii) The seven strategies are ranked according to their overall priorities 
as follows: A, F, B, C, D, E, and G. This result is the same as that of the classic 
AHP. However, the overall priorities are slightly different from that of the classic 
AHP. The fuzzy AHP has a relatively wider range of the overall priorities than 
that of the classic AHP. This implies that the fuzzy AHP can differentiate the 
relative importance of the strategies more clearly; (iii) Several defuzzification 
methods were used in the fuzzy AHP analysis. The results showed that the 
rankings of the seven strategies remain the same regardless of the 
defuzzification methods. 
9.5 Significance of the research  
The significance of this thesis can be concluded in the following several points: 
Firstly, many studies have done the risk management in container shipping 
area; however, the risk factors or the strategies they focused are one or two or 
several parts, and this is fragmental. The aim of this thesis is to cover as many 
risk factors and risk mitigation strategies as possible, from logistics perspective 
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(i.e. information flow, physical flow, and payment flow), in order to provide an 
inclusive risk picture in container shipping operations. Based on the literature 
review, this has never been done before. 
Secondly, compared with several studies using secondary data for simulation or 
other methods, this thesis uses empirical data to conduct risk analysis and risk 
mitigations strategies evaluation. This provides the latest information that can 
reflect current situation in Taiwan’s container shipping industry rather than using 
historical data to conduct risk management.  
Thirdly, in terms of risk analysis, this thesis ranked a group of risk factors rather 
than identified the most important risk factor. The reason of doing this is 
because the situations of the respondents’ companies are different. One risk 
factor might be the most important one in some companies but not in other 
companies. Through ranking the risk factors, this thesis provides a group of 
important risk factors that can be general to the whole container shipping 
companies in Taiwan, or even be generalised to the container shipping 
companies in the whole world. 
Fourthly, in terms of risk management, compared with previous studies usually 
only analyse the importance of strategies, this thesis analyses the results of 
AHP from three different angles: the financial, reputation, and safety and 
security incident related loss. This can provide more comprehensive results for 
the managers who consider different consequence. 
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9.6 Research limitation 
Although the research has achieved its aims and objectives, there are several 
limitations in this study. Firstly, we could not conduct more face-to-face 
interviews with experts who work as shipping agents because of the time limit 
and the difficulty to get them involved. It is believed that there would be some 
degree of difference between the experts who work in shipping companies (who 
own container ships, e.g. Evergreen Line, Yang Ming Marine Transport Corp., 
and Wan Hai Lines) and the experts in shipping agents (who do not own 
containerships but serve for container shipping, e.g. Maersk Taiwan, CMA CGM 
(Taiwan) Ltd, and Hapag-Lloyd (Taiwan) Ltd). However, because of the limited 
connection with the people who work in shipping agents, the author can only 
conduct the interviews with the people who work in container shipping 
companies.  
Secondly, we have obtained 62 valid questionnaire replies in the risk-factor 
survey and mitigation-strategy survey. It is, of course, true that the more valid 
questionnaire replies the author gets the more accurate results this thesis can 
obtain. More valid questionnaire replies could have been achieved through 
sending the second round of the same questionnaire survey. However, because 
of the cost consideration and the time limit, the author did not conduct the 
second round questionnaire survey.  
Thirdly, this thesis uses Taiwan as a case study. It is believed that the results 
would be more accurate if the author had interviewed and done the 
questionnaire survey in international container shipping companies outside of 
Taiwan. However, our results could be generalised to many international 
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container shipping companies due to the following two reasons: (1) the 
interviewees include the managers of Taiwan’s container shipping companies in 
the UK. Through their point of view, the risk factors and risk mitigation strategies 
in container shipping operations could be generalised to international container 
shipping companies. (2) Although the respondents of the three surveys we 
focused are working in Taiwan, their companies are also regarded as 
international companies as they (container shipping companies) have branches 
in other countries or they (container shipping agents) work for international 
container shipping companies. 
9.7 Further research  
Many previous studies have brought some valuable insight into the issue of risk 
management through interviews and/or questionnaire survey. However, what 
have not been well addressed is that the interviewees or the respondents 
involved are normally treated as an homogenous group; the factors such as 
their work experience, age, and position that may have some impact on their 
perception of risks have not been considered. In the future, we will address this 
issue and it is expected that such study will shed some light on the issue of risk 
perception of employees in shipping companies. 
Supply chain risk management has been a popular topic recently. In today’s 
competitive business environment, a company cannot make a successful 
business by itself, the supply chain partners have become more and more 
important particularly for the international business. Supply chain risk 
management has been defined as “the management of external risks and 
supply chain risks through a coordinated approach among supply chain 
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members to reduce supply chain vulnerability as a whole” (Christopher et al., 
2002). In the container shipping supply chain, shipping companies are closely 
linked to other channel members such as shippers, port authorities, freight 
forwarders, and inland transport companies. Risk management in container 
shipping operations may impact on the performance of other supply chain 
members. However, there has been rather limited research on supply chain risk 
management in container shipping. Further research is required in this direction.  
As mentioned in Chapter 1, many types of risks exist in container shipping 
business such as technical risk, market risk, business risk and operations risk. 
This study only focuses on risk management in container shipping operations. It 
would be interesting to consider multiple types of risks in a single framework so 
that a more complete assessment could be made. 
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Appendix 1 Face-to-Face Interview Questions 
專家訪談問卷 Face-to-face Interview Questions 
第一部份: 定義海運中的資訊流，物流，及現金流 
Part 1: Identification of the three logistics flows in container shipping 
 
1. 下圖為我參考教科書及一些網路資訊，整理過後的資訊流程圖，如有錯誤，請
依您的看法進行修改 (虛線是指不一定會有的行程) 
Figure 1 is the information flow that I organised from some text books and 
the internet. Could you please modify it if there is anything wrong within this 
flow chart? (The dotted lines represent that the flows are not necessary to 
happen) 
Forwarder
S/O
Booking
Space
Booking
Space
Broker 1
Booking space
Exp docs
& B/L
Customs
Data S/O
B/L & S/O
CY 1 CY 2
D/O
Discharged
Loading
Consignor
S/O
B/L
Inform
cargos are
arrived
Shipping
company
D/O
Exp docs & B/L
Shipping
doc & B/L
Consignee
L/C
Bank 1 Bank 2 L/C
form
L/C
Unloading
Custom
s
Export
declarat io
n
Discharged
Import
declarat io
n
Customs
agency
D/O
Asking price &
making contract
Figure 1 
S/O: Shipping order 
B/L: Bill of loading 
L/C: Letter of credit 
D/O: Delivery Order 
CY: Container yard 
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2. 下圖為我參考教科書及一些網路資訊，整理過後的實體運輸流程圖，如有錯誤，
請依您的看法進行修改 (虛線是指不一定會有的行程) 
Figure 2 is the transportation/physical flow that I organised from some text 
books and the internet. Could you please modify it if there is anything wrong 
within this flow chart? (The dotted lines represent that the flows are not 
necessary to happen) 
Consignor Consignee
CY1/
Port of Load
CY2/ Port of
Destination
Inland
Transportation 1
Loading Unloading
Inland
Transportation 2
Transfer
Port
Shipping
Company
 
Figure 2 
 
3. 下圖為我參考教科書及一些網路資訊，整理過後的現金流流程圖，如有錯誤，
請依您的看法進行修改 
Figure 3 is the payment flow that I organised from some text books and the 
internet. Could you please modify it if there is anything wrong within this flow 
chart?  
ConsigneeConsignor
Forwarder
Inland
Transportation 1
Forward
Shipping
company
Money of
freight
Inland
Transportation 2
Money of freight Money of freight
Money of freight
and commission Freight Bills
Money of
freight
Bank 1 Bank 2
Money of
goods
Money of
goods
Money of goods
Money of freight
and commissionFreight Bills
 
Figure 3 
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第二部分: 定義風險因子 
Part 2: Identification of risk factors 
 
1. 請問貴公司認為在資訊流方面，與供應鏈伙伴之間可能存在什麼樣的風險? 
In the information flow perspective, what are the possible risks between your 
company and your partners on the supply chain?  
 
2. 請問貴公司認為在實體物流方面，與供應鏈伙伴之間可能存在什麼樣的風險? 
In the physical flow perspective, what are the possible risks between your 
company and your partners on the supply chain? 
 
3. 請問貴公司認為在現金流方面，與供應鏈伙伴之間可能存在什麼樣的風險? 
In the payment flow perspective, what are the possible risks between your 
company and your partners on the supply chain? 
 
4. 下表為過去文獻中提及與這三個流動相關的風險，您認為在海運業中也同時存
在這些風險嗎? 此外，您還認為有哪些風險是下表中沒有提到的? 
The following table is the risks associated with the three flows that I 
summarised from existing studies. Do you think they exist in container 
shipping companies? Do you think there are any other risks that are not 
mentioned in this list? 
Risks associated with information flow 
Using different communication channels in the supply chain and consequently 
increasing the time of information transmission. (e.g. telephone, Email, EDI) 
Supply chain partners not transmitting essential information on time 
Processing documents being detained by government departments (e.g. 
customs) 
Shipping company not transmitting essential information on time 
Lack of information security during the information flow 
Information asymmetry/incompleteness 
Lack of information standardisation and compatibility 
IT infrastructure breakdown or crash 
Unsuitable human operation on IT infrastructure 
Unsuitable human operation on application software 
Risks associated with physical flow 
Port strike 
Port congestion (unexpected waiting times before berthing or before starting 
loading/discharging) 
Port/terminal productivity being below expectations (loading/discharging) 
Unstable weather 
Inappropriate empty container transportation  
Lack of flexibility of fleet size and designed schedules  
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Oil price rise 
Damage to containers or cargo due to terminal operators’ improper 
loading/unloading operations 
Cargo being stolen from unsealed containers 
Damage caused by transporting dangerous goods  
Damage to ship or quay due to improper berth operations  
Attack from pirates or terrorists 
Risks associated with payment flow 
Change of currency exchange rate during payment process 
Payment delay from partners or shippers 
Unrealised contract with partners 
Shippers going into bankruptcy 
Shippers breaking the contract or reducing the container volume 
Having partners with bad credit 
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第三部分: 定義風險管理策略 
Part 3: Identification of risk mitigation strategies 
 
1. 下表為過去文獻中提及的風險管理策略，您認為這些策略運用在海運業中合適
嗎? 此外，您還認為有哪些策略是下表中沒有提到的? 
The following table is the risk mitigation strategies that I summarised from 
existing studies related to general supply chains, do you think they are 
appropriated in container shipping companies? Do you think there are any 
other strategies that are not mentioned in this list? 
Intra-organisational level 
Execute regular employee training (e.g. every year or half of year) 
Use more advanced infrastructure (hardware and software) 
Improve the security 
Slow steaming and increase ships in the existed routes  
Omit port-of-calls to keep original schedule when the ship has already been 
delayed 
Include buffer times when designing the timetable/schedule 
Intra-channel level 
Enter a long-term contract with shippers 
Information sharing with your partners without co-management (cooperation 
level) 
Exchange ideas with partners to solve conflict or improve service quality 
(coordination level) 
Collaboration with your partners, e.g. terminal operational company, inland 
transportation,  involving joint long-term planning (collaboration level) 
Trust your partners 
Reward / assist partners who comply with shipping lines’ initiatives 
Shorten/ withdraw the contract with partners who have bad performance 
Avoid too many partners  
Inter-channel level 
Form alliance with other shipping companies  
Slot-exchange, slot charter, joint fleet, ship-charter with other container 
shipping companies 
Acquire and merge with other shipping companies 
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Appendix 2 Face-to-Face Interview Transcriptions 
Interviewee A:  
[This interviewee did not want to be recorded by the recorder, and he could only 
spend no more than 30 minutes for the interview. As his job title is operation 
management, his answer mainly focused on risk associated with physical flow 
and its risk mitigation strategies. The following is the note of the result from his 
saying. ] 
Q: In the physical flow perspective, what are the possible risks between your 
company and your partners on the supply chain? Also, the following table is 
the risk mitigation strategies that I summarised from existing studies related 
to general supply chains. Do you think they exist in container shipping 
companies? Do you think there are any other strategies that are not 
mentioned in this list? 
A: The risks associated with dangerous goods transportation could damage not 
only cargo, but also ships, which is more serious than cargo damage or 
transportation delay. Sometimes we lose the whole ship, cargo, and 
reputation because of dangerous goods explosion. However, dangerous 
goods transportation is our company’s niche market. The freight of 
dangerous goods is more expensive than normal cargo. The risks can be 
reduced through the support of an accurate information system, and our 
company can also earn a higher profit and gain more custom. Therefore, it is 
important to carefully check the details of the cargo. This can not only reduce 
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the threat from dangerous goods, but also increase our reputation from 
customers and the customs authorities. 
One more strategy that can reduce the impact of risk to ship operations, this 
is using advanced equipment such as dead-reckoning equipment or gyro 
sextant. Using advanced equipment on ship will definitely improve the safety 
when ships are sailing, they can also reduce the mistakes caused by human 
error. 
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Interviewee B: 
[This interviewee is a vice-president of the shipping company, his answer 
therefore cover the three risk categories and their mitigation strategies. The 
following is the results from the interview.] 
Q: Figure 1, 2 and 3 are the information flow, physical flow, and payment flow 
that I organised from some text books and the internet. Could you please 
modify it if there is anything wrong within these flow charts?  
A: The flow chats are fine. But I will suggest you to add two government parts in 
information flow chart, in which the consignor will send the export documents 
to the government (in the export side country). After checking the documents, 
the government will return the export documents to the consignor.  The 
same as the other side, the consignee should send the import documents to 
the government (in the import side country), and the government will return 
the import documents after checking. 
Q: In the information flow perspective, what are the possible risks between your 
company and your partners on the supply chain? 
A: In the risk associated with information flow, there is a risk factor that have to 
be mentioned, namely, the shippers’ declaration. We have paid some 
penalties and our ship has once been detained because the documents for 
customs clearance were inconsistent with the shipper and the process was 
delayed. The reason is that our customer [the shipper] did not inform us that 
the contents of the cargos had been changed, or even the cargo information 
was hidden by the shipper. 
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Another risk factor associated with information flow is shippers hiding cargo 
information. We charge expensive freight and insurance for transporting 
expensive cargo and/ or dangerous goods. Some shippers hide the cargo 
information in order to save money. This action may produce serious 
consequence, such as explosion if the cargo is dangerous goods, or cargo 
damage if the cargo is frangible. 
Q: In the physical flow perspective, what are the possible risks between your 
company and your partners on the supply chain? 
A: In the risk associated with physical flow, I firstly will mention the freezing 
cargo. The majority of the cargos in freezer container transportation are fruit, 
high technology products, and chemistry material. These types of cargos 
need to be kept in certain and stable temperature. In order to maintain the 
temperature, we charge high fees for supplying extra electricity. [But] 
Sometimes the electricity failure in ports or on ships damages the high value 
cargos, and makes fruit decayed or high technology products overheated, 
then we have to pay huge penalty. Sometimes the shipper will lie to us, for 
example a shipper does not want the cargo anymore, and he just splashed 
some water on the cargos and did not want to take the cargos. Sometimes 
the large companies will threaten us that if we don’t pay the penalty, then 
they will never do our business. Sometimes the shippers ask some 
congressmen to lobby us. Therefore, there are many cased about cargo 
claims. The risk of dangerous goods transportation could damage not only 
cargos, but also ships, which is more serious than cargo damage or 
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transportation delay. Sometimes we lose the whole ship, cargos, and 
reparations because of the dangerous goods explosion.  
There is one very special type of risk associated with physical flow. One of 
our containers was stolen in a very special case. Several criminal 
organisations try to bribe several truck drivers. The bribed truck drivers will 
drive trucks to some occult places and change the containers if the 
containers have no seal security during re-export transportation. Even [the 
containers] have container seal security, they (the criminals) will cut off the 
top of containers and steal the goods without breaking the container seal. 
Sometimes, they (the criminals) have other trucks and containers which are 
exactly the same as the original one. They use the fake containers to replace 
the valued ones. This type of risk will not only affect our financial loss, but 
also reduce our reputation.  
Q: In the payment flow perspective, what are the possible risks between your 
company and your partners on the supply chain? 
A: In the risk associated with payment flow, in some cases, shippers may 
abandon cargos if the value of the cargos become low during the 
transportation, we therefore cannot receive the transportation fee if the 
contract is under FOB (Free On Board). 
Q: The following table is the risk mitigation strategies that I summarised from 
existing studies related to general supply chains. Do you think they are 
appropriated in container shipping companies? Do you think there are any 
other strategies that are not mentioned in this list? 
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A: In the risk mitigation strategy part, in order to reduce the impact of delay on 
the ensuring part of the journey, three strategies are commonly used in our 
company for pursuing original schedules: (1) When the delay is not too 
serious, the ship will normally cancel the buffering time to pursue the 
original schedule if it is possible; (2) If the delay is more serious, and if the 
buffering time is not enough for the ship to pursue the original schedule, the 
ship will normally increase her navigating speed. However, this strategy will 
also increase the fuel consumption; and (3) When the delay is very serious, 
in order to pursue the original schedule, some ships may skip over one or 
more ports on her route. The cargos that are therefore discharged to other 
ports will be transported to their destination ports. This strategy, however, 
will significantly increase the operational costs and may have considerable 
impact on the reliability of the company. 
In order to deal with payment delay, we have a specific department – 
operational payment department – to deal with the payment of income and 
outcome in our company. Their job is trying to get the payment from 
shippers as soon as possible, and make the payment to our partners as 
slow as possible. Some mighty shippers will ask to pay their payment after 
3 or 4 months, but we will not allow the payment delay to small shippers. 
Sometimes we will just transfer the payment risks to forwarders.  
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Interviewee C: 
[This interviewee could only have 30 minutes for interview. As this interviewee is 
a finance manager, his answer only focus on the risk associated with payment 
flow and the mitigation strategies.] 
Q: In the payment flow perspective, what are the possible risks between your 
company and your partners on the supply chain? Also, the following table is 
the risk mitigation strategies that I summarised from existing studies related 
to general supply chains. Do you think they are appropriated in container 
shipping companies? Do you think there are any other strategies that are not 
mentioned in this list? 
A: The transportation fees we get are usually calculated by USD. However, 
some shippers will still pay the bills by local currency, such as Euro or JPY. 
We need to afford the risk from the unstable currency exchange rate during 
payment process. The change of currency exchange rate during payment 
process sometimes makes us lose the profit. Although we can transfer some 
impacts of currency exchange risk [to shippers] by doing Currency 
Adjustment Factor (CAF), it could only be used in a huge fluctuation of 
currency exchange rate. 
“Shippers going into bankruptcy” is also a risk associated with payment flow. 
Sometimes we need to handle or accept the risks from the shippers who 
bankrupt before making the payment. We need to do some survey about the 
shippers or supply chain partners. Avoid doing the business with the 
shippers who have bad credit or unstable finance [is very important to us]. 
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But we do not need to handle all the shippers’ bad behaviours as we only 
care about large shippers. Forwarder is the one who do the business with 
small shippers, who may highly possibility that have bad credit. So, 
sometimes we [shipping companies] will just transfer this risk to forwarders. 
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Interviewee D: 
[This interviewee is a senior information manager, so his answer mainly focused 
on the risk associated with information flow] 
Q: Figure 1 is the information flow (after modifying through the interviewee B) 
that I organised from some text books and the internet. Could you please 
modify it if there is anything wrong within this flow chart? (The dotted lines 
represent that the flows are not necessary to happen) 
A: There are some errors in the information flow chat. For example, the S/O is in 
the wrong direction, it should be sent out from the consignor directly to the 
shipping company, or through the forwarder to the shipping company. After 
that, the shipping company will send out a master B/L to the forwarder, and 
the forwarder will sent a house B/L to the consignor.  
Q: In the information flow perspective, what are the possible risks between your 
company and your partners on the supply chain? Also, the following table is 
the risk mitigation strategies that I summarised from existing studies related 
to general supply chains. Do you think they are appropriated in container 
shipping companies? Do you think there are any other strategies that are not 
mentioned in this list? 
A: I have watched the risk factor table you gave. There are some information 
asymmetries existing between our company and the forwarder/ broker. 
Forwarders usually hold many small shippers and they will not give us these 
small shippers’ information. However, unlike retailers or manufacturer, we do 
not really care about information asymmetry. According to 80/20 rule, 
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compared to the cargo flow that starts from small shippers through brokers 
or forwarders to our company, the large shippers who can offer large scale 
cargo directly to us without brokers or forwarders are the ones that we really 
concern. 
However, on the other side, the large shippers often request for extra 
services, such as organising holistic logistic information which includes 
inland transportation shifts and customs clearance date.… Large shippers 
may even request for forecasting inland transportation timetable for several 
months in the future.  
Q: The following table is the risk mitigation strategies that I summarised from 
existing studies related to general supply chains. Do you think they are 
appropriated in container shipping companies? Do you think there are any 
other strategies that are not mentioned in this list? 
A: Yes, we hold regular employee training sessions to train the relevant staff to 
avoid or at least reduce the effect of risks associated with information flow 
from failures caused by human errors when using IT systems. 
Moreover, we have already used ISO 27001 to increase information security. 
ISO 27001 is a regulation that is used to keep business confidential.  
We also implement IMGD Code, an international regulations, which can 
reduce potential risks in shipping operations when transporting dangerous 
goods 
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We need to do forecast on the transportation demand, although the 
forecasting could not achieve 100% correction. The normal model of 
management is called PDCA, which are planning, do, check, and action. 
Through shipping demand forecast, we can adjust the number of fleets we 
need to launch or remove in the following year. Therefore, planning is the 
important beginning of the management model. In order to forecast our 
[company’s] budget, we have to consider many factors such as the forecast 
reports from the professional consultant company. The forecast sometimes 
maybe wrong, but doing forecast is necessary for us. 
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Interviewee E: 
[This interviewee does not want to be recorded by the recorder. Moreover, as 
he is an information manager, his answer mainly focuses on the risk associated 
with information flow. The following is the note from the interview.] 
Q: In the information flow perspective, what are the possible risks between your 
company and your partners on the supply chain? 
A:  
1. Information flow could impact on physical flow, but it cannot replace physical 
flow.  
2. IT infrastructure is obviously the most important area of concern for us 
(information department); it is the core business in our department. Many 
information problems occur, for example, information storage or 
transmission failure, when the IT infrastructure fails. 
3. Risks associated with information flow such as information inaccuracy will 
affect financial loss, reputation loss. Sometime we may get the penalty from 
the Customs because of the information inaccuracy on declaration. 
4. Different countries’ Customs and different shippers use different information 
systems. This makes our operation on information transmission more 
difficult.  
Q: The following table is the risk mitigation strategies that I summarised from 
existing studies related to general supply chains. Do you think they are 
appropriated in container shipping companies? Do you think there are any 
other strategies that are not mentioned in this list? 
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A: 
1. Our company holds regular employee training sessions to teach the 
necessary staff to avoid or at least reduce the effect of information risks 
from personal failures by using IT systems. 
2. We have already used ISO 27001 to increase information security. ISO 
27001 is an information security management system (ISMS) standard 
process that records every single employee to keep business confidential. 
On the other side, from the safety perspective, we implement IMGD Code, 
an international regulations, which can help reduce potential risks in 
shipping operations when transporting dangerous goods. This types of risk 
[dangerous goods transportation] has more serious impact than the 
previous one [information security risk], because it may harm to human life 
safety. In our company, we pay more attention on implementing safety rules 
and regulations. 
3. There are two types of RFID, passive tag and active tag. The passive tag is 
not really useful for us as it only works in a close area and has only several 
gates connecting outside world, so that the reader can set up in the gates 
and read the information on the passive tag. For us, the containers are 
transported in an open area, which means all over the world, and this 
should use the active tag to actively send the cargo information to us if the 
cargo has been stolen. However, the active tag is quite expensive and we 
have around 80,000 to 100,000 containers transporting in the world. If our 
containers are all equipped with the RFID with active tag, this will be a big 
issue, and we have to consider it very carefully. Now, we still use the 
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normal seal and electronic seal and the e-seal is usually used in transit 
containers and expensive cargo containers. 
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Interviewee F: 
[This interviewee could only provide 30 minutes] 
Q: Figure 1, 2 and 3 are the information flow (after modifying through the 
interviewee B and D), physical flow and payment flow that I organised from 
some text books and the internet. Could you please modify it if there is 
anything wrong within these three flow charts? (The dotted lines represent 
that the flows are not necessary to happen) 
A: I think the three flow charts are fine.  
Q: The following table is the risks associated with the three flows that I 
summarised from existing studies. Do you think they are appropriated in 
container shipping companies? Do you think there are any other risks that 
are not mentioned in this list? Also, the following table is the risk mitigation 
strategies that I summarised from existing studies related to general supply 
chains. Do you think they are appropriated in container shipping 
companies? Do you think there are any other strategies that are not 
mentioned in this list? 
A: As I don’t have much time, I would only mention some part that may be really 
worth to be mentioned. In the risk mitigation strategies part, I suggest you to 
add one more strategy, cultivate loyal partners. We usually cultivate loyalty 
of our partners and make a long-term contract with shippers to reduce the 
uncertain transportation demand and these strategies could also maintain 
minimal revenue for us. This is very important because we [shipping 
company] do not produce any product, what we earned is from the service 
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we provide, the cargo transportation. If there is no cargo to transport, we 
cannot survive. Therefore, I suggest you add this strategy.  
Interviewee G: 
[This interviewee could only spend no more than 30 minutes for the interview.] 
Q: In the information flow perspective, what are the possible risks between your 
company and your partners on the supply chain? Also, the following table is 
the risk mitigation strategies that I summarised from existing studies related 
to general supply chains. Do you think they are appropriated in container 
shipping companies? Do you think there are any other strategies that are 
not mentioned in this list? 
A: There are various information systems between different countries’ customs 
and shippers. Among all the information systems, EDI (Electronic Data 
Interchange) is the most popular IT used in shipping companies and port 
authorities, because it can transmit information rapidly. However, there are 
still some supply chain partners who cannot afford the investment of EDI, 
and they transmit the required information through other information 
channels, such as email or telephone. The information transmitted through 
these different information channels is neither organised nor standardised. 
This disintegrated information transmission may cause information delay 
and inaccuracy. The advantages of EDI include formatted data, huge data 
capacity, quick data transition, and a basic hardware requirement. We 
usually ask our partners to use EDI to transmit the information in order to 
reduce the potential information risk. 
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Appendix 3 Email Interview Questions 
 
 
 
Research Project on  
Risk Management in Container Shipping Operations 
 
 
Dear Sir/Madam, 
My name is Chia-Hsun Chang; I am currently pursuing a PhD degree at the 
International Shipping and Logistics Group in the University of Plymouth under 
the supervision of Prof. Dong-Ping Song and Dr. Jingjing Xu. My research 
focuses on supply chain risk management in container shipping. Three 
dimensions of risk will be examined; namely, risks associated with information 
flow, risks associated with physical flow, and risks associated with payment flow. 
The purpose of the research is to investigate the factors in these three 
dimensions and to identify appropriate mitigating strategies. I was wondering if 
you would be kind enough to provide some insight into this issue by answering 
the questions below.  
All the answers will be held in the strictest confidence, as this has always been 
the policy of the University of Plymouth. This survey will take you 10 – 15 
minutes. In exchange for your help, I will send you a summary report of this 
survey if you wish. 
I am aware that you must be very busy. As your opinion is very important for the 
study, I would be most grateful if you could spare some of your valuable time to 
complete this short questionnaire.  
 
 
Yours faithfully,   
 
Chia-Hsun Chang, 
PhD Candidate,  
Email: chia-hsun.chang@plymouth.ac.uk 
 
 
University of Plymouth, Cookworthy Building, 
Drake Circus, Plymouth Devon, UK, PL4 8AA 
Tel: +44 (0)7575 012555 
Fax: +44 (0)1752 585713 
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Section 1: Respondent Profile 
1. Your Position:______________________________ 
2. How many years have you been working in the maritime field: 
__________  
Section 2: Please tick Yes or No, and provide any comments that you may 
have. 
1. The following table contains the risk factors and elements that I organised 
from previous studies and from a series of interviews. 
Risks associated with information flow 
Information Delay (InfoD) 
1. Using different communication channels in the supply chain increases the 
time of information transmission. (e.g. telephone, Email, EDI) 
2. Supply chain partners do not transmit essential information on time 
3. Processing documents are detained by the government departments (e.g. 
customs) 
4. Shipping company cannot transmit essential information on time 
Information Inaccuracy (InfoI) 
1. Lack of information security during the information flow  
2. Information asymmetry/incompleteness  
3. Lack of information standardisation and compatibility 
4. Shippers request extra service information 
5. Shippers hide cargo information (non-declare) 
IT Problem (InfoIT) 
1. IT infrastructure breakdown or crash 
2. Unsuitable human operation on IT infrastructure 
3. Unsuitable human operation on application software 
 
Considering the above structure, elements contributing to risks 
associated with information flow are categorised into “information 
delay”, “information inaccuracy”, and “IT problem”. Do you think this 
categorisation is appropriate? 
Risk element 
categories 
Yes No Any comments? 
Information delay    
Information inaccuracy    
IT problem    
Any other elements 
should be considered? 
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2. The following table contains the risk factors and elements that I organised 
from previous studies and from a series of interviews. 
Risks associated with physical flow 
Transportation Delay (PhTD) 
1. Port strike 
2. Port congestion (unexpected waiting times before berthing or before 
starting loading/discharging) 
3. Port/terminal productivity below expectations (loading/discharging) 
4. Unstable weather 
5. Unsuitable empty mile transportation 
6. Container shortage (e.g. shippers use containers as storage, container 
revamp, unexpected demand) 
7. Lack of flexibility of fleet size and designed schedules  
8. Oil price rise  
Cargo/asset loss or Damage (PhCD)  
1. Damage to containers or cargos due to terminal operators’ improper 
loading/unloading operations 
2. Cargo stolen from unsealed containers  
3. Damage caused by transporting dangerous goods  
4. Damage to ship or quay due to improper berth operations  
5. Damage to frozen cargos/ reefer containers due to electricity failure 
6. Attack from pirates or terrorists 
 
Considering the above structure, elements contributing to risks 
associated with physical flow are categorised into “transportation delay” 
and “cargo/asset loss or damage”. Do you think this categorisation is 
appropriate? 
Risk element 
categories 
Yes No Any comments? 
Transportation delay    
Cargo/asset loss or 
damage 
   
Any other elements 
should be considered? 
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3. The following table contains the risk factors and elements that I organised 
from previous studies and from a series of interviews. 
Risks associated with payment flow 
Currency Exchange (PayCE) 
1. Currency exchange during payment process 
2. Financial crisis in the loan countries  
Payment Delay (PayPD) 
1. Payment delay from partners or shippers 
2. Unrealised contract with partners 
Non-Payment (PayNP) 
1. Shippers go into bankruptcy 
2. Shippers abandon cargos if the value of the cargos become lower during 
the transportation 
3. Shippers break the contract and reduce the container volume 
4. Have partners with bad credit 
 
Considering the above structure, elements contributing to risks 
associated with payment flow (refers to risks associated with payments 
with shippers, freight forwarders, or ports in the logistics processes) are 
categorised into “currency exchange”, “payment delay” and 
“non-payment”. Do you think this categorisation is appropriate? 
Risk element 
categories 
Yes No Any comments? 
Currency exchange    
Payment delay    
Non-payment    
Any other elements 
should be considered? 
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Section 3: We have identified three groups of risk mitigation strategies for 
container shipping operations. Please add any other strategies that you think 
should also be included in the list and/or provide any comments that you may 
have on the ones that we have identified.  
Intra-organisation strategies 
Implement regular employee training  
Use advanced equipment 
Improve security 
Implement international regulations (e.g. ISO27001, C-TPAT) 
Implement slow steaming and deploy more ships in the same route 
Reduce port time or cut port-of-calls when delay occurs 
Design service schedules with buffer time 
Intra-channel strategies 
Collaborate with partners (e.g. terminal operators, freight forwarders, and inland 
distributors, etc.) 
Enter into long term contracts with shippers 
Reduce /withdraw contracts with partners with poor performance 
Reward partners who follow your company’s suggestions 
Exchange ideas with partners to resolve conflicts and/or improve quality of 
service   
Information sharing (e.g. provide tracking and tracing for shippers) 
Avoid having too many partners 
Choose partners more carefully 
Trust your supply chain partners 
Cultivate loyalty with your partners 
Inter-channel strategies 
Form alliance with other shipping companies 
Exchange slots with other shipping companies 
Merge with or acquire other shipping companies 
Any other mitigation strategies/categories & comments: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Would you like to have a summary of this survey: ________ 
If yes, please provide your email address to receive summary:  
_______________________________________________________________ 
THANK YOU ONCE AGAIN FOR YOUR KIND PARTICIPATION IN THIS 
SURVEY. 
YOUR ANSWER WILL BE KEPT CONFIDENTIAL. 
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Appendix 4 Risk Factor and Mitigation Strategy 
Questionnaire Survey 
Questionnaire on “Risks in Container Shipping Operations” 
Dear Sir/Madam, 
    My name is Chia-Hsun Chang; I am currently pursuing a PhD degree at the International 
Shipping and Logistics Group in the University of Plymouth.  
    The purpose of this questionnaire is to collect data for the fulfilment of the PhD’s project. 
The objectives of this questionnaire are : 
1. To identify the risk factors in container shipping operations; 
2. To identify the risk mitigating strategies in container shipping operations. 
    This questionnaire will take you about 15 minutes to answer. According to your experience 
and opinion, please fill the appropriate answer in the following questions. 
    All the answers will be held in the strictest confidence, as this has always been the policy of 
the University of Plymouth.      
 
Thank you for your help. 
 
Your Sincerely, 
 
Supervisors: Prof. Dong-Ping Song, Dr. Jingjing Xu 
Researcher: Chia-Hsun Chang 
University of Plymouth, International shipping & logistics group 
Tel: +44 (0) 7575 012 555 
Address: Cookworthy Building, Drake Circus, Plymouth, PL4 8AA  
E-mail: chia-hsun.chang@plymouth.ac.uk 
 
Likelihood 
 Financial, reputation, safety and security 
consequences 
Rare Unlikely Possible Likely  Almost 
certain 
Insignificant Minor Moderate Major Catastrophic 
0 1 2 3 4 0 1 2 3 4 
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Section A: The following questions are related to Risks associated with information 
flow in container shipping operations. According to your experience and opinion about 
the degree of likelihood and impacts, please fill the appropriate score in each of the 
following box: 
Following questions are related to Information Delay 
risks in shipping supply chain 
Likeli- 
hood 
Financial 
loss 
Reputation 
loss 
Safety and 
security damage 
1. Using different communication channels in the 
supply chain increases the time of information 
transmission. (e.g. telephone, Email, EDI) 
    
2. Supply chain partners do not transmit essential 
information on time 
    
3. Processing documents are detained by the 
government departments (e.g. customs) 
    
4. Shipping company cannot transmit essential 
information on time 
    
Following questions are related to Information 
Inaccuracy risks in shipping supply chain 
Likeli- 
hood 
Financial 
loss 
Reputation 
loss 
Safety and 
security damage 
1. Lack of information security during the information 
flow  
    
2. Information asymmetry/incompleteness      
3. Lack of information standardisation and 
compatibility 
    
4. Shippers request extra service information     
5. Shippers hide cargo information     
Following questions are related to IT Problem risks in 
shipping supply chain 
Likeli- 
hood 
Financial 
loss 
Reputation 
loss 
Safety and 
security damage 
1. IT infrastructure breakdown or crash     
2. Unsuitable human operation on IT infrastructure     
3. Unsuitable human operation on application 
software 
    
 
Section B: The following questions are related to Risks associated with physical 
flow in container shipping operations. According to your experience and opinion about 
the degree of likelihood and impacts, please fill the appropriate score in each of the 
following box: 
Following questions are related to Transportation 
Delay risks in shipping supply chain 
Likeli- 
hood 
Financial 
loss 
Reputation 
loss 
Safety and 
security damage 
1. Port strike     
2. Port congestion (unexpected waiting times before 
berthing or before starting loading/discharging) 
    
3. Port/terminal productivity below expectations  
(loading/discharging) 
    
4. Unstable weather     
5. Unsuitable empty mile transportation     
6. Container shortage (e.g. Shippers use containers 
as storage, container revamp, unexpected 
demand) 
    
7. Lack of flexibility of fleet size and designed 
schedules  
    
8. Cargos are detained by customs     
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9. Oil price rise      
Following questions are related to Cargo/Asset 
Damage risks in shipping supply chain 
Likeli- 
hood 
Financial 
loss 
Reputation 
loss 
Safety and 
security damage 
1. Damage to containers or cargos due to terminal 
operators’ improper loading/unloading operations 
    
2. Cargo stolen from unsealed containers      
3. Damage caused by transporting dangerous goods      
4. Damage to ship or quay due to improper berth 
operations  
    
5. Damage to frozen cargos/ reefer containers due to 
electricity failure 
    
6. Attack from pirates or terrorists     
 
Section C: The following questions are related to Risks associated with payment 
flow in container shipping operations. According to your experience and opinion about 
the degree of likelihood and impacts, please fill the appropriate score in each of the 
following box: 
Following questions are related to Currency 
Exchange risks in shipping supply chain 
Likeli- 
hood 
Financial 
loss 
Reputation 
loss 
Safety and 
security damage 
1. Currency exchange during payment process     
2. Financial crisis in the loan countries???      
Following questions are related to Payment Delay 
risks in shipping supply chain 
Likeli- 
hood 
Financial 
loss 
Reputation 
loss 
Safety and 
security damage 
1. Payment delay from partners or shippers     
2. Unrealised contract with partners     
Following questions are related to No Payment risks 
in shipping supply chain 
Likeli- 
hood 
Financial 
loss 
Reputation 
loss 
Safety and 
security damage 
1. Shippers go into bankruptcy     
2. Shippers abandon cargos when cargos have 
already reached the port of destination 
    
3. Shippers break the contract and reduce the 
container volume 
    
4. Have partners with bad credit     
 
Section D: Following questions are related to the improvement of Risk mitigating 
strategies in container shipping operations. According to your experience and opinion, 
please click the appropriate □. 
Following questions are related to Intra-organisation risk mitigating 
strategies in shipping supply chain 
No impact     positive 
1 2 3 4 5 
1. Regular employee training (e.g. every year or half of year) □ □ □ □ □ 
2. More advanced infrastructure (hardware and software) □ □ □ □ □ 
3. Improve the security □ □ □ □ □ 
4. Implement international regulations (e.g. ISO27001, C-TPAT, IMO 
regulations) 
□ □ □ □ □ 
5. Slow steaming and increase ships in the existed routes  □ □ □ □ □ 
6. Omit port-of-calls to keep original schedule when the ship has already 
been delayed 
□ □ □ □ □ 
7. Include buffer times when designing the timetable/schedule □ □ □ □ □ 
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Following questions are related to Intra-channel risk mitigating strategies 
in shipping supply chain 
No impact     positive 
1. Cooperate with your partners (e.g. terminal operational company，
inland transportation) 
□ □ □ □ □ 
2. Make a long-term contract with shippers □ □ □ □ □ 
3. Shorten/ withdraw the contract with partners who have bad 
performance 
□ □ □ □ □ 
4. Reward / assist partners who comply with shipping lines’ initiatives □ □ □ □ □ 
5. Exchange ideas with partners to solve conflict or improve service 
quality 
□ □ □ □ □ 
6. Share information with your partners □ □ □ □ □ 
7. Avoid too many partners  □ □ □ □ □ 
8. Choose partners more carefully □ □ □ □ □ 
9. Trust your partners □ □ □ □ □ 
10. Cultivate loyalty of supply chain partners □ □ □ □ □ 
Following questions are related to Inter-channel risk mitigating strategies 
in shipping supply chain 
No impact     positive 
1. Form alliance with other shipping companies  □ □ □ □ □ 
2. Slot-exchange, slot charter, joint fleet, ship-charter with other container 
shipping companies 
□ □ □ □ □ 
3. Acquire and merge with other shipping companies □ □ □ □ □ 
 
Section E: Respondent’s profile 
1. How many years have you worked in the shipping industry? 
□ 1 - 5 years □ 6 - 10 years □ 11 - 15 years □ 16 - 20 years □ 21 - 25 years 
□ Over 25 years 
2. What is your department in your company? 
 
3. What is your professional role in your company? 
□ Vice president or above □ Manager/Assistant manager □ Director/Vice 
Director 
□ Clerk □ Sales representative □ Others (___________________) 
4. What is your company’s main business? 
□ Container shipping company □ Container shipping agency  
□ Others (___________________) 
5. What is your company’s ownership type?  
□ Local firm □ Foreign-owned firm □ Foreign-local firm □ Others 
(____________) 
6. How many employees are in your company? 
□ 1 - 50 people □ 51 - 100 people □ 101~200 people □ 201~500 people □ 
over 500 people  
 
Thank you once again for your kind participation in this survey. 
Your answer will be kept confidential. 
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Appendix 5 AHP Questionnaire Survey 
Expert Questionnaire on “Risk Management in Container Shipping” 
Dear Sir/Madam, 
My name is Chia-Hsun Chang; I am currently pursuing a PhD degree at the 
International Shipping and Logistics Group in the University of Plymouth.  
The purpose of this questionnaire is to collect data for the fulfilment of my PhD’s 
project. The objective of this survey is to identify the relative importance of 
mitigation risk strategies in container shipping operations. 
It will take you approximately 20 minutes to complete this questionnaire. As you will 
see, the questionnaire starts with Part A including an introduction to the structure of 
the survey and an explanation about how the questionnaire should be completed. 
This is followed by Part B consisting of a number of questions about risk mitigation 
strategies and Part C consisting of 3 questions about your profile. 
All the answers will be held in the strictest confidence, as this has always been the 
policy of the University of Plymouth.      
Thank you very much in advance for your help. 
Your sincerely, 
Chia-Hsun Chang 
International shipping & logistics group, University of 
Plymouth 
Address: Cookworthy Building, Drake Circus, Plymouth, PL4 8AA;  
E-mail: chia-hsun.chang@plymouth.ac.uk Tel: +44 (0) 7575 012 555 
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Part A: Introduction and Explanation 
The following figure is the AHP structure of this survey. The first level 
represents the research goal: mitigating risks in shipping supply chain. The 
second level consists of three criteria: reducing financial loss, reducing 
reputation loss and reducing safety and security incident related loss. At the 
third level the alternative mitigating strategies are listed, and they are identified 
from a previous survey. 
 
Goal 
 
Criteria 
 
Strategies 
 
The following example illustrates how the answers should be selected.  
To compare two alternatives - “Form alliance with other shipping companies” 
and “Make a long-term contract with shippers” as shown below, if you think for 
“Reducing financial loss (F)” the former is 3 times more important than the latter, 
you should circle the number “3” on the left-hand side in the first row; if you think 
for “Reduce reputation loss (R)” the latter is 4 times more important than the 
former, you should circle the number “4” on the right-hand side in the second row 
as shown below. 
Alternatives  Criteria 
Increasing importance    Increasing importance 
 
Alternatives 
Form alliance with 
other shipping 
companies 
F 9  8  7  6  5  4  ○3   2  1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9 Enter a 
long-term 
contract with 
shippers 
R 9  8  7  6  5  4  3  2  1  2  3  ○4   5  6  7  8  9 
S 9  8  7  6  5  4  3  2  1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9 
 
Part B: Questionnaire  
1) Regarding the three criteria at the second level, in your opinion what is the 
relative importance of “Reducing financial loss”, “Reducing reputation loss” 
and “Reducing safety and security incident related loss” in making risk 
mitigation strategies?  
Criteria 
Increasing importance    Increasing 
importance 
 
Criteria 
Mitigating risks in shipping supply chain 
Reducing 
financial loss (F) 
Reducing 
reputation loss (R) 
Reducing Safety and 
security incident 
related loss (S) 
Slot-exchange, slot charter, 
joint fleet, ship-charter with 
other container shipping 
companies 
Strategic 
alliance 
Advanced 
infrastructure
Probabilit
Choose 
partners 
carefully 
Collaboratio
n with 
partners 
Enter 
long-term 
contracts with 
shippers 
Be flexible when 
designing the 
timetable/schedule
Accept 
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Reduce financial 
loss 
9  8  7  6  5  4  3  2  1  2  3  4  5  6  7  
8  9 
Reduce reputation 
loss 
Reduce financial 
loss 9  8  7  6  5  4  3  2  1  2  3  4  5  6  7  
8  9 
Reduce safety 
and security 
incident related 
loss 
Reduce 
reputation loss 9  8  7  6  5  4  3  2  1  2  3  4  5  6  7  
8  9 
Reduce safety 
and security 
incident related 
loss 
 
2) Regarding the alternative strategies at the third level, in your opinion what is 
the relative importance of the alternatives under each criteria (F, R, S) in 
making risk mitigation strategies? 
Strategies Criteria 
Increasing importance    Increasing 
importance 
 
Strategies 
Slot-exchange, 
slot charter, 
joint fleet, 
ship-charter 
with other 
container 
shipping 
companies 
F 9  8  7  6  5  4  3  2  1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  
9 
Form alliance with 
other shipping 
companies R 
9  8  7  6  5  4  3  2  1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  
9 
S 9  8  7  6  5  4  3  2  1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  
9 
F 9  8  7  6  5  4  3  2  1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  
9 
Use more advanced 
infrastructures 
(hardware and 
software) 
R 9  8  7  6  5  4  3  2  1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  
9 
S 9  8  7  6  5  4  3  2  1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  
9 
F 9  8  7  6  5  4  3  2  1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  
9 
Choose partners very 
carefully 
R 9  8  7  6  5  4  3  2  1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  
9 
S 9  8  7  6  5  4  3  2  1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  
9 
F 9  8  7  6  5  4  3  2  1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  
9 
Collaboration with 
partners (e.g., terminal 
operational company, 
inland transportation) 
through making a joint 
long-term plan 
R 9  8  7  6  5  4  3  2  1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  
9 
S 
9  8  7  6  5  4  3  2  1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  
9 
F 9  8  7  6  5  4  3  2  1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  
9 
Enter a long-term 
contract with shippers 
R 9  8  7  6  5  4  3  2  1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  
9 
S 9  8  7  6  5  4  3  2  1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  
9 
F 9  8  7  6  5  4  3  2  1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  
9 
Be flexible when 
designing the 
timetable/schedule R 
9  8  7  6  5  4  3  2  1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  
9 
S 9  8  7  6  5  4  3  2  1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  
9 
Form alliance 
with other 
shipping 
companies 
F 9  8  7  6  5  4  3  2  1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  
9 
Use more advanced 
infrastructures 
(hardware and 
software) 
R 9  8  7  6  5  4  3  2  1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  
9 
S 9  8  7  6  5  4  3  2  1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  
9 
F 9  8  7  6  5  4  3  2  1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  
9 
Choose partners very 
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R 9  8  7  6  5  4  3  2  1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  
9 
carefully 
S 9  8  7  6  5  4  3  2  1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  
9 
F 9  8  7  6  5  4  3  2  1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  
9 
Collaboration with 
partners (e.g., terminal 
operational company, 
inland transportation) 
through making a joint 
long-term plan 
R 9  8  7  6  5  4  3  2  1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  
9 
S 
9  8  7  6  5  4  3  2  1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  
9 
F 9  8  7  6  5  4  3  2  1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  
9 
Enter a long-term 
contract with shippers 
R 9  8  7  6  5  4  3  2  1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  
9 
S 9  8  7  6  5  4  3  2  1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  
9 
F 9  8  7  6  5  4  3  2  1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  
9 
Be flexible when 
designing the 
timetable/schedule R 
9  8  7  6  5  4  3  2  1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  
9 
S 9  8  7  6  5  4  3  2  1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  
9 
Use more 
advanced 
infrastructures 
(hardware and 
software) 
F 9  8  7  6  5  4  3  2  1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  
9 
Choose partners very 
carefully 
R 9  8  7  6  5  4  3  2  1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  
9 
S 9  8  7  6  5  4  3  2  1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  
9 
F 9  8  7  6  5  4  3  2  1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  
9 
Collaboration with 
partners (e.g., terminal 
operational company, 
inland transportation) 
through making a joint 
long-term plan 
R 9  8  7  6  5  4  3  2  1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  
9 
S 
9  8  7  6  5  4  3  2  1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  
9 
F 9  8  7  6  5  4  3  2  1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  
9 
Enter a long-term 
contract with shippers 
R 9  8  7  6  5  4  3  2  1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  
9 
S 9  8  7  6  5  4  3  2  1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  
9 
F 9  8  7  6  5  4  3  2  1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  
9 
Be flexible when 
designing the 
timetable/schedule R 
9  8  7  6  5  4  3  2  1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  
9 
S 9  8  7  6  5  4  3  2  1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  
9 
Choose 
partners very 
carefully 
F 9  8  7  6  5  4  3  2  1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  
9 
Collaboration with 
partners (e.g., terminal 
operational company, 
inland transportation) 
through making a joint 
long-term plan 
R 9  8  7  6  5  4  3  2  1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  
9 
S 9  8  7  6  5  4  3  2  1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  
9 
F 9  8  7  6  5  4  3  2  1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  
9 
Enter a long-term 
contract with shippers 
R 9  8  7  6  5  4  3  2  1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  
9 
S 9  8  7  6  5  4  3  2  1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  
9 
F 9  8  7  6  5  4  3  2  1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  
9 
Be flexible when 
designing the 
timetable/schedule R 
9  8  7  6  5  4  3  2  1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  
9 
S 9  8  7  6  5  4  3  2  1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  
9 
Collaboration with 
partners (e.g., 
terminal 
F 9  8  7  6  5  4  3  2  1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  
9 
Enter a long-term 
contract with shippers 
R 9  8  7  6  5  4  3  2  1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  
9 
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operational 
company, inland 
transportation) 
through making a 
joint long-term 
plan  
S 9  8  7  6  5  4  3  2  1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  
9 
F 9  8  7  6  5  4  3  2  1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  
9 
Be flexible when 
designing the 
timetable/schedule R 
9  8  7  6  5  4  3  2  1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  
9 
S 9  8  7  6  5  4  3  2  1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  
9 
Enter a 
long-term 
contract with 
shippers 
F 9  8  7  6  5  4  3  2  1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  
9 
Be flexible when 
designing the 
timetable/schedule R 
9  8  7  6  5  4  3  2  1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  
9 
S 9  8  7  6  5  4  3  2  1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  
9 
 
Part C: Your profile 
1. How many years have you worked in the shipping industry? 
□ 1 - 10 years □ 11 - 15 years □ 16 - 20 years □ 21 - 25 years □ 
Over 25 years 
2. What is your professional role/position in your company?  
□ Vice president or above □ Manager/Assistant manager □ Director/Vice 
Director 
□ Clerk □ Sales representative □ Others (___________________) 
 
3. What is your department?  
□ Vice president or above □ Information/document □ operation/ 
shipping              □ financial/accounting □ Others 
(___________________) 
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Appendix 6 Fuzzy AHP results 
Sample 1 
Step 1 Build fuzzy positive reciprocal matrix 
Table 1.1 The fuzzy positive reciprocal matrix of three criteria 
 Reduce 
financial loss 
Reduce 
reputation loss 
Reduce safety 
and security 
incident related 
loss 
Reduce financial loss (1, 1, 2) (5, 6, 7) (2, 3, 4) 
Reduce reputation loss (0.143, 0.167, 
0.2) (1, 1, 2) (0.25, 0.333, 0.5) 
Reduce safety and 
security incident related 
loss 
(0.25, 0.333, 
0.5) (2, 3, 4) (1, 1, 2) 
C.R. = 0.015771 
Table 1.2 The fuzzy positive reciprocal matrix of seven strategies under reduce 
financial loss 
R
e
d
u
c
e
 f
in
a
n
c
ia
l 
lo
s
s
 
 A B C D E F G 
A (1, 1, 2) (2, 3, 4) (2, 3, 4) (2, 3, 4) (2, 3, 4) (1, 2, 3) (1, 2, 3) 
B 
(0.25, 
0.333, 0.5) 
(1, 1, 2) 
(0.333, 
0.5, 1) 
(0.167, 
0.2, 0.25) 
(0.167, 
0.2, 0.25) 
(0.143, 
0.167, 
0.2) 
(0.143, 
0.167, 
0.2) 
C 
(0.25, 
0.333, 0.5) 
(1, 2, 3) (1, 1, 2) (1, 1, 2) (1, 1, 2) 
(0.167, 
0.2, 0.25) 
(0.143, 
0.167, 
0.2) 
D 
(0.25, 
0.333, 0.5) 
(4, 5, 6) (0.5, 1, 1) (1, 1, 2) (1, 1, 2) 
(0.143, 
0.167, 
0.2) 
(0.167, 
0.2, 0.25) 
E 
(0.25, 
0.333, 0.5) 
(4, 5, 6) (0.5, 1, 1) (0.5, 1, 1) (1, 1, 2) 
(0.167, 
0.2, 0.25) 
(0.167, 
0.2, 0.25) 
F 
(0.333, 0.5, 
1) 
(5, 6, 7) (4, 5, 6) (5, 6, 7) (4, 5, 6) (1, 1, 2) (1, 1, 2) 
G 
(0.333, 0.5, 
1) 
(5, 6, 7) (5, 6, 7) (4, 5, 6) (4, 5, 6) (0.5, 1, 1) (1, 1, 2) 
C.R.=0.082091 
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Table 1.3 The fuzzy positive reciprocal matrix of seven strategies under reduce 
reputation loss 
R
e
d
u
c
e
 r
e
p
u
ta
ti
o
n
 l
o
s
s
 
 A B C D E F G 
A (1, 1, 2) (1, 1, 2) (1, 1, 2) (1, 2, 3) (1, 2, 3) (1, 1, 2) (1, 1, 2) 
B 
(0.5, 1, 
1) 
(1, 1, 2) (1, 1, 2) (1, 1, 2) (1, 1, 2) 
(0.25, 
0.333, 
0.5) 
(1, 1, 2) 
C 
(0.5, 1, 
1) 
(0.5, 1, 
1) 
(1, 1, 2) (1, 1, 2) (1, 1, 2) 
(0.25, 
0.333, 
0.5) 
(0.167, 
0.2, 0.25) 
D 
(0.333, 
0.5, 1) 
(0.5, 1, 
1) 
(0.5, 1, 
1) 
(1, 1, 2) (1, 1, 2) 
(0.167, 
0.2, 0.25) 
(0.25, 
0.333, 
0.5) 
E 
(0.333, 
0.5, 1) 
(0.5, 1, 
1) 
(0.5, 1, 
1) 
(0.5, 1, 
1) 
(1, 1, 2) 
(0.25, 
0.333, 
0.5) 
(0.25, 
0.333, 
0.5) 
F 
(0.5, 1, 
1) 
(2, 3, 4) (2, 3, 4) (4, 5, 6) (2, 3, 4) (1, 1, 2) (1, 1, 2) 
G 
(0.5, 1, 
1) 
(0.5, 1, 
1) 
(4, 5, 6) (2, 3, 4) (2, 3, 4) 
(0.5, 1, 
1) 
(1, 1, 2) 
C.R.=0.043089 
Table 1.4 The fuzzy positive reciprocal matrix of seven alternatives under reduce 
safety and security incident related loss 
R
e
d
u
c
e
 s
a
fe
ty
 a
n
d
 s
e
c
u
ri
ty
 i
n
c
id
e
n
t 
re
la
te
d
 l
o
s
s
 
 A B C D E F G 
A (1, 1, 2) (2, 3, 4) (2, 3, 4) (1, 2, 3) (2, 3, 4) (1, 1, 2) (1, 1, 2) 
B 
(0.25, 
0.333, 
0.5) 
(1, 1, 2) (1, 1, 2) (1, 1, 2) (1, 2, 3) 
(0.333, 
0.5, 1) 
(1, 1, 2) 
C 
(0.25, 
0.333, 
0.5) 
(0.5, 1, 
1) 
(1, 1, 2) (1, 1, 2) (1, 1, 2) 
(0.25, 
0.333, 
0.5) 
(0.167, 
0.2, 0.25) 
D 
(0.333, 
0.5, 1) 
(0.5, 1, 
1) 
(0.5, 1, 
1) 
(1, 1, 2) (1, 1, 2) 
(0.167, 
0.2, 
0.25) 
(0.167, 
0.2, 0.25) 
E 
(0.25, 
0.333, 
0.5) 
(0.333, 
0.5, 1) 
(0.5, 1, 
1) 
(0.5, 1, 
1) 
(1, 1, 2) 
(0.25, 
0.333, 
0.5) 
(0.167, 
0.2, 0.25) 
F 
(0.5, 1, 
1) 
(1, 2, 3) (2, 3, 4) (4, 5, 6) (2, 3, 4) (1, 1, 2) (1, 1, 2) 
G 
(0.5, 1, 
1) 
(0.5, 1, 
1) 
(4, 5, 6) (4, 5, 6) (4, 5, 6) 
(0.5, 1, 
1) 
(1, 1, 2) 
C.R.=0.037491 
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Step 2 Calculate the fuzzy weights of fuzzy positive reciprocal matrix 
Table 1.5 The geometric mean of TFN and the fuzzy weights of three criteria 
   Financial loss    Reputation loss    Safety and 
security incident 
related loss 
 ̃ 
  (2.154, 2.621, 3.826) (0.329, 0.382, 0.585) (0.794, 1, 1.587) 
 ̃ 
  (0.359, 0.655, 1.167) (0.055, 0.095, 0.178) (0.132, 0.25, 0.484) 
Table 1.6 The geometric mean of TFN and the fuzzy weights of seven strategies 
under reduce financial loss 
   A    B    C    D    E    F    G 
 ̃ 
   
(1.486,  
2.284, 
3.337) 
(0.241,  
0.293, 
0.425) 
(0.481,  
0.581,  
0.93) 
(0.531,  
0.662, 
0.93) 
(0.492, 
0.679, 
0.869) 
(2.012,  
2.393, 
3.546) 
(1.822,  
2.393, 
3.212) 
 ̃ 
   
(0.112, 
0.246, 
0.472) 
(0.018, 
0.032, 
0.06) 
(0.036,  
0.063, 
0.132) 
(0.04, 
0.071, 
0.132) 
(0.037, 
0.073, 
0.123) 
(0.152,  
0.258, 
0.502) 
(0.138, 
0.258, 
0.455) 
Table 1.7 The geometric mean of TFN and the fuzzy weights of seven strategies 
under reduce reputation loss 
   A    B    C    D    E    F    G 
 ̃ 
   
(1,  
1.219, 
2.246) 
(0.743, 
0.855, 
1.486) 
(0.521, 
0.679,  
1) 
(0.445, 
0.615, 
0.906) 
(0.427, 
0.662, 
0.906) 
(1.486, 
2.015, 
2.852) 
(1.104, 
1.723, 
2.119) 
 ̃ 
   
(0.087, 
0.157, 
0.392) 
(0.065, 
0.11, 
0.259) 
(0.045, 
0.087, 
0.175) 
(0.039, 
0.079, 
0.158) 
(0.037, 
0.085, 
0.158) 
(0.129, 
0.259, 
0.498) 
(0.096, 
0.222, 
0.37) 
Table 1.8 The geometric mean of TFN and the fuzzy weights of seven strategies 
under reduce safety and security incident related loss 
   A    B    C    D    E    F    G 
 ̃ 
   
(1.346, 
1.768, 
2.852) 
(0.701, 
0.855, 
1.575) 
(0.472, 
0.581, 
0.906) 
(0.42, 
0.572, 
0.82) 
(0.365, 
0.526, 
0.743) 
(1.346, 
1.902, 
2.737) 
(1.346, 
1.993, 
2.38) 
 ̃ 
   
(0.112, 
0.216, 
0.476) 
(0.058, 
0.104, 
0.263) 
(0.039, 
0.071, 
0.151) 
(0.035, 
0.07, 
0.137) 
(0.03, 
0.064, 
0.124) 
(0.112, 
0.232, 
0.457) 
(0.112, 
0.243, 
0.397) 
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Step 3 Defuzzify the fuzzy weights and normalise the crisp weights 
Table 1.9 The defuzzified and standardized weights of three criteria 
 Financial loss Reputation loss Safety and security 
incident related loss 
Defuzzified 
weights 
0.727 0.11 0.289 
Standardised  
weights 
0.646 0.097 0.257 
Table 1.10 The defuzzified and standardized weights of seven strategies under 
reduce financial loss 
 A B C D E F G 
Defuzzified 
weights 
0.277 0.037 0.077 0.081 0.078 0.304 0.283 
Standardised  
weights 
0.244 0.032 0.068 0.071 0.068 0.267 0.249 
Table 1.11 The defuzzified and standardized weights of seven strategies under 
reduce reputation loss 
 A B C D E F G 
Defuzzified 
weights 
0.212 0.145 0.102 0.092 0.093 0.296 0.229 
Standardised  
weights 
0.181 0.124 0.088 0.079 0.08 0.253 0.196 
Table 1.12 The defuzzified and standardized weights of seven strategies under 
reduce safety and security incident related loss 
 A B C D E F G 
Defuzzified 
weights 
0.268 0.142 0.087 0.081 0.073 0.267 0.251 
Standardised  
weights 
0.229 0.121 0.075 0.069 0.062 0.229 0.215 
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Sample 2 
Step 1 Build fuzzy positive reciprocal matrix 
Table 2.1 The fuzzy positive reciprocal matrix of three criteria 
 Reduce 
financial loss 
Reduce 
reputation loss 
Reduce safety 
and security 
incident related 
loss 
Reduce financial loss (1, 1, 2) (1, 1, 2) (1, 1, 2) 
Reduce reputation loss (0.5, 1, 1) (1, 1, 2) (1, 1, 2) 
Reduce safety and 
security incident related 
loss 
(0.5, 1, 1) (0.5, 1, 1) (1, 1, 2) 
C.R. = 0.000 
Table 2.2 The fuzzy positive reciprocal matrix of seven strategies under reduce 
financial loss 
R
e
d
u
c
e
 f
in
a
n
c
ia
l 
lo
s
s
 
 A B C D E F G 
A (1, 1, 2) (2, 3, 4) (2, 3, 4) (1, 2, 3) (2, 3, 4) (1, 1, 2) (1, 1, 2) 
B 
(0.25, 
0.333, 
0.5) 
(1, 1, 2) (2, 3, 4) (2, 3, 4) (2, 3, 4) 
(0.25, 
0.333, 
0.5) 
(1, 2, 3) 
C 
(0.25, 
0.333, 
0.5) 
(0.25, 
0.333, 
0.5) 
(1, 1, 2) 
(0.25, 
0.333, 
0.5) 
(0.25, 
0.333, 
0.5) 
(0.25, 
0.333, 
0.5) 
(0.25, 
0.333, 
0.5) 
D 
(0.333, 
0.5, 1) 
(0.25, 
0.33, 0.5) 
(2, 3, 4) (1, 1, 2) (1, 1, 2) 
(0.25, 
0.33, 0.5) 
(0.25, 
0.33, 0.5) 
E 
(0.25, 
0.333, 
0.5) 
(0.25, 
0.333, 
0.5) 
(2, 3, 4) (0.5, 1, 1) (1, 1, 2) 
(0.25, 
0.333, 
0.5) 
(0.25, 
0.333, 
0.5) 
F (0.5, 1, 1) (2, 3, 4) (2, 3, 4) (2, 3, 4) (2, 3, 4) (1, 1, 2) (2, 3, 4) 
G (0.5, 1, 1) 
(0.333, 
0.5, 1) 
(2, 3, 4) (2, 3, 4) (2, 3, 4) 
(0.25, 
0.333, 
0.5) 
(1, 1, 2) 
C.R.= 0.073 
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Table 2.3 The fuzzy positive reciprocal matrix of seven strategies under reduce 
reputation loss 
R
e
d
u
c
e
 r
e
p
u
ta
ti
o
n
 l
o
s
s
 
 A B C D E F G 
A (1, 1, 2) (1, 1, 2) (1, 1, 2) (1, 1, 2) (1, 2, 3) (1, 1, 2) (1, 1, 2) 
B (0.5, 1, 1) (1, 1, 2) (1, 1, 2) (1, 1, 2) (1, 1, 2) (1, 2, 3) (1, 1, 2) 
C (0.5, 1, 1) (0.5, 1, 1) (1, 1, 2) (1, 2, 3) (1, 1, 2) (1, 2, 3) (1, 1, 2) 
D (0.5, 1, 1) (0.5, 1, 1) 
(0.33, 0.5, 
1) 
(1, 1, 2) (1, 1, 2) (2, 3, 4) (1, 1, 2) 
E 
(0.333, 
0.5, 1) 
(0.5, 1, 1) (0.5, 1, 1) (0.5, 1, 1) (1, 1, 2) (2, 3, 4) (2, 3, 4) 
F (0.5, 1, 1) 
(0.333, 
0.5, 1) 
(0.333, 
0.5, 1) 
(0.25, 
0.333, 
0.5) 
(0.25, 
0.333, 
0.5) 
(1, 1, 2) 
(0.25, 
0.333, 
0.5) 
G (0.5, 1, 1) (0.5, 1, 1) (0.5, 1, 1) (0.5, 1, 1) 
(0.25, 
0.333, 
0.5) 
(2, 3, 4) (1, 1, 2) 
C.R.= 0.054 
Table 2.4 The fuzzy positive reciprocal matrix of seven alternatives under reduce 
safety and security incident related loss 
R
e
d
u
c
e
 s
a
fe
ty
 a
n
d
 s
e
c
u
ri
ty
 
in
c
id
e
n
t 
re
la
te
d
 l
o
s
s
 
 A B C D E F G 
A (1, 1, 2) (1, 1, 2) (1, 1, 2) (1, 2, 3) (1, 1, 2) (2, 3, 4) (2, 3, 4) 
B 
(0.5, 1, 
1) 
(1, 1, 2) (1, 1, 2) (1, 1, 2) (1, 1, 2) (1, 1, 2) (1, 1, 2) 
C 
(0.5, 1, 
1) 
(0.5, 1, 
1) 
(1, 1, 2) (1, 1, 2) 
(0.33, 
0.5, 1) 
(1, 1, 2) (1, 1, 2) 
D 
(0.333, 
0.5, 1) 
(0.5, 1, 
1) 
(0.5, 1, 
1) 
(1, 1, 2) (1, 1, 2) (2, 3, 4) (1, 1, 2) 
E 
(0.5, 1, 
1) 
(0.333, 
0.5, 1) 
(1, 2, 3) 
(0.5, 1, 
1) 
(1, 1, 2) (2, 3, 4) (2, 3, 4) 
F 
(0.25, 
0.333, 
0.5) 
(0.5, 1, 
1) 
(0.5, 1, 
1) 
(0.25, 
0.333, 
0.5) 
(0.25, 
0.333, 
0.5) 
(1, 1, 2) 
(0.25, 
0.333, 
0.5) 
G 
(0.25, 
0.333, 
0.5) 
(0.5, 1, 
1) 
(0.5, 1, 
1) 
(0.5, 1, 
1) 
(0.25, 
0.333, 
0.5) 
(2, 3, 4) (1, 1, 2) 
C.R.=0.069 
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Step 2 Calculate the fuzzy weights of fuzzy positive reciprocal matrix 
Table 2.5 The geometric mean of TFN and the fuzzy weights of three criteria 
   Financial loss    Reputation loss    Safety and 
security incident 
related loss 
 ̃ 
  (1, 1, 2) (0.794, 1, 1.587) (0.63, 1, 1.26) 
 ̃ 
  (0.206, 0.333, 0.825) (0.164, 0.333, 0.655) (0.13, 0.333, 0.52) 
Table 2.6 The geometric mean of TFN and the fuzzy weights of seven strategies 
under reduce financial loss 
   A    B    C    D    E    F    G 
 ̃ 
   
(1.346, 
1.768, 
2.852) 
(0.906, 
1.92, 
1.919) 
(0.305, 
0.39, 
0.61) 
(0.521, 
0.662, 
1.104) 
(0.453, 
0.624, 
0.906) 
(1.486, 
2.192, 
2.972) 
(0.855, 
1.24, 
1.811) 
 ̃ 
   
(0.111, 
0.216, 
0.486) 
(0.074, 
0.158, 
0.327) 
(0.025, 
0.048, 
0.104) 
(0.043, 
0.081, 
0.188) 
(0.037, 
0.076 
0.154) 
(0.122, 
0.268, 
0.506) 
(0.07, 
0.152, 
0.309) 
Table 2.7 The geometric mean of TFN and the fuzzy weights of seven strategies 
under reduce reputation loss 
   A    B    C    D    E    F    G 
 ̃ 
   
(1, 
1.104, 
2.119) 
(0.906, 
1.104, 
1.919) 
(0.82, 
1.219, 
1.842) 
(0.774, 
1.06, 
1.641) 
(0.774, 
1.24, 
1.641) 
(0.365, 
0.512, 
0.82) 
(0.61, 1, 
1.219) 
 ̃ 
   
(0.089, 
0.153, 
0.404) 
(0.081, 
0.153, 
0.365) 
(0.073, 
0.1668, 
0.351) 
(0.069, 
0.146, 
0.313) 
(0.069, 
0.171, 
0.313) 
(0.033, 
0.071, 
0.156) 
(0.054, 
0.138, 
0.232) 
Table 2.8 The geometric mean of TFN and the fuzzy weights of seven strategies 
under reduce safety and security incident related loss 
   A    B    C    D    E    F    G 
 ̃ 
   
(1.219, 
1.511, 
2.583) 
(0.906, 
1.104, 
1.919) 
(0.701, 
0.906, 
1.486) 
(0.774, 
1.06, 
1.641) 
(0.855, 
1.369, 
1.919) 
(0.371, 
0.534, 
0.743) 
(0.552, 
0.855, 
1.104) 
 ̃ 
   
(0.107, 
0.206, 
0.48) 
(0.079, 
0.15, 
0.357) 
(0.062, 
0.123, 
0.276) 
(0.068, 
0.144, 
0.305) 
(0.075, 
0.187, 
0.357) 
(0.033, 
0.073, 
0.138) 
(0.048, 
0.116, 
0.205) 
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Step 3 Defuzzify the fuzzy weights and normalise the crisp weights 
Table 2.9 The defuzzified and standardized weights of three criteria 
 Financial loss Reputation loss Safety and security 
incident related loss 
Defuzzified 
weights 
0.394 0.359 0.331 
Standardised  
weights 
0.364 0.331 0.305 
Table 2.10 The defuzzified and standardized weights of seven strategies under 
reduce financial loss 
 A B C D E F G 
Defuzzified 
weights 
0.244 0.172 0.053 0.092 0.083 0.284 0.164 
Standardised  
weights 
0.223 0.158 0.049 0.085 0.076 0.26 0.15 
Table 2.11 The defuzzified and standardized weights of seven strategies under 
reduce reputation loss 
 A B C D E F G 
Defuzzified 
weights 
0.184 0.176 0.183 0.161 0.178 0.079 0.14 
Standardised  
weights 
0.167 0.16 0.166 0.146 0.162 0.071 0.127 
Table 2.12 The defuzzified and standardized weights of seven strategies under 
reduce safety and security incident related loss 
 A B C D E F G 
Defuzzified 
weights 
0.235 0.173 0.139 0.158 0.196 0.077 0.12 
Standardised  
weights 
0.214 0.158 0.126 0.144 0.179 0.07 0.109 
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Sample 3 
Step 1 Build fuzzy positive reciprocal matrix 
Table 3.1 The fuzzy positive reciprocal matrix of three criteria 
 Reduce financial 
loss 
Reduce 
reputation loss 
Reduce safety 
and security 
incident related 
loss 
Reduce financial loss (1, 1, 2) (1, 1, 2) (0.333, 0.5, 1) 
Reduce reputation 
loss 
(0.5, 1, 1) (1, 1, 2) (0.25, 0.333, 0.5) 
Reduce safety and 
security incident 
related loss 
(1, 2, 3) (2, 3, 4) (1, 1, 2) 
C.R. = 0.016 
Table 3.2 The fuzzy positive reciprocal matrix of seven strategies under reduce 
financial loss 
R
e
d
u
c
e
 f
in
a
n
c
ia
l 
lo
s
s
 
 A B C D E F G 
A (1, 1, 2) (1, 2, 3) (1, 2, 3) (1, 2, 3) (1, 2, 3) (1, 2, 3) (1, 2, 3) 
B 
(0.333, 0.5, 
1) 
(1, 1, 2) (1, 2, 3) (1, 2, 3) (1, 2, 3) (1, 2, 3) (1, 1, 2) 
C 
(0.333, 0.5, 
1) 
(0.333, 
0.5, 1) 
(1, 1, 2) (1, 1, 2) 
(0.333, 
0.5, 1) 
(1, 1, 2) (1, 1, 2) 
D 
(0.333, 0.5, 
1) 
(0.333, 
0.5, 1) 
(0.5, 1, 1) (1, 1, 2) (1, 2, 3) (1, 1, 2) 
(0.333, 
0.5, 1) 
E 
(0.333, 0.5, 
1) 
(0.333, 
0.5, 1) 
(1, 2, 3) 
(0.333, 
0.5, 1) 
(1, 1, 2) (1, 2, 3) (1, 1, 2) 
F 
(0.333, 0.5, 
1) 
(0.333, 
0.5, 1) 
(0.5, 1, 1) (0.5, 1, 1) 
(0.333, 
0.5, 1) 
(1, 1, 2) (1, 1, 2) 
G 
(0.333, 0.5, 
1) 
(0.5, 1, 1) (0.5, 1, 1) (1, 2, 3) (0.5, 1, 1) (0.5, 1, 1) (1, 1, 2) 
C.R.= 0.038 
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Table 3.3 The fuzzy positive reciprocal matrix of seven strategies under reduce 
reputation loss 
R
e
d
u
c
e
 r
e
p
u
ta
ti
o
n
 l
o
s
s
 
 A B C D E F G 
A (1, 1, 2) (1, 1, 2) 
(0.333, 
0.5, 1) 
(0.25, 
0.333, 
0.5) 
(1, 1, 2) (1, 1, 2) (1, 1, 2) 
B 
(0.5, 1, 
1) 
(1, 1, 2) (1, 1, 2) 
(0.333, 
0.5, 1) 
(1, 2, 3) (1, 1, 2) (1, 1, 2) 
C (1, 2, 3) 
(0.5, 1, 
1) 
(1, 1, 2) 
(0.333, 
0.5, 1) 
(1, 1, 2) (1, 1, 2) (1, 1, 2) 
D (2, 3, 4) (1, 2, 3) (1, 2, 3) (1, 1, 2) (1, 1, 2) (1, 1, 2) (1, 1, 2) 
E 
(0.333, 
0.5, 1) 
(0.333, 
0.5, 1) 
(0.5, 1, 
1) 
(0.5, 1, 
1) 
(1, 1, 2) (1, 1, 2) (1, 1, 2) 
F 
(0.333, 
0.5, 1) 
(0.5, 1, 
1) 
(0.5, 1, 
1) 
(0.5, 1, 
1) 
(0.5, 1, 
1) 
(1, 1, 2) (1, 1, 2) 
G 
(0.5, 1, 
1) 
(0.5, 1, 
1) 
(0.5, 1, 
1) 
(0.5, 1, 
1) 
(0.5, 1, 
1) 
(0.5, 1, 
1) 
(1, 1, 2) 
C.R.= 0.053 
Table 3.4 The fuzzy positive reciprocal matrix of seven alternatives under reduce 
safety and security incident related loss 
R
e
d
u
c
e
 s
a
fe
ty
 a
n
d
 s
e
c
u
ri
ty
 i
n
c
id
e
n
t 
re
la
te
d
 l
o
s
s
 
 A B C D E F G 
A (1, 1, 2) (1, 1, 2) (1, 1, 2) 
(0.333, 
0.5, 1) 
(0.333, 
0.5, 1) 
(1, 1, 2) (1, 1, 2) 
B 
(0.5, 1, 
1) 
(1, 1, 2) (1, 1, 2) (1, 1, 2) (1, 1, 2) (1, 1, 2) (1, 2, 3) 
C 
(0.5, 1, 
1) 
(0.5, 1, 
1) 
(1, 1, 2) 
(0.333, 
0.5, 1) 
(0.333, 
0.5, 1) 
(1, 1, 2) (1, 1, 2) 
D (1, 2, 3) 
(0.5, 1, 
1) 
(1, 2, 3) (1, 1, 2) (2, 3, 4) (1, 1, 2) (1, 1, 2) 
E (1, 2, 3) 
(0.5, 1, 
1) 
(1, 2, 3) 
(0.25, 
0.333, 
0.5) 
(1, 1, 2) (2, 3, 4) (2, 3, 4) 
F 
(0.5, 1, 
1) 
(0.5, 1, 
1) 
(0.5, 1, 
1) 
(0.5, 1, 
1) 
(0.25, 
0.333, 
0.5) 
(1, 1, 2) (1, 1, 2) 
G 
(0.5, 1, 
1) 
(0.333, 
0.5, 1) 
(0.5, 1, 
1) 
(0.5, 1, 
1) 
(0.25, 
0.333, 
0.5) 
(0.5, 1, 
1) 
(1, 1, 2) 
C.R.= 0.057 
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Step 2 Calculate the fuzzy weights of fuzzy positive reciprocal matrix 
Table 3.5 The geometric mean of TFN and the fuzzy weights of three criteria 
   Financial loss    Reputation loss    Safety and 
security incident 
related loss 
 ̃ 
  (0.693, 0.794, 1.587) (0.5, 0.693, 1) (1.26, 1.817, 2.884) 
 ̃ 
  (0.127, 0.24, 0.647) (0.091, 0.21, 0.408) (0.23, 0.55, 1.176) 
Table 3.6 The geometric mean of TFN and the fuzzy weights of seven strategies 
under reduce financial loss 
   A    B    C    D    E    F    G 
 ̃ 
   
(1, 
1.811, 
2.831) 
(0.855, 
1.346, 
2.284) 
(0.624, 
0.743, 
1.486) 
(0.566, 
0.82, 
1.426) 
(0.624, 
0.906, 
1.669) 
(0.512, 
0.743, 
1.219) 
(0.575, 
1, 1.292) 
 ̃ 
   
(0.082, 
0.246, 
0.595) 
(0.07, 
0.183, 
0.48) 
(0.051, 
0.101, 
0.312) 
(0.046, 
0.111, 
0.3) 
(0.051, 
0.123, 
0.351) 
(0.042, 
0.101, 
0.256) 
(0.047, 
0.136, 
0.272) 
Table 3.7 The geometric mean of TFN and the fuzzy weights of seven strategies 
under reduce reputation loss 
   A    B    C    D    E    F    G 
 ̃ 
   
(0.701, 
0.944, 
1.669) 
(0.774, 
1, 1.739) 
(0.774, 
1, 1.739) 
(1.104, 
1.426, 
2.479) 
(0.599, 
0.82, 
1.346) 
(0.575, 
0.906, 
1.219) 
(0.552, 
1, 1.104) 
 ̃ 
   
(0.062, 
0.133, 
0.328) 
(0.069, 
0.141, 
0.342) 
(0.069, 
0.141, 
0.342) 
(0.098, 
0.201, 
0.488) 
(0.053, 
0.116, 
0.265) 
(0.051, 
0.128, 
0.24) 
(0.049, 
0.141, 
0.217) 
Table 3.8 The geometric mean of TFN and the fuzzy weights of seven strategies 
under reduce safety and security incident related loss 
   A    B    C    D    E    F    G 
 ̃ 
   
(0.731, 
0.82, 
1.641) 
(0.906, 
1.104, 
1.919) 
(0.599, 
0.82, 
1.346) 
(1, 
1.426, 
2.246) 
(0.906, 
1.426, 
2.034) 
(0.552, 
0.855, 
1.104) 
(0.472, 
0.774, 1) 
 ̃ 
   
(0.065, 
0.114, 
0.318) 
(0.08, 
0.153, 
0.372) 
(0.053, 
0.114, 
0.261) 
(0.089, 
0.197, 
0.435) 
(0.08, 
0.197, 
0.394) 
(0.049, 
0.118, 
0.214) 
(0.042, 
0.107, 
0.194) 
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Step 3 Defuzzify the fuzzy weights and normalise the crisp weights 
Table 3.9 The defuzzified and standardized weights of three criteria 
 Financial loss Reputation loss Safety and security 
incident related loss 
Defuzzified 
weights 
0.289 0.223 0.601 
Standardised  
weights 
0.26 0.2 0.54 
Table 3.10 The defuzzified and standardized weights of seven strategies under 
reduce financial loss 
 A B C D E F G 
Defuzzified 
weights 
0.277 0.213 0.128 0.132 0.149 0.117 0.144 
Standardised  
weights 
0.239 0.184 0.11 0.114 0.128 0.101 0.124 
Table 3.11 The defuzzified and standardized weights of seven strategies under 
reduce reputation loss 
 A B C D E F G 
Defuzzified 
weights 
0.154 0.162 0.162 0.232 0.13 0.134 0.138 
Standardised  
weights 
0.138 0.146 0.146 0.208 0.117 0.12 0.124 
Table 3.12 The defuzzified and standardized weights of seven strategies under 
reduce safety and security incident related loss 
 A B C D E F G 
Defuzzified 
weights 
0.139 0.177 0.128 0.219 0.211 0.123 0.111 
Standardised  
weights 
0.126 0.16 0.116 0.198 0.19 0.111 0.1 
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Sample 4 
Step 1 Build fuzzy positive reciprocal matrix 
Table 4.1 The fuzzy positive reciprocal matrix of three criteria 
 Reduce 
financial loss 
Reduce 
reputation loss 
Reduce safety 
and security 
incident related 
loss 
Reduce financial loss (1, 1, 2) (3, 4, 5) (2, 3, 4) 
Reduce reputation loss (0.2, 0.25, 
0.333) (1, 1, 2) (0.25, 0.333, 0.5) 
Reduce safety and 
security incident related 
loss 
(0.25, 0.333, 
0.5) (2, 3, 4) (1, 1, 2) 
C.R. = 0.063 
Table 4.2 The fuzzy positive reciprocal matrix of seven strategies under reduce 
financial loss 
R
e
d
u
c
e
 f
in
a
n
c
ia
l 
lo
s
s
 
 A B C D E F G 
A (1, 1, 2) (1, 2, 3) (1, 2, 3) (2, 3, 4) (1, 2, 3) (2, 3, 4) (2, 3, 4) 
B 
(0.333, 0.5, 
1) 
(1, 1, 2) (1, 2, 3) (1, 2, 3) (2, 3, 4) (2, 3, 4) (3, 4, 5) 
C 
(0.333, 0.5, 
1) 
(0.333, 
0.5, 1) 
(1, 1, 2) (1, 2, 3) (1, 2, 3) 
(0.333, 
0.5, 1) 
(2, 3, 4) 
D 
(0.25, 
0.333, 0.5) 
(0.333, 
0.5, 1) 
(0.333, 
0.5, 1) 
(1, 1, 2) (1, 1, 2) (1, 1, 2) (2, 3, 4) 
E 
(0.333, 0.5, 
1) 
(0.25, 
0.333, 
0.5) 
(0.333, 
0.5, 1) 
(0.5, 1, 1) (1, 1, 2) (1, 1, 2) (1, 1, 2) 
F 
(0.25, 
0.333, 0.5) 
(0.25, 
0.333, 
0.5) 
(1, 2, 3) (0.5, 1, 1) (0.5, 1, 1) (1, 1, 2) (1, 1, 2) 
G 
(0.25, 
0.333, 0.5) 
(0.2, 
0.25, 
0.333) 
(0.25, 
0.333, 
0.5) 
(0.25, 
0.333, 
0.5) 
(0.5, 1, 1) (0.5, 1, 1) (1, 1, 2) 
C.R.= 0.053 
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Table 4.3 The fuzzy positive reciprocal matrix of seven strategies under reduce 
reputation loss 
R
e
d
u
c
e
 r
e
p
u
ta
ti
o
n
 l
o
s
s
 
 A B C D E F G 
A (1, 1, 2) (1, 1, 2) (1, 1, 2) 
(0.333, 
0.5, 1) 
(2, 3, 4) (2, 3, 4) (1, 2, 3) 
B 
(0.5, 1, 
1) 
(1, 1, 2) (2, 3, 4) (2, 3, 4) (2, 3, 4) (2, 3, 4) (2, 3, 4) 
C 
(0.5, 1, 
1) 
(0.25, 
0.333, 
0.5) 
(1, 1, 2) 
(0.333, 
0.5, 1) 
(0.333, 
0.5, 1) 
(2, 3, 4) (2, 3, 4) 
D (1, 2, 3) 
(0.25, 
0.333, 
0.5) 
(1, 2, 3) (1, 1, 2) (2, 3, 4) (2, 3, 4) (2, 3, 4) 
E 
(0.25, 
0.333, 
0.5) 
(0.25, 
0.333, 
0.5) 
(1, 2, 3) 
(0.25, 
0.333, 
0.5) 
(1, 1, 2) (2, 3, 4) (2, 3, 4) 
F 
(0.25, 
0.333, 
0.5) 
(0.25, 
0.333, 
0.5) 
(0.25, 
0.333, 
0.5) 
(0.25, 
0.333, 
0.5) 
(0.25, 
0.333, 
0.5) 
(1, 1, 2) 
(0.333, 
0.5, 1) 
G 
(0.333, 
0.5, 1) 
(0.25, 
0.333, 
0.5) 
(0.25, 
0.333, 
0.5) 
(0.25, 
0.333, 
0.5) 
(0.25, 
0.333, 
0.5) 
(1, 2, 3) (1, 1, 2) 
C.R.= 0.078 
Table 4.4 The fuzzy positive reciprocal matrix of seven alternatives under reduce 
safety and security incident related loss 
R
e
d
u
c
e
 s
a
fe
ty
 a
n
d
 s
e
c
u
ri
ty
 
in
c
id
e
n
t 
re
la
te
d
 l
o
s
s
 
 A B C D E F G 
A (1, 1, 2) (1, 1, 2) (1, 2, 3) (1, 1, 2) (1, 1, 2) (1, 2, 3) (1, 2, 3) 
B 
(0.5, 1, 
1) 
(1, 1, 2) (1, 1, 2) (1, 1, 2) (1, 1, 2) (2, 3, 4) 
(1, 2, 3) 
C 
(0.333, 
0.5, 1) 
(0.5, 1, 
1) 
(1, 1, 2) (1, 1, 2) (1, 2, 3) (2, 3, 4) 
(3, 4, 5) 
D 
(0.5, 1, 
1) 
(0.5, 1, 
1) 
(0.5, 1, 
1) (1, 1, 2) 
(1, 2, 3) (2, 3, 4) 
(3, 4, 5) 
E 
(0.5, 1, 
1) 
(0.5, 1, 
1) 
(0.333, 
0.5, 1) 
(0.333, 
0.5, 1) (1, 1, 2) 
(2, 3, 4) 
(3, 4, 5) 
F (0.333, 
0.5, 1) 
(0.25, 
0.333, 
0.5) 
(0.25, 
0.333, 
0.5) 
(0.25, 
0.333, 
0.5) 
(0.25, 
0.333, 
0.5) (1, 1, 2) (1, 2, 3) 
G 
(0.333, 
0.5, 1) 
(0.333, 
0.5, 1) 
(0.2, 
0.25, 
0.333) 
(0.2, 
0.25, 
0.333) 
(0.2, 
0.25, 
0.333) 
(0.333, 
0.5, 1) (1, 1, 2) 
C.R.= 0.038 
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Step 2 Calculate the fuzzy weights of fuzzy positive reciprocal matrix 
Table 4.5 The geometric mean of TFN and the fuzzy weights of three criteria 
   Financial loss    Reputation loss    Safety and 
security incident 
related loss 
 ̃ 
  (1.817, 2.289, 3.42) (0.368, 0.437, 0.693) (0.794, 1, 1.587) 
 ̃ 
  (0.319, 0.614, 1.148) (0.065, 0.117, 0.233) (0.139, 0.268, 0.533) 
Table 4.6 The geometric mean of TFN and the fuzzy weights of seven strategies 
under reduce financial loss 
   A    B    C    D    E    F    G 
 ̃ 
   
(1.346, 
2.155, 
3.203) 
(1.219, 
1.842, 
2.826) 
(0.689, 
1.06, 
1.842) 
(0.662, 
0.82, 
1.486) 
(0.543, 
0.701, 
1.219) 
(0.552, 
0.807, 
1.17) 
(0.36, 
0.512, 
0.701) 
 ̃ 
   
(0.108, 
0.273, 
0.596) 
(0.098, 
0.233, 
0.526) 
(0.055, 
0.134, 
0.343) 
(0.053, 
0.104, 
0.277) 
(0.044, 
0.089, 
0.227) 
(0.044, 
0.102, 
0.218) 
(0.029, 
0.065, 
0.131) 
Table 4.7 The geometric mean of TFN and the fuzzy weights of seven strategies 
under reduce reputation loss 
   A    B    C    D    E    F    G 
 ̃ 
   
(1.042, 
1.369, 
2.34) 
(1.486, 
2.192, 
2.972) 
(0.662, 
0.96, 
1.486) 
(1.104, 
1.669, 
2.479) 
(0.673, 
0.944, 
1.426) 
(0.318, 
0.413, 
0.673) 
(0.387, 
0.534, 
0.869) 
 ̃ 
   
(0.085, 
0.169, 
0.413) 
(0.121, 
0.271, 
0.524) 
(0.054, 
0.119, 
0.262) 
(0.09, 
0.207, 
0.437) 
(0.055, 
0.117, 
0.251) 
(0.026, 
0.051, 
0.119) 
(0.032, 
0.066, 
0.153) 
Table 4.8 The geometric mean of TFN and the fuzzy weights of seven strategies 
under reduce safety and security incident related loss 
   A    B    C    D    E    F    G 
 ̃ 
   
(1, 
1.346, 
2.38) 
(1, 
1.292, 
2.119) 
(1, 
1.426, 
2.188) 
(0.96, 
1.575, 
1.982) 
(0.774, 
1.17, 
1.697) 
(0.387, 
0.534, 
0.869) 
(0.313, 
0.41, 
0.689) 
 ̃ 
   
(0.084, 
0.174, 
0.438) 
(0.084, 
0.167, 
0.39) 
(0.084, 
0.184, 
0.403) 
(0.081, 
0.203, 
0.365) 
(0.065, 
0.151, 
0.312) 
(0.032, 
0.069, 
0.16) 
(0.026, 
0.053, 
0.127) 
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Step 3 Defuzzify the fuzzy weights and normalise the crisp weights 
Table 4.9 The defuzzified and standardized weights of three criteria 
 Financial loss Reputation loss Safety and security 
incident related loss 
Defuzzified 
weights 0.654 0.128 0.291 
Standardised  
weights 0.61 0.119 0.271 
Table 4.10 The defuzzified and standardized weights of seven strategies under 
reduce financial loss 
 A B C D E F G 
Defuzzified 
weights 0.299 0.26 0.156 0.124 0.104 0.112 0.07 
Standardised  
weights 0.266 0.231 0.139 0.11 0.093 0.099 0.062 
Table 4.11 The defuzzified and standardized weights of seven strategies under 
reduce reputation loss 
 A B C D E F G 
Defuzzified 
weights 0.196 0.288 0.132 0.226 0.129 0.058 0.075 
Standardised  
weights 0.177 0.261 0.119 0.204 0.117 0.053 0.068 
Table 4.12 The defuzzified and standardized weights of seven strategies under 
reduce safety and security incident related loss 
 A B C D E F G 
Defuzzified 
weights 0.203 0.19 0.204 0.21 0.163 0.078 0.061 
Standardised  
weights 0.183 0.171 0.184 0.189 0.147 0.07 0.055 
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Sample 5 
Step 1 Build fuzzy positive reciprocal matrix 
Table 5.1 The fuzzy positive reciprocal matrix of three criteria 
 Reduce financial 
loss 
Reduce 
reputation loss 
Reduce safety 
and security 
incident related 
loss 
Reduce financial loss (1, 1, 2) (4, 5, 6) (1, 2, 3) 
Reduce reputation 
loss 
(0.167, 0.2, 
0.25) 
(1, 1, 2) (0.333, 0.5, 1) 
Reduce safety and 
security incident 
related loss 
(0.333, 0.5, 1) (1, 2, 3) (1, 1, 2) 
C.R. = 0.005 
Table 5.2 The fuzzy positive reciprocal matrix of seven strategies under reduce 
financial loss 
R
e
d
u
c
e
 f
in
a
n
c
ia
l 
lo
s
s
 
 A B C D E F G 
A (1, 1, 2) (1, 2, 3) (1, 2, 3) (1, 2, 3) (1, 2, 3) 
(0.25, 
0.333, 
0.5) 
(1, 2, 3) 
B 
(0.333, 0.5, 
1) 
(1, 1, 2) (1, 2, 3) (1, 1, 2) (1, 2, 3) 
(0.25, 
0.333, 
0.5) 
(1, 2, 3) 
C 
(0.333, 0.5, 
1) 
(0.333, 
0.5, 1) 
(1, 1, 2) (1, 2, 3) (1, 2, 3) 
(0.2, 
0.25, 
0.333) 
(1, 2, 3) 
D 
(0.333, 0.5, 
1) 
(0.5, 1, 1) 
(0.333, 
0.5, 1) 
(1, 1, 2) (1, 2, 3) 
(0.2, 
0.25, 
0.333) 
(1, 2, 3) 
E 
(0.333, 0.5, 
1) 
(0.333, 
0.5, 1) 
(0.333, 
0.5, 1) 
(0.333, 
0.5, 1) 
(1, 1, 2) 
(0.2, 
0.25, 
0.333) 
(1, 2, 3) 
F (2, 3, 4) (2, 3, 4) (3, 4, 5) (3, 4, 5) (3, 4, 5) (1, 1, 2) (1, 2, 3) 
G 
(0.333, 0.5, 
1) 
(0.333, 
0.5, 1) 
(0.333, 
0.5, 1) 
(0.333, 
0.5, 1) 
(0.333, 
0.5, 1) 
(0.333, 
0.5, 1) 
(1, 1, 2) 
C.R.= 0.055 
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Table 5.3 The fuzzy positive reciprocal matrix of seven strategies under reduce 
reputation loss 
R
e
d
u
c
e
 r
e
p
u
ta
ti
o
n
 l
o
s
s
 
 A B C D E F G 
A (1, 1, 2) (1, 1, 2) (1, 1, 2) (1, 1, 2) (1, 1, 2) (1, 2, 3) (1, 2, 3) 
B 
(0.5, 1, 
1) 
(1, 1, 2) (1, 2, 3) (1, 1, 2) (1, 2, 3) (1, 2, 3) (1, 2, 3) 
C 
(0.5, 1, 
1) 
(0.333, 
0.5, 1) 
(1, 1, 2) (1, 1, 2) (1, 1, 2) (1, 1, 2) (1, 1, 2) 
D 
(0.5, 1, 
1) 
(0.5, 1, 1) 
(0.5, 1, 
1) 
(1, 1, 2) (1, 1, 2) (1, 1, 2) (1, 1, 2) 
E 
(0.5, 1, 
1) 
(0.333, 
0.5, 1) 
(0.5, 1, 
1) 
(0.5, 1, 
1) 
(1, 1, 2) (1, 1, 2) (1, 1, 2) 
F 
(0.333, 
0.5, 1) 
(0.333, 
0.5, 1) 
(0.5, 1, 
1) 
(0.5, 1, 
1) 
(0.5, 1, 
1) 
(1, 1, 2) (1, 1, 2) 
G 
(0.333, 
0.5, 1) 
(0.333, 
0.5, 1) 
(0.5, 1, 
1) 
(0.5, 1, 
1) 
(0.5, 1, 
1) 
(0.5, 1, 
1) 
(1, 1, 2) 
C.R.= 0.015 
Table 5.4 The fuzzy positive reciprocal matrix of seven alternatives under reduce 
safety and security incident related loss 
R
e
d
u
c
e
 s
a
fe
ty
 a
n
d
 s
e
c
u
ri
ty
 i
n
c
id
e
n
t 
re
la
te
d
 l
o
s
s
 
 A B C D E F G 
A (1, 1, 2) (1, 2, 3) (1, 2, 3) 
(0.333, 
0.5, 1) 
(1, 1, 2) (1, 2, 3) (1, 2, 3) 
B 
(0.333, 
0.5, 1) 
(1, 1, 2) (1, 1, 2) 
(0.333, 
0.5, 1) 
(0.333, 
0.5, 1) 
(1, 1, 2) (1, 2, 3) 
C 
(0.333, 
0.5, 1) 
(0.5, 1, 
1) 
(1, 1, 2) 
(0.333, 
0.5, 1) 
(0.25, 
0.333, 
0.5) 
(0.333, 
0.5, 1) 
(1, 1, 2) 
D (1, 2, 3) (1, 2, 3) (1, 2, 3) (1, 1, 2) 
(0.25, 
0.333, 
0.5) 
(0.333, 
0.5, 1) 
(1, 1, 2) 
E 
(0.5, 1, 
1) 
(1, 2, 3) (2, 3, 4) (2, 3, 4) (1, 1, 2) 
(0.333, 
0.5, 1) 
(1, 1, 2) 
F 
(0.333, 
0.5, 1) 
(0.5, 1, 
1) 
(1, 2, 3) (1, 2, 3) (1, 2, 3) (1, 1, 2) (1, 1, 2) 
G 
(0.333, 
0.5, 1) 
(0.333, 
0.5, 1) 
(0.5, 1, 
1) 
(0.5, 1, 
1) 
(0.5, 1, 
1) 
(0.5, 1, 
1) 
(1, 1, 2) 
C.R.= 0.086 
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Step 2 Calculate the fuzzy weights of fuzzy positive reciprocal matrix 
Table 5.5 The geometric mean of TFN and the fuzzy weights of three criteria 
   Financial loss    Reputation loss    Safety and 
security incident 
related loss 
 ̃ 
  (1.587, 2.154, 3.302) (0.382, 0.464, 0.794) (0.693, 1, 1.817) 
 ̃ 
  (0.268, 0.595, 1.24) (0.065, 0.128, 0.298) (0.117, 0.276, 0.683) 
Table 5.6 The geometric mean of TFN and the fuzzy weights of seven strategies 
under reduce financial loss 
   A    B    C    D    E    F    G 
 ̃ 
   
(0.82, 
1.402, 
2.192) 
(0.701, 
1.042, 
1.768) 
(0.581, 
0.906, 
1.511) 
(0.526, 
0.82, 
1.292) 
(0.424, 
0.61, 
1.104) 
(1.952, 
2.737, 
3.826) 
(0.39, 
0.552, 
1.104) 
 ̃ 
   
0.064, 
0.174, 
0.406 
(0.055, 
0.129, 
0.328) 
(0.045, 
0.112, 
0.28) 
(0.041, 
0.102, 
0.239) 
(0.033, 
0.076, 
0.205) 
(0.153, 
0.339, 
0.709) 
(0.03, 
0.068, 
0.205) 
Table 5.7 The geometric mean of TFN and the fuzzy weights of seven strategies 
under reduce reputation loss 
   A    B    C    D    E    F    G 
 ̃ 
   
(1, 
1.219, 
2.246) 
(0.906, 
1.486, 
2.284) 
(0.774, 
0.906, 
1.641) 
(0.743, 
1, 1.486) 
(0.635, 
0.906, 
1.346) 
(0.543, 
0.82, 
1.219) 
(0.492, 
0.82, 
1.104) 
 ̃ 
   
(0.088, 
0.17, 
0.441) 
(0.08, 
0.208, 
0.448) 
(0.068, 
0.127, 
0.322) 
(0.066, 
0.14, 
0.292) 
(0.056, 
0.127, 
0.264) 
(0.048, 
0.115, 
0.239) 
(0.043, 
0.115, 
0.217) 
Table 5.8 The geometric mean of TFN and the fuzzy weights of seven strategies 
under reduce safety and security incident related loss 
   A    B    C    D    E    F    G 
 ̃ 
   
(0.855, 
1.346, 
2.284) 
(0.624, 
0.82, 
1.575) 
(0.464, 
0.635, 
1.104) 
(0.701, 
1.042, 
1.768) 
(0.944, 
1.369, 
2.119) 
(0.74, 
1.219, 
1.952) 
(0.492, 
0.82, 
1.104) 
 ̃ 
   
(0.072, 
0.186, 
0.47) 
(0.0.52, 
0.113, 
0324) 
(0.039, 
0.088, 
0.227) 
(0.059, 
0.144, 
0.364) 
(0.079, 
0.189, 
0.437) 
(0.065, 
0.168, 
0.402) 
(0.041, 
0.113, 
0.227) 
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Step 3 Defuzzify the fuzzy weights and normalise the crisp weights 
Table 5.9 The defuzzified and standardized weights of three criteria 
 Financial loss Reputation loss Safety and security 
incident related loss 
Defuzzified 
weights 
0.648 0.146 0.318 
Standardised  
weights 
0.583 0.131 0.286 
Table 5.10 The defuzzified and standardized weights of seven strategies under 
reduce financial loss 
 A B C D E F G 
Defuzzified 
weights 
0.194 0.15 0.129 0.115 0.09 0.37 0.085 
Standardised  
weights 
0.172 0.132 0.114 0.101 0.079 0.327 0.075 
Table 5.11 The defuzzified and standardized weights of seven strategies under 
reduce reputation loss 
 A B C D E F G 
Defuzzified 
weights 
0.202 0.226 0.149 0.153 0.138 0.124 0.12 
Standardised  
weights 
0.181 0.204 0.134 0.137 0.124 0.112 0.108 
Table 5.12 The defuzzified and standardized weights of seven strategies under 
reduce safety and security incident related loss 
 A B C D E F G 
Defuzzified 
weights 
0.214 0.138 0.103 0.166 0.212 0.19 0.12 
Standardised  
weights 
0.187 0.121 0.09 0.145 0.185 0.166 0.105 
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Sample 6 
Step 1 Build fuzzy positive reciprocal matrix 
Table 6.1 The fuzzy positive reciprocal matrix of three criteria 
 Reduce financial 
loss 
Reduce 
reputation loss 
Reduce safety 
and security 
incident related 
loss 
Reduce financial loss (1, 1, 2) (1, 1, 2) (1, 1, 2) 
Reduce reputation 
loss (0.5 ,1, 1) (1, 1, 2) (0.333, 0.5, 1) 
Reduce safety and 
security incident 
related loss (0.5 ,1, 1) (1, 2, 3) (1, 1, 2) 
C.R. = 0.046 
Table 6.2 The fuzzy positive reciprocal matrix of seven strategies under reduce 
financial loss 
R
e
d
u
c
e
 f
in
a
n
c
ia
l 
lo
s
s
 
 A B C D E F G 
A (1, 1, 2) (1, 2, 3) 
(0.333, 
0.5, 1) 
(1, 2, 3) 
(0.333, 
0.5, 1) 
(0.2, 
0.25, 
0.333) 
(2, 3, 4) 
B 
(0.333, 0.5, 
1) 
(1, 1, 2) 
(0.333, 
0.5, 1) 
(0.333, 
0.5, 1) 
(0.25, 
0.333, 
0.5) 
(0.143, 
0.167, 
0.2) 
(0.333, 
0.5, 1) 
C (1, 2, 3) (1, 2, 3) (1, 1, 2) (2, 3, 4) (1, 1, 2) 
(0.167;0.
200;0.25
0) 
(1, 1, 2) 
D 
(0.333, 0.5, 
1) 
(1, 2, 3) 
(0.25, 
0.333, 
0.5) 
(1, 1, 2) (1, 1, 2) 
(0.2, 
0.25, 
0.333) 
(2, 3, 4) 
E (1, 2, 3) (2, 3, 4) (0.5 ,1, 1) (0.5 ,1, 1) (1, 1, 2) 
(0.2, 
0.25, 
0.333) 
(3, 4, 5) 
F (3, 4, 5) (5, 6, 7) (4, 5, 6) (3, 4, 5) (3, 4, 5) (1, 1, 2) (6, 7, 8) 
G 
(0.25, 
0.333, 0.5) 
(1, 2, 3) (0.5 ,1, 1) 
(0.25, 
0.333, 
0.5) 
(0.2, 
0.25, 
0.333) 
(0.125, 
0.143, 
0.167) 
(1, 1, 2) 
C.R.= 0.070 
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Table 6.3 The fuzzy positive reciprocal matrix of seven strategies under reduce 
reputation loss 
R
e
d
u
c
e
 r
e
p
u
ta
ti
o
n
 l
o
s
s
 
 A B C D E F G 
A (1, 1, 2) (1, 2, 3) (1, 1, 2) (1, 1, 2) (1, 1, 2) (1, 1, 2) (1, 2, 3) 
B 
(0.333, 
0.5, 1) 
(1, 1, 2) 
(0.25, 
0.333, 
0.5) 
(0.333, 
0.5, 1) 
(0.25, 
0.333, 
0.5) 
(0.25, 
0.333, 
0.5) 
(0.333, 
0.5, 1) 
C 
(0.5 ,1, 
1) 
(2, 3, 4) (1, 1, 2) (2, 3, 4) (1, 1, 2) 
(0.25, 
0.333, 
0.5) 
(1, 1, 2) 
D 
(0.5 ,1, 
1) 
(1, 2, 3) 
(0.25, 
0.333, 
0.5) 
(1, 1, 2) (1, 1, 2) 
(0.25, 
0.333, 
0.5) 
(2, 3, 4) 
E 
(0.5 ,1, 
1) 
(2, 3, 4) 
(0.5 ,1, 
1) 
(0.5 ,1, 
1) 
(1, 1, 2) 
(0.2, 
0.25, 
0.333) 
(3, 4, 5) 
F 
(0.5 ,1, 
1) 
(2, 3, 4) (2, 3, 4) (2, 3, 4) (3, 4, 5) (1, 1, 2) (3, 4, 5) 
G 
(0.333, 
0.5, 1) 
(1, 2, 3) 
(0.5 ,1, 
1) 
(0.25, 
0.333, 
0.5) 
(0.2, 
0.25, 
0.333) 
(0.2, 
0.25, 
0.333) 
(1, 1, 2) 
C.R.= 0.074 
Table 6.4 The fuzzy positive reciprocal matrix of seven alternatives under reduce 
safety and security incident related loss 
R
e
d
u
c
e
 s
a
fe
ty
 a
n
d
 s
e
c
u
ri
ty
 
in
c
id
e
n
t 
re
la
te
d
 l
o
s
s
 
 A B C D E F G 
A (1, 1, 2) (1, 1, 2) (1, 2, 3) (1, 1, 2) (1, 1, 2) (1, 1, 2) (1, 2, 3) 
B 
(0.5 ,1, 
1) 
(1, 1, 2) (1, 1, 2) (1, 1, 2) (1, 1, 2) 
(0.333, 
0.5, 1) 
(1, 1, 2) 
C 
(0.333, 
0.5, 1) 
(0.5 ,1, 
1) 
(1, 1, 2) (2, 3, 4) (1, 1, 2) 
(0.333, 
0.5, 1) 
(1, 1, 2) 
D 
(0.5 ,1, 
1) 
(0.5 ,1, 
1) 
(0.25, 
0.333, 
0.5) 
(1, 1, 2) (1, 1, 2) 
(0.333, 
0.5, 1) 
(1, 2, 3) 
E 
(0.5 ,1, 
1) 
(0.5 ,1, 
1) 
(0.5 ,1, 
1) 
(0.5 ,1, 
1) 
(1, 1, 2) 
(0.333, 
0.5, 1) 
(1, 2, 3) 
F 
(0.5 ,1, 
1) 
(1, 2, 3) (1, 2, 3) (1, 2, 3) (1, 2, 3) (1, 1, 2) (1, 2, 3) 
G 
(0.333, 
0.5, 1) 
(0.5 ,1, 
1) 
(0.5 ,1, 
1) 
(0.333, 
0.5, 1) 
(0.333, 
0.5, 1) 
(0.333, 
0.5, 1) 
(1, 1, 2) 
C.R.= 0.041 
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Step 2 Calculate the fuzzy weights of fuzzy positive reciprocal matrix 
Table 6.5 The geometric mean of TFN and the fuzzy weights of three criteria 
   Financial loss    Reputation loss    Safety and 
security incident 
related loss 
 ̃ 
  (1, 1, 2) (0.55, 0.794, 1.26) (0.794, 1.26, 1.817) 
 ̃ 
  (0.197, 0.327, 0.853) (0.108, 0.26, 0.538) (0.156, 0.413, 0.775) 
Table 6.6 The geometric mean of TFN and the fuzzy weights of seven strategies 
under reduce financial loss 
   A    B    C    D    E    F    G 
 ̃ 
   
(0.641, 
0.96, 
1.575) 
(0.332, 
0.445, 
0.795) 
(0.855, 
1.133, 
1.842) 
(0.615, 
0.82, 
1.346) 
(0.842, 
1.292, 
1.694) 
(3.173, 
3.888, 
5.052) 
(0.36, 
0.501, 
0.701) 
 ̃ 
   
(0.049, 
0.106, 
0.231) 
(0.025, 
0.049, 
0.117) 
(0.066, 
0.125, 
0.27) 
(0.047, 
0.091, 
0.197) 
(0.065, 
0.143, 
0.248) 
(0.244, 
0.43, 
0.741) 
(0.028, 
0.055, 
0.103) 
Table 6.7 The geometric mean of TFN and the fuzzy weights of seven strategies 
under reduce reputation loss 
   A    B    C    D    E    F    G 
 ̃ 
   
(1, 
1.219, 
2.246) 
(0.345, 
0.464, 
0.82) 
(0.906, 
1.17, 
1.811) 
(0.673, 
0.944, 
1.426) 
(0.763, 
1.17, 
1.448) 
(1.669, 
2.38, 
3.168) 
(0.401, 
0.575, 
0.855) 
 ̃ 
   
(0.085, 
0.154, 
0.39) 
(0.029, 
0.059, 
0.143) 
(0.077, 
0.148, 
0.315) 
(0.057, 
0.119, 
0.248) 
(0.065, 
0.148, 
0.252) 
(0.142, 
0.3, 
0.55) 
(0.034, 
0.073, 
0.149) 
Table 6.8 The geometric mean of TFN and the fuzzy weights of seven strategies 
under reduce safety and security incident related loss 
   A    B    C    D    E    F    G 
 ̃ 
   
(1, 
1.219, 
2.246) 
(0.774, 
0.906, 
1.641) 
(0.731, 
0.96, 
1.641) 
(0.575, 
0.855, 
1.292) 
(0.575, 
1, 1.292) 
(0.906, 
1.641, 
2.42) 
(0.438, 
0.673, 
1.104) 
 ̃ 
   
(0.086, 
0.168, 
0.449) 
(0.067, 
0.125, 
0.328) 
(0.063, 
0.132, 
0.328) 
(0.049, 
0.118, 
0.258) 
(0.049, 
0.138, 
0.258) 
(0.078, 
0.226, 
0.484) 
(0.038, 
0.093, 
0.221) 
 
  
312 
 
Step 3 Defuzzify the fuzzy weights and normalise the crisp weights 
Table 6.9 The defuzzified and standardized weights of three criteria 
 Financial loss Reputation loss Safety and security 
incident related loss 
Defuzzified 
weights 0.393 0.281 0.43 
Standardised  
weights 0.356 0.254 0.39 
Table 6.10 The defuzzified and standardized weights of seven strategies under 
reduce financial loss 
 A B C D E F G 
Defuzzified 
weights 0.117 0.057 0.14 0.101 0.147 0.451 0.059 
Standardised  
weights 0.11 0.053 0.13 0.094 0.138 0.421 0.055 
Table 6.11 The defuzzified and standardized weights of seven strategies under 
reduce reputation loss 
 A B C D E F G 
Defuzzified 
weights 0.182 0.068 0.164 0.13 0.151 0.316 0.079 
Standardised  
weights 0.167 0.062 0.15 0.12 0.139 0.29 0.072 
Table 6.12 The defuzzified and standardized weights of seven strategies under 
reduce safety and security incident related loss 
 A B C D E F G 
Defuzzified 
weights 0.201 0.149 0.153 0.13 0.143 0.244 0.105 
Standardised  
weights 0.179 0.132 0.136 0.115 0.127 0.217 0.093 
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Sample 7 
Step 1 Build fuzzy positive reciprocal matrix 
Table 7.1 The fuzzy positive reciprocal matrix of three criteria 
 Reduce financial 
loss 
Reduce 
reputation loss 
Reduce safety 
and security 
incident related 
loss 
Reduce financial loss (1, 1, 2) (7, 8, 9) (3, 4, 5) 
Reduce reputation 
loss 
(0.111, 0.125, 
0.143) 
(1, 1, 2) (1, 1, 2) 
Reduce safety and 
security incident 
related loss (0.2, 0.25, 0.333) (0.5, 1, 1) (1, 1, 2) 
C.R. = 0.046 
Table 7.2 The fuzzy positive reciprocal matrix of seven strategies under reduce 
financial loss 
R
e
d
u
c
e
 f
in
a
n
c
ia
l 
lo
s
s
 
 A B C D E F G 
A (1, 1, 2) (1, 1, 2) (1, 2, 3) (1, 1, 2) (1, 2, 3) (1, 2, 3) (1, 2, 3) 
B (0.5, 1, 1) (1, 1, 2) (2, 3, 4) (2, 3, 4) (1, 2, 3) (1, 2, 3) (2, 3, 4) 
C (0.333, 
0.5, 1) 
(0.25, 
0.333, 
0.5) 
(1, 1, 2) (1, 1, 2) 
(1, 2, 3) 
(1, 1, 2) (1, 1, 2) 
D 
(0.5, 1, 1) 
(0.25, 
0.333, 
0.5) (0.5, 1, 1) 
(1, 1, 2) (1, 1, 2) (1, 1, 2) (1, 1, 2) 
E 
(0.333, 
0.5, 1) 
(0.333, 
0.5, 1) 
(0.333, 
0.5, 1) (0.5, 1, 1) (1, 1, 2) 
(0.333, 
0.5, 1) (1, 1, 2) 
F 
(0.333, 
0.5, 1) 
(0.333, 
0.5, 1) (0.5, 1, 1) (0.5, 1, 1) (1, 2, 3) (1, 1, 2) (1, 2, 3) 
G (0.333, 
0.5, 1) 
(0.25, 
0.333, 
0.5) (0.5, 1, 1) (0.5, 1, 1) (0.5, 1, 1) 
(0.333, 
0.5, 1) (1, 1, 2) 
C.R.=0.025 
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Table 7.3 The fuzzy positive reciprocal matrix of seven strategies under reduce 
reputation loss 
R
e
d
u
c
e
 r
e
p
u
ta
ti
o
n
 l
o
s
s
 
 A B C D E F G 
A (1, 1, 2) (1, 1, 2) (1, 2, 3) (1, 1, 2) (1, 1, 2) (1, 2, 3) (1, 2, 3) 
B 
(0.5, 1, 
1) 
(1, 1, 2) 
(1, 2, 3) 
(1, 1, 2) (1, 1, 2) (1, 1, 2) 
(1, 2, 3) 
C 
(0.333, 
0.5, 1) 
(0.333, 
0.5, 1) 
(1, 1, 2) (1, 1, 2) (1, 1, 2) (0.333, 
0.5, 1) 
(1, 1, 2) 
D 
(0.5, 1, 
1) 
(0.5, 1, 
1) 
(0.5, 1, 
1) 
(1, 1, 2) (1, 1, 2) (1, 1, 2) (1, 1, 2) 
E 
(0.5, 1, 
1) 
(0.5, 1, 
1) 
(0.5, 1, 
1) 
(0.5, 1, 
1) 
(1, 1, 2) (1, 1, 2) (1, 1, 2) 
F 
(0.333, 
0.5, 1) 
(0.5, 1, 
1) (1, 2, 3) 
(0.5, 1, 
1) 
(0.5, 1, 
1) 
(1, 1, 2) (1, 1, 2) 
G 
(0.333, 
0.5, 1) 
(0.333, 
0.5, 1) 
(0.5, 1, 
1) 
(0.5, 1, 
1) 
(0.5, 1, 
1) 
(0.5, 1, 
1) 
(1, 1, 2) 
C.R.= 0.020 
Table 7.4 The fuzzy positive reciprocal matrix of seven alternatives under reduce 
safety and security incident related loss 
R
e
d
u
c
e
 s
a
fe
ty
 a
n
d
 s
e
c
u
ri
ty
 
in
c
id
e
n
t 
re
la
te
d
 l
o
s
s
 
 A B C D E F G 
A (1, 1, 2) (1, 1, 2) (1, 1, 2) (1, 1, 2) (1, 2, 3) (1, 2, 3) (1, 2, 3) 
B 
(0.5, 1, 
1) 
(1, 1, 2) (1, 1, 2) 
(1, 2, 3) (1, 2, 3) (1, 2, 3) (1, 2, 3) 
C 
(0.5, 1, 
1) 
(0.5, 1, 
1) 
(1, 1, 2) 
(1, 2, 3) 
(1, 1, 2) (0.333, 
0.5, 1) (1, 2, 3) 
D 
(0.5, 1, 
1) 
(0.333, 
0.5, 1) 
(0.333, 
0.5, 1) 
(1, 1, 2) (1, 1, 2) (1, 1, 2) 
(1, 2, 3) 
E 
(0.333, 
0.5, 1) 
(0.333, 
0.5, 1) 
(0.5, 1, 
1) 
(0.5, 1, 
1) 
(1, 1, 2) (0.333, 
0.5, 1) 
(1, 1, 2) 
F 
(0.333, 
0.5, 1) 
(0.333, 
0.5, 1) (1, 2, 3) 
(0.5, 1, 
1) (1, 2, 3) 
(1, 1, 2) 
(1, 2, 3) 
G 
(0.333, 
0.5, 1) 
(0.333, 
0.5, 1) 
(0.333, 
0.5, 1) 
(0.333, 
0.5, 1) 
(0.5, 1, 
1) 
(0.333, 
0.5, 1) 
(1, 1, 2) 
C.R.= 0.037 
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Step 2 Calculate the fuzzy weights of fuzzy positive reciprocal matrix 
Table 7.5 The geometric mean of TFN and the fuzzy weights of three criteria 
   Financial loss    Reputation loss    Safety and 
security incident 
related loss 
 ̃ 
  (2.759, 3.175, 4.481) (0.481, 0.5, 0.83) (0.464, 0.63, 0.874) 
 ̃ 
  (0.446, 0.738, 1.21) (0.078, 0.116, 0.224) (0.075, 0.146, 0.236) 
Table 7.6 The geometric mean of TFN and the fuzzy weights of seven strategies 
under reduce financial loss 
   A    B    C    D    E    F    G 
 ̃ 
   
(1, 
1.486, 
2.251) 
(1.219, 
1.952, 
2.737) 
(0.701, 
0.855, 
1.575) 
(0.673, 
0.855, 
1.346) 
(0.483, 
0.673, 
1.219) 
(0.599, 
1, 1.511) 
(0.445, 
0.701, 1) 
 ̃ 
   
(0.084, 
0.198, 
0.492) 
(0.102, 
0.26, 
0.535) 
(0.059, 
0.114, 
0.307) 
(0.057, 
0.114, 
0.263) 
(0.041, 
0.089, 
0.238) 
(0.050, 
0.133, 
0.295) 
(0.037, 
0.093, 
0.195) 
Table 7.7 The geometric mean of TFN and the fuzzy weights of seven strategies 
under reduce reputation loss 
   A    B    C    D    E    F    G 
 ̃ 
   
(1, 
1.346, 
2.38) 
(0.906, 
1.219, 
2.034) 
(0.624, 
0.743, 
1.486) 
(0.743, 
1, 1.486) 
(0.673, 
1, 1.346) 
(0.635, 
1, 1.426) 
(0.492, 
0.82, 
1.104) 
 ̃ 
   
(0.089, 
0.189, 
0.469) 
(0.08, 
0.171, 
0.401) 
(0.055, 
0.104, 
0.293) 
(0.066, 
0.14, 
0.293) 
(0.06, 
0.14, 
0.265) 
(0.056, 
0.14, 
0.281) 
(0.044, 
0.115, 
0.218) 
Table 7.8 The geometric mean of TFN and the fuzzy weights of seven strategies 
under reduce safety and security incident related loss 
   A    B    C    D    E    F    G 
 ̃ 
   
(1, 
1.346, 
2.38) 
(0.906, 
1.486, 
2.284) 
(0.701, 
1.104, 
1.669) 
(0.662, 
0.906, 
1.575) 
(0.512, 
0.743, 
1.219) 
(0.662, 
1.104, 
1.768) 
(0.413, 
0.61, 
1.104) 
 ̃ 
   
(0.083, 
0.184, 
0.49) 
(0.075, 
0.204, 
0.47) 
(0.058, 
0.151, 
0.344) 
(0.055, 
0.124, 
0.324) 
(0.043, 
0.102, 
0.251) 
(0.055, 
0.151, 
0.364) 
(0.034, 
0.084, 
0.227) 
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Step 3 Defuzzify the fuzzy weights and normalise the crisp weights 
Table 7.9 The defuzzified and standardized weights of three criteria 
 Financial loss Reputation loss Safety and security 
incident related loss 
Defuzzified 
weights 0.768 0.128 0.149 
Standardised  
weights 0.735 0.122 0.143 
Table 7.10 The defuzzified and standardized weights of seven strategies under 
reduce financial loss 
 A B C D E F G 
Defuzzified 
weights 0.228 0.279 0.137 0.129 0.106 0.146 0.101 
Standardised  
weights 0.202 0.248 0.122 0.115 0.094 0.13 0.09 
Table 7.11 The defuzzified and standardized weights of seven strategies under 
reduce reputation loss 
 A B C D E F G 
Defuzzified 
weights 0.219 0.194 0.128 0.153 0.148 0.15 0.12 
Standardised  
weights 0.197 0.175 0.115 0.138 0.133 0.135 0.108 
Table 7.12 The defuzzified and standardized weights of seven strategies under 
reduce safety and security incident related loss 
 A B C D E F G 
Defuzzified 
weights 0.219 0.227 0.168 0.146 0.117 0.171 0.099 
Standardised  
weights 0.191 0.198 0.146 0.127 0.102 0.149 0.087 
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Sample 8 
Step 1 Build fuzzy positive reciprocal matrix 
Table 8.1 The fuzzy positive reciprocal matrix of three criteria 
 Reduce 
financial loss 
Reduce 
reputation loss 
Reduce safety 
and security 
incident related 
loss 
Reduce financial loss (1, 1, 2) (4, 5, 6) (1, 1, 2) 
Reduce reputation loss (0.167, 0.2, 0.25) (1, 1, 2) (0.333, 0.5, 1) 
Reduce safety and 
security incident related 
loss 
(0.5, 1, 1) (1, 2, 3) (1, 1, 2) 
C.R. = 0.081 
Table 8.2 The fuzzy positive reciprocal matrix of seven strategies under reduce 
financial loss 
R
e
d
u
c
e
 f
in
a
n
c
ia
l 
lo
s
s
 
 A B C D E F G 
A (1, 1, 2) (1, 1, 2) (1, 1, 2) 
(0.333, 
0.5, 1) 
(0.25, 
0.333, 
0.5) 
(2, 3, 4) (4, 5, 6) 
B (0.5, 1, 1) (1, 1, 2) 
(0.333, 
0.5, 1) 
(0.333, 
0.5, 1) 
(0.2, 
0.250, 
0.333) 
(1, 2, 3) (3, 4, 5) 
C (0.5, 1, 1) (1, 2, 3) (1, 1, 2) (1, 2, 3) (1, 2, 3) (3, 4, 5) (4, 5, 6) 
D (1, 2, 3) (1, 2, 3) 
(0.333, 
0.5, 1) 
(1, 1, 2) 
(0.333, 
0.5, 1) 
(1, 2, 3) (2, 3, 4) 
E (2, 3, 4) (3, 4, 5) 
(0.333, 
0.5, 1) 
(1, 2, 3) (1, 1, 2) (2, 3, 4) (3, 4, 5) 
F 
(0.25, 
0.333, 
0.5) 
(0.333, 
0.5, 1) 
(0.2, 
0.250, 
0.333) 
(0.333, 
0.5, 1) 
(0.25, 
0.333, 
0.5) 
(1, 1, 2) (1, 1, 2) 
G 
(0.167, 
0.2, 0.25) 
(0.2, 
0.250, 
0.333) 
(0.167, 
0.2, 0.25) 
(0.25, 
0.333, 
0.5) 
(0.2, 
0.250, 
0.333) 
(0.5, 1, 1) (1, 1, 2) 
C.R.= 0.055 
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Table 8.3 The fuzzy positive reciprocal matrix of seven strategies under reduce 
reputation loss 
R
e
d
u
c
e
 r
e
p
u
ta
ti
o
n
 l
o
s
s
 
 A B C D E F G 
A (1, 1, 2) (1, 1, 2) (1, 1, 2) 
(0.2, 
0.250, 
0.333) 
(0.333, 
0.5, 1) 
(1, 1, 2) (4, 5, 6) 
B 
(0.5, 1, 
1) 
(1, 1, 2) (1, 1, 2) 
(0.333, 
0.5, 1) 
(0.333, 
0.5, 1) 
(2, 3, 4) (4, 5, 6) 
C 
(0.5, 1, 
1) 
(0.5, 1, 
1) 
(1, 1, 2) (1, 1, 2) (1, 1, 2) (1, 2, 3) (4, 5, 6) 
D (3, 4, 5) (1, 2, 3) 
(0.5, 1, 
1) 
(1, 1, 2) (1, 1, 2) (2, 3, 4) (3, 4, 5) 
E (1, 2, 3) (1, 2, 3) 
(0.5, 1, 
1) 
(0.5, 1, 
1) 
(1, 1, 2) (4, 5, 6) (4, 5, 6) 
F 
(0.5, 1, 
1) 
(0.25, 
0.333, 
0.5) 
(0.333, 
0.5, 1) 
(0.25, 
0.333, 
0.5) 
(0.167, 
0.2, 
0.25) 
(1, 1, 2) (1, 1, 2) 
G 
(0.167, 
0.2, 
0.25) 
(0.167, 
0.2, 
0.25) 
(0.167, 
0.2, 
0.25) 
(0.2, 
0.250, 
0.333) 
(0.167, 
0.2, 
0.25) 
(0.5, 1, 
1) 
(1, 1, 2) 
C.R.= 0.045 
Table 8.4 The fuzzy positive reciprocal matrix of seven alternatives under reduce 
safety and security incident related loss 
R
e
d
u
c
e
 s
a
fe
ty
 a
n
d
 s
e
c
u
ri
ty
 i
n
c
id
e
n
t 
re
la
te
d
 l
o
s
s
 
 A B C D E F G 
A (1, 1, 2) (1, 1, 2) (1, 1, 2) (1, 1, 2) (1, 1, 2) (1, 2, 3) (3, 4, 5) 
B 
(0.5, 1, 
1) 
(1, 1, 2) (1, 1, 2) (1, 1, 2) (1, 1, 2) (2, 3, 4) 
(5, 6, 7) 
C 
(0.5, 1, 
1) 
(0.5, 1, 
1) 
(1, 1, 2) (2, 3, 4) (2, 3, 4) (3, 4, 5) (4, 5, 6) 
D 
(0.5, 1, 
1) 
(0.5, 1, 
1) 
(0.25, 
0.333, 
0.5) 
(1, 1, 2) (1, 1, 2) (2, 3, 4) (4, 5, 6) 
E 
(0.5, 1, 
1) 
(0.5, 1, 
1) 
(0.25, 
0.333, 
0.5) 
(0.5, 1, 
1) 
(1, 1, 2) (1, 2, 3) (4, 5, 6) 
F 
(0.333, 
0.5, 1) 
(0.25, 
0.333, 
0.5) 
(0.2, 
0.250, 
0.333) 
(0.25, 
0.333, 
0.5) 
(0.333, 
0.5, 1) 
(1, 1, 2) (1, 2, 3) 
G 
(0.2, 
0.250, 
0.333) 
(0.143, 
0.167, 
0.2) 
(0.167, 
0.2, 
0.25) 
(0.167, 
0.2, 
0.25) 
(0.167, 
0.2, 
0.25) 
(0.333, 
0.5, 1) 
(1, 1, 2) 
C.R.= 0.026 
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Step 2 Calculate the fuzzy weights of fuzzy positive reciprocal matrix 
Table 8.5 The geometric mean of TFN and the fuzzy weights of three criteria 
   Financial loss    Reputation loss    Safety and 
security incident 
related loss 
 ̃ 
  (1.587, 1.71, 2.884) (0.382, 0.464, 0.794) (0.794, 1.26, 1.817) 
 ̃ 
  (0.289, 0.498, 1.044) (0.069, 0.135, 0.287) (0.144, 0367, 0.658) 
Table 8.6 The geometric mean of TFN and the fuzzy weights of seven strategies 
under reduce financial loss 
   A    B    C    D    E    F    G 
 ̃ 
   
(0.944, 
1.14, 
1.919) 
(0.615, 
0.906, 
1.389) 
(1.292, 
2.065, 
2.874) 
(0.807, 
1.292, 
2.155) 
(1.426, 
2.034, 
3.04) 
(0.391, 
0.492, 
0.855) 
(0.281, 
0.363, 
0.492) 
 ̃ 
   
(0.074, 
0.137, 
0.334) 
(0.048, 
0.109, 
0.241) 
(0.102, 
0.249, 
0.499) 
(0.063, 
0.156, 
0.374) 
(0.112, 
0.245, 
0.528) 
(0.031, 
0.059, 
0.149) 
(0.022, 
0.044, 
0.085) 
Table 8.7 The geometric mean of TFN and the fuzzy weights of seven strategies 
under reduce reputation loss 
   A    B    C    D    E    F    G 
 ̃ 
   
(0.828, 
0.935, 
1.641) 
(0.891, 
1.208, 
1.919) 
(1, 
1.389, 
2.034) 
(1.369, 
1.919, 
2.753) 
(1.219, 
1.931, 
2.521) 
(0.403, 
0.526, 
0.82) 
(0.259, 
0.327, 
0.427) 
 ̃ 
   
(0.068, 
0.114, 
0.275) 
(0.074, 
0.147, 
0.322) 
(0.083, 
0.169, 
0.341) 
(0.113, 
0.233, 
0.461) 
(0.101, 
0.234, 
0.422) 
(0.033, 
0.064, 
0.137) 
(0.021, 
0.04, 
0.072) 
Table 8.8 The geometric mean of TFN and the fuzzy weights of seven strategies 
under reduce safety and security incident related loss 
   A    B    C    D    E    F    G 
 ̃ 
   
(1.17, 
1.346, 
2.416) 
(1.258, 
1.511, 
2.392) 
(1.426, 
2.1, 
2.667) 
(0.906, 
1.258, 
1.739) 
(0.743, 
1.188, 
1.511) 
(0.391, 
0.543, 
0.906) 
(0.239, 
0.289, 
0.414) 
 ̃ 
   
(0.097, 
0.163, 
0.394) 
(0.104, 
0.184, 
0.39) 
(0.118, 
0.255, 
0.435) 
(0.075, 
0.153, 
0.283) 
(0.062, 
0.144, 
0.246) 
(0.032, 
0.066, 
0.148) 
(0.02, 
0.035, 
0.068) 
 
  
320 
 
Step 3 Defuzzify the fuzzy weights and normalise the crisp weights 
Table 8.9 The defuzzified and standardized weights of three criteria 
 Financial loss Reputation loss Safety and security 
incident related loss 
Defuzzified 
weights 0.554 0.15 0.378 
Standardised  
weights 0.512 0.138 0.35 
Table 8.10 The defuzzified and standardized weights of seven strategies under 
reduce financial loss 
 A B C D E F G 
Defuzzified 
weights 0.16 0.121 0.266 0.177 0.27 0.069 0.047 
Standardised  
weights 0.144 0.109 0.24 0.159 0.243 0.062 0.042 
Table 8.11 The defuzzified and standardized weights of seven strategies under 
reduce reputation loss 
 A B C D E F G 
Defuzzified 
weights 0.133 0.164 0.183 0.251 0.243 0.071 0.042 
Standardised  
weights 0.122 0.151 0.168 0.231 0.224 0.065 0.039 
Table 8.12 The defuzzified and standardized weights of seven strategies under 
reduce safety and security incident related loss 
 A B C D E F G 
Defuzzified 
weights 0.191 0.205 0.262 0.162 0.148 0.074 0.038 
Standardised  
weights 0.177 0.19 0.243 0.15 0.137 0.069 0.035 
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Sample 9 
Step 1 Build fuzzy positive reciprocal matrix 
Table 9.1 The fuzzy positive reciprocal matrix of three criteria 
 Reduce financial 
loss 
Reduce 
reputation loss 
Reduce safety 
and security 
incident related 
loss 
Reduce financial loss (1, 1, 2) (3, 4, 5) (0.25, 0.333, 0.5) 
Reduce reputation 
loss 
(0.2, 0.25, 0.333) (1, 1, 2) (0.167, 0.2, 0.25) 
Reduce safety and 
security incident 
related loss 
(2, 3, 4) (4, 5, 6) (1, 1, 2) 
C.R. = 0.074 
Table 9.2 The fuzzy positive reciprocal matrix of seven strategies under reduce 
financial loss 
R
e
d
u
c
e
 f
in
a
n
c
ia
l 
lo
s
s
 
 A B C D E F G 
A (1, 1, 2) (1, 2, 3) (2, 3, 4) (2, 3, 4) (1, 2, 3) 
(0.333, 
0.5, 1) 
(2, 3, 4) 
B 
(0.333, 
0.5, 1) 
(1, 1, 2) (2, 3, 4) (2, 3, 4) (1, 2, 3) (2, 3, 4) 
(4, 5, 6) 
C 
(0.25, 
0.333, 
0.5) 
(0.25, 
0.333, 
0.5) 
(1, 1, 2) (1, 1, 2) (1, 1, 2) 
(0.333, 
0.5, 1) 
(1, 1, 2) 
D 
(0.25, 
0.333, 
0.5) 
(0.25, 
0.333, 
0.5) 
(0.5, 1, 1) (1, 1, 2) (1, 1, 2) 
(0.25, 
0.333, 
0.5) 
(2, 3, 4) 
E 
(0.333, 
0.5, 1) 
(0.333, 
0.5, 1) 
(0.5, 1, 1) (0.5, 1, 1) (1, 1, 2) 
(0.333, 
0.5, 1) 
(2, 3, 4) 
F (1, 2, 3) 
(0.25, 
0.333, 
0.5) 
(1, 2, 3) (2, 3, 4) (1, 2, 3) (1, 1, 2) (2, 3, 4) 
G 
(0.25, 
0.333, 
0.5) 
(0.167, 
0.2, 0.25) 
(0.5, 1, 1) 
(0.25, 
0.333, 
0.5) 
(0.25, 
0.333, 
0.5) 
(0.25, 
0.333, 
0.5) 
(1, 1, 2) 
C.R.= 0.061 
 
  
322 
 
Table 9.3 The fuzzy positive reciprocal matrix of seven strategies under reduce 
reputation loss 
R
e
d
u
c
e
 r
e
p
u
ta
ti
o
n
 l
o
s
s
 
 A B C D E F G 
A (1, 1, 2) 
(0.333, 
0.5, 1) 
(1, 1, 2) (1, 1, 2) (1, 1, 2) (3, 4, 5) 
(0.25, 
0.333, 
0.5) 
B (1, 2, 3) (1, 1, 2) (2, 3, 4) (2, 3, 4) (2, 3, 4) (3, 4, 5) (1, 2, 3) 
C 
(0.5, 1, 
1) 
(0.25, 
0.333, 
0.5) 
(1, 1, 2) (2, 3, 4) (1, 2, 3) (2, 3, 4) (1, 2, 3) 
D 
(0.5, 1, 
1) 
(0.25, 
0.333, 
0.5) 
(0.25, 
0.333, 
0.5) 
(1, 1, 2) 
(0.333, 
0.5, 1) 
(1, 2, 3) 
(0.333, 
0.5, 1) 
E 
(0.5, 1, 
1) 
(0.25, 
0.333, 
0.5) 
(0.333, 
0.5, 1) 
(1, 2, 3) (1, 1, 2) (1, 2, 3) 
(0.333, 
0.5, 1) 
F 
(0.2, 
0.25, 
0.333) 
(0.2, 
0.25, 
0.333) 
(0.25, 
0.333, 
0.5) 
(0.333, 
0.5, 1) 
(0.333, 
0.5, 1) 
(1, 1, 2) 
(0.333, 
0.5, 1) 
G (2, 3, 4) 
(0.333, 
0.5, 1) 
(0.333, 
0.5, 1) 
(1, 2, 3) (1, 2, 3) (1, 2, 3) (1, 1, 2) 
C.R.= 0.053 
Table 9.4 The fuzzy positive reciprocal matrix of seven alternatives under reduce 
safety and security incident related loss 
R
e
d
u
c
e
 s
a
fe
ty
 a
n
d
 s
e
c
u
ri
ty
 i
n
c
id
e
n
t 
re
la
te
d
 l
o
s
s
 
 A B C D E F G 
A (1, 1, 2) (1, 2, 3) (1, 1, 2) (1, 2, 3) (1, 2, 3) (3, 4, 5) (3, 4, 5) 
B 
(0.333, 
0.5, 1) 
(1, 1, 2) (1, 2, 3) (1, 2, 3) (2, 3, 4) (2, 3, 4) (2, 3, 4) 
C 
(0.5, 1, 
1) 
(0.333, 
0.5, 1) 
(1, 1, 2) (1, 2, 3) (1, 2, 3) (1, 2, 3) (1, 2, 3) 
D 
(0.333, 
0.5, 1) 
(0.333, 
0.5, 1) 
(0.333, 
0.5, 1) 
(1, 1, 2) (1, 2, 3) (1, 2, 3) (1, 2, 3) 
E 
(0.333, 
0.5, 1) 
(0.25, 
0.333, 
0.5) 
(0.333, 
0.5, 1) 
(0.333, 
0.5, 1) 
(1, 1, 2) (2, 3, 4) (1, 2, 3) 
F 
(0.2, 
0.25, 
0.333) 
(0.25, 
0.333, 
0.5) 
(0.333, 
0.5, 1) 
(0.333, 
0.5, 1) 
(0.25, 
0.333, 
0.5) 
(1, 1, 2) (1, 1, 2) 
G 
(0.2, 
0.25, 
0.333) 
(0.25, 
0.333, 
0.5) 
(0.333, 
0.5, 1) 
(0.333, 
0.5, 1) 
(0.333, 
0.5, 1) 
(0.5, 1, 
1) 
(1, 1, 2) 
C.R.= 0.035 
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Step 2 Calculate the fuzzy weights of fuzzy positive reciprocal matrix 
Table 9.5 The geometric mean of TFN and the fuzzy weights of three criteria 
   Financial loss    Reputation loss    Safety and 
security incident 
related loss 
 ̃ 
  (0.909, 1.101, 1.71) (0.322, 0.368, 0.55) (2, 2.466, 3.634) 
 ̃ 
  (0.154, 0.28, 0.529) (0.055, 0.094, 0.17) (0.339, 0.627, 1.125) 
Table 9.6 The geometric mean of TFN and the fuzzy weights of seven strategies 
under reduce financial loss 
   A    B    C    D    E    F    G 
 ̃ 
   
(1.15, 
1.768, 
2.737) 
(1.402, 
2.015, 
3.022) 
(0.575, 
0.662, 
1.219) 
(0.552, 
0.731, 
1.104) 
(0.566, 
0.869, 
1.346) 
(1, 
1.575, 
2.38) 
(0.318, 
0.424, 
0.61) 
 ̃ 
   
(0.093, 
0.22, 
0.492) 
(0.113, 
0.251, 
0.543) 
(0.046, 
0.082, 
0.219) 
(0.044, 
0.091, 
0.198) 
(0.046, 
0.108, 
0.242) 
(0.081, 
0.196, 
0.428) 
(0.026, 
0.053, 
0.11) 
Table 9.7 The geometric mean of TFN and the fuzzy weights of seven strategies 
under reduce reputation loss 
   A    B    C    D    E    F    G 
 ̃ 
   
(0.82, 
0.944, 
1.694) 
(1.575, 
2.38, 
3.445) 
(0.906, 
1.426, 
2.034) 
(0.445, 
0.662, 
1.06) 
(0.543, 
0.855, 
1.369) 
(0.323, 
0.427, 
0.731) 
(0.807, 
1.292, 
2.155) 
 ̃ 
   
(0.066, 
0.118, 
0.313) 
(0.126, 
0.298, 
0.636) 
(0.073, 
0.179, 
0.375) 
(0.036, 
0.083, 
0.196) 
(0.043, 
0.107, 
0.253) 
(0.026, 
0.054, 
0.135) 
(0.065, 
0.162, 
0.398) 
Table 9.8 The geometric mean of TFN and the fuzzy weights of seven strategies 
under reduce safety and security incident related loss 
   A    B    C    D    E    F    G 
 ̃ 
   
(1.369, 
2, 3.092) 
(1.15, 
1.768, 
2.737) 
(0.774, 
1.346, 
2.068) 
(0.624, 1, 
1.768) 
(0.566, 
0.82, 
1.426) 
(0.391, 
0.492, 
0.855) 
(0.369, 
0.521, 
0.855) 
 ̃ 
   
(0.107, 
0.252, 
0.59) 
(0.09, 
0.222, 
0.522) 
(0.06, 
0.169, 
0.395) 
(0.049, 
0.126, 
0.337) 
(0.044, 
0.103, 
0.272) 
(0.031, 
0.062, 
0.163) 
(0.029, 
0.066, 
0.163) 
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Step 3 Defuzzify the fuzzy weights and normalise the crisp weights 
Table 9.9 The defuzzified and standardized weights of three criteria 
 Financial loss Reputation loss Safety and security 
incident related loss 
Defuzzified 
weights 0.3 0.1 0.662 
Standardised  
weights 0.283 0.094 0.623 
Table 9.10 The defuzzified and standardized weights of seven strategies under 
reduce financial loss 
 A B C D E F G 
Defuzzified 
weights 0.244 0.276 0.099 0.101 0.12 0.215 0.058 
Standardised  
weights 0.219 0.248 0.089 0.091 0.108 0.193 0.052 
Table 9.11 The defuzzified and standardized weights of seven strategies under 
reduce reputation loss 
 A B C D E F G 
Defuzzified 
weights 0.142 0.326 0.194 0.094 0.121 0.062 0.185 
Standardised  
weights 0.126 0.29 0.172 0.084 0.107 0.056 0.165 
Table 9.12 The defuzzified and standardized weights of seven strategies under 
reduce safety and security incident related loss 
 A B C D E F G 
Defuzzified 
weights 0.284 0.25 0.189 0.148 0.122 0.074 0.076 
Standardised  
weights 0.249 0.219 0.165 0.13 0.106 0.064 0.066 
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Sample 10 
Step 1 Build fuzzy positive reciprocal matrix 
Table 10.1 The fuzzy positive reciprocal matrix of three criteria 
 Reduce financial 
loss 
Reduce 
reputation loss 
Reduce safety 
and security 
incident related 
loss 
Reduce financial loss (1, 1, 2) (1, 1, 2) (0.25, 0.333, 0.5) 
Reduce reputation 
loss 
(0.5, 1, 1) (1, 1, 2) (0.143, 0.167, 0.2) 
Reduce safety and 
security incident 
related loss 
(2, 3, 4) (5, 6, 7) (1, 1, 2) 
C.R. = 0.046 
Table 10.2 The fuzzy positive reciprocal matrix of seven strategies under reduce 
financial loss 
R
e
d
u
c
e
 f
in
a
n
c
ia
l 
lo
s
s
 
 A B C D E F G 
A (1, 1, 2) (2, 3, 4) (1, 1, 2) 
(0.333, 
0.5, 1) 
(1, 1, 2) (1, 1, 2) (1, 2, 3) 
B 
(0.25, 
0.333, 
0.5) 
(1, 1, 2) (1, 1, 2) 
(0.333, 
0.5, 1) 
(0.25, 
0.333, 
0.5) 
(0.333, 
0.5, 1) 
(1, 1, 2) 
C (0.5, 1, 1) (0.5, 1, 1) (1, 1, 2) 
(0.333, 
0.5, 1) 
(0.333, 
0.5, 1) 
(0.333, 
0.5, 1) 
(1, 1, 2) 
D (1, 2, 3) (1, 2, 3) (1, 2, 3) (1, 1, 2) 
(0.333, 
0.5, 1) 
(3, 4, 5) (2, 3, 4) 
E (0.5, 1, 1) (2, 3, 4) (1, 2, 3) (1, 2, 3) (1, 1, 2) (2, 3, 4) (3, 4, 5) 
F (0.5, 1, 1) (1, 2, 3) (1, 2, 3) 
(0.200, 
0.25, 
0.333) 
(0.25, 
0.333, 
0.5) 
(1, 1, 2) (1, 1, 2) 
G 
(0.333, 
0.5, 1) 
(0.5, 1, 1) (0.5, 1, 1) 
(0.25, 
0.333, 
0.5) 
(0.200, 
0.25, 
0.333) 
(0.5, 1, 1) (1, 1, 2) 
C.R.= 0.048 
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Table 10.3 The fuzzy positive reciprocal matrix of seven strategies under reduce 
reputation loss 
R
e
d
u
c
e
 r
e
p
u
ta
ti
o
n
 l
o
s
s
 
 A B C D E F G 
A (1, 1, 2) (1, 1, 2) 
(0.333, 
0.5, 1) 
(1, 1, 2) (1, 1, 2) (1, 1, 2) (1, 1, 2) 
B 
(0.5, 1, 
1) 
(1, 1, 2) (1, 1, 2) (1, 1, 2) 
(0.333, 
0.5, 1) 
(0.333, 
0.5, 1) 
(1, 2, 3) 
C (1, 2, 3) 
(0.5, 1, 
1) 
(1, 1, 2) (1, 1, 2) (1, 2, 3) (1, 2, 3) (1, 2, 3) 
D 
(0.5, 1, 
1) 
(0.5, 1, 
1) 
(0.5, 1, 
1) 
(1, 1, 2) (1, 1, 2) (2, 3, 4) (3, 4, 5) 
E 
(0.5, 1, 
1) 
(1, 2, 3) 
(0.333, 
0.5, 1) 
(0.5, 1, 
1) 
(1, 1, 2) (1, 1, 2) (2, 3, 4) 
F 
(0.5, 1, 
1) 
(1, 2, 3) 
(0.333, 
0.5, 1) 
(0.25, 
0.333, 
0.5) 
(0.5, 1, 
1) 
(1, 1, 2) (1, 2, 3) 
G 
(0.5, 1, 
1) 
(0.333, 
0.5, 1) 
(0.333, 
0.5, 1) 
(0.200, 
0.25, 
0.333) 
(0.25, 
0.333, 
0.5) 
(0.333, 
0.5, 1) 
(1, 1, 2) 
C.R.= 0.053 
Table 10.4 The fuzzy positive reciprocal matrix of seven alternatives under 
reduce safety and security incident related loss 
R
e
d
u
c
e
 s
a
fe
ty
 a
n
d
 s
e
c
u
ri
ty
 
in
c
id
e
n
t 
re
la
te
d
 l
o
s
s
 
 A B C D E F G 
A (1, 1, 2) (1, 1, 2) (1, 1, 2) (1, 2, 3) (1, 1, 2) (1, 1, 2) (1, 2, 3) 
B 
(0.5, 1, 
1) 
(1, 1, 2) 
(0.333, 
0.5, 1) 
(1, 1, 2) (1, 1, 2) (1, 1, 2) (1, 2, 3) 
C 
(0.5, 1, 
1) 
(1, 2, 3) (1, 1, 2) (1, 1, 2) (1, 1, 2) (2, 3, 4) (2, 3, 4) 
D 
(0.333, 
0.5, 1) 
(0.5, 1, 
1) 
(0.5, 1, 
1) 
(1, 1, 2) (1, 1, 2) (3, 4, 5) (3, 4, 5) 
E 
(0.5, 1, 
1) 
(0.5, 1, 
1) 
(0.5, 1, 
1) 
(0.5, 1, 
1) 
(1, 1, 2) (4, 5, 6) (3, 4, 5) 
F 
(0.5, 1, 
1) 
(0.5, 1, 
1) 
(0.25, 
0.333, 
0.5) 
(0.2, 
0.25, 
0.333) 
(0.167, 
0.2, 
0.25) 
(1, 1, 2) (1, 1, 2) 
G 
(0.333, 
0.5, 1) 
(0.333, 
0.5, 1) 
(0.25, 
0.333, 
0.5) 
(0.2, 
0.25, 
0.333) 
(0.2, 
0.25, 
0.333) 
(0.5, 1, 
1) 
(1, 1, 2) 
C.R.= 0.056 
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Step 2 Calculate the fuzzy weights of fuzzy positive reciprocal matrix 
Table 10.5 The geometric mean of TFN and the fuzzy weights of three criteria 
   Financial loss    Reputation loss    Safety and 
security incident 
related loss 
 ̃ 
  (0.63, 0.693, 1.26) (0.415, 0.55, 0.737) (2.154, 2.621, 3.826) 
 ̃ 
  (0.108, 0.179, 0.394) (0.071, 0.142, 0.23) (0.37, 0.678, 1.196) 
Table 10.6 The geometric mean of TFN and the fuzzy weights of seven 
strategies under reduce financial loss 
   A    B    C    D    E    F    G 
 ̃ 
   
(0.944, 
0.17, 
2.119) 
(0.492, 
0.599, 
1.104) 
(0.512, 
0.743, 
1.219) 
(1.104, 
1.739, 
2.712) 
(1.292, 
2.034, 
2.826) 
(0.59, 
0.855, 
1.292) 
(0.414, 
0.635, 
0.855) 
 ̃ 
   
(0.078, 
0.15, 
0.396) 
(0.041, 
0.077, 
0.206) 
(0.042, 
0.096, 
0.228) 
(0.091, 
0.224, 
0.507) 
(0.107, 
0.262, 
0.528) 
(0.049, 
0.11, 
0.242) 
(0.034, 
0.082, 
0.16) 
Table 10.7 The geometric mean of TFN and the fuzzy weights of seven 
strategies under reduce reputation loss 
   A    B    C    D    E    F    G 
 ̃ 
   
(0.855, 
0.906, 
1.811) 
(0.662, 
0.906, 
1.575) 
(0.906, 
1.486, 
2.284) 
(0.96, 
1.426, 
1.87) 
(0.774, 
1.17, 
1.739) 
(0.575, 
0.944, 
1.369) 
(0.369, 
0.521, 
0.855) 
 ̃ 
   
(0.074, 
0.123, 
0.355) 
(0.058, 
0.123, 
0.309) 
(0.079, 
0.202, 
0.448) 
(0.083, 
0.194, 
0.367) 
(0.067, 
0.159, 
0.341) 
(0.05, 
0.128, 
0.268) 
(0.032, 
0.071, 
0.168) 
Table 10.8 The geometric mean of TFN and the fuzzy weights of seven 
strategies under reduce safety and security incident related loss 
   A    B    C    D    E    F    G 
 ̃ 
   
(1, 
1.219, 
2.246) 
(0.774, 
1, 1.739) 
(1.104, 
1.511, 
2.34) 
(0.96, 
1.346, 
1.931) 
(0.96, 
1.534, 
1.795) 
(0.414, 
0.0557, 
0.774) 
(0.343, 
0.472, 
0.731) 
 ̃ 
   
(0.087, 
0.16, 
0.404) 
(0.067, 
0.131, 
0.313) 
(0.096, 
0.198, 
0.421) 
(0.083, 
0.176, 
0.348) 
(0.083, 
0.201, 
0.323) 
(0.036, 
0.073, 
0.139) 
(0.03, 
0.062, 
0.132) 
 
  
328 
 
Step 3 Defuzzify the fuzzy weights and normalise the crisp weights 
Table 10.9 The defuzzified and standardized weights of three criteria 
 Financial loss Reputation loss Safety and security 
incident related loss 
Defuzzified 
weights 0.203 0.145 0.713 
Standardised  
weights 0.191 0.137 0.672 
Table 10.10 The defuzzified and standardized weights of seven strategies under 
reduce financial loss 
 A B C D E F G 
Defuzzified 
weights 0.179 0.093 0.109 0.249 0.28 0.122 0.087 
Standardised  
weights 0.16 0.083 0.097 0.223 0.251 0.109 0.078 
Table 10.11 The defuzzified and standardized weights of seven strategies under 
reduce reputation loss 
 A B C D E F G 
Defuzzified 
weights 0.154 0.143 0.222 0.204 0.174 0.139 0.08 
Standardised  
weights 0.138 0.128 0.199 0.183 0.156 0.124 0.072 
Table 10.12 The defuzzified and standardized weights of seven strategies under 
reduce safety and security incident related loss 
 A B C D E F G 
Defuzzified 
weights 0.188 0.151 0.218 0.189 0.202 0.078 0.068 
Standardised  
weights 0.172 0.138 0.199 0.173 0.184 0.071 0.062 
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Sample 11 
Step 1 Build fuzzy positive reciprocal matrix 
Table 11.1 The fuzzy positive reciprocal matrix of three criteria 
 Reduce financial 
loss 
Reduce 
reputation loss 
Reduce safety 
and security 
incident related 
loss 
Reduce financial loss (1, 1, 2) (1, 1, 2) (0.25, 0.333, 0.5) 
Reduce reputation 
loss 
(0.5, 1, 1) (1, 1, 2) (0.25, 0.333, 0.5) 
Reduce safety and 
security incident 
related loss 
(2, 3, 4) (2, 3, 4) (1, 1, 2) 
C.R. = 0.000 
Table 11.2 The fuzzy positive reciprocal matrix of seven strategies under reduce 
financial loss 
R
e
d
u
c
e
 f
in
a
n
c
ia
l 
lo
s
s
 
 A B C D E F G 
A (1, 1, 2) (1, 2, 3) (1, 2, 3) (1, 1, 2) 
(0.333, 
0.5, 1) 
(0.25, 
0.333, 
0.5) 
(1, 2, 3) 
B 
(0.333, 
0.5, 1) 
(1, 1, 2) (1, 2, 3) 
(0.25, 
0.333, 
0.5) 
(0.25, 
0.333, 
0.5) 
(0.25, 
0.333, 
0.5) 
(2, 3, 4) 
C 
(0.333, 
0.5, 1) 
(0.333, 
0.5, 1) 
(1, 1, 2) (1, 1, 2) 
(0.333, 
0.5, 1) 
(0.333, 
0.5, 1) 
(1, 2, 3) 
D (0.5, 1, 1) (2, 3, 4) (0.5, 1, 1) (1, 1, 2) (1, 2, 3) 
(0.333, 
0.5, 1) 
(1, 2, 3) 
E (1, 2, 3) (2, 3, 4) (1, 2, 3) 
(0.333, 
0.5, 1) 
(1, 1, 2) 
(0.333, 
0.5, 1) 
(1, 2, 3) 
F (2, 3, 4) (2, 3, 4) (1, 2, 3) (1, 2, 3) (1, 2, 3) (1, 1, 2) (1, 2, 3) 
G 
(0.333, 
0.5, 1) 
(0.25, 
0.333, 
0.5) 
(0.333, 
0.5, 1) 
(0.333, 
0.5, 1) 
(0.333, 
0.5, 1) 
(0.333, 
0.5, 1) 
(1, 1, 2) 
C.R.= 0.075 
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Table 11.3 The fuzzy positive reciprocal matrix of seven strategies under reduce 
reputation loss 
R
e
d
u
c
e
 r
e
p
u
ta
ti
o
n
 l
o
s
s
 
 A B C D E F G 
A (1, 1, 2) (1, 1, 2) (1, 1, 2) (1, 1, 2) 
(0.333, 
0.5, 1) 
(0.25, 
0.333, 
0.5) 
(1, 1, 2) 
B 
(0.5, 1, 
1) 
(1, 1, 2) (1, 2, 3) (1, 1, 2) (1, 1, 2) (1, 1, 2) (2, 3, 4) 
C 
(0.5, 1, 
1) 
(0.333, 
0.5, 1) 
(1, 1, 2) (1, 1, 2) (1, 1, 2) 
(0.333, 
0.5, 1) 
(1, 2, 3) 
D 
(0.5, 1, 
1) 
(0.5, 1, 
1) 
(0.5, 1, 
1) 
(1, 1, 2) (1, 1, 2) 
(0.333, 
0.5, 1) 
(1, 1, 2) 
E (1, 2, 3) 
(0.5, 1, 
1) 
(0.5, 1, 
1) 
(0.5, 1, 
1) 
(1, 1, 2) 
(0.333, 
0.5, 1) 
(1, 1, 2) 
F (2, 3, 4) 
(0.5, 1, 
1) 
(1, 2, 3) (1, 2, 3) (1, 2, 3) (1, 1, 2) (1, 2, 3) 
G 
(0.5, 1, 
1) 
(0.25, 
0.333, 
0.5) 
(0.333, 
0.5, 1) 
(0.5, 1, 
1) 
(0.5, 1, 
1) 
(0.333, 
0.5, 1) 
(1, 1, 2) 
C.R.= 0.031 
Table 11.4 The fuzzy positive reciprocal matrix of seven alternatives under 
reduce safety and security incident related loss 
R
e
d
u
c
e
 s
a
fe
ty
 a
n
d
 s
e
c
u
ri
ty
 i
n
c
id
e
n
t 
re
la
te
d
 l
o
s
s
 
 A B C D E F G 
A (1, 1, 2) (1, 1, 2) (1, 2, 3) (1, 1, 2) (1, 1, 2) 
(0.25, 
0.333, 
0.5) 
(1, 2, 3) 
B 
(0.5, 1, 
1) 
(1, 1, 2) (1, 2, 3) (1, 1, 2) (1, 1, 2) (1, 1, 2) (2, 3, 4) 
C 
(0.333, 
0.5, 1) 
(0.333, 
0.5, 1) 
(1, 1, 2) (1, 1, 2) (1, 1, 2) 
(0.333, 
0.5, 1) 
(1, 2, 3) 
D 
(0.5, 1, 
1) 
(0.5, 1, 
1) 
(0.5, 1, 
1) 
(1, 1, 2) (1, 1, 2) 
(0.333, 
0.5, 1) 
(1, 1, 2) 
E 
(0.5, 1, 
1) 
(0.5, 1, 
1) 
(0.5, 1, 
1) 
(0.5, 1, 
1) 
(1, 1, 2) 
(0.333, 
0.5, 1) 
(1, 1, 2) 
F (2, 3, 4) 
(0.5, 1, 
1) 
(1, 2, 3) (1, 2, 3) (1, 2, 3) (1, 1, 2) (1, 2, 3) 
G 
(0.333, 
0.5, 1) 
(0.25, 
0.333, 
0.5) 
(0.333, 
0.5, 1) 
(0.5, 1, 
1) 
(0.5, 1, 
1) 
(0.333, 
0.5, 1) 
(1, 1, 2) 
C.R.= 0.033 
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Step 2 Calculate the fuzzy weights of fuzzy positive reciprocal matrix 
Table 11.5 The geometric mean of TFN and the fuzzy weights of three criteria 
   Financial loss    Reputation loss    Safety and 
security incident 
related loss 
 ̃ 
  (0.63, 0.693, 1.26) (0.5, 0.693, 1) (1.578, 2.08, 3.175) 
 ̃ 
  (0.116, 0.2, 0.464) (0.092, 0.2, 0.368) (0.292, 0.6, 1.168) 
Table 11.6 The geometric mean of TFN and the fuzzy weights of seven 
strategies under reduce financial loss 
   A    B    C    D    E    F    G 
 ̃ 
   
(0.701, 
1.042, 
1.768) 
(0.521, 
0.731, 
1.17) 
(0.534, 
0.743, 
1.426) 
(0.774, 
1.292, 
1.842) 
(0.807, 
1.292, 
2.155) 
(1.219, 
2.034, 
3.074) 
(0.374, 
0.521, 1) 
 ̃ 
   
(0.056, 
0.136, 
0.359) 
(0.042, 
0.095, 
0.237) 
(0.043, 
0.097, 
0.289) 
(0.062, 
0.169, 
0.374) 
(0.065, 
0.169, 
0.437) 
(0.098, 
0.266, 
0.623) 
(0.03, 
0.068, 
0.203) 
Table 11.7 The geometric mean of TFN and the fuzzy weights of seven 
strategies under reduce reputation loss 
   A    B    C    D    E    F    G 
 ̃ 
   
(0.701, 
0.774, 
1.486) 
(1, 
1.292, 
2.119) 
(0.662, 
0.906, 
1.575) 
(0.635, 
0.906, 
1.346) 
(0.635, 
1, 1.426) 
(1, 
1.739, 
2.521) 
(0.445, 
0.701, 1) 
 ̃ 
   
(0.061, 
0.106, 
0.293) 
(0.087, 
0.177, 
0.417) 
(0.058, 
0.124, 
0.31) 
(0.055, 
0.124, 
0.265) 
(0.055, 
0.137, 
0.281) 
(0.087, 
0.238, 
0.497) 
(0.039, 
0.096, 
0.197) 
Table 11.8 The geometric mean of TFN and the fuzzy weights of seven 
strategies under reduce safety and security incident related loss 
   A    B    C    D    E    F    G 
 ̃ 
   
(0.82, 
1.042, 
1.842) 
(1, 
1.292, 
2.119) 
(0.624, 
0.82, 
1.575) 
(0.635, 
0.906, 
1.346) 
(0.575, 
0.906, 
1.219) 
(1, 
1.739, 
2.521) 
(0.42, 
0.635, 1) 
 ̃ 
   
(0.071, 
0.142, 
0.363) 
(0.086, 
0.176, 
0.418) 
(0.054, 
0.112, 
0.31) 
(0.055, 
0.123, 
0.265) 
(0.049, 
0.123, 
0.24) 
(0.086, 
0.237, 
0.497) 
(0.036, 
0.087, 
0.197) 
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Step 3 Defuzzify the fuzzy weights and normalise the crisp weights 
Table 11.9 The defuzzified and standardized weights of three criteria 
 Financial loss Reputation loss Safety and security 
incident related loss 
Defuzzified 
weights 0.23 0.21 0.643 
Standardised  
weights 0.212 0.194 0.594 
Table 11.10 The defuzzified and standardized weights of seven strategies under 
reduce financial loss 
 A B C D E F G 
Defuzzified 
weights 0.16 0.11 0.12 0.185 0.196 0.297 0.084 
Standardised  
weights 0.139 0.096 0.104 0.161 0.17 0.258 0.073 
Table 11.11 The defuzzified and standardized weights of seven strategies under 
reduce reputation loss 
 A B C D E F G 
Defuzzified 
weights 0.129 0.202 0.144 0.136 0.147 0.256 0.103 
Standardised  
weights 0.116 0.181 0.129 0.122 0.132 0.229 0.092 
Table 11.12 The defuzzified and standardized weights of seven strategies under 
reduce safety and security incident related loss 
 A B C D E F G 
Defuzzified 
weights 0.167 0.201 0.135 0.136 0.131 0.255 0.097 
Standardised  
weights 0.149 0.18 0.121 0.121 0.116 0.228 0.086 
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Sample 12 
Step 1 Build fuzzy positive reciprocal matrix 
Table 12.1 The fuzzy positive reciprocal matrix of three criteria 
 Reduce financial 
loss 
Reduce 
reputation loss 
Reduce safety 
and security 
incident related 
loss 
Reduce financial loss (1, 1, 2) (4, 5, 6) (0.25, 0.333, 0.5) 
Reduce reputation 
loss 
(0.167, 0.2, 0.25) (1, 1, 2) (0.143, 0.167, 0.2) 
Reduce safety and 
security incident 
related loss 
(2, 3, 4) (5, 6, 7) (1, 1, 2) 
C.R. = 0.081 
Table 12.2 The fuzzy positive reciprocal matrix of seven strategies under reduce 
financial loss 
R
e
d
u
c
e
 f
in
a
n
c
ia
l 
lo
s
s
 
 A B C D E F G 
A (1, 1, 2) (1, 1, 2) (2, 3, 4) (1, 2, 3) (1, 2, 3) 
(0.25, 
0.333, 
0.5) 
(2, 3, 4) 
B (0.5, 1, 1) (1, 1, 2) (1, 2, 3) (1, 2, 3) (1, 2, 3) 
(0.167, 
0.2, 0.25) 
(1, 2, 3) 
C 
(0.25, 
0.333, 
0.5) 
(0.333, 
0.5, 1) 
(1, 1, 2) (1, 1, 2) 
(0.333, 
0.5, 1) 
(0.167, 
0.2, 0.25) 
(1, 1, 2) 
D 
(0.333, 
0.5, 1) 
(0.333, 
0.5, 1) 
(0.5, 1, 1) (1, 1, 2) 
(0.333, 
0.5, 1) 
(0.25, 
0.333, 
0.5) 
(1, 2, 3) 
E 
(0.333, 
0.5, 1) 
(0.333, 
0.5, 1) 
(1, 2, 3) (1, 2, 3) (1, 1, 2) 
(0.2, 0.25, 
0.333) 
(2, 3, 4) 
F (2, 3, 4) (4, 5, 6) (4, 5, 6) (2, 3, 4) (3, 4, 5) (1, 1, 2) (2, 3, 4) 
G 
(0.25, 
0.333, 
0.5) 
(0.333, 
0.5, 1) 
(0.5, 1, 1) 
(0.333, 
0.5, 1) 
(0.25, 
0.333, 
0.5) 
(0.25, 
0.333, 
0.5) 
(1, 1, 2) 
C.R.= 0.042 
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Table 12.3 The fuzzy positive reciprocal matrix of seven strategies under reduce 
reputation loss 
R
e
d
u
c
e
 r
e
p
u
ta
ti
o
n
 l
o
s
s
 
 A B C D E F G 
A (1, 1, 2) 
(0.333, 
0.5, 1) 
(0.333, 
0.5, 1) 
(0.333, 
0.5, 1) 
(0.333, 
0.5, 1) 
(1, 2, 3) (1, 2, 3) 
B (1, 2, 3) (1, 1, 2) (1, 2, 3) 
(0.25, 
0.333, 
0.5) 
(0.25, 
0.333, 
0.5) 
(0.333, 
0.5, 1) 
(1, 2, 3) 
C (1, 2, 3) 
(0.333, 
0.5, 1) 
(1, 1, 2) 
(0.333, 
0.5, 1) 
(0.333, 
0.5, 1) 
(1, 2, 3) (1, 2, 3) 
D (1, 2, 3) (2, 3, 4) (1, 2, 3) (1, 1, 2) (1, 2, 3) (1, 2, 3) (2, 3, 4) 
E (1, 2, 3) (2, 3, 4) (1, 2, 3) 
(0.333, 
0.5, 1) 
(1, 1, 2) (2, 3, 4) (1, 2, 3) 
F 
(0.333, 
0.5, 1) 
(1, 2, 3) 
(0.333, 
0.5, 1) 
(0.333, 
0.5, 1) 
(0.25, 
0.333, 
0.5) 
(1, 1, 2) (4, 5, 6) 
G 
(0.333, 
0.5, 1) 
(0.333, 
0.5, 1) 
(0.333, 
0.5, 1) 
(0.25, 
0.333, 
0.5) 
(0.333, 
0.5, 1) 
(0.167, 
0.2, 
0.25) 
(1, 1, 2) 
C.R.= 0.093 
Table 12.4 The fuzzy positive reciprocal matrix of seven alternatives under 
reduce safety and security incident related loss 
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 A B C D E F G 
A (1, 1, 2) (1, 1, 2) (1, 1, 2) (1, 1, 2) (1, 1, 2) (1, 2, 3) (1, 2, 3) 
B 
(0.5, 1, 
1) 
(1, 1, 2) (1, 2, 3) (1, 1, 2) (1, 1, 2) (1, 2, 3) (1, 2, 3) 
C 
(0.5, 1, 
1) 
(0.333, 
0.5, 1) 
(1, 1, 2) (2, 3, 4) (2, 3, 4) (1, 2, 3) (1, 2, 3) 
D 
(0.5, 1, 
1) 
(0.5, 1, 
1) 
(0.25, 
0.333, 
0.5) 
(1, 1, 2) (1, 2, 3) (4, 5, 6) (2, 3, 4) 
E 
(0.5, 1, 
1) 
(0.5, 1, 
1) 
(0.25, 
0.333, 
0.5) 
(0.333, 
0.5, 1) 
(1, 1, 2) (1, 1, 2) (2, 3, 4) 
F 
(0.333, 
0.5, 1) 
(0.333, 
0.5, 1) 
(0.333, 
0.5, 1) 
(0.167, 
0.2, 
0.25) 
(0.5, 1, 
1) 
(1, 1, 2) (1, 1, 2) 
G 
(0.333, 
0.5, 1) 
(0.333, 
0.5, 1) 
(0.333, 
0.5, 1) 
(0.25, 
0.333, 
0.5) 
(0.25, 
0.333, 
0.5) 
(0.5, 1, 
1) 
(1, 1, 2) 
C.R.= 0.072 
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Step 2 Calculate the fuzzy weights of fuzzy positive reciprocal matrix 
Table 12.5 The geometric mean of TFN and the fuzzy weights of three criteria 
   Financial loss    Reputation loss    Safety and 
security incident 
related loss 
 ̃ 
  (1, 1.186, 1.817) (0.288, 0.322, 0.464) (2.154, 2.621, 3.826) 
 ̃ 
  (0.164, 0.287, 0.528) (0.047, 0.078, 0.135) (0.353, 0.635, 1.111) 
Table 12.6 The geometric mean of TFN and the fuzzy weights of seven 
strategies under reduce financial loss 
   A    B    C    D    E    F    G 
 ̃ 
   
(1, 
1.426, 
2.246) 
(0.701, 
1.181, 
1.697) 
(0.464, 
0.557, 1) 
(0.464, 
0.701, 
1.17) 
(0.641, 
0.96, 
1.575) 
(2.34, 
3.092, 
4.2) 
(0.365, 
0.512, 
0.82) 
 ̃ 
   
(0.079, 
0.169, 
0.376) 
(0.055, 
0.14, 
0.284) 
(0.037, 
0.066, 
0.167) 
(0.037, 
0.083, 
0.196) 
(0.05, 
0.114, 
0.264) 
(0.184, 
0.367, 
0.703) 
(0.029, 
0.061, 
0.137) 
Table 12.7 The geometric mean of TFN and the fuzzy weights of seven 
strategies under reduce reputation loss 
   A    B    C    D    E    F    G 
 ̃ 
   
(0.534, 
0.82, 
1.511) 
(0.575,  
0.891, 
1.45) 
(0.624, 
1, 1.768) 
(1.219, 
2.034, 
3.074) 
(1.042, 
1.669, 
2.627) 
(0.624, 
0.882, 
1.511) 
(0.339, 
0.457, 
0.82) 
 ̃ 
   
(0.042, 
0.106, 
0.305) 
(0.045, 
0.115, 
0.293) 
(0.049, 
0.129, 
0.357) 
(0.096, 
0.262, 
0.62) 
(0.082, 
0.215, 
0.53) 
(0.049, 
0.114, 
0.305) 
(0.027, 
0.059, 
0.165) 
Table 12.8 The geometric mean of TFN and the fuzzy weights of seven 
strategies under reduce safety and security incident related loss 
   A    B    C    D    E    F    G 
 ̃ 
   
(1, 
1.219, 
2.246) 
(0.906, 
1.346, 
2.155) 
(0.944, 
1.511, 
2.246) 
(0.906, 
1.389, 
1.842) 
(0.635, 
0.906, 
1.346) 
(0.438, 
0.59, 1) 
(0.381, 
0.543, 
0.906) 
 ̃ 
   
(0.085, 
0.162, 
0.431) 
(0.077, 
0.179, 
0.414) 
(0.08, 
0.201, 
0.431) 
(0.077, 
0.185, 
0.354) 
(0.054, 
0.121, 
0.258) 
(0.037, 
0.079, 
0.192) 
(0.032, 
0.072, 
0.174) 
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Step 3 Defuzzify the fuzzy weights and normalise the crisp weights 
Table 12.9 The defuzzified and standardized weights of three criteria 
 Financial loss Reputation loss Safety and security 
incident related loss 
Defuzzified 
weights 0.307 0.082 0.667 
Standardised  
weights 0.29 0.078 0.632 
Table 12.10 The defuzzified and standardized weights of seven strategies under 
reduce financial loss 
 A B C D E F G 
Defuzzified 
weights 0.189 0.15 0.078 0.094 0.128 0.392 0.068 
Standardised  
weights 0.171 0.136 0.071 0.086 0.117 0.357 0.062 
Table 12.11 The defuzzified and standardized weights of seven strategies under 
reduce reputation loss 
 A B C D E F G 
Defuzzified 
weights 0.128 0.133 0.154 0.294 0.245 0.135 0.071 
Standardised  
weights 0.111 0.114 0.132 0.253 0.211 0.116 0.061 
Table 12.12 The defuzzified and standardized weights of seven strategies under 
reduce safety and security incident related loss 
 A B C D E F G 
Defuzzified 
weights 0.194 0.201 0.22 0.195 0.133 0.091 0.083 
Standardised  
weights 0.174 0.18 0.197 0.175 0.119 0.081 0.074 
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